University of Wollongong

Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

2011

Organizations of corrupt individuals: a study of
corruption in international cricket and the Catholic
Church
Michael Gross
University of Wollongong

Recommended Citation
Gross, Michael, Organizations of corrupt individuals: a study of corruption in international cricket and the Catholic Church, Doctor
of Philosophy thesis, School of Management and Marketing, University of Wollongong, 2011. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3519

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the
University of Wollongong. For further information contact Manager
Repository Services: morgan@uow.edu.au.

ORGANIZATIONS OF CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS:
A STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRICKET AND THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

MICHAEL GROSS, MBA
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING
MARCH 2011

CERTIFICATION
I, Michael Gross, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Management and Marketing,
University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or
acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other
academic institution.

Michael Gross

13 March 2011

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I express my sincere thanks to Dr Karin Garrety and Associate Professor Andrew Sense
for their efforts, time and skills in supervising me throughout my PhD candidature. In
particular, I am deeply indebted to Karin for her patience in supporting me during a long
journey together.

In addition, I wish to thank former colleagues Professors Robert Jones, Richard Badham
and Warrick Funnell who assisted me with supervision at different stages. I also wish to
acknowledge the contributions of Dr Michael Zanko, Dr Peter McLean, Associate
Professor Rodney Clarke and other University of Wollongong colleagues who advised
and encouraged me during my candidature.

I especially thank my brother, Dr Paul Gross, for his interest and encouragement.

In addition, my thanks extend all the authors whose publications I read in preparation of
this thesis. My PhD thesis has been a journey rather than a project during which I have
learned along the way, from my reading of their works, more than I have expressed in
the thesis. I have passed to my students and colleagues some of what I have learned
from them.

Finally, I thank my family - my wife Sue, children Justin, Shari and Gia, and their
families - for allowing me time away from our life together while I pursued my dream.
It is my sincere hope that you feel some degree of accomplishment from your sacrifice.

ii

ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, the general public has been shocked by revelations of widespread
corruption and malfeasance in international cricket and the Catholic Church, two
institutions that had hitherto been respected and trusted. Even more shocking, we now
know that corruption had been happening in these institutions for decades, and that
senior administrators had for much of this time known about it. This thesis seeks to
understand how and why the corruption was allowed to develop and grow, despite being
known about by these administrators and other institutional stakeholders. Using an
interpretive, processual approach involving grounded theory methods, this textual study
was conducted on documents related to match-fixing in international cricket and child
sexual abuse by clergy in the U.S. Catholic Church during the late 20th century. The
thesis advances understanding of the phenomenon known as the ‘organization of corrupt
individuals’ (OCI) – where subordinate employees or members, rather than senior
managers or administrators, are the primary perpetrators of the corruption.

The thesis develops a theoretical model of the OCI phenomenon which suggests that a
set of antecedent conditions influence the behaviour of perpetrators and organizational
and institutional stakeholders over five stages of the phenomenon’s growth and decline.
When perpetrators identify and begin to exploit opportunities to act corruptly, the
response of stakeholders at each stage either enables or disables such corruption. The
OCI progresses through stages of emergence, uncertainty and cover up which, if it
eventually becomes unsustainable, results in a powerful intervention and scandal that
damages the affected institution before efforts are made by key stakeholders to control
the problem and restore its reputation. This model can be used by researchers and
managers to understand the complex dynamics which embolden perpetrators to act
corruptly and lead to organizational stakeholders, either unintentionally or intentionally,
facilitating their corrupt behaviour.

The thesis demonstrates the value of an interpretive, processual methodological
approach when exploring the dynamics of corruption development and the benefits of
integrating some important extant theories in the diverse fields of organizational
iii

corruption, deviance, ethical management and governance, man-made disasters and
secrecy and silence. Furthermore, it demonstrates the important role that stakeholders
play in enabling and disabling individual corruption in organizations.

A significant outcome of this thesis is that it demonstrates that ethical management
alone will not prevent OCI development in its early stages. To overcome this difficulty,
the thesis argues that ethical research should be extended to examining prevention and
mitigation strategies that governance bodies might use to identify and control potential
forms of corruption by individuals in their organizations and institutions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Problem of defining Corruption

‘Corruption’ is a widespread phenomenon that has long been present in society but, as
with many phenomena, can be open to different interpretations (DeMaria, 2009).
Scholars have struggled to formulate an enduring and universal definition of what
counts as ‘corruption’ (Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010a; Pinto et al, 2008; McKoy, 2010).
This difficulty in determining what behaviour is corrupt and what is not is not
surprising. Throughout history, people have engaged in actions that some have judged
to be a moral transgression or violation of social norms and therefore either deviant,
corrupt or criminal, while, at different times or places, those same actions have been
deemed to be normal, or even desirable.

Scholars have experienced difficulty in reaching a common understanding of
‘corruption’ for several reasons. One reason is that the notion of ‘corruption’ and its
variants has been studied across a number of disciplines, including psychology,
sociology, economics, law and political science, whose adherents have used a variety of
theoretical perspectives in their investigations (Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010a).

Some see ‘corruption’ as an objective reality encompassing various behaviours that are
unproblematically presented as unethical, antisocial, deviant and/or illegal, independent
of observer’s interpretations. Other academics have looked at the concept of
‘corruption’ as a socially constructed phenomenon used in regard to behaviours which
have been deemed by powerful individuals, or groups to violate their social norms.
Particular behaviours judged to be immoral, even criminal, in certain societies are likely
to be, or have been, regarded as acceptable, even desirable, at other places or times. For
example, off-court and off-field recreational drug use which the law may regard as
criminal has been ignored by some sporting bodies but punished by others where the
sport has been seen by the management to have been damaged economically (Kim &
Parlow, 2009). Similarly, sexual relations between men has long been condemned and
stigmatised in some societies but accepted and decriminalised in others, while such
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relations between men and boys, widely condemned now, was a traditional path to
adulthood in ancient Greek and Roman cultures (Fradella, 2002).

Another reason why the task of defining ‘corruption’ is complex is that it is manifested
in many different ways. Organizational corruption involving many individuals occurs at
an international level, in national governments and business communities, where it has
been found to have a detrimental economic impact (Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010b;
Transparency International, 2005). Studies into possible causes of and different
solutions to corporate level corruption conducted in the wake of concern and outrage
that followed numerous corporate scandals during the past ten years (Ashforth et al,
2003, 2008; Luo, 2005; Anand et al, 2004) have not resolved the problem. A more
recent challenge for defining, identifying and preventing corruption is that different
forms of deviant behaviour have recently engulfed significant governmental, religious
and sporting institutions.

This problematic issue of defining ‘corruption’ lies at the heart of this thesis. Two
international cases are featured in this study - a sporting institution continually plagued
by match-fixing by elite players, and a religious institution in which clergy engaged in
sexual behaviour with young people. In both situations, behaviours developed which
their interested ‘publics’ ultimately condemned as ‘corruption’. The organizational
stakeholders struggled over many years to understand what was happening and how the
alleged behaviour should be regarded and addressed. Some experienced the problem of
failing ‘to see’ or ‘to understand’ such behaviour at an early stage while others who
noticed the behaviours deployed alternative definitions which described it in more
benign terms as something other than ‘corruption’. Organization leaders tolerated the
behaviour when they deemed it was in their interest or part of their organizational role
to do so, managing it in a way that endeavoured to protect the reputation of those
involved and their institution. In this task, they were often supported by outside
institutions.

The understanding of ‘corruption’ which I adopt in this thesis accords with the approach
that it is a socially constructed phenomenon - a term which people in a particular culture
apply to situations in which they believe that one or more individuals, often in positions
of trust, have violated particular social norms, mores, rules or expectations of
2

appropriate behaviour which apply to members of their organization or society for
financial or other personal gain, thereby distinguishing the ‘corrupt’ behaviour from
other forms of deviant behaviour.

My study of corruption in these organizations is aligned with theoretical perspectives
that seek to understand how and why particular behaviours come to be labelled as
‘corrupt’ over time. There will be further discussion of the theoretical perspectives that
have informed my work in Chapter 2, which provides an overview of the literature that
is relevant to this thesis.

1.2

The Purpose and Original Contribution of this Study

As indicated above, this study examines recent large scale examples of ‘organizational
corruption’ in two international institutions - international cricket and the Catholic
Church. My decision to study these two cases, the result of a process that I detail in
section 1.5, was initially a personal one but later a scholarly choice. My investigations
of each case commenced in the wake of a major scandal that revealed not only the
extent of ‘corrupt’ behaviour that had been committed by numerous people over many
years but the widespread perception that a breach of trust had been perpetrated by
managers of those institutions who failed to act after they became aware of the problem.
My interest firmed between 2000 and 2002 when I discerned common patterns of
behaviour among stakeholders of the affected institutions as they encountered and
struggled to understand and manage the corruption that was occurring.

It was somewhat fortuitous that a renewed academic interest in ‘organizational
corruption’ occurred during my study. In 2003, concern with the upward trend in
‘organizational corruption’ led to a call by Ashforth and colleagues for increased
management research into this problem (Ashforth et al, 2003). In response to this call,
Pinto and colleagues made an interesting contribution in 2008 by distinguishing
between two forms of organizational corruption - a corrupt organization (CO) and an
organization of corrupt individuals (OCI) (Pinto et al, 2008). Considerable academic
research had been conducted since the turn of the century on the CO, a phenomenon in
3

which ‘a group of organizational members – typically, the dominant coalition,
organizational elites, or top management team – undertake, directly or through
subordinates, collective or coordinated corrupt actions that primarily benefit the
organization’ (Pinto et al, 2008: 689). Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and HIH are
well known examples. However, little attention had been paid to understanding the OCI,
a phenomenon in which individuals at lower organization levels than management
engage in corrupt actions and where ‘one or more meso-level processes facilitate
contagion (and sometimes initiation as well) of personally corrupt behaviours that cross
a critical threshold such that the organization can be characterised as corrupt’ (Pinto et
al, 2008: 688). I was well advanced in determining the similarities between my two
cases when, in 2008, I realised that they represented major examples of this latter
phenomenon.

This thesis makes a further significant contribution to knowledge about organizational
corruption. Its primary objective is to investigate how and why organizational corruption
develops. A specific outcome of the study is a substantive theory on how and why the
organization of corrupt individuals (OCI) phenomenon develops despite organizational
stakeholders, who are not acting corruptly, becoming aware of behaviour taking place
which is later labelled as ‘corrupt’, and sometimes even ‘criminal’ where a law is
broken. In doing so, it responds to some of the issues and questions Ashforth et al
(2003) posed when they called for more academic work on corruption in organizations,
including contritributions from a constructivist perspective, that explored how a better
understanding of conceptual and definitional issues, corruption processes and dynamics,
and perception and labelling of corruption might contribute to its detection, prevention
and management.

To facilitate my exploration into organizational corruption, I conducted a textual study
of match-fixing in international cricket between 1975 and 2000, and the sexual abuse of
minors by clergy in the U.S. Catholic Church between 1940 and 2002. These cases were
selected for several reasons. Firstly, an initial review of the cases following my own
experience with corruption in the church which I detail in section 1.4, suggested that
they exhibited different forms of corruption from that observed in the well-documented
corporate scandals of the time - notably that the perpetrators were not organizational
leaders but lower level organizational elites. Secondly, the two institutions exert
4

considerable influence on the lives of millions of people who belong to and/or trust in
them. This trust was shattered when the media scandals revealed the scale of
reprehensible conduct which had been perpetrated by the deviant elites and which had
been condoned by their leaders over many years and warranted, in my view, a study into
how and why this occurred. Finally, it became apparent to me that other organizational
stakeholders had been aware of incidents of corrupt behavior but, consistent with my
own experience, had not spoken out about what they knew prior to a major scandal
occurring. Given the congruence of influence and size of these institutions and scale of
the corruption that occurred, it seemed to me that an interpretive study of these two
cases over many decades had the potential to facilitate a rich expose of factors that
contribute to organizational corruption.

My analysis has enabled me to develop a meso-level substantive theory that provides a
more in-depth understanding of organizational corruption than has been hitherto
available. The thesis begins to develop a deep view of organizational corruption,
through an approach which is integrative, interactionist and processual (Ashforth et al,
2008). It is integrative in that it draws on and synthesizes academic research from the
fields of organizational corruption, deviance, ethical management and corporate
governance, secrecy and silence and man-made disasters. It adds to our understanding
of organizational corruption and endeavours to explain some contradictions about
corruption – for example, why many people who encounter corrupt behaviour by
observing it or hearing about it fail to speak up or act effectively in order to prevent it. It
is interactionist in that it focuses on the way in which human interactions and situations
coalesce in the development of organizational corruption. It is processual in that it
focuses on the long term trajectory of corruption and how, over time, individual and
collective perceptions and actions enable or disable its development.

For the purpose of this study, my working definition of ‘corruption,’ outlined in Section
1.1 of this chapter, is consistent with my interactionist approach to the concept that
‘who’ or ‘what’ is corrupt (or deviant) is an outcome of learning and social negotiation
(Charon, 2007). ‘Corrupt’ is a label which individuals affix to a particular form of
behaviour and to the people who perpetrate it after interactions with self and others in
making sense of the behaviour and determining what, if anything, they should do about
it. Furthermore it is a term which people apply to those who enable it to happen when
5

they have the responsibility as managers or leaders of their organizations to prevent it.
Between the genesis of a corrupt idea and its widespread development, its identification
and labelling by social communities who are affected may be slow due to two sets of
factors. Firstly, the context in which the corrupt behaviour takes place may prevent
potential observers from noticing the behaviour, and /or frustrate or distort their
attempts to make sense of it. Secondly, the state of corruption in that organization or
community may emerge slowly over time, its gradual development also inhibiting
sensemaking. My study addresses both these factors.

First, building on the work of organizational corruption researchers such as Gorta
(1998), Lange (2008) and particularly Pinto et al (2008), the thesis identifies, codifies
and establishes relationships between four types of contextual factors evident in
documents examined on the two cases that arguably provide opportunities for and
facilitate the occurrence and perpetuation of organizational corruption of the OCI
variety.

Next, the thesis conceptualizes the OCI as a phenomenon that develops in stages, the
understanding of which is of value in the following ways. It enables weaknesses in
extant ethical management and corporate governance literature on the control of
corruption to be made apparent. Using an interpretive approach that draws on theories
of noticing (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) and sense-making (Weick, 1995a), and on
man-made disaster research (Beamish, 2000, 2002; Vaughan, 1996), this study explains
the cognitive problems that actors face in noticing and making sense of the corruption in
its formative stages. While attention has been paid to the incubation period of manmade disasters, the early stages of corruption development have escaped such scrutiny
by researchers on corruption, ethics and governance. The study highlights the role that
managers unintentionally or intentionally play in perpetuating organizational corruption
by restricting information about the emerging problem that leads to the uncertainty and
ambiguity that various actors experience when they notice deviant behaviour that could
be labelled corrupt. Managerial ambivalence (Bauman, 1991) sees managers categorize
the behaviour occurring as ‘other than corruption’. Their insistence on this
categorization of the noticed behaviour prevents other organizational stakeholders from
labelling the questionable activities and the perpetrators as ‘deviant’ (Becker, 1963). It
also shows why the development of an OCI remains largely hidden from the public.
6

Managers who are more concerned about guarding the image and reputation of their
organizations than ending the corruption are inclined to ‘escalate their commitment’
(Staw, 1981, 2005) to organizational policies and practices that, while demonstrably
failing to prevent the corruption, meet their objective of preventing scandal. They will
engage in ‘organizational hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 2002) when their decisions and actions
contradict the personal and organizational values they espouse. Using ‘organizational
defensive routines’ (Argyris, 1990, 2005), they will restrict the flow of information
about the corruption in their organization to the public by reinforcing a culture of
secrecy and silence in their organizations. In doing so, they protect the elite perpetrators
and cover-up evidence of their corruption, enabling its further development.

Finally, the study explains the effect that a media scandal can have on the sense-making
of various audiences. While not all do, some media scandals lead to the public
perception that a ‘social problem’ exists (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) that requires
remedial action. In these cases, when public concern rises and a ‘moral panic’ (Goode &
Ben-Yehuda, 1994) ensues that dramatises the situation, external intervention by a
government authority that enhances public sense-making usually results in the deviant
behaviour being labelled as corrupt or even criminal (Becker, 1963) by observers.

1.3

The Wider Significance of this Study

This study is important because the two institutional cases it analyses are not the only
examples of the OCI phenomenon that have been revealed in the past decade. Such
deviance has been uncovered in sporting organizations, where match-fixing and
performance-enhancing drug use by individuals has been found in soccer, baseball and
cycling, as well as cricket (Asinof, 1963; Fleitz, 2001; Carney, 2006; Voet, 2001,
Whittle, 2008); in organizations in which child sexual abuse by clergy has been
revealed, for example, in many U.S. Catholic dioceses and Catholic organizations in
other countries such as Canada, Ireland and Australia (Podles, 2008; Yallop, 2010); and
in local government organizations where individuals have sought and obtained illicit
payments for planning approvals, for example, at Wollongong City Council in Australia
as reported by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption in
7

2008 (East, 2009). OCI development has damaging consequences for the individuals,
organizations and institutions involved, and for wider society. Victims can be
psychologically damaged, and perpetrators ensnared in corrupt activities can lose their
reputations, livelihoods and freedom. In extreme cases, both victims and perpetrators
can lose their lives. Organizations and the wider institutions of which they are part can
suffer economically from their loss of reputation, and societies can lose trust in the
institutions on which they often rely for their wellbeing. This has been the case in the
Catholic Church since 2002 (Lawler, 2008). If the development of the OCI phenomenon
can be prevented, these negative consequences can be minimised.

Hence, this study is particularly significant for managers and stakeholders in
organizations in pointing out the circumstances in which OCI development may emerge
and in suggesting ways of minimising its perpetuation.

1.4

Theoretical Perspective and Research Strategy

Research concerns and questions shape the research design needed to address them
(Crotty, 1998). The researcher needs to align the epistemological position taken with the
theoretical perspective or philosophical stance that supports the methodology or strategy
adopted and methods used to conduct the study.

The central outcome of this study is to explain how and why the organization of corrupt
individuals (OCI) phenomenon developed in two institutions. In this endeavour, as
indicated earlier, I develop a deep view of corruption in organizations that throws light
on the OCI phenomenon from a management perspective. In gaining an understanding
of how and why individual corruption escalates, I interpret the sense that actors in the
situation made of the developing corruption over time and how that sense shaped their
response to the corrupt behaviour. To gain this understanding, I focus ‘on the social
context in which the interacting individuals employ a variety of practices to create and
sustain particular definitions of their worlds’ (Burrell & Morgan, 1979: 271).

8

The interpretive theoretical perspective of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969;
Charon, 2007) which I take is ‘an approach designed to yield verifiable knowledge of
the human group life and human conduct’ (Blumer, 1969: 21). This perspective is
informed by the epistemology of ‘pragmatism’, the view that our knowledge, and
therefore meaningful reality for each of us, is constructed in and through our
interactions with others, and is developed and transmitted within a social context
(Crotty, 1998). This theoretical perspective enabled me to become familiar with the
social worlds of the actors in each case through the many texts available in order to
understand how they interacted, historically and during the corruption period, in relation
to objects and events that they noticed, interpreted and assessed.

In undertaking this study, I have not been able to personally access the social worlds of
the actors in cricket and the U.S. Catholic Church to obtain data on the phenomenon in
question. However, this limitation has been recognized at the outset and appropriately
addressed by undertaking a study using documents. The data sources accessed are
publicly available documents comprising media stories and interview transcripts,
transcripts of legal and quasi-legal inquiries, reports of government and institutional
investigations, and both historic and biographical texts by authors and academics who
have written about the specific cases or the actors, organizations and institutions
involved. As an interpretive study without direct access to the actors, it has been
necessary for me to interpret their behaviour from the textual information recorded in
these multifarious documents. While much of the data obtained has been from primary
sources (for example, interview and investigatory or inquiry transcripts containing the
words of the actors), other data obtained is from secondary sources which requires me
to interpret the behaviour of the actors from the text of the authors of these documents
(Crotty, 1998; Schwandt, 1994). The scope and robustness of the data is considerable
given the numerous authors, types of documents and different times when they were
written (Prior, 2003). I have been aware of the need to differentiate opinions from facts,
to be aware of the twisting or selection of facts and of bias in the presentation of
information, and to assess the intent of the writer in each document examined
(Finnegan, 1996). When data are ‘unstructured’, that is, not coded as ‘structured’ data
arising from interviewing actors might be, the plausibility and credibility of
interpretations of such data can be examined closely by readers, perhaps more so than if
transcripts of ‘structured’ data based on conversations with actors in each case are being
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interpreted (Boulton & Hammersley, 1998). However, because significant data are
contained in transcripts of official inquiries where key actors were questioned, so can be
termed primary sources, and other data in many accounts of the same events can be
cross checked, some limitations of my methodology can be circumvented.

The

interpretive perspective I adopt in examining the data is primarily ‘symbolic
interactionist’, where I endeavour imaginatively to enter the worlds of the actors to see
the situations from their point of view in order to determine what they took into account
and their interpretation of each situation they encountered.

In order to conceptualize what had happened in each case, data are examined using
qualitative methods typically used in grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), an
approach ‘spawned’ from symbolic interactionism (Crotty, 1998). Grounded theory has
often been acknowledged as a pragmatic method for research in management and
organizational studies (Creswell, 1994, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Goulding, 2002; Locke,
2001; Remenyi et al, 1998).

This research is also influenced by two other compatible perspectives. Following the
advice of Pettigrew (1997), a processual perspective is integrated into the study since, as
noted earlier, the corruption in both cases developed over several decades and the
explanation of what happened, and how and why it happened, is to be discovered by
examining the context and processes involved in the affected organizations and
institutions. This perspective is consistent with symbolic interactionism in which time
is implied in studying interpretations (Blumer, 1969), and enables the changing
interpretations of the actors in the situations that occurred over many years to be better
understood. In addition, certain case study techniques recommended by Yin (2003)
prove helpful, namely the delineation of the boundaries of the study by use of time
frames, and preparation of chronologies of incidents and events described in the data
that assist my understanding of the progressive sense-making of the actors in each case.
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1.5

A Brief Overview of the Two Cases

The Choice of the Cases
The choice of these two cases was a decision I made in 2002 in the course of my messy
research journey. Donnelly and colleagues (Donnelly et al, 2011) argue the importance
of describing the chaos of research stories as a means of explaining the reality of the
research craft.

My research story began in 1993 in Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. Two
prominent scandals broke over allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated on several young
people by a prominent member of the Catholic clergy and a school principal who was a
member of a religious order. The scandals came as a shock to me and to other members
of the Catholic community since both the alleged perpetrators and their victims were
known to us. After being charged by police, in the following months the priest served a
jail sentence, but the principal committed suicide before the matter reached the court. A
few months later, during The Wood Royal Commission into Police Corruption and
Pedophilia in NSW, the local Bishop admitted having being aware of earlier allegations
against his priest (Wood, 1995) as had the leaders of the religious order about their
school principal when he was teaching in another locality years before. These church
leaders had remained silent about what they knew until the scandals broke and external
inquiries were held. So too had some parents who, in the wake of these scandals,
indicated that they been aware of rumours emanating from the young people concerning
both men. Reflecting on this secrecy and silence among church stakeholders, I recalled
my own silence concerning the alleged behaviour of another priest prior to him being
charged and jailed for embezzling church funds.

As an academic at the University of Wollongong in search of a research topic in 1999, I
sought the cooperation of the new Bishop in exploring the local corruption in a PhD
thesis, but was unsuccessful. I did not receive an official explanation for the refusal of
Church authorities but understood from private conversations that Church leaders would
have been concerned about possible civil claims and damage to the identity and image
of the Church (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991) that might eventuate from release of details
of their handling of the abuse problem.
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Shortly afterwards, in 2000, the problem of match-fixing in cricket also became of
interest to me after reading Pradeep Magazine’s book Not Quite Cricket (Magazine,
2000). First printed in 1999, Magazine’s new edition of his book began with his account
of a scandal in April 2000 over alleged match-fixing by South African cricket captain
Hansie Cronje. Magazine showed that the alleged behaviour of Cronje was consistent
with evidence he had uncovered about the prevalence of match-fixing during his
journalistic career between 1997 and 1999 after the Indian magazine published two
stories: the first based on investigative efforts by two journalists into match-fixing
rumours and allegations in Indian cricket in 1997, the second of allegations by a former
cricketer of approaches he had received and rejected in 1994 from a former Indian
cricket captain. My interest was aroused by some similarities with my experience
regarding the sexual abuse scandal in Wollongong – the perpetration of corrupt
behaviour by elite members of an organization, an apparent cover-up by senior officials,
the emergence of the corruption as signs noticed by organizational stakeholders, the
concerns expressed about the need for secrecy and silence by those stakeholders, and
the apathy or antagonism experienced by those investigating public allegations which
was suggestive of a cover-up by those officials. Because of these similarities, I initially
decided to research the cricket match-fixing scandal.

While doing so, I read the story which the Boston Globe published in January 2002
about a cover-up by the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston of sexual abuse of children by
its clergy. In contrast to the smaller scale sexual abuse scandals I had experienced, the
Archdiocese of Boston scandal rivalled the match-fixing in cricket in the extent of
corruption and cover-up it revealed. I subsequently read Anson Shupe’s Wolves within
the Fold (Shupe, 1998) which indicated to me that the Boston scandal was a watershed
event in a larger sex abuse scandal that had begun much earlier but was beginning to
envelope the Catholic Church both in the U.S. and internationally. Perceiving some
similarities between the cases, and having a personal desire to further empirically
support the development of my theory I therefore also decided to study this church case
alongside of the cricket case.
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Categorizing these Cases as Examples of OCI
Having undertaken considerable analysis of the two cases before 2008 as examples of
organizational corruption, only then was I able to clarify in my mind what distinguished
them from the spate of corporate corruption cases which had occurred around 2000. In
contrast to cases such as Enron (McLean & Elkind 2003) and WorldCom (Jeter, 2003)
which Pinto and colleagues categorized as examples of corrupt organizations (COs), I
concluded that my two cases were examples of what they termed organizations of
corrupt individuals (OCIs) (Pinto et al, 2008).

In corporations like Enron and WorldCom, the main perpetrators were the leaders of the
organizations who initiated the corrupt ideas. In cricket and the Catholic Church, the
main perpetrators were cricketers and clergy at a lower level in their organizations than
its principal leaders. In my OCI cases, the corruption spread from the periphery to the
core of the organizations, not from the core to the periphery as happened in the CO
cases. Whereas a CO develops when groups perpetrate corruption for their
organization’s short term gain, intentionally violating its espoused values and
benefitting themselves in the process, the OCIs in my cases developed as a result of
individuals perpetrating their corrupt activities, either alone or in groups, solely for their
personal benefit. In my cases, as Pinto et al (2008) also noted, the time taken for the
OCI to manifest itself to stakeholders was gradual, relatively slow; not fast like a CO.

There is another feature of my two cases that required examination – the role that
organizational leaders played in facilitating the development of an OCI. Organizational
corruption which becomes endemic among its members may be the result of facilitation
by its leaders. In the case of a CO, leaders directly spread the corruption; in the case of
an OCI, leaders facilitate the corruption by failing to prevent it, and failing to reprimand
or remove perpetrators from the organization. Their conduct ‘may allow, encourage or
cause the occurrence of corrupt conduct’ (Independent Commission Against Corruption
2008:79). While they contribute to organizational corruption in both cases, in the CO
they perpetrate it but in the OCI they enable it. In the former (CO), they instigate the
corruption and are aware of it from the outset; in the latter (OCI), they may initially be
unaware of the problem in its early stages. When they do become aware, influenced by
the institutional and organizational cultural norms they have developed and sustained,
they may be slow to realise that the corruption is more than the occasional aberrant
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behaviour of a few individuals, a perception reinforced by other stakeholders who either
fail to notice the questionable behaviour, or may notice the behaviour but fail to label it
as corrupt. Where secrecy and silence is a cultural expectation, they may fail to discuss
it even when they understand that such behaviour would be wrong.

In this thesis, I therefore define an OCI as a phenomenon that develops when corrupt
behaviour for personal benefit is initiated by members positioned toward the bottom or
the periphery of an organization, and which spreads to such an extent, unintentionally or
intentionally enabled by management, that a threshold of acceptability is crossed in the
perception of a significant group of stakeholders which comes to public attention. In
contrast, I define a CO as a phenomenon that develops when corrupt behaviour, initiated
by members at the top or core of the organization and carried out by a large number of
members for the benefit of their organization and themselves, spreads to such an extent
that a threshold of acceptability is crossed in the perception of a significant group of
stakeholders when the scale of the problem is publicly revealed.

Corruption is seen by the public as both its perpetration and its cover up. It is a violation
of norms and expectations of the society by the perpetrators and a breach of trust by
those persons legally responsible for the organization who have knowledge of the
violation but fail to do anything effective to prevent or moderate it. Corruption can be
perpetrated by those at its core and spread to those at its periphery, or can be perpetrated
by those at its periphery and be tolerated by those at its core. Many people also see a
cover up as ‘corruption’.

The Cricket Case
Between 1975 and 2000, international cricket was infiltrated by a small number of
individual punters and bookmakers who corrupted the captains of three international
teams by enticing them to manipulate the results of international cricket games their
teams were playing (CBI, 2000).

Despite occasional stories in the media of alleged corruption of cricket during this
period, the problem only resonated with the public in April 2000 after Delhi Police
revealed evidence they had obtained of South African cricket Captain Hansie Cronje
entering into match-fixing arrangements with a bookmaker and his associates. The
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United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCBSA) and the South African Ministry of
Sport initially defended their hero, and even the Secretary of the Board of Control for
Cricket in India claimed that the allegations against Cronje were ‘false and rubbish’
(Magazine, 2000: xviii). However, when Cronje confessed his involvement four days
later, and international media recorded the shock, anger and pain felt in the South
African nation and throughout the cricketing world, the South African government
decided to hold its own inquiry into match-fixing by its cricket players. Cronje was
widely regarded by the South African cricketing public, and internationally, as a
sporting hero, icon and legend of the game. High expectations by the cricketing public
and nation’s leaders associated with his role and status had been dashed, and as he fell
from his pedestal, the foundations of the institution of cricket were shaken. As the
media statement from the Delhi Police on 7th April 2000 noted, the public watched
cricket matches at the international level under the belief that they are played fairly and
honestly, and that there are no dishonest dealings, but some people had conspired to
alter the normal course of matches, thereby deceiving the public (Magazine, 2000).

In the months that followed, testimony and evidence presented at government and
national cricket board inquiries revealed that other national cricket captains, players and
some officials had also been involved in this form of corruption. So widespread was the
corruption that leading players such as Australian Captain Steve Waugh openly feared
that this period in which they had played would come to be known as ‘the match-fixing
era’ (Jackson, 2000).

This match-fixing scandal came to be regarded as the biggest crisis cricket had faced in
its 250 year history (Ramchand, 2000). Match-fixing had been commonly understood to
mean the pre-match fixing of the result of a contest between two opponents, either
individuals or teams, where the weaker opponent wins as a result of the intentional
underperformance of the stronger. In sport, match-fixing is usually engaged in for
money, where bets are placed on the weaker team winning, but is sometimes engaged in
to achieve a team result that improves its future prospects in the current or future
competition. As such, match-fixing in sport is regarded as a form of corruption. As this
case shows, however, more nuanced forms of match-fixing that developed, which
involved underperformance without losing the contest, again associated with betting,
presented cricket stakeholders with a set of challenges they had not previously
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encountered. Two such forms of match-fixing have subsequently come to be known as
‘spot-fixing’ (Wilkinson, 2010) and ‘bracket-fixing’ (Pierik, 2011). Despite matchfixing having been a problem for cricket in the past (Underdown, 2000), the major
scandal that erupted on 7th April 2000 only occurred after more than two decades of
corrupt behaviour,

despite the fact that earlier indications of the presence of the

corruption came in the form of rumours, media reports, allegations and occasional
cricket board inquiries. How did cricket’s governing bodies allow this to happen? The
government inquiries were not specifically tasked to determine the answer to this
question. However, international cricket’s governing body, the International Cricket
Council (ICC), did attempt to address its own role in the scandal.

The Cronje scandal became a watershed event in the handling of the match-fixing
corruption in cricket after Cronje’s confession implicated the Indian cricket captain
Mohammad Azharuddin and the Pakistan captain Salim Malik. The South African
government initiated a judicial commission under Justice Edwin King (King, 2000a,
2000b, 2001) on 8th May 2000 to investigate match-fixing corruption in the South
African team. That announcement was preceded by an order on 2nd May from the Indian
Ministry of Sport for a Preliminary Enquiry to be undertaken by their Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) (CBI, 2000). These decisions took the investigation of match-fixing
in those countries out of the hands of cricket authorities.

Pre-empting these government interventions, the ICC became more resolute in their
efforts to address the corruption they had known about, but had covered up, during the
1990s. It established an Anti-Corruption Unit under Sir Paul Condon, a former London
Police Chief, to investigate cricket corruption internationally. In the following months,
the Pakistan Government released its 1999 Inquiry report by Justice M.M. Qayyum
(Qayyum, 1999) which it had held from the public, the Board of Control for Cricket in
India (BCCI) released its 1997 inquiry report which had exonerated Indian players from
involvement in corruption (Chandrachud, 1997), and the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB)
released its 1995 report (Ebrahim, 1995) which had also exonerated its captain, Salim
Malik, from involvement in match-fixing. With a report into match-fixing in 1994-5
involving Australian players that the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) had made public
in January 1999 (O’Regan, 1999), the interested public were able to conclude that
widespread corruption existed in the international game and that much of the behaviour
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certain players engaged in in collaboration with bookmakers and punters, which had
been tolerated by cricket officials, was deviant and unacceptable.

While the initial media scandal in April 2000 focused primarily on Cronje and other
South African cricketers, throughout 2000-2001 the public and cricket fans were
reminded of the pervasiveness of the corruption in cricket by media coverage of the
investigations taking place and of earlier incidents from the 1970s and 1980s (Polack &
Pettet, 2000). In its early stages, the presence of the corruption had been largely
unnoticed; in its latter stages, it had been covered up by cricket officials. This
understanding that corruption had been occurring since the late 1970s was reinforced in
the report to the ICC by its Anti-Corruption Unit chief, Sir Paul Condon (Condon,
2001). As the game changed from a sport to a form of commercial media entertainment,
during the growth in cricket in the period 1980-2000 when the ‘one day international’
(ODI) became the dominant form of the game, incidents of corruption had increased.
There were many factors that he believed had contributed to the corruption and its
perpetuation during that 20 year period, about which I will say more in the discussion of
my analysis of this case in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Church Case
In the United States in January 2002, a second case of interest came to light when the
Boston Globe broke the story that the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston (AOB) had
protected priests who perpetrated sexual abuse of children over many decades. The
story dominated the Globe headlines during that month and triggered a major scandal
for the Catholic Church during its ‘Long Lent of 2002’ (Neuhaus, 2004). This revelation
of a ‘holy water-gate’ (Healey, 2004) in the AOB shocked church members and the
broader society.

The Boston scandal was not the first that had occurred in relation to clergy sexual abuse
in the Catholic Church; scandals in Louisiana in 1984 and Boston in 1992 had preceded
it. Furthermore, child sexual abuse (CSA) by clergy had been the subject of academic
accounts (Berry, 2000; Shupe, 1995, 1998; Sipe, 1995; Parkinson, 1997; Krebs, 1998),
but these scandals and publications had not awakened much public interest. The Boston
Globe revelations were different. Supported by evidence in church documents released
to plaintiffs’ lawyers by the U.S. Supreme Court, the detailed accounts of the nature and
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scope of the sexual abuse by clergy and its mishandling by church authorities in Boston
in 2002 contributed to a greater understanding by the public of this corruption in the
church (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; Cozzens, 2002; Berry and Renner,
2004: France, 2004). This understanding by the public from the Boston Globe Spotlight
Investigation resulted in a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1972) and a public perception that
clergy sexual abuse constituted a ‘social problem’ (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) that
threatened the values and norms of society.

The Boston Globe stories and the resultant public concern led the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Office of the Attorney-General to conduct an official inquiry. After an 18
month investigation, Attorney-General Thomas F. Reilly reported in July 2003 on what
he described as ‘a tragedy of unimaginable dimensions’, where over six decades under
the administrations of three successive Archbishops in Boston, 789 child victims had
been sexually abused by 250 members of the Boston clergy. Furthermore, he found that
Boston church authorities, accountable only to themselves, protected the reputation of
their priests and their institution rather than the safety and well-being of children
(Reilly, 2003).

A National Review Board (NRB), established by the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops (USCCB) in 2002 at the height of the scandal, conducted an internal
investigation of sexual abuse allegations made to U.S. Catholic Church authorities
during the period 1940-2002. Conducted by a John Jay College research team, this
research study found that credible allegations had been received that 4392 priests, who
comprised four percent of priests in the U.S. ministry, had committed acts of sexual
abuse against 10667 minors (Burke, 2004). The NRB concluded that the response of
AOB and other diocesan leaders to sexual abuse by clergy was characterized by moral
laxity and excessive leniency towards the offending priests, many of whom were known
serial abusers. Many cardinals and bishops had ‘coddled’ their priests and, when
scandal about their actions threatened, had transferred them to other parishes where
their previous violations were unknown. In placing the welfare of their abusive priests
over the welfare of the children, church leaders had breached the trust of the majority of
church members - clergy, religious and the laity - who had not participated in the
corruption, and who had expected that, as ‘shepherds of the flock’, they would act with
integrity in carrying out their governance role (Burke, 2004).
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These initial investigations did not throw much light on the handling of early cases of
CSA by clergy prior to the 1980s, but subsequent research did so. I will show in
Chapters 6 and 7 that the church’s handling of clergy offenders was tacitly accepted in
the U.S. by legal and medical institutions until the 1970s, after which a disjunction
between the policy and practices of the church and state gradually occurred as the
community became increasingly aware of the problem of CSA in society.

1.6

Thesis Structure

This thesis is presented in eight chapters, including this introduction.

In Chapter 2, I present an overview of three fields of literature that provide a conceptual
framework for the study. Firstly, I review selected literature on possible causes of
organizational corruption together with the related literature on the governance of and
ethics in organizations focussed on controlling such corruption. Secondly, I discuss the
contribution of some leading theorists on man-made disasters which do not appear to
have been previously considered by corruption theorists until this study. Finally, I
address literature on the problem of pervasive twin problems of secrecy and silence in
organizations.

In Chapter 3, I outline the methodology and research methods which I use to conduct
this qualitative study. After positioning the methodology within the symbolic
interactionist tradition, I discuss the grounded theory methods of data collection and
analysis used in this study. The methodology I adopt and methods I apply to the
contemporary and historic textual material obtained during analysis of the two cases
enable me to develop an integrated explanation of the behaviour of the actors who
encountered corruption but, over long periods, were unsuccessful in preventing its
development.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I explain the development of the OCI phenomenon that occurred in
international cricket teams during the match-fixing period between 1975 and 2000. In
19

Chapter 4, I describe the context of cricket during the match-fixing period and discuss
historical and contemporary environmental factors that shaped the social world of
cricket prior to and during the match-fixing period. I explain the development of
cricket’s structure and culture during the match-fixing period during which the erosion
of the espoused ‘spirit of cricket’ developed by leading administrators in the ‘golden
ages’ (Morrah, 1967; Howat, 1989) prior to 1930, occurred. I show how this central
value in cricket, initially breached during the ‘Bodyline’ Ashes series in 1932-33, was
thereafter ignored by subsequent generations of players and administrators from the
1950s as they engaged in overly-competitive practices in seeking beat their opponents.
External environmental factors that resulted in transformational change in cricket from
1975 to 2000, and which provided opportunities for corrupt behaviour, are summarised.
Then, in Chapter 5, I provide an interpretive processual account of the match-fixing that
occurred internationally during that period which explains the corruption that occurred
in four teams – Pakistan, Australia, India and South Africa. In both chapters, the themes
of this study related to OCI development in cricket are made evident.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I describe and discuss OCI development in the Archdiocese of
Boston (AOB) between 1940 and 2002 related to the sexual abuse of minors by clergy
in this and other U.S. Catholic dioceses. In Chapter 6, I provide my interpretation of the
historical and contemporary context of the Catholic Church during the abuse period,
highlighting factors that created the conditions that enabled that corruption to occur and
perpetuate. In Chapter 7, I provide an account of the abuse in the AOB and its handling
by the actors involved over 5 decades, limiting the narrative to a sample of the clergy
who perpetrated the corruption, the victims, victim’s relatives and peers of the offending
clergy who encountered the corruption, the leaders and church officials who managed
the situations created, and lawyers, doctors, media or government representatives who
encountered the church abuse in their institutional roles. Their actions and interactions
are interpreted, conceptualised and linked in a manner that provides an understanding of
the OCI development in the Catholic Church.

Whereas Chapters 4-7 represent what Weick (1995b) describes as products of
‘theorizing’, in Chapter 8, I provide a meso-level theory in which the concepts and
themes from the cases examined are connected in a way that meet the criteria for a
sound organizational theory (Whetten, 1989; Bacharach, 1989) that answers my
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research question - how and why an organization becomes an OCI despite non-corrupt
individuals becoming aware of the corrupt activities taking place. The implications of
these findings for management academics and practitioners are then addressed,
including some suggestions on what aspects of the corruption process managers might
focus in order to minimise the possibility of their organization becoming an OCI. The
limitations of the study and some possible suggestions for future research in this area
complete this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I identified the key research objective of this study as an attempt to
understand how and why organizational corruption develops despite many people in and
associated with the organization becoming aware that it is happening. While theorists
from various academic disciplines have studied organizational corruption both
theoretically and empirically (see, for example, Stachowowicz-Stanusch, 2010b), little
empirical and interpretivist research into this phenomenon had been undertaken by
management researchers (Ashforth et al, 2003). This study aims to address this
imbalance by offering an empirical examination of organizational corruption in
international cricket and the Catholic Church.

Man-made
disasters:

Corruption in
Organizations:
Understandings of
corruption
Causes of
corruption

Secrecy and
silence:

Emergence of
crescive problems

Silence in
organizations

Control to prevent
disaster

Cultures of
silence & secrecy

Noticing & sensemaking

Control of
corruption

This study

Figure 2.1 – Fields of literature relevant to this study

The purpose of this chapter is to review relevant literature on ‘corruption in
organizations’ as well as literature in two other fields which, because of the
methodological approach used which I explicate in Chapter 3, I found to be relevant to
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an understanding of the development of corruption for this study, namely the literature
on ‘man-made disasters’ and ‘organizational secrecy and silence’. Figure 2.1 illustrates
these three fields, their relationship to one another and their contributions to the study. It
signifies a literature-centric approach I take to this review rather than alternative
situation-centric or organization-centric approaches which might have been adopted.
Having done so, reverting to a problem-centric approach, in Section 2.5 I provide an
outline of the manner in which the contributions play into the two research settings in
this study.

In the literature review, in Section 2.2 I provide an overview of work undertaken by
researchers and practitioners in seeking to understand, inter alia, the many types,
contexts, causes of and solutions to corrupt behaviour. Literature on man-made disasters
(Section 2.3) has highlighted the challenges people face in noticing and sense-making
posed by crescive or creeping problems. The second is the two-fold problem addressed
in the literature on organizational secrecy and silence (Section 2.4) – the tendency of
many organizations to hide their dark side from public scrutiny coupled with the
reluctance of most people to speak up about behaviour which they have a feeling may
be occurring and may be corrupt when they experience uncertainty about it. These
insights from the three literature fields provide multiple threads which, in Chapters 4-8,
I use to create two tapestries that represent my interpretive pictures of the OCI
development that occurred in international cricket and the U.S. Catholic Church.

2.2

Corruption in Organizations

2.2.1

Understandings of Corruption

Literature on corruption has been informed by researchers in disciplines such as
economics, political science, criminology, sociology and management using a variety of
theoretical perspectives (Pinto et al, 2008; Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2010).

Corruption is a widespread and recurrent phenomenon. It is both ancient and pervasive,
having occurred internationally in government, business, sporting and religious
institutions (Cuadrado, 2005). Corruption has been formally defined as the abuse of
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public office for private gain (Collier, 2002), and the misuse of authority for personal,
sub-unit and/or organizational gain (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Treisman (2000)
broadened the definition of corruption, suggesting that it is a departure from accepted
societal norms of a more serious nature than breaches of etiquette.

An Australian anti-corruption body which focuses on public sector corruption, the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) holds that corrupt conduct is
more than wrong conduct associated with public officials. In its view, any conduct of
any person (whether or not a public official) that adversely affects, or could adversely
affect, either directly or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public
official, or group of officials or public authority, can be regarded as corrupt conduct.
Corruption, it argues, can involve matters such as official misconduct (including breach
of trust, nonfeasance, misfeasance and malfeasance), bribery, illegal gambling, illegal
drug dealings, violence, harbouring criminals and other matters of a similar nature
(ICAC, 2009).

In business organizations, conduct involving the manipulation of financial accounts (for
example, see McLean & Elkind, 2003; Westfield, 2003; Main, 2003) and soft auditing
and rorting of consultancy fees (Toffler, 2003) has come to be regarded as corrupt, and
each of the organizations involved categorised as a CO following recent corporate
scandals. Prior to these scandals, this particular type of behaviour by business and
accounting professionals was not labelled as corrupt because, in my opinion, there does
not appear to have been agreement in business and government in the U.S. that such
behaviours were anything more than sharp business practices.

In sporting organizations, corruption has been seen to include the bribing of officials
(for example, Jennings, 1996, 2000, 2006; Milton-Smith, 2002), match-fixing by sports
contestants (Asinof, 1963; Carney, 2006; Condon, 2001), and use of performance
enhancing drugs by athletes such as cyclists (Pound, 2003; Voet, 2001). These forms of
corruption, perpetrated by individuals who are not managers, fall into the OCI category.
Similarly, in religious organizations, corruption has involved financial misconduct
(Shupe, 1998), and sexual abuse and other misconduct towards people linked to misuse
of power by the perpetrators and the betrayal of trust by organization elites who allowed
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the conduct to perpetuate (Olsson & Chung, 2004; Parkinson, 1997; Berry, 2000; Berry
& Renner, 2004; Shupe, 1995, 1998; Krebs, 1998; Ashforth et al, 2008).

Despite the plethora of research on corruption by researchers from other disciplines,
theorising on reasons for corrupt behaviour at individual, group, organizational and
institutional levels, there has been little empirical work by management researchers
(Ashforth et al, 2003, 2008; Pinto et al, 2008) that investigates how some apparently
well managed organizations gradually become corrupt over time.

2.2.2

Causes of Corruption

There is broad consensus among researchers that corruption becomes manifest as a
result of a range of dispositional and situational factors (Clarke, 1980; Gorta, 1998;
Ashforth et al, 2003, 2008; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006). While there is disagreement
on which are more important or relevant, these factors are deemed to provide the
antecedent conditions for corruption at individual and group levels in organizations.

At an individual level, some theorists in the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry and
criminology argue the ‘bad apple’ theory (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990, Ashforth et al,
2008) - that corrupt behaviour is perpetrated by certain individuals who possess
enduring pathological traits (Berry, 2000; Smallbone et al, 2008; White & Terry, 2008),
certain personality characteristics (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; Baucus, 1994; Pinto
et al, 2008), low levels of cognitive moral development (Rest et al, 1969; Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990; McKenna, 1996) or little belief in a just world (Ashkanasy et al,
2000). In their view, prevention of corruption lies in identifying those individuals before
they enter an organization, or discovering their involvement in acts of corruption and
deterring its continuance by punishing them or treating them for their pathology so that
they and others may not reoffend. Other theorists argue that corrupt acts are perpetrated
by people who fail to scrutinize their contemplated acts from an ethical perspective
(Gorta, 1998, citing Mars, 1982; Darley, 2005). Economic and political theorists argue
that such individuals act corruptly after taking a rational-cognitive assessment of
corruption opportunities they identify. They weigh up the costs of a corrupt act including psychological, social and financial costs – against the expected benefit and act
corruptly if the benefit exceeds the cost (Clarke, 1980; Cornish & Clarke, 1986;
Treisman, 2000).
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Corruption spreads to group level if individuals learn corrupt behaviour from others
(Burgess & Akers, 1969; Sutherland & Cressey, 1978). Social group norms shape
behaviour, so an influential person within a group may lead more susceptible members
to follow their lead in acting in a deviant way which they may decline to do were they
more rational, independent and unaffected by enculturation within the group. According
to Pinto et al, (2008), an OCI can develop through contagion as a result of the relational
associations between individuals that may or may not involve direct interaction of those
individuals, or collusion which always involves direct interaction. Corrupt individuals
‘infect’ others in an organization through social network mechanisms (for example,
through the proximity of or interdependence between the individuals), cognitive
mechanisms (for example, through interaction among individuals and collective sensemaking that leads to the recognition of opportunities for corruption), social
psychological mechanisms (for example, where group norms that allow corruption are
followed unquestioningly), and emotional mechanisms (for example, where an affective
response towards a corrupt individual dominates the judgement considerations of other
individuals). Darley (2005) argues that the distance between the first act and the next
which fails to amplify the unethical nature of the first, the follow-on acts being seen as
shades of grey rather than black so not clearly wrong, and loyalty to the initiator of the
acts contribute to this infection. The ‘infection’ spreads as an emergent process that
does not readily manifest itself to non-participating actors, and therefore delays any
efforts by them to initiate control measures. This delay may see other actors accept the
erosion of core values and thereby participate in or tolerate corrupt activity (Gino &
Bazerman, 2009). Organizations in which many new members become socialized in the
corrupt ways of existing members have been termed ‘bad barrels’ (Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990; Ashforth et al, 2008).

Individual and group factors alone are not the sole cause of corrupt behaviour;
situational factors also play a part. According to Clarke (1980), the difficulties
‘dispositional’ theorists face in explaining corruption may be avoided by conceiving of
crime as an outcome of immediate choices and decisions made by offenders. Motivated
individuals who identify opportunities for corruption assess situational factors that
either increase their chances of success or heighten the risk of them being caught and
punished. Situational crime prevention theorists have examined immediate behavioural
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settings where corruption has occurred to identify factors that either encourage or permit
particular forms of crime or corruption (Clarke 1980; Gorta, 1998; Wortley &
Smallbone, 2006). Situational crime prevention:
…is a relatively new applied criminological model that shifts focus from deficits
of offenders to aspects of immediate environments that encourage or permit
crime to occur. It is based on the premise that all behaviour is the result of
interaction between the characteristics of the actor and the circumstances in
which the act is performed (Wortley & Smallbone, 2006: 8).
While factors that influence one form of crime or corruption (for example, matchfixing) may not be important in another form (for example, sexual abuse of children), in
most cases of crime or corruption motivated rational actors will seek opportunities and
evaluate the immediate environment to determine their chances of success. Their
resulting behaviour will be a function of the interaction between their psychological
disposition and their assessment of the situation in regard to the effort required, the risk
involved, and the strength of motivational triggers they experience (Gorta, 1998;
Wortley & Smallbone, 2006).

The antecedents of corporate illegality - situations where individuals intentionally or
unintentionally engage in wrongdoing for the benefit of their organizations through acts
of commission or omission – comes about as a result of contextual factors external or
internal to their organizations (Baucus & Near, 1991; Baucus, 1994; Pinto et al, 2008).
Where these antecedents of pressure, opportunity and predisposition are not present,
organizational misbehaviour they claim is less likely to occur.

Antecedents of individual corruption in organizations that management researchers have
theorized, but are yet to test empirically, are consistent; they comprise motivation-based
and opportunity-based factors that may be internal or external to the organization
(Ashforth et al, 2008; Pinto et al, 2008). Situational factors are often transient, present
for a short period if controlled and their harmful effects recognized and moderated by an
organization. By contrast, more permanent features of organizational environments may
provide both opportunity and conditions which enable corruption. According to Pinto et
al (2008), internal antecedents that lead to OCI development include organization
structure factors where corruption opportunities are embedded in particular tasks,
positional relationships and hierarchical levels of the organization that give unique
authority to an individual to act autonomously in loosely coupled sub-units, and result
27

orientation factors where a weak performance-compensation link may leave employees
dissatisfied with rewards they receive for effort or sacrifice they make on behalf of the
organization or institution. External antecedents, which they contend lead to OCI
development, include environmental scarcity, where tight control over an individual
member’s ability to legitimately gain desired benefits (financial or non-financial), and
industry structure and norms, such as the legal structure, regulations and government
monitoring and industry / institutional culture and norms.

These contextual risk factors correspond with the findings of Gorta (1998) who, after
reviewing earlier literature on corruption, prepared a list of risk factors in organizations
which enable or optimize the occurrence and perpetuation of corruption. Gorta proposed
that the nature of work performed in organizations, where individuals had unsupervised
autonomy and discretion, working conditions that create dissatisfaction and possibly
motivate individuals to act corruptly, and the ethical decision making histories and
dependencies of individuals which indicate that they make unethical or deviant choices,
are organizational factors likely to contribute to the occurrence of individual corruption.
Factors that Gorta believed perpetuate individual corruption in organizations are
member failure to identify behaviour as wrong, organization factors that affect taking
action to control the behaviour, and individual beliefs of the organization members
about the behaviour and reporting it. Organizational culture factors that indicate a lack
of ethics, such as unclear messages about what is acceptable, tolerant attitudes of
members towards deviant behaviour, lack of ethical management examples in
reinforcing ethical behaviour and a range of other workplace practices that indicate low
ethical standards enable or facilitate both the occurrence and perpetuation of corruption.
Where a corruption tolerant culture exists, certain forms of corrupt conduct may not be
labelled as deviant by other members because much corruption is often hidden, or
because the complexity of the corrupt behaviour makes it difficulty to detect and
separate from routine behaviour, or because the behaviour is normalised by its
audiences (Goode, 1978, 1984). Repeated corrupt conduct, even recidivism by
particular perpetrators, may become normalized and its lenient treatment routinized
within an organization / industry (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). Corrupt individuals and
others around them may rationalize their actions and convince others to participate
through socialization (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Anand et al, 2004), making individual
deviance in such settings almost predictable (Monahan & Quinn, 2006).
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There is a growing understanding among corruption theorists that the spread and growth
of corruption cannot be explained by discovery and analysis of static factors alone. The
development of corruption in organizations is now being explored as a dynamic process
created by interdependent factors that enable or inhibit the behaviour of the participants
(den Nieuwenbour and Kaptein, 2008).

2.2.3

Corruption Control

Corruption control literature is based on the presumption that organization leaders are
expected to use a range of controls to limit the myriad of corruption opportunities that
organizational operations present to motivated individuals. Principles of good corporate
governance are consistent with this presumption, the key objects of which are that the
people responsible for governance should understand and manage organizational risks
and minimise their negative aspects, strengthen stakeholder and community confidence
in their entity, enhance its public reputation, and assist in the prevention and detection
of unethical behaviour by establishing and maintaining an ethical culture (Standards
Australia, 2003).

This part of my review on corruption control begins with an overview of two macro
level strategies - corporate governance and ethical management - that have become
normative guideposts for minimising corruption and other unethical behaviour in both
regulated and unregulated organizations. The review then focuses on corresponding
corruption prevention tactics, applied at meso and micro organizational levels, using
Lange’s (2008) typology.

Corporate governance in the control of organizational corruption
Corporate governance refers to a process of governing organizations and states (Colley
Jr. et al, 2005). Governance emerged as a self-regulation strategy for organizations in
the late 1920s as a consequence of the collapse of organizations operated by company
officers on behalf of their owners who were multiple investors. National governments,
from the time of the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and in the wake of more recent crashes
in the 1980s and 1990s (for example, see Bosch, 1995; Cadbury, 2002) and others since
2000 (see, for example, Drennan, 2004; Mardjono, 2005; Mellahi, 2005; Trevino et al,
2006; Verschoor, 2004), have seen the need for good corporate governance as an
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organizational strategy for improving investor confidence and producing better
operating results.

Government legislation has attempted to establish clear roles and necessary skills for
relevant personnel aimed at limiting corruption and poor governance practice (Green,
2003; Ward, 2003; MacAvoy & Millstein, 2004; Verschoor, 2004). However, the
practice of legislating for governance has been criticized for undermining public trust in
those who perform governance functions (Longstaff, 1992; Morrison, 2004) and for
creating an illusion of governance compliance on the part of individuals who act legally,
but unethically or in a socially irresponsible way (Laufer, 2006). All organizations,
including organizations not regulated by government, are capable of acting responsibly
and self-regulating by voluntarily adopting standards of good governance,
accountability and transparency (Mardjono, 2005; Standards Australia, 2003a).
Recently, in Australia, general principles of corporate governance have been
recommended for use in not-for-profit organizations, such as sporting and religious
organizations, in establishing high standards that benefit their stakeholders (Standards
Australia, 2003). However, each nation has its own standards so these principles have
not been universally applied.

One of the important roles of governance is managing business risk (Standards
Australia, 2009). While fraud has been regarded as the most common risk, good
governance requires a continuous process of risk management assessment of other
forms of corruption that have the potential to damage the organization (Standards
Australia, 2003; Drennan, 2004). Risk management includes all aspects of
identification, analysis and assessment of corruption risks, and the development of
mitigation strategies and their implementation, communication and monitoring.
Controls include awareness training, establishment of sanctions for non-compliance
with an entity’s policies and protocols, and clear accountability structures and reporting
procedures (Standards Australia, 2009).

These standards appear straight forward, but based on international and their own
research, the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC, 2001a) has
concluded that, with no shared understanding in the minds of the public of what
behaviour constitutes corruption, the willingness of individuals in governance and
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management roles to minimise corruption is dependent on whether they think the
particular behaviour is justified, harmful and/or corrupt.

ICAC prescriptions for controlling corruption in organizations include: i) educating
members about behaviour which is corrupt, to show how such behaviour is harmful, and
to show the way incidents of such behaviour can be safely reported (ICAC, 2001a), ii)
development of systems, culture and risk management after identification of corruption
risk factors, iii) provision of internal and external reporting mechanisms to protect the
person reporting, iv) and creation of an ethical workplace through leadership behaviour
that makes organizational members feel safe in reporting, that shows effective action
being taken in response to reports, and that educates members in operational risks they
face in their industry (ICAC, 2001b).

Ineffective risk management can have serious consequences and, in extreme cases in the
business environment, can lead to organizational failure (Mellahi, 2005). In the nonregulated environments of sport and religion, as this study shows, organizations that
operate in contexts where governance standards are neither well understood nor
practiced, where little accountability is enacted, and where risk management is either
not undertaken or assessments are ignored can suffer serious economic and social
consequences.

Ethics in organizations
A second strategy for managing the risk of corruption in an entity (group, organization
or institution) is a product of work on corporate governance (Longstaff, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1998). This is the development and maintenance of a sound ethical culture
(Standards Australia, 2003a).

Ethics has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide as
‘the moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or how an activity is conducted’
and a ‘branch of knowledge concerned with moral principles’ (Soanes et al, 2001: 302).
According to Longstaff (1992), ethics provide answers to the founding question asked
by the Greek philosopher Socrates, “what ought one to do?”
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Ethics theorists generally agree that how a person acts when faced with an ethical
dilemma is the result of a complex interaction of the individual’s cognitive processes
(Rest, 1986), stage of moral development (Kohlberg, 1963), organizational environment
factors and characteristics of the moral issue (Jones, 1991). According to Kohlberg
(1963), individual ethical decisions depend on a moral agent’s level of cognitive moral
development in a particular situation. Building on Kohlberg’s theory, Rest hypothesised
that the process that individual moral agents use when they understand that their
behaviour may affect other people is, first, perceive a moral issue is present; second,
make a moral judgment (based on their moral development); third, resolve to place the
moral concerns ahead of other concerns; and fourth, act on the moral concerns (Rest,
1986, quoted in Jones, 1991: 368). Jones (1991) subsequently argued that characteristics
of the moral issue also influence moral actors. These actors judge the magnitude of
negative and positive consequences of their intended action on others, assess social
consensus about whether this action is regarded as right or wrong, determine the
probability of harm that the behaviour will cause, assess whether the time gap between
the planned behaviour and the onset of its negative consequences will reduce any
negative consequences, and evaluate their proximity or feeling of nearness to the
victims, and the concentration of negative effect of their intended act will have on them
(Jones, 1991).

Contextual factors are also understood to impact on the moral actor’s decision (see, for
example, Jones, 1991; Trevino, 1992; Trevino & Nelson, 1995; Ferrell & Gresham,
1985; Butterfield et al, 2000; Grojean et al, 2004; Trevino & Brown, 2004). Trevino
(1992), for example, hypothesizes that an individual’s moral reasoning may vary
depending on the context in which that reasoning takes place since the primary source
of morality is the external social system rather than the individual. Trevino & Nelson
(1995) recommend that organization leaders should proactively develop an ethical
culture, beginning with an audit of the existing ethical culture.
The spate of high impact scandals in the new millennium highlights the importance of
ethical behaviour for organizations (Trevino et al, 2006). Ethics researchers and
regulators argue that leaders in organizations should guide both the morality of their
employees and the morality of their organizations (Fisher & Lovell, 2006), and should
do so by building and maintaining an ethical culture though leadership integrity
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(Milton-Smith, 2002; Trevino & Brown, 2004; Zandstra, 2002; Grojean et al, 2004;
Springett, 2004; Caldwell & Karri, 2005). In an ethical culture, Trevino & Nelson
(1995) argue that not only would moral actors going through the process of making a
moral choice be deterred from wrongdoing, but fellow actors would avoid becoming
‘moral bystanders’ (Bandura, 2002; Moore, 2008). Employees would morally engage in
preventing wrongdoing and, if necessary, challenge authority when noticing, or asked to
do, something that they consider to be wrong. In doing so, an unethical culture in ‘bad
barrels’, attributed to a poor moral ethos among entity members, could be avoided
(Darley, 1996). Internal whistleblowing, which many people avoid in organizations for
fear of retribution, and in the absence of clear structures of responsibility and ethical
norms that render members prone to inflict harm on others and to cover up evil-doing
rather than rectify it, would be encouraged and supported (Miceli & Near, 1992).
These theoretical ethical prescriptions, however, have been regarded as problematic.
Ford & Richardson (1994), for example, in their review of empirical literature on
individual ethical decision-making, conclude that only an individual’s ‘strength of
religious belief’ has been found to be significantly and positively related to an
individual’s strength of ethical standards. Earlier, Longstaff (1992a), uncharacteristic of
his stance in his earlier writings, expressed a less-than-enthusiastic view about the
contribution that prescriptive ethics can make to improving organizational behaviour in
a postmodern world. More recently, he bemoaned the lack of ethics in the Olympic
movement (1999a, 1999b) and cricket (2000). His views echoed those of Lyotard
(1984) who claimed that growing ethical relativism in society, particularly since the
1960s, is a consequence of ‘the postmodern condition’. Sociologist Richard Rorty too
argues that ‘ethical questions must be dealt with in the untidy realm of human
interaction rather than in the tidy world of universal reasoning’ (Blackshaw & Crabbe,
2004: 13). Similarly, Coakley (1995) and Critcher (1995) both argue that a single set of
values that underpin ethics is unlikely to be embraced in the future because of socioeconomic, political and cultural factors that weaken individual and organization interest
in establishing and implementing universal ethical standards. I would argue therefore
that, with little possibility of different institutions adopting universal ethical standards
or reaching agreement on whether certain behaviour is unethical, ethics will not provide
an effective barrier to organizational corruption.
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Methods of corruption control
These two strategies - corporate governance and ethical management – each have a set
of corresponding tactics that theorists (Gorta, 1998; Lange, 2008) have argued can be
successfully applied to minimise corruption.

Lange’s corruption control model identifies various means whereby management can
target corruption prevention efforts, either through administrative or socio-cultural
transmission channels. Administrative channels, he argues, emphasise a strong
governance approach by the imposition of formal controls on organization members by
management, whereas socio-cultural channels emphasize a soft governance approach
achieved by the development of an ethical culture which utilises informal controls
exercised by non-managerial agents on fellow members. Lange stresses that mixing
channels of control or certain control types without considering their interrelated effects
can reduce their effectiveness.

Lange’s typology of administrative controls exercised by management comprises: i)
bureaucratic controls; ii) punishment; iii) incentive alignments, and iv) legal or
regulatory sanctioning. His typology of socio-cultural controls exercised by other
stakeholders comprises: v) social sanctioning; vi) vigilance controls; vii) self-control;
and viii) concertive controls.

Bureaucratic controls aim to prevent unacceptable behavioural deviation in
organizations. Where members acquiesce to such control, processes can become routine
and taken-for-granted (Pinto et al, 2008, citing, among others, Weber, 1947, Mintzberg,
1979). While these controls are expected to reduce corruption, Ashforth and Anand
(2003) show that unethical leaders may use such controls to routinize their handling of
individual corruption, perpetuating rather than preventing it. Punishment aims to deter
corruption by actively managing targeted solutions arrived at after diagnosis of linkages
between particular behaviour and its consequences. Another bureaucratic method is to
conduct an internal inquiry. Processes in defining and investigating corrupt behaviour
(Boudes & Laroche, 2009), and leader ambivalence about punishing some members
(Merton, 1976), are structural weaknesses in organizations that reduce the effectiveness
of the internal inquiry. Incentive alignments can remove situational reasons for
individuals behaving corruptly in cases where those incentives satisfy pertinent needs of
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the potential offender. Finally, legal / regulatory sanctioning can be employed, where
intended corrupt acts are illegal, by making clear that offenders will be reported to
outside authorities.

Some criminologists argue that administrative controls prevent corruption by inducing
fear of punishment or of being caught (Wright et al, 2004). As rational decision makers,
they weigh up the costs and benefits of acting corruptly. They act corruptly if the costs
of doing so are not outweighed by the personal benefits gained from the corrupt acts and
the chances of being caught are low. Critics, on the other hand, argue that situational
factors may complicate and outweigh rational considerations, and that an individual
pathology may be a greater force in an individual’s choice about acting corruptly in a
particular situation, which would explain much recidivism (Wright et al, 2004). If there
is no legal / regulatory sanctioning, or what is available is manipulated by powerful
stakeholders who act in the interest of the corrupt, or sanctioning is lenient because of
economic factors as occurs in the case of plea bargaining (Sudnow, 1965), this form of
control may not be effective (Lange, 2008).

Leaders may prefer socio-cultural over administrative controls as an alternative
approach to minimising corruption in their organizations, in line with the thinking of
ethics theorists. Social sanctioning by influential secondary stakeholders who are not
part of the legal / regulatory network, such as the media, interest groups, the public and
society, may be applied to influence the behaviour of organization members (Pfeffer,
1981; Weiss, 2006). These secondary stakeholders who voice their concerns about
known unethical behaviour of deviant members can influence some of their future moral
actions. In the post-modern age, however, ethical relativism means that there is less
likely to be agreement among the various stakeholders about what behaviour is
unethical (Weiss, 2006). Furthermore, ‘moral panic’ (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994) by
some of these stakeholders about a particular behaviour is likely to instigate
administrative control being exercised in such a crisis, possibly undoing the trust
between managers and employees that is needed in a socio-cultural control system.
Vigilance controls see leaders encourage individuals to maintain watch on the behaviour
of other members and to exercise ‘constructive deviance’ by actions such as ‘blowing
the whistle’ (Miceli & Near, 1992) on fellow members who indulge in corrupt acts. This
form of control is rare as it is more common for organization members to bond when it
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is in their interest to do so, as the discussion in Section 2.4 on ‘group level silence’ and
‘codes of silence’ will show. Loyalty to group members takes priority over many
traditional ethical standards. Self-controls are similar to vigilance controls but are at the
level of the individual rather than the group or organization. Self-controls do not rely on
extrinsic punishments or costs, but on intrinsic internal motivation of individuals in
maintaining conformity. Leaders play an important role in motivating others to
voluntarily strive for constructive conformity. However, recidivist behaviour suggests
that leader support for a corrupt individual is not always successful where the cause is
pathological or the culture is otherwise morally flawed. Finally, concertive controls that
function when leaders allow members to reduce individual autonomy and subject their
behaviour and any sanctioning to the judgment of their peers in a highly developed
ethical culture, may be appropriate. Again, success may depend on the presence of
ethical leaders at all levels and adherence to an agreed set of ethical values in
environments that are marked by pluralism and moral relativism (Lange, 2008).

Lange’s administrative rule-based approach to control is supported by the findings of
Gorta (1998). Lessons to be absorbed by governance bodies from her review of the
corruption literature are that all people need to be viewed as potential offenders,
particularly those who appear the most unlikely; that the perspective of the individual
offender should be understood in tailoring prevention strategies; that offenders’
explanations that endeavour to justify or minimise the corruption need to be challenged;
that features of the organization’s structure and culture that provide antecedent
conditions for the corruption need to be examined and corrected; and that appropriate
anti-corruption techniques such as those recommended by Lange need to be applied.

Summary
From the corruption literature, the following insights are important for this study.
Organizational corruption, the abuse of one’s position in an organization for personal
financial or non-financial gain, is a pervasive phenomenon that takes many forms and
occurs at individual, group and organization levels. No organization is immune from
corruption. Corruption may develop either as a top-down or a bottom-up phenomenon.
If allowed to develop, top down corruption results in a corrupt organization (CO);
bottom-up corruption results in an organization of corrupt individuals (OCI).
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Both dispositional and situational factors are believed to cause corruption, but there is
disagreement about which are more important. Empirical evidence from research
suggests that almost anyone is capable of acting corruptly.

There has been an expectation that organizational leaders, through good governance and
ethical management, are able to prevent corruption by the exercise of administrative
and/or socio-cultural control tactics. In this age of post-modernity, pluralism and
cultural/moral relativism, administrative controls that are rule-based are more likely to
be effective than socio-cultural controls that are norm-based.

Despite this knowledge about corruption and means for preventing it, certain forms of
corruption continue to develop in ostensibly well-governed and ethical organizations
despite public knowledge that it is taking place. The question arises – why is nothing
effectively done to prevent it from proliferating? Some insights into that conundrum
have been provided by theorists who have studied the problem of man-made disasters
and the twin phenomena of secrecy and silence. A discussion of each and a summary of
their separate and combined effects complete the conceptual framework for this study.

2.3

Man-made Disasters

2.3.1. Cases of Emergent Problems
Literature on corruption has been helpful in explaining possible causes and suggesting
controls to known corrupt or deviant behaviour, but that literature has mainly been
silent on the ways corruption may emerge and the problems which its incubation causes
for its detection and control. However, a small amount of research has examined issues
pertinent to the slow emergence of problematic situations in cases of ‘man-made
disasters’, the third field of literature reviewed.

Beamish (2000, 2002) explored a ‘crescive’ or creeping environmental problem that led
to a major environmental disaster in the United States. He explained the combination of
natural and human factors that allowed the problem - a chronic spillage of petroleum at
the Guadalupe Dunes that continued unabated for 38 years, to emerge and go
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unaddressed over that period. First, the spill developed slowly, in stages and in an
unspectacular way. Signs of the spill were not evident since the spilled liquid was clear
and seeped into the surrounding sandy ground. Second, when signs of the spill were
noticed because of occasional plumes and odours, they were not reported because they
came to be regarded as a normal aspect of the oil field environment and were tolerated
by the local community. Third, at the site, the ‘secret’ spill was accommodated by
workers whose occupational culture stabilised the field routines they undertook. They
believed that their jobs were at stake if they reported the accumulating spill. The extent
of spill was not accurately measured despite its cost to the organization so that there was
no evidence of its extent. Fourth, away from the site, senior managers took no action
because they would lose their bonuses if production was halted to address the
accumulating spill. Fifth, multiple government agencies with responsibility for pollution
control were uncertain about whether the spill constituted threatening circumstances
under the regulations they enforced and were unable to determine what action should be
taken. When they did decide that there was a problem, incremental ad hoc solutions
were successful in appeasing stakeholder audiences without fixing the problem. Finally,
a collective secrecy and silence about the problem within the organization, and limited
admissions by managers to accommodating regulators, allowed the spill to become a
major industrial crisis.

The pattern of behaviour in the Guadalupe Dunes case bears similarity to patterns of
behaviour in other man-made disasters. Sociologist Andrew Hopkins examined two
major accidents in Australia that resulted in human and economic loss in the
organizations involved (Hopkins 1999, 2000). In his study of organization culture and
processes that resulted in a fatal explosion in a BHP coal mine at Moura in central
Queensland in 1994, Hopkins (1999) found that the accident was man-made, the result
of what he termed ‘organizational inattentiveness’. A culture of privileging production
over safety existed at the mine site. Within this culture, there was a collective denial by
members of the possibility of an explosion, despite occasional minor incidents. Further,
there was an acceptance of the inadequate system for the transmission of information
about warning signs of a potential explosion. There was no incentive for management to
focus on the possibility of disaster and to take steps to ensure safety. The only safetyrelated task for which managers took responsibility was measuring lost time caused by
38

accidents. Overall, there was a lack of focus about managing the risk of mine explosion
throughout the organization.

Hopkins (2000) found a similar pattern of organizational failures in a 1998 fatal
explosion at the Esso Gas Plant at Longford, Victoria. In a high-technology
environment that Perrow (1999) classified as a complex and tightly-coupled system, a
culture existed where production was given priority over safety. Multiple alarms
installed to alert staff to process upsets were not responded to as clear warnings of
danger since many alarms had sounded or flashed over the years without disastrous
effects, so were regarded as normal. Furthermore, the culture at the site was marked by
communication problems among the workers, a lack of management attention to major
hazards, superficial auditing of safety management systems in place and a failure to
learn from previous experience of disasters in other Esso plants (Hopkins, 2000).

In her research on the Challenger disaster in 1986, Diane Vaughan (1996, 1997a,
1997b) found that a similar phenomenon – the normalization of deviation from
technological safety standards - was present in the culture in the National Aeronomics
and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. organization created in the 1950s to
explore space and to undertake space missions. In a context where economic and
political pressure was placed on NASA to perform despite having an insufficient
budget, decisions that allowed incremental deviations from acceptable engineering
standards in the space shuttle program were kept secret by key Challenger launch
stakeholders. In an achievement-driven culture, despite leaders and astronauts
recognizing the inherent danger in a space program, managers and engineers responsible
for standards of safety on the space craft allowed an incremental lowering of
engineering standards, partly due to weak signals they received about the seriousness of
small technical failures that regularly occurred on the Challenger space craft during
missions.

In a detailed account of his involvement in the infamous Pinto fire case, Gioia (1992)
explains the context and decision environment within which he failed to initiate an early
recall of faulty vehicles. This account shows the practical difficulties one might
experience in an organizational setting in noticing and making sense of one or a series
of incidents among so many reports and other data where an individual is operating on
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the basis of a predetermined schema which simplifies decision making by routinizing
the handling of such incidents, even those that have ethical overtones.

2.3.2. Patterns of Behaviour in Cases of Emergent Problems
In each of the above cases, a common pattern of behaviour regarding emergent
problems that led to disasters is evident. The organizational context in which man-made
disasters occurred were marked by a culture where individuals, over time, collectively
decided through an interaction process that human safety plays second fiddle to
production, profit or other achievement-based priority. In high risk-taking cultures,
safety risks that interfered with organizational achievement were accorded low
probability status by managers, and came to be accepted by employees. Incremental
deviation from accepted standards was tolerated and, over time, normalized. Control
systems that existed to ensure compliance with quality / safety standards were not
audited. Occasional warning signs that something was wrong when deviance occurs
were ignored when no disaster ensued. In accordance with organizational priorities and
culture, which influenced social interactions about the interpretation of such signs,
decisions were made that increased the risk of a disaster. Where organizational or group
leaders did not want problems in the organization discussed outside, a culture of secrecy
and silence developed over time that restricted interaction both inside and outside the
organization. Literature on secrecy and silence is discussed in more detail in Section
2.6.

2.3.3. Emergent Problems – Noticing and Sense-making
How does a pattern of behaviour that ignores or dismisses emergent problems develop?
An understanding of Karl Weick’s theory of sense-making (1995a) and Starbuck and
Milliken’s theory of noticing (1988) helps explain the difficulties which individuals
experience in addressing what Beamish (2000) calls ‘crescive problems’.

According to Weick, an individual’s sense-making is triggered when objects are
noticed, that is, filtered, classified and compared to similar objects one has encountered
in the past. However, an object has to be noticed before sense-making begins.
According to Starbuck and Milliken (1988), noticing is the act of being aware or paying
attention to something. It involves a rudimentary form of sense-making that
distinguishes signal from noise by crudely separating the relevant in a situation from the
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irrelevant, the first stage in an active process involving filtering, classifying and
comparing cues. This process of interpreting cues is an integral component of the
process of sense-making. While noticing can involve the deliberate process of
environmental scanning followed by interpretation of what has been noticed, noticing
can also be the serendipitous outcome of a person’s reflection on stimuli in their
environment, some of which will be more available to the senses and therefore likely to
attract attention than others. The sense made of an extracted cue depends on context
(Weick, 1995a); many objects that an individual encounters escape notice, even stimuli
that the senses pick up as they concentrate on other tasks or look elsewhere.
Furthermore, noticing is influenced by each perceiver’s habits and beliefs about what is
and what ought to be, about the degree of difference between what is usual and
expected, what is occurring in the stimuli, and between foreground and background
events (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988).

Sense-making may involve noticing when a perceiver reclassifies a remembered signal
as noise, or a remembered noise as a signal, in order to fit a new and perhaps emerging
interpretive framework. Individuals will engage in a process of enlarging small cues and
searching for contexts within which the small details fit together and make sense
(Weick, 1995a). The sense-making process involves extraction and interpretation of
cues about the object which guide an individual’s meaning-making. The meaning of the
cues is derived from interaction the individual has with self and others. Collective
sense-making may result in a generic interpretation of the object noticed, which will be
a guide to future action or inaction.

‘Sense-making is tested to the extreme when people encounter an event whose
occurrence is so implausible that they hesitate to report it for fear it will not be believed’
(Weick, 1995a:1). Weick used ‘battered child syndrome’ as an example of such a
problem when its symptoms become visible. At the opposite end of the spectrum of
noticeable events, Beamish (2000) pointed out sense-making difficulties that are
associated with crescive problems - those problems which are occasionally noticed,
whose symptoms are barely perceptible, whose causes are unclear and whose
consequences unknown. In his study of the Guadalupe Dunes environmental disaster,
Beamish (2000: 10) states:
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Mainstream sociology’s historical neglect of environmental problems reveals a
proclivity to sense only immediate and sudden threats to our well-being (social
or environmental), especially in circumstances of slow and incremental change,
threatening changes are normalised because actors…accommodate themselves
to gradually evolving signs of crises. This proclivity is not limited to
environmental matters, but was found by Vaughan (1996) in the Challenger
Disaster…where organizational actors, while working together, developed
routines that blinded them to the consequences of their actions.
Beamish’s and Hopkin’s examples of crescive environmental and technological
problems show that, even when noticed, these problems may be tolerated and allowed to
accumulate in certain organizational settings with disastrous consequences. Incremental
deviation over time becomes accepted and normalized in organizational environments
where risk is accepted and even embraced. In pursuit of goals that reflect reputation or
achievement-based priorities before safety, the cumulative negative effects of small
deviations in standards are often ignored or dismissed.

Organizational corruption, on the other hand, has been studied neither as a crescive
problem nor from a sense-making perspective. Yet, by virtue of its definition, an OCI
develops as a crescive problem. The research on noticing and making sense of crescive
problems that result in man-made accidents is therefore helpful in this study of OCI
development.

Summary
The research on some notable man-made environmental and technological disasters and
patterns of behaviour they share provides the following useful insights for this study.
Organizations in which achievement or reputation-related organizational goals are given
priority over safety or ethical concerns run the risk of allowing man-made disasters and
organizational scandals to occur. The probability of a man-made disaster or major crises
happening in many organizations tends to be underestimated. It is not generally
understood that major disasters and scandals can occur as a result of creeping or
crescive problems that grow when small deviations in safety or behavioural standards
are systemically tolerated. In the absence of risk management in an organization, little
attention is paid to such matters. Crescive problems are likely to inhibit individual and
collective sense-making in organizations where they are not noticed or, when noticed,
are the subject of unresolved uncertainty or ambiguity about the nature and scope of the
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problem. Control systems may fail to record warning signs of deviation from standards
or may ignore isolated deviate events which do not result in serious consequences.
Individual and collective sense-making may be inhibited by an organizational culture of
secrecy and silence, discussed in the next section, which restricts social interaction
about and acknowledgement of crescive problems.

2.4

Secrecy and Silence in Organizations

The final field of literature reviewed and relevant to this study addresses organizational
secrecy and silence. William De Maria, who has explored the association between
organizational secrecy and silence, argues that they are twin siblings that ‘remain at the
service of management wishing to evade ethical obligations’ (De Maria, 2006: 219).
Supporting this view, a steady stream of descriptive literature in recent years has
attested to the presence of pervasive silence as a phenomenon in cases of long term
corruption in government (Bernstein & Woodward, 1974), business (Main, 2005;
McLean & Eckland, 2003; Toffler, 2004; Westfield, 2003), sport (Asinof, 1963;
Telander, 1996; Carney, 2006; Jennings, 2000; Pound, 2003), law enforcement agencies
(Brereton & Ede, 1996; Brown, 1997; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Skolnick, 2002;
Trautman, 2000; Wood, 2000) and indigenous communities (Wild & Andersen, 2007).
The presence of both secrecy and silence has also been noted in relation to adverse
events in the health services industry (Hart & Hazelgrove, 2001; Henriksen & Dayton,
2006) and, as mentioned in Section 2.3, in cases of man-made disasters (Beamish, 2000;
2002; Vaughan, 1996; Gioia, 1992).

In business, for example, the silence of organizational stakeholders in the Enron case
attests to the presence of the phenomenon that is typical in CO cases. Referring to what
was discussed in the corruption control literature as a socio-cultural approach, Trinkaus
and Giacalone (2005) showed that Enron stakeholders failed to undertake an informal
‘watchdog’ role to ensure their interests were being met or to ‘activate alarms’ when
operations failed to meet acceptable legal and moral standards. Many stakeholder
audiences, including board members, the audit committee, compliance and ethics
officers, shareholders, institutional investors, other financial agencies, government
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regulatory agencies, external auditors, employees, competitors, customers and suppliers,
public interest groups, investigative reporters and other ‘corporate gadflies’, were silent
before the corporate bubble burst. At Enron, they claimed, the ‘stakeholder silence was
deafening’ (2005: 238).
Prior to this study, there has been no research undertaken on pervasive silence in OCI
cases, although the silence of various stakeholders has been described in many of the
non-business cases listed. It could be reasonably presumed, therefore, that secrecy and
silence are regular attendees in organizational corruption cases, including cases of OCI.
This study shows that such a presumption is well founded.
Research that has examined silence at different levels – individual, group and
organizational – explains much about its causes.

Individual (Employee) level silence
Interest by researchers in the silence of individuals in organizations has been accredited
to the pioneering efforts of Albert Hirschman (1970) who, in Exit, Voice and Loyalty,
discussed silence in two of those three choices (exit and loyalty) employees face in
conflict situations.
More recent interest in employee silence, however, was sparked by the seminal
theoretical contribution of Morrison & Milliken (2000) on organizational silence.
Subsequent research noted that employees may be silent about both non-ethical and
ethical issues that managers do not want raised (Milliken & Morrison, 2003; Milliken et
al, 2003).

Three motives for individual silence have been identified. They are : i) an individual’s
concerns for their own wellbeing, that is, a fear of punishment (Ryan & Oestreich,
1991; Milliken & Morrison, 2003), job security concerns (Piderit, 2000), being treated
negatively as a whistleblower (Miceli & Near, 1992), being labelled negatively by peers
(Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Creed, 2003; Milliken et al, 2003), and wanting to manage
one’s image with superiors (Milliken et al, 2003; Piderit & Ashford, 2003); ii) one’s
concern for others - not wanting to hurt someone else (Van Dyne et al, 2003) and
preserving one’s relationships with others in order to get tasks done (Perlow &
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Repenning, 2004); and iii) belief that speaking up is futile (Van Dyne et al, 2003; Ryan
& Oestreich, 1991; Morrison & Milliken, 2000).
Silence not only affects employees; managers too may be silent. Perlow & Repenning
(2004) have argued that, in some circumstances, silence is perceived by managers to be
more productive for an organization than speaking up, when conflict on an issue arises
that may lead to, inter alia, damaging member relationships, which can have a
detrimental long term effect if it becomes the norm in a group or organization.

Individual silence by organizational stakeholders / audiences has also been noted as a
common response to unethical situations. Cases of ordinary people doing nothing about
clearly unethical situations has been conceptualized as ‘moral muteness’ (Bird &
Waters, 1989; Bird 1996), ‘moral disengagement’ (Beu & Buckley, 2004), ‘ethical
distance’ (Mellema, 2003) and ‘ethical blind spots’ (Moberg, 2006).

Group level silence
Group level silence in organizations – often referred to as a ‘code of silence’ - has been
noted in several institutions. A ‘code of silence’ sees group members ‘place loyalty over
integrity’ (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007: 341).

A ‘blue code of silence’ among police has been noted in government inquiries and
empirical investigations into corruption in law enforcement agencies in Australia (see,
for example, Brereton & Ede, 1996; Brown, 1997; Wood, 2000) and internationally (for
example, Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Skolnick, 2002; Trautman, 2000). It has been
described as ‘an unwritten norm under which it is considered impermissible for police
to criticize their colleagues, particularly to anyone outside the organization, or to
cooperate in the investigation of fellow police’ (Brereton & Ede, 1996: 107). Hence,
most members fail to speak up when they witness misconduct by colleagues (Trautman,
2000). The presence of such a code inhibits whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1992) and
can protect members who engage in systemic and entrenched corruption (Brown, 1997).
A ‘wall of silence’ that they erect keeps outsiders from finding out about what they
believe will be regarded as illicit activities of members.
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In health service institutions, a ‘white code of silence’ about mistakes by medical staff
that have adverse outcomes for patients has been examined by Hart & Hazelgrove
(2001) and Henriksen & Dayton (2006). This code has led to information about adverse
outcomes being pushed underground, preventing medical staff from engaging in new
learning that might reduce the problems. Hart & Hazelgrove (2001) linked team loyalty
in the health professions to ‘cultural censorship’ which resulted in communal silence
about accidental and deliberate adverse events that were well known but concealed,
despite affecting patient safety in many health institutions.
‘Codes of silence’ have also been found in relation to harassment or sexual abuse of
women in the armed forces (Pershing, 2003) and sports teams (Ferguson, 2009;
Masters, 2008) and in covering up alcohol-fuelled mistakes that led to the Australian
Navy Voyager disaster (Cabban & Salter, 2005).

Organization level silence
According to Morrison & Milliken (2000:706), ‘there are powerful forces in many
organizations that cause widespread withholding of information by employees about
potential problems or issues by employees’, including unethical practices. They
hypothesized that managers who hold certain implicit beliefs or fear negative feedback
create conditions that result in the formation of a ‘climate of silence’ in which collective
sense-making dynamics among employees result in a shared perception that speaking up
in their organization is unwise.

The structure and culture of an organization can prevent the flow of important
information upwards from employees to management (Morrison & Milliken, 2000,
2004; Cohan, 2002) and the failure of organizational stakeholders to heed and report
warning signs that indicate the presence of threats to an organization (Hirschman, 1970;
Roberto et al, 2006; Simola, 2005). Silence about problems in organizations impedes
effective organizational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1990; Beer and
Eisenstadt, 2000; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Edmonson, 2003) about the risk it poses
for stakeholders (Hendriksen & Dayton, 2006). Despite the dangers that silence poses to
organizations, managers who do not want particular issues to be discussed or widely
known may adopt defensive strategies in order to silence those who have knowledge
about organizational secrets (Argyris, 1990; Dworkin & Callaghan, 1999).
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Organizational silence can be prevented if members are encouraged to speak up on
ethical issues. This can be achieved by managers who develop trust (Edmondson, 2003)
and train employees in ways of safely reporting an ethical issue (Piderit and Ashford,
2003). Essentially, individuals cannot be expected to be moral agents and speak up
about ethical issues without leadership support.
A popular view has arisen that people establish ‘conspiracies of silence’ about many
issues (Zerubaval, 2006). Drawing largely on popular literature and fiction for
examples, Zerubavel argues that ‘conspiracies of silence’ exist at every level of society,
ranging from small groups to large organizations. Based on the two cases investigated
in this study – involving the long standing institutions of cricket and the Catholic
Church, I will argue that pervasive silence about an OCI develops as a ‘nexus of
silence’ - a non-conspiratorial phenomenon reinforced within an organizational context
in which the sharing of information and open discussion by organization members and
stakeholders about issues that might embarrass them is inhibited. I expand on this
broader concept of secrecy and silence in Chapter 8.

Summary
Recent literature on secrecy and silence argues that they are ‘twin siblings’ who
accompany deviance of various kinds. Together with the more prolific literature on
organizational silence, the following insights that are helpful in this study have been
gleaned.

Individual silence about deviance in organizations, including corruption, is influenced
by the culture that has been developed by the interactions of managers and employees
over time. Group silence about deviance manifests itself as both a code of silence and a
wall of silence. These barriers, constructed as an outcome of interactions between
members of in-groups, are designed to prevent information about the deviant activities
of members from reaching outsiders. Organizational silence occurs as a consequence of
a culture, supported and enforced by organizational leaders, which is formed by the
constant interaction of members who reinforce attitudes and beliefs that discourage
members from speaking up about deviance within the organization that might embarrass
them and have a detrimental effect on the organization’s reputation. Pervasive silence
has been described as a conspiracy but, in OCI cases, was arguably non-conspiratorial
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within organizational and wider institutional contexts that discouraged discussion with
outsiders about deviance in their ranks.

2.5

Conclusion

How do these three multi-disciplinary literature streams play into the two research
settings in this study? As indicated in chapter 1 (section 1.6), each case is presented in
two chapters comprising a description and analysis of the context in which the
corruption occurred (chapters 4 and 6) followed by a processual analysis of the way the
corruption developed (chapters 5 and 7). The two literatures on ‘corruption in
organizations’ and ‘secrecy and silence’ support my understanding of the pertinent
contextual factors which influenced the corruption in each case; all four literature
streams featuring in the dynamic process which resulted in the OCI phenomenon
developing in the affected cricket and church organizations.

Corruption literature recognizes the important role organizational context plays in
providing antecedent conditions for corrupt behaviour in organizations (see, for
example, Baucas & Near, 1991; Baucas, 1994; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pinto et al,
2008). In chapters 4 and 6, I analyse environmental and organizational factors that were
present prior to and during the corruption period which may have influenced
perpetrators and other key organizational stakeholders in bringing about the corrupt
state. In particular, as the secrecy and silence literature has found, I show how this
culture in the cricket and church institutions inhibited stakeholders who encountered the
corruption from speaking out and led the leaders of these institutions to conceal
evidence of corruption, resulting in an apathetic response to the growing problem prior
to the scandals which engulfed them, in a similar manner to some man-made disasters in
that literature.

Moving to my processual accounts of the corruption in chapters 5 and 7, I show in some
detail an aspect of organizational corruption which the man-made disaster literature
highlights – the difficulties people experience during the initial periods when corruption
emerges from being inconspicuous, through uncertainty and ambiguity, to
comprehensibility and intelligibility – as a result of which effective action is not taken
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to prevent it. I reveal, as this literature does, how seemingly minor problems or issues
for organizations in the scale of their operations are overlooked, minimised, tolerated,
normalised or covered up by various stakeholders who only gradually become aware of
such problems and recognise the threat they pose. Just as ‘man-made disasters’ result in
human or property damage when actors fail to address crescive problems of an
environmental or technological nature, ‘reputational disasters’ in the form of media
scandals result when the initial corrupt behaviour perpetrated by individuals is not
adequately addressed.

Next, as the secrecy and silence literature shows, I describe the powerful effect that an
organizational culture has on the behaviour of members who share a norm which
discourages them from speaking out about mistakes or deviant behaviours by their
trusted elites. Linked to this secrecy and silence, I show how deference to authority and
a general reluctance by members to openly question leaders about behaviour they
believe is deviant brings about a climate of uncertainty and ambiguity. When, as the
deviance literature shows, these leaders define the questionable behaviour as something
‘other than corrupt’, they establish a state of ambivalence in their organizations and
across the institution about the corruption which inhibits most stakeholders, apart from
some courageous whistleblowers, from taking deliberate action to address the problem.
Finally, as the corruption literature on recent cases of corporate corruption has shown,
media scandals bring about heightened public awareness of the extent of organizational
corruption occurring which leads external regulators into forcing chastened
organizational leaders to ‘clean the Augean stables’ of their affected organizations,
often by addressing governance and ethical leadership weaknesses in order to minimise
future corruption.

In chapter 8, I outline my contributions to the corruption literature in the form of new
insights into the dynamics of OCI development based on the two cases in this study,
acknowledging my predecessors in these four related literature streams and other
management theorists I refer to in chapters 4-7.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1

Introduction

This chapter explains my research design and shows why it was appropriate for
investigating the research question that motivates this study. That research question is to
determine how and why organizations of corrupt individuals (OCI) developed in the two
institutions - international cricket and the U.S. Catholic Church.

The elements of my research design, or ‘scaffold’ as Crotty (1998) terms it, comprise
the epistemological view of ‘pragmatism’ and the related theoretical perspective of
‘symbolic interactionism’ advocated by Herbert Blumer (1969) and subsequently
elaborated on by others (for example, Cuff et al, 1990; Charon, 2007). It is a perspective
that provides a suitable and flexible methodology for conducting this study when
coupled with ‘grounded theory’ methods recommended by Glaser and Strauss (1967)
and, more recently, by Strauss and Corbin (1990), Locke (2001) and Charmaz (2006).
The study also involves process research (Pettigrew, 1997) which captures the dynamic
quality of human conduct in organizational and institutional settings. I examine the
contexts in which corruption occurred and the way in which the various actors dealt
with the corruption within the organizations and institutions in those changing contexts
over time.

I determined the research design following my initial exploration of several documents
relating to the cricket match-fixing case after the Cronje scandal in 2000. That
exploration showed that a number of international cricket players had conspired with
bookmakers and punters to manipulate the results of international cricket matches over a
period of up to 25 years, the exact time the corruption started being unclear. While there
was considerable interest after the scandal in who perpetrated the corruption, I was more
interested in explaining how and why the perpetrators were able to act corruptly for
such a long period given that, at some stage, their superiors and other organizational
stakeholders became aware of their activities. These intriguing puzzles led to my
formulation of the research question and my development of an appropriate research
methodology for investigating the issue. Similarly, in January 2002, when a major
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scandal involving the sexual abuse of minors by clergy in the Catholic Archdiocese of
Boston erupted, an exploratory enquiry I conducted of this case indicated that leaders
and stakeholders of the U.S. Catholic Church had enabled many perpetrators to
continually offend over a period of about 50 years.

To investigate the corruption, I needed a way into the social worlds of international
cricket and the U.S. Catholic Church. For practical and parsimonious reasons, direct
personal access was not an option for me. However, access to the data on these cases
was available through the documents that began to proliferate following the scandals,
and through other historical documents pertaining to the institutions involved. Grounded
theory methodology would be an appropriate means of interpreting this data.
Pragmatism and symbolic interactionism would provide an appropriate epistemological
and theoretical perspective combination to pursue this textual study. The historical
interpretive textual approach would enable me to understand the contexts in which the
corruption occurred which influenced the interpretations and decisions of the actors. I
would be able to appreciate the individual and situational factors that enabled the
corrupt conduct of the perpetrators to develop (Gorta, 1998), to assess the responses to
the corrupt conduct of various internal and external actors who became concerned and
attempted to prevent it, and to evaluate the consequences that the cumulative impact of
these dynamics had on the trajectory of corruption.

These formative decisions are expanded on in the detailed research design sections that
follow.

3.2

Symbolic Interactionism

3.2.1

Pragmatism – the Foundation of Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism traces its roots to the American pragmatist philosophers one of
whom was Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914), a mathematician and physicist who
believed that knowledge is not a collection of universal and impersonal facts but a
product of human activity. Disenchanted with what they saw as the irrelevance of grand
macro theories to people’s every-day lived situations, Pierce and his fellow pragmatists,
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William James and John Dewey, developed a way of thinking about and
conceptualizing human behaviour that focused attention on people’s practices and lived
realities. According to Magee (2001), Pierce’s central contention was that knowledge
develops from activity rather than from observation:

We are moved to enquire, to want to know, by some need or lack or doubt. This
leads us to evaluate our problem-situation, to try to see what it is in the situation
that is wrong, or missing, and ways in which that might be put right (Magee,
2001: 186).

The pragmatists argued that humans act on useful knowledge that they learn and
remember, they notice mainly what is useful to their goals, and their actions can be
usefully studied to advance social science (Charon, 2007).

These ideas were further developed by George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) at the
University of Chicago from 1894. Influenced by the evolutionary theory of Charles
Darwin and the view of the pragmatists that knowledge is the product of human activity,
Mead argued that humans exercise their minds in solving their problems by reflecting
on past situations they have experienced in deciding on their present course of action.
They are capable of treating themselves as objects. They become self-aware by seeing
themselves from the point of view of ‘a generalised other’ – the general, typical and
predominant views of the social group to which they belong, and take these views into
account in making their decisions (Cuff et al, 1992).

3.2.2

Symbolic Interactionism as a Theoretical Perspective

From this pragmatist foundation Herbert Blumer, a pupil of Mead, developed and
refined a theoretical perspective he called ‘symbolic interactionism’. Symbolic
interactionism, Blumer argued, is based on three premises. First, human beings act
towards things on the basis of meanings that the things have for them; that is, meanings
inform and guide human action. Second, the meaning of things is derived from, or arises
out of, the social interaction one has with one’s fellow humans; that is, from the
communication among individuals, not from the thing or object itself. Third, these
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by
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persons in dealing with the things encountered; that is, meaning is not fixed or stable,
but is always in process (Blumer, 1969; Locke, 2001).

To symbolic interactionists, group life is a process in which people, as they meet in
different situations, indicate lines of action to each other and interpret the indications
made by others. These ‘lines of action’ signify the way individuals think about and
signal their intent to act towards certain physical or social objects that come to their
attention. Objects so noticed become meaningful, socially defined, and intentionally
used in language during interaction among individuals. They are symbolized, or named,
according to the meaning they have for the individual. Symbolising, or naming an
object, allows an individual to mark it out as noted, to distinguish it from other names
for the object or from other objects, and to store it for later application and use. Symbols
are therefore important for communication - they help individuals share their
perspective of reality with others (Blumer, 1969). A person’s language about an object
signifies his or her perspective on it. Common language about an object indicates a
shared perspective among those who use it, and can become part of that society’s
culture when consistently used and understood to have a particular meaning over time.
People who begin their interaction with different perspectives may come to a commonly
shared perspective about some objects; what they call them, how they regard them, and
their symbolic meanings (Charon, 2007).

Meanings created through social interaction are the basic units of ‘symbolic
interactionist’ study (Charon, 2007). Hence, by studying the available documents
concerning the two cases, I was able to examine the perspectives of the people who
perpetrated it and encountered it and its meaning to them, individually and collectively.
The language of stakeholders about the corrupt behaviour they noticed at different
stages in its development in their institutions signified to me their perceptions about the
perpetrators involved and whether or not, and how, they labelled them as deviant
(Becker, 1966; Goode, 1978, 1984). Symbolic interactionists understand that the
meanings individuals share about an object can change over time as they obtain new
information about it. Through their social interaction, two or more actors may
constantly define and redefine their lines of actions in relation to an object or a situation
on which they are focused (Charon, 2007). In this study, a processual dimension was
added to trace people’s interpretations of corruption, and actions towards it, over time.
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In organizations and societies in which people have worked hard to create groups and
keep them together in pursuit of common goals at the cost of some of their
individuality, actors will take one another’s actions into account and may often vary
their own action accordingly. Each takes into account, when deciding on their personal
line of action, the culture they share that includes rules and norms embodied in what
Mead called a ‘generalised other’ (Charon, 2007). According to Charon (2007), a
‘generalised other’ encompasses the laws that are supposed to be obeyed, the customs,
informal and formal rules, procedures, traditions, taboos and morals. It develops over
time through cooperative shared perspectives. While generalised others do not
determine the action that an individual takes in a situation, because people don’t simply
respond to situations automatically, they do exert a powerful influence on the social
interactions that individuals engage in when assessing the situations they encounter.

As a theoretical perspective, symbolic interactionism proved useful in this study for
analysing the behaviour of the actors in their encounters with corruption over time,
enabling me to interpret what happened at the different stages as corruption grew, what
different people noticed, what sense they made of what they noticed, and the actions
they took at each stage as a consequence.

While Blumer outlined a methodological framework for symbolic interactionist studies,
he provided no specific guidelines or blueprint on how such studies should be
conducted. In studying human activity, he argued, the problem of methodology cannot
be settled in advance of the investigation. Undertaking qualitative research, he
contended, is a risky expedition for the researcher into unknown territory requiring
experience, hard work, creativity and good luck. To get close to the area of research, it
is necessary for the researcher to enter the field to be studied in order to conduct an
‘exploration’ of what is happening before launching an ‘inspection’ to understand the
way in which people in their particular situations handle problems they encounter and
develop findings about how they do so (Blumer, 1969).

In this study, I used textual analysis of documents relating to corruption cases and to the
social worlds involved in the corruption. I explored a sample of available literature that
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provided data on the context to the corruption in each case, and all the literature that
could be found on the corruption and how it was discovered and handled.

Exploration, however, was not enough to produce a theoretical explanation that
answered my research question. For me to understand in more detail the problem that
the participants experienced, a second research procedure was required – inspection.
According to Blumer (1969), inspection involves direct examination of the empirical
social world. Inspection is not conducted in a routine or prescribed manner, since it can
be unclear for a considerable time what phenomena are being examined. Inspection is
flexible, imaginative, creative and free to take new directions when examining social
objects, a process, or a relationship.

The aim of the inspection process I conducted in this study was to explain how and why
the OCI phenomenon developed in each case. To do so, it was useful to construct a
comprehensive and chronological account of what had happened and, more importantly,
to understand, and recast in theoretical form, the meanings made and the decisions and
action taken by the various actors in the two institutions in their ongoing struggle to
make sense of and address the corrupt conduct taking place.

Process will be shown to be important in the continually unfolding saga of corruption in
each case (Cuff et al, 1992), particularly in regard to the time taken by the actors to
develop a shared understanding that corrupt conduct was occurring and to label the
corrupt behaviour and known perpetrators as deviant. Reasons for that delay lie at the
heart of this explanation.

3.3

Processual Analysis

In order to capture the dynamic quality of the behaviour of the actors in a study
involving organizational change, Pettigrew (1997) argues that it is necessary to think
about time, history and process during research. This study incorporates analysis of
human behaviour over time of organizations affected by corruption, of historic and
immediate contexts which influenced actors and were subsequently reshaped by them,
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and of processes including eroding, emerging, developing, silencing, whistleblowing,
reporting, secreting, revealing, judging, reforming and renewing. Processual analysis
therefore plays an important role in explaining the development and demise of
corruption over time. Processual analysis applied to these two case studies involved a
search for patterns in the processes of corruption development and demise for
underlying mechanisms which drive the processes which enabled OCI development
(Pettigrew, 1997). Processual analysis of what I perceive are two similar cases enabled a
comparison of those mechanisms to be undertaken, which I undertake in Chapter 8 of
this study.

Process analysis examines how streams of events unfold as an issue develops and
changes over time in an unsteady state. In a similar way to interactionists, process
analysts are interested in actions of individual and collective agents. But they also
understand that their ‘actions are embedded in contexts which limit their information,
insight and influence’ (Pettigrew, 1997: 338). Time and history are at the centre of
process analysis. Contexts are historic and immediate, outer and inner, shaping and
shaped. Interchanges between organizational agents and contexts occur over time and
are cumulative. The legacy of the past is always shaping the emerging future.
Antecedent conditions are an integral part of any explanation of processes (Pettigrew,
1997). Contexts are given thorough analysis in chapters 4 and 6. Factors highlighted
play an important role in shaping processes discussed in chapters 5 and 7.

While time is a major focus, processual analysts also recognize that processes involving
human behaviour in many organizations may not be strictly linear, logical, directional
and irreversible and therefore not be able to be explained neatly in fixed or
predetermined stages. In this study, I identify five stages of development and demise of
corruption in the two affected institutions. My depiction of OCI development and
decline in stages is a methodological device I use to assist readers in understanding key
patterns of behaviour that this study indicates take place at particular points of the OCI
trajectory. Use of this methodological tool, however, can be misleading if the readers do
not appreciate the complexity of factors that influence the behaviour of the various
stakeholders who encounter the corruption at different stages. Corruption does not lend
itself easily to analysis in the social sciences (Blundo, 2007). While my analysis may
suggest that certain behaviours are confined to a particular stage because that is where I
56

discuss the barriers stakeholders face, behaviour of a large number of organizational or
institutional stakeholders are not so consistent and cannot be neatly compartmentalised
in a particular period. I make this permeation of behaviour across several periods
apparent in my narrative and explanation of the cricket match-fixing case throughout
chapter 5 and, to a lesser degree but similar fashion, in my narrative of the church abuse
case in a single organization in chapter 7. I discuss this porosity between stages or
periods in more detail in section 8.3 when explaining my theoretical model.

3.4

Grounded Theory Method

3.4.1

The Relationship between Symbolic Interactionism and Grounded Theory

Having explained ‘symbolic interactionism’ as an appropriate theoretical perspective
informing my use of textual study, a detailed explanation of the methods or techniques
employed in this study to collect and analyse documents about the corruption is now
provided. This explanation allows the validity of the methods used to be demonstrated
and those methods to be possibly replicated in future studies examining cases of OCI
development.

The methods and techniques used in this study – grounded theory - grew out of
symbolic interactionism (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001). Grounded theory
methodology is accepted as a pragmatic method for research in management, business,
and organizational studies (Creswell, 1998; Goulding, 2002; Locke, 2001; Remenyi et
al, 1998).

Symbolic interactionism lends itself readily to interpretivist understandings of social
phenomena, that is, to analysis in which the social scientist refrains from imposing
his/her own definition of the situation in favour of studying the definitions and
interpretations of the actors in the situation of interest. Symbolic interactionist
methodology is flexible in regard to the choice of techniques and procedures that its
adherents can use in conducting their research, their effectiveness being the guide
(Blumer, 1969; Locke, 2001; Charmaz, 2007). Although grounded theory grew out of
symbolic interactionism, it is used for both interpretivist and positivist research. It is
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based on a relatively prescribed set of techniques or methods that are used to construct
substantive theory, that is, a theoretical interpretation or explanation of a delimited
problem in a particular area (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Locke,
2001; Charmaz, 2006), and therefore suitable for examining the management of
paedophilia in church organizations and match-fixing in sporting organizations.

Grounded theory provides:
a set of established methods that consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for
collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories grounded in the
data themselves (Charmaz, 2006: 2).

In applying grounded theory methods in this study, I followed the advice of its
developers (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and adherents (Strauss and Corbin, 1998;
Charmaz, 2006; Suddaby, 2006) and used it flexibly as a tool to assist theorizing rather
than as a prescriptive procedure or routine application of formulaic technique. Data
collection and analysis were undertaken during the study as ongoing parallel processes
over the ten year period between the Cronje scandal in the cricket case in April 2000
and late 2010 when the most recent historical and theoretical literature on the church
case became available. Throughout this period, open, in-vivo, and focused coding was
undertaken on available documents, memos were written and diagrams drawn to assist
my interpretation and theorizing. Furthermore, theoretical and axial coding was carried
out to identify the core phenomenon or problem experienced by the participants, and to
construct both substantive and more generalised theory that explains that phenomenon.
While the process in practice was iterative and somewhat messy, the grounded theory
methods that were used are explained sequentially here in order to clarify and justify
their use in answering the research question.

3.4.2

The Research Process – Data Sources

Primary and secondary sources of data were obtained in each case in the form of
nontechnical (non-academic) and technical (academic) literature (Strauss and Corbin,
1998). The primary data sources comprised inquiry and investigation reports and
documents spanning a period of ten years that became publicly available, while the
secondary data sources comprised various biographical and historical publications on
the institutions, organizations and key individuals who were participants in the cases
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and encountered the corruption. The nontechnical or popular literature available was
considerable, and while much of this literature was produced after the ‘watershed’
scandals in each case, several significant documents pre-dated those scandals. The
technical literature available mainly comprised research studies of the church case in the
post-scandal period.

Data sources on the cricket case
My interest in the cricket case started with the book Not Cricket, authored by the Indian
cricket correspondent, Pradeep Magazine (Magazine, 2000). The Cronje scandal in
April 2000 was not the first time that match-fixing in cricket had been noticed; the
author had been investigating signs of corruption for more than three years. I began by
collecting media reports on the cricket scandal, starting with stories and leads provided
in the British cricket publications Wisden Monthly and The Cricketer. Simultaneously,
as the history of match-fixing dating back to the 1970s was revealed in inquiries that
followed the scandal, I progressively located earlier documents mentioning these
incidents.

Many kinds of documents refer to the match-fixing case. First, there are the
chronologies of Gaundalkar (1997), Polack and Pettet (2000) and Condon (2001) that
provided information on the timing of incidents and events, despite some inaccuracies,
and a smaller version in The Cricketer International in 2000. Next, the Inquiry reports
of Ebrahim (1995), Chandrachud (1997), Yousuf (1998), O’Regan (1999), Qayyum
(1999), Central Bureau of Investigation in India (CBI, 2000), King (2000a, 2000b,
2001), the ICC Code of Conduct Commission (2001), Condon (2001), Melick (2001),
Madhaven (2000) and Bhandari (2002) provide details of key events and both testimony
provided and evidence obtained against allegedly corrupt individuals. Media archives
from Cricinfo, rediff.com, BBC Sport, newspaper reports, the ICC and national Cricket
Board web sites provided daily accounts of current and historic events associated with
the corruption. Published cricket histories, records and both Test and ODI Cricket Lists,
by Dawson & Wat (1998) and Samuelson, Mason & Clark (1998) respectively, enabled
the data on matches (for example, dates, locations, players, scores, results) to be
checked to provide context for the corruption that occurred or was alleged to have
occurred in particular matches. Historic accounts of the scandal have been produced by
a number of cricket writers and aficionados, notably Oslear & Bannister (1996),
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Magazine (2000), Piesse (2000), Wilde (2001), Gouws (2000), Oosthuizen and Tinkler
(2001), Bose (2002), Guha (2002), Majumdar (2004), Haigh (2004) and Haigh and Frith
(2007). These writers provide detailed accounts of events and behind-the-scenes
interactions among participants. Finally, greater detail and varying accounts of certain
events emerged in the autobiographies and biographies of players and administrators of
the time. Players included Mark Taylor (2000), Shane Warne (2001), Mark Waugh in
Knight (2002), Michael Slater (2005), Steve Waugh (2005) and the late Hansie Cronje
in King (2005). Administrators were former Australian Cricket Board CEO Graham
Halbish (2003) and South African Cricket Board Managing Director Dr. Ali Bacher
(Hartman, 2004). Of interest in these accounts, published after the writers or their
subjects had officially left the institution, were their revelations of interactions they had
been silent about at the time they occurred.

To understand the context in which the corruption occurred, some prominent histories
of cricket were examined – of Australia (Moyes, 1959; Pollard, 1982, 1992; Harte,
2003; Haigh & Frith, 2007), England (Altham, 1962; Swanton, 1962; Birley, 1999;
Underdown, 2000; Williams, 1999; Warner, 1946; Moorhouse,1983; Rait Kerr &
Peebles, 1971), India (Guha, 2002; Majumdar, 2004; Haigh, 2010) and West Indies
(James, 1963; Manley, 1988); of the golden age in cricket (Morrah, 1967; Howat,
1989); of the ‘bodyline’ crisis in 1932-1933 (Fingleton, 1946; Mason, 1982; Le Quesne,
1983; Larwood, 1982; Jardine, 1984; Sissons & Stoddart, 1984; Derriman, 1984;
Douglas, 2002; Frith, 2002a); and of the ‘Packer revolution’ from 1977-1978 that gave
birth to one-day cricket (Haigh, 2000) and the age that followed summarised in the
Wisden Chronology 1978-2006 (Moss, 2006).

I also examined historic documents on cricket for evidence of ways in which actors in
the past handled corruption or other forms of misconduct off and on the field. A large
body of literature about such issues in cricket includes the famous annual Wisden
Cricketers’ Almanack, Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack Australia, biographies and
autobiographies, player and umpire diaries and reminiscences, themed anthologies of
cricket writings, and histories of cricket in England, Australia, India and West Indies
(for example, Birley, 1999; Harte, 2003; Guha, 2002; Manley, 1990). These were read
and relevant sections located and analysed as data relevant to the contexts that shaped
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the interpretations, interactions and subsequent actions of the participants during the
‘corruption’ period.

Finally, I examined these data for incidents and events other than the match-fixing
corruption that helped explain the interpretations and interactions among players,
officials, administrators, and governance bodies in dealing with cases of ‘misconduct’
unrelated to match-fixing, both on-field and off-field.

Data sources on the church case
I followed a similar plan in the Church case starting with the book Betrayal, authored
by the Boston Globe Investigative Staff (2002). I then collected media reports on the
Boston scandal, starting with the Boston Globe’s website titled ‘Spotlight on the
Catholic Church’ (http://www.boston.co/globe/spotlight/abuse/).

Documents I consulted included general theoretical treatises on child sexual abuse in
society (Simon, 1998; Mudaly & Goddard, 2006; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006;
Smallbone, Marshall & Wortley, 2008), clergy malfeasance (Shupe, 1995, 1998, 2008;
Sipe, 1995) and clergy ethics (Gula, 1996); texts on sexual abuse in the Church
(Parkinson, 1997; Berry, 2000; Bruni & Burkett, 2002; Friberg and Laaser, 1998;
Doyle, Sipe & Wall, 2006; Robinson, 2007; Podles, 2008; Yallop, 2010) and on the
Boston scandal specifically (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; France, 2004); the
Inquiry reports of the Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas Reilly (Reilly, 2003)
and the National Review Board of the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference (NRB, 2004),
and media archives particularly from the Boston Globe web site.

In order to appreciate the context in which the abuse developed in the Church, I studied
the history of christianity (Kung, 1994; McManners, 1990; Green, 1996), christianity
and sexuality ( Rudy, 1997; Weisner-Hanks, 2000), the structure and culture of the
Church (for example, Reese, 1998; Beed, 1998; Dillon, 1999; Cozzens, 2002; Berry &
Renner, 2004; Allen, 2004; Bartenuk, Hinsdale & Keenan, 2006; Lucas, Slack &
d’Apice, 2008; Lawler, 2008), the teaching of the church covered in the Vatican II
documents (Flannery, 1988), and read critical reviews on the papacy and church
teaching during the abuse period

(for example, Collins, 1986, 1991, 1997, 2001;

Stourton, 1998; Wills, 2000; Berry & Renner, 2004). Finally, in the post-scandal period,
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journal articles based on research conducted by the John Jay College for the U.S.
Catholic Church that were published in a special edition of Criminal Justice and
Behaviour in 2008 provided a research-based analysis of the scale of the abuse in the
U.S. Church, and insights into factors that the authors believe contributed to the crisis in
the Catholic Church.

3.4.3

The Research Process – Data Analysis

As indicated earlier, the methods and procedures employed in this study were based on
grounded theory. Texts on grounded theory methods, principally Glaser and Strauss
(1967); Strauss and Corbin (1998); Locke (2001) and Charmaz (2007), guided the
research process, as did the text Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 1969) and two
journal articles by Turner (1976, 1983) in which grounded theory methods were
employed in the study of man-made disasters.

While I did not employ the grounded theory methods in the sequence often prescribed, I
describe them below in that sequence as suggested by Suddaby (2006).

Open and In-vivo Coding
As indicated earlier, research on the cricket case began in 2000 when news of the
Cronje scandal came to my attention. In both the exploration and inspection stages of
researching this case, data were coded in order to develop concepts and categories (that
is, names and meanings) for objects, incidents, events and interactions found. The
coding process comprised two basic operations: first, asking questions of the data to
further my understanding of the emerging issues; second, making theoretical
comparisons of incidents to classify the data in terms of their properties and dimensions,
and to determine how the various incidents and interpretations of them by the actors
related to one another (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

The process of analysing the data involved, first, open coding - an analytic process
through which concepts, their properties and dimensions were identified in the data. A
concept is a labelled phenomenon or abstract representation of an object, interaction,
incident or event that the researcher identifies as being significant in the data. Properties
are characteristics of such concepts, the delineation of which define and give each one
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meaning. Dimensions are the range along which general properties of such concepts or
categories vary. For example, in the first document on the cricket case I examined
during the exploratory stage, Indian cricket journalist Pradeep Magazine relates the
event on 7 April 2000 when Delhi Police made formal allegations of match-fixing
against the South African cricket captain Hansie Cronje. Magazine was advised by
telephone in the morning of the allegations that were to be made later that day, and he
was asked to appear on the evening television program to discuss this event. The code
created – ‘allegations of match-fixing’ – was repeated on several occasions as the
remainder of the document was examined and earlier incidents of allegations against
other cricket captains were uncovered.

Open coding was accompanied by the constant comparison of concepts identified.
Hence, in the example above, when various incidents of ‘allegations of match-fixing’
were compared during the inspection stage of the research, they were seen to vary in
regard to when they were made and who made them, whom they were made about, what
evidence supported them, to whom they were made, what response followed each one
and when that response occurred. This constant comparison provided me with an
understanding of the properties and dimensions of that phenomenon (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998). Some properties and dimensions of this code uncovered as the coding
progressed were, for example, allegations made privately compared with those made
publicly; some based on perception compared with those based on solid evidence; some
made informally compared with others made formally; some were made by an
individual compared with others made by a group. In the church case, the comparative
concept was ‘allegations of sexual abuse’ where different properties related to whether
an allegation was made directly by a victim, a victim’s family, or through a legal
representative, and timing of the allegation - whether it was made soon or a
considerable time after the abuse had occurred. In undertaking coding and constant
comparison of data on ‘allegations of match-fixing or ‘allegations of sexual abuse’, I set
out to interpret the different meanings that the corrupt conduct had for the actors
involved, how they led to these allegations, and to the manner in which they were
responded to.

‘In vivo’ coding is similar to open coding but the concepts are those that have been
named by the participants; in the cricket case by cricketers and aficionados of the game.
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For example, ‘sledging’ is an ‘in vivo’ concept that describes a practice engaged in by
players in the fielding team from the 1970s until after 2000 of verbally abusing
opposing batsmen in order to distract their attention from the batting task. This practice,
seen by cricket authorities in 2000 to be contrary to the spirit of cricket, was an
unsavoury escalation of the traditional practice of fielders, close to the batsmen,
engaging in friendly banter with them. Cricket authorities allowed this extreme practice
to develop in the game in the late 20th century during which time there was considerable
ambivalence among the cricketing public, players and officials, and frequent debates in
the sporting media, about its fairness. I write more about this concept in Chapter 4.
Related concepts that share common properties and dimensions were drawn together
into categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For example, in the cricket case, ‘unfair
practices’ is a category that describes a number of related on-field practices, including
sledging, throwing, ball tampering, refusing to walk and arguing with the umpire when
given out, all of which were aimed at obtaining an unfair advantage over opponents.
Many of these ‘unfair practices’ were not interpreted by many players and fans as
deviant if they conferred a winning advantage for their team; instead they were
euphemistically referred to as ‘competitive tactics or strategies’.

Memos and Diagrams
I wrote memos and sketched diagrams as exercises in parallel with coding and constant
comparison of the data. These memos and diagrams provided a record of my analysis,
thoughts, interpretations and questions regarding the meaning that interactions,
incidents and events had for the various actors, and provided me with directions for
further data collection. Memos were written about documents being analysed, written
on separate sheets of paper or developed as word, spreadsheet or presentation
documents during the coding process, and filed for later use. Multiple diagrams were
sketched depicting potential relationships among concepts and categories, of which
Figures 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1 are examples that I developed and
progressively refined during the research.

Focused Coding
Codes and categories became progressively saturated as the analysis of new incidents
and events elicited no new concepts or categories. At this stage, I turned to focused
coding, using what I regarded were ‘the most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to
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sift large amounts of data’ (Charmaz, 2006: 57). This coding took place as new cricket
texts and media stories were published in the months and years following the conduct of
formal government and national cricket authority inquiries. While these authors were
more open in discussing their knowledge of past match-fixing, it was rare that new
concepts emerged from these reports. A similar process was followed in ongoing
analysis of the church case.

Perusing entire documents about the institutions also provided me with an
understanding of ‘the big picture’ - what was happening and had happened on a meso or
macro scale in the past and present that was related to the corruption. ‘Seeing the big
picture’ of long term pervasive corruption in international cricket and in the Catholic
Church at an early stage enabled me to more easily understand ‘what is going on here?’
in relation to particular interpretations of interactions, incidents or events being
inspected at a later stage.

This process of ‘seeing the big picture’ included the preparation of a chronology of
incidents and events related to both the cricket corruption and the corruption of sexual
abuse in the Catholic Church in Boston. I have not included these chronologies in this
thesis, but their usefulness can be seen in Chapters 5 and 7. The textual material
published prior to the scandals, and many of the biographies published in the postscandal periods, were seldom arranged in a chronological order. Consequently, these
accounts had to be examined carefully to locate incidents and events in a time line by
date, location and participants involved in the interactions to understand what they may
have known, and when, and to locate their responses chronologically. Furthermore, the
descriptions, commentary and statements of the authors and actors in these texts had to
be interpreted carefully, and compared with published interpretations by others on the
same interactions, incidents and events, in order to understand their meaning from the
perspective of those commentators at those particular times.

Axial Coding
When saturation had been reached, that is, when additional analysis of texts revealed no
new concepts, categories, properties and dimensions of value, I reintegrated the main
categories for the purpose of showing the relationships among them. This process of
reintegration – termed axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) or theoretical coding
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(Charmaz, 2006) - enabled me to delimit the theory to its main conceptual elements in
order to tell the corruption stories in a way that provides a theoretical explanation of the
main problem that the participants were experiencing (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) - in
both cases, the development of an OCI in those institutions. However, the full
theoretical explanation that answers the research question would be provided by
combining the developed axial coding model in each case (Figures 4.1 and 6.1) with the
respective process coding model (Figures 5.1 and 7.1). This theoretical model (Figure
8.1) is explained in Chapter 8.

The axial / theoretical coding I conducted conceptualized ‘how the substantive codes
may relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated into a theory’ (Charmaz, 2006:
63). As suggested by Strauss & Corbin (1998) and Charmaz (2006), categories were
incorporated into a preliminary explanatory model (Figure 3.1) around the core
category, or main problem, being experienced by the participants in each case, namely
‘OCI development over time’.

Figure 3.1
OCI development – a preliminary model
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factors, facilitated OCI development
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The first theoretical category – contextual factors or antecedent conditions –
incorporates outer and inner environmental conditions which affected the organizations
/ institutions together with individual and situational factors that enabled individual
corruption to occur and an OCI to develop. The second category – insider moderations –
incorporates actions which most organizational members took based on their
interpretations of what was happening and their strategies for addressing perceived
corruption which were influenced by the contextual factors. These insider moderations
allowed the trajectory of corruption to rise when they failed to minimise corrupt
conduct, thereby facilitating OCI development. The third category – outsider
interventions – incorporates the actions taken by organizational / institutional
stakeholders who noticed behaviour which they perceived to be corrupt and
endeavoured to prevent it. These outsider stakeholders included the media, government
regulators and members of the public who were not members of the insider groups who
attempted to moderate such interventions, and whistleblowers who came to be regarded
as outsiders because of their private and public efforts to prevent the problem, often
against the wishes of the organizational elites. The vertical arrows signify those ongoing
moderations and interventions, the thickness their relative strength; hence the figure
indicates the domination of moderations over interventions during OCI development.

Process Coding
Figure 3.1 alone is insufficient to explain the OCI development over time. As Strauss
and Corbin (1998) have explained, the discovery of process in each case requires
another form of analysis to be conducted – process coding. The exploratory stage of the
analytic coding process revealed that the corruption in cricket spanned more than 25
years; in the church case, the corruption spanned 50 years. In both cases, the trajectory
of corruption rose until a major scandal occurred, after which it fell as a consequence of
strong media and government interventions. Figure 3.2 is a process model that depicts
the trajectory of corruption, represented by the dotted line, over five nominal periods I
identified in these two cases – three pre-scandal, one scandal and one post-scandal. This
study suggests that these three pre-scandal stages comprise an emergence stage, an
uncertainty stage and a cover-up stage. The post-scandal restoration stage involves
efforts to re-establish the reputation and image of the organization, but these efforts are
not always successful. While I argue that there are three pre-scandal periods in OCI
development based on my analysis of these cases, with different forms of corrupt
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behaviour that are more easily recognized such as fraud, or in a different context where
earlier interventions by insiders or outsiders are more influential or informative because
they are backed by evidence of the corrupt behaviour, there may be less OCI
development if prevention measures are enacted earlier than at the cover-up stage.

Figure 3.2
OCI development – a preliminary process model
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Selective Coding
Once axial and process coding had been carried out during the exploration stage of the
research, I undertook selective coding in order to integrate the emerging categories
along the dimensional level to begin the task of forming a theory, to validate statements
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about relationships among concepts and to fill in any categories that needed refinement
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

I began by comparing the two cases for the similarities and differences in the categories
and concepts I identified in each. During the exploratory analysis of the Church case,
initial coding indicated that there were conceptual similarities between the two cases,
and the possibility of theoretical similarity. This was confirmed as the analysis
proceeded, particularly when both the cases were able to be categorized as examples of
OCI development (Pinto et al, 2008). During the inspection stages of analysing and
comparing the two cases I noted that, while there were some differences in the
properties and dimensions of the concepts and categories identified, for example, in the
type, scale and duration of corruption, there were no differences in the concepts.

Next, I examined wider literature on similar corruption situations in sport (for example,
the Black Sox match-fixing in baseball in 1919 - see Asinof, 1963; Carney, 2006; Fleitz,
2001, and the drugs problem in international cycling – see Voet, 2001; Whittle, 2008),
the church (for example, the sexual abuse scandals in the Anglican Church in Australia
in Brisbane - see O’Callaghan and Briggs, 2003, and Adelaide –see Olsson and Chung,
2004), and local government (the planning-related corruption at Wollongong City
Council – see ICAC, 2008; East, 2009). I also examined literature on related situations
involving man-made disasters in which I located evidence of sense-making difficulties
with crescive or complex problems (for example, Snook, 2000; Beamish, 2000, 2002;
Hopkins, 2000, 2005). In a preliminary exploration of some these cases, I found
similarities and differences in these cases to those in this study, but to elaborate on what
these similarities and differences were is beyond the scope of this thesis.

At the inspection stage, there were category gaps that required filling before I could
produce a substantive theory in each case, or provide a general theory that answered the
research question. I turned to literature on management concepts / theories which I
believed were suitable categories I could use to explain and integrate concepts in the
cases and fill gaps in my emerging theory. Notable among these concepts / theories
were sense-making (Weick, 1995a), ambivalence (Bauman, 1991), legalistic
organizations (Sitkin and Bies, 1994), escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981, 2005) and
organizational defensive routines (Argyris, 1990, 1994, 2005). The category of
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‘organizational defensive routines’, for example, describes the strategies, policies or
actions that some managers use to avoid embarrassment or threat to their reputation and
that of their organizations. ‘Organizational defensive routines’ became a moderation
category (see Figure 3.1) under which I was able to cluster a range of concepts naming
actions taken by management to inhibit the impact of interventions during the late prescandal periods, examples of which are explicated in Chapters 5 and 7.

3.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, the methodological approach used to answer the research question has
been explained. In contrast to the extant research on corruption discussed in Chapter 2,
which has been mainly been undertaken using a positivist approach, this study employs
processual analysis guided and informed by a symbolic interactionist theoretical
perspective in which grounded theory methods are used. From this analytic process, two
substantive theories that explain the development of an OCI in the cricket case and the
church case are constructed.

In chapter 4, I describe the context in which match-fixing corruption developed. In
accordance with the views expressed by Pettigrew (1997), I highlight features of that
context which were influential in shaping the corruption process.
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CHAPTER 4: THE CRICKET MATCH-FIXING CASE –
PART I: THE CONTEXT THAT ENABLED THE
CORRUPTION
4.1

Introduction

The cricket match-fixing case is regarded by some commentators as the greatest crisis
that cricket has faced in its 300 year history (Qayyum, 1999; Condon, 2001; Hartman,
2004; Stern, 2003).

Between 1975 and 2002, international cricket was corrupted when a small number of
bookmakers and punters formed nexus with leading cricketers in order to obtain
information on or manipulate the outcomes of at least 50 international cricket matches
in order to win bets placed (Condon, 2001; Polack & Pettet, 2000). The extent of the
corruption in cricket became a public scandal in April 2000 after Delhi Police revealed
that they had uncovered evidence that the iconic South African cricket captain Hansie
Cronje, and certain bookmakers / punters of Indian and South African origin, had
contrived to fix the results of a small number of international matches in which the
South African team was playing. The scandal escalated and tarnished the image of
international cricket and the reputation of leading players and officials from many
nations when, during 2000, a government inquiry in South Africa (King, 2000a, 2000b,
2001) and a national police investigation in India (CBI, 2000) revealed the names of
those who had been involved, and when the release of reports of earlier cricket board
inquiries conducted by Justice Chandrachud (1997) in India and by Justices Ebrahim
(1995) and Qayyum (1999) in Pakistan, which had been kept secret, were released.
Belatedly cricket’s international governing body, the International Cricket Council
(ICC), established an Anti-Corruption Unit and commissioned a review of the history
and causes of the corruption in international cricket (Condon, 2001). According to
Condon, the known incidents were, in all likelihood, just ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of
corruption. His report confirmed the scale of the corruption, identified its likely causes
and made recommendations on minimising it in the future, and made clear to the public

71

that cricket authorities - the trustees of the game - had played a major role in allowing
the corruption to develop.

Together, the post-scandal inquiries aimed to identify and punish the deviant individuals
and restoring public confidence in international cricket. While largely successful in
achieving this aim, with the exception of Condon’s report, they largely ignored the
question of interest in this study, namely - how and why cricket officials and other
institutional actors failed to prevent their organizations developing into OCIs despite
many of them being aware, at some stage, of the corrupt conduct that was taking place.
The answers to these questions are provided in this chapter and the next.

Figure 4.1 is a framework I use for explaining OCI development over time in the
institution of cricket. Based on Figure 3.1, this framework indicates that the OCI
development in cricket occurred as a result of the actions of certain individuals to
exploit opportunities created by a combination of conditions in cricket’s environment in
order to make money through match-fixing. The corrupt behaviour of these individuals
was facilitated by strong moderating behaviour and weak interventionist behaviours of
cricket’s stakeholders who encountered corruption. These behaviours are represented by
the vertical arrows in the figure: the upward arrows represent the relative strength of
moderating behaviours of those actors who facilitated the corruption; the downward
arrows represent the relative strength of intervening behaviours by media
representatives and governments, sometimes instigated by internal whistleblowers, who
attempted to reveal and suppress the corruption.

In this chapter, I discuss the context – what some theorists (e.g., Pettigrew, 1997; Zahra
et al, 2005) refer to as the antecedent conditions for the corruption and its cover up. In
order to understand corruption, one must appreciate the context in which it develops
(Anand et al, 2004). Understanding context and its effects is central to processual
analysis (Pettigrew, 1997). As Blumer (1969) has noted, human interactions create
context and are also influenced by it.
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Figure 4.1
OCI development in cricket – an explanatory framework (context)
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CHAPTER 5

Four categories of contextual factors are examined in this chapter. First, I describe
factors in the external environmental which provided opportunities for some individuals
to engage in match-fixing. Second, I outline some enduring internal conditions in
cricket organizations - of structure and culture – which influenced the actions of
institutional members (internal moderations) and stakeholders (external interventions)
who enabled the corrupt behaviour prior to the ‘Cronje’ scandal. Third, I suggest why
certain individuals and not others may have decided to act corruptly. Fourth, and of
particular significance in this case, I highlight the situational factors present that
increased the likelihood that some individuals would act corruptly. Thereafter, in
Chapter 5, I discuss in detail the dynamic aspects of the corruption and its cover-up, in
particular the moderating and intervening behaviour of various actors who encountered
it.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, I provide a brief description of
cricket for those who are unfamiliar with the game, following which I provide an
explanation of match-fixing. I show that definitions of match-fixing during the
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corruption period did not encompass the diversity of corrupt activities that were
possible, a consequence of this categorization problem being the effect that it had on the
sense-making of many actors concerning incidents that they noticed and later recalled.
They were unable to reconcile the behaviour they considered might constitute matchfixing with the contrary views of others and the official position taken by cricket
management that such behaviour was not associated with match-fixing. In Section 4.3, I
discuss three changes that occurred in the external environment of cricket during the
match-fixing period between 1975 and 2000 – first, the impact of the ‘Packer
Revolution’ between 1977 and 1979; second, the growth in international cricket,
particularly the one-day international game (ODI); and third, the growth in illegal
betting on cricket centred in India. In Section 4.4, I subject the internal environment of
cricket - its structure, governance, laws, ethics, and culture – to analysis, highlighting
the conditions in each that I believe enabled the match-fixing corruption. Following
that, in Section 4.5, I address the more proximate individual and situational factors that
enabled the corruption.

4.2

The Description of Cricket and Match-Fixing

Cricket is described in the Wisden Australia 2005-2006 (Baum, 2006: 804) as:

a game played between two teams generally of eleven members each. In
essence, it is single combat in which the individual batsman does battle against
an individual bowler, who has helpers known as fielders. The bowler propels the
ball with a straight arm from one end of a 22-yard pitch in an attempt to dismiss
the batsman by hitting a target known as a wicket at the other end, or by causing
the batsman to hit the ball into the air into a fielder’s grasp, or by inducing one
of a number of other indiscretions. The batsman attempts to defend the wicket
with a bat and to score runs – the currency of the game – by striking the ball to
the field boundary, or far enough from the fielders to allow the batsman to run to
the other end of the pitch before the ball can be returned. At least two bowlers
must take turns, from alternating ends; also there are always two batsmen in the
field, each to take a turn as required. When all but one of the batting team have
been dismissed - or after an agreed period - the teams’ roles are reversed. After
all the players required to bat on both sides have done so, either once or twice
(which can take from a few hours to five days), the total number of runs
accumulated determines the winner. But sometimes there isn’t one.

74

Cricket evolved to its present form over a period of some 300 years. From undetermined
origins in northern Europe, when cricket was a pastime known as club-ball, it developed
into a competitive sport within and between English counties (Brayshaw, 1985). Since
the late nineteenth century, competitive cricket has been played at club, regional,
national and international levels in many nations. Cricket today is played in many
countries but predominantly in England, Australia, New Zealand, West Indies, South
Africa, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Zimbabwe.

The traditional ‘two innings’ international cricket match was originally of unlimited
duration, but was gradually shortened to its current duration of five days. A shorter form
of the game, the ‘one innings’ game of 50 overs per team played in one-day, was
allowed by English cricket officials in 1963. In the 21st century, a quicker form of the
game –‘20:20 cricket’, comprising 20 overs per team, has become popular with fans and
television audiences.

4.2.1 Match-fixing in Cricket
Match-fixing in cricket is not a new problem. Underperformance for money, leading to
a preconceived result in a game, has been known about since the 1700s. Scandals
related to betting occurred in the early 19th century in Britain, when individuals left their
poverty in rural England to come to the maelstrom of gambling and corruption, where
matches were bought and sold, in order to earn a better living as professional players
(Underdown, 2000). They became easy prey for bookies, with some infamous players
selling matches to protect their wagers. The ruling body in cricket at the time was the
Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). It took some 20 years for the MCC to decide that this
corruption was killing the game, as well as costing gentlemen large sums of money,
before it acted to remove the bookmakers from the grounds. Likewise, Majumdar
(2004) noted that attempts were made to fix matches in the 1930s and 1940s in India.
But elite players, suspected of deliberately contributing to an unexpected result by slow
play, escaped punishment by cricket authorities because of their past achievements, lack
of evidence or alternative explanations for their slow play.

Based on knowledge at the time, between 1975 and 2000, the prevailing understanding
of match-fixing among cricket administrators was that it entailed a situation in which
players deliberately underperformed in order to lose a game that they were expected to
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win, and from which loss they received considerable financial gain or other benefit
(Qayyum, 1999). As I will show in Chapter 5, these administrators ignored signs and
dismissed allegations of match-fixing that did not fit this interpretation until 2000 when
a significant shift occurred in their understanding as a result of education provided by
the CBI report (CBI, 2000), and reinforced in 2001 by their Anti-Corruption Unit report
(Condon, 2001). Only at that stage did they accept a new definition of match-fixing that
covered a range of on-field and off-field practices aimed at manipulating the results of
many routine activities during a cricket match on which bets were being placed. In
2010, following recent match-fixing allegations against the Pakistan team, the new term
‘spot-fixing’ has come into everyday use for this later form of match-fixing (Wilkinson,
2010).

It should come as no surprise that early signs of the match-fixing that developed from
1975 went unnoticed, or when noticed were not understood by the actors involved at the
time. Nor should it be surprising that many of the allegations of underperformance
made later were dismissed by officials and other stakeholders who understood matchfixing in the traditional sense. The match-fixing that the perpetrators instigated was
novel in the variety of behaviours it encompassed and was more complex than the
throwing of games.

Following the interrogation of Indian players and bookies in 2000, match-fixing was
redefined more broadly by the CBI as ‘an omnibus phrase to denote the following:

i)

instances where an individual player or group of players received money
individually / collectively to under-perform;

ii)

instances where an individual player placed bets in matches in which he
played that would naturally undermine his performance;

iii)

instances where players passed on information to a betting syndicate about
team composition, probable result, pitch condition, weather etc.;

iv)

instances where groundsmen were given money to prepare a pitch in a way
which suited the betting syndicate;

v)

instances where current and ex-players were used by bookies to gain access
to players to influence their performance for monetary consideration’ (CBI,
2000: Section II).
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The CBI revealed how these novel forms of match-fixing were associated with ‘spread
betting’, a form of betting that had grown in popularity. ‘Spread betting’ worked in the
following way:
A bookmaker says that a player will score 40- 45 runs. A punter bets on a high
or low result at a unit rate he chooses, say $5. He wins or loses his stake
multiplied by the difference between prediction chosen and the result. If the
player scores 60 runs, the punter wins $75 (60-45 = 15 x $5 = $75). If the player
scores only 38 runs, the punter betting on the high result loses $35 (45-38 = 7 x
$5 = $35). The scam comes in the form of the bookie knowing the result and
fixing a low prediction rate with the player delivering a low actual score as
prearranged (BBC News, April 2000).
Following the lead given by the CBI report, in 2001 the ICC Anti-Corruption Unit Chief
Sir Paul Condon spelt out in his report the greater sophistication in match-fixing:

From the late 1970s onwards, a more insidious and corrosive form of fixing took
hold of the game. This involved a player or players underperforming in relation
to certain events within a game. This allowed bets to be placed with a high
probability of winning…with the winnings from such bets greatly enhanced.
Players…could under perform at predetermined parts of the match and still go
on to win (Condon, 2001: para 66).
Condon described many ways in which match-fixing corruption occurred:

…in its most serious and lucrative form, corruption in cricket has many
manifestations because every single aspect of the game is vulnerable to
manipulation and fixing, on matters such as –
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The outcome of the toss at the beginning of a match
The end from which the fielding captain will elect to bowl
A set number of wides or no balls occurring in an over
Players being placed in unfamiliar fielding positions
Individual batsmen scoring fewer runs than their opposite numbers batting
first
Batsmen being out at a specific point in their innings
The total runs that the batting captain will declare
The timing of a declaration
The total runs in an innings and particularly the first innings in an ODI.
(Condon, 2001: para 74)

It did not need all members of a team to participate in order for the main perpetrators to
successfully manipulate the result of a game and win bets. As Condon showed, the other
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forms of betting were related to decisions by the captain on the day of the match. These
would normally not be known to bookie or punter, but if prearranged between the
bookie and captain, could deliver substantial winnings to the bookie, captain and
participating players. Officials also became targets for corruption in regard to the
decisions they made that often decided the result of some aspect of play on which bets
could be placed.

These forms of match-fixing occurred from 1975 (CBI, 2000; Condon, 2001) but was
unbeknown to the public until 1996 when evidence provided by Oslear & Bannister in
their book Tampering with Cricket (1996) showed that betting took place on more than
the outcome of a game. Despite the availability of this information, the inquiries
conducted by cricket authorities before 2000 used the traditional definition of matchfixing in interpreting what behaviour in cricket constituted that corruption (Qayyum,
1999). Many cricket stakeholders used this same definition when interpreting
allegations that certain players were accepting gifts from bookmakers or were providing
them with information in exchange for money. Ambivalence about the definition and
seriousness of match-fixing remained after 2000 with opinions of some leading players,
notably former England captain Nasser Hussain, and Australian batsman Michael
Slater, not changing (Hussain, 2004; Slater, 2005). Hussain, for example, after
retirement recounted his attitude and unwillingness to be dictated to by cricket
authorities in regard to whom he could communicate with during a cricket match;
similarly Slater after retirement belatedly admitted to having been aware that a fellow
player had received money for providing team information to a punter in 1994. This
ambivalence among key stakeholders in cricket is still present judging by statements
made and actions taken concerning allegations of spot-fixing against certain Pakistan
players in 2010 (Wilkinson, 2010).

4.3

External Conditions in Cricket that Provided Corruption

Opportunities
4.3.1

Changes affecting Cricket 1975-2000

In the period 1975-2000, the environment of cricket underwent major economic and
social change. A nexus of three social worlds – the television industry, international
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cricket and the illegal betting industry in India – resulted in change in the game of
cricket at international level and, at the same time, unintentionally provided
opportunities for match-fixing.

The Packer Revolution and the One-Day International (ODI)
This transformation in cricket began with an attempt by media owner Kerry Packer to
obtain broadcasting rights for cricket in Australia. With the advent of colour television
in Australia, and the prospect of cable television developing internationally, media
owner Kerry Packer began looking for suitable content for his television channel. The
televising of sport promised a high net revenue opportunity for media owners.

In 1976, Packer made an offer to the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) to televise test
cricket for a substantial monetary payment in excess of that which had been routinely
made by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) for those rights in past years.
Without a commercial focus, the ACB decided to continue its traditional arrangements
with the ABC. Incensed at his dismissive treatment by the ACB, Packer established a
rival competition, World Series Cricket (WSC), to provide his televised sports content.
He secretly enrolled leading international players and former players for considerably
more pay and better conditions than they were being offered in the traditional game
(Forsyth, 1978; Blofeld, 1978; Caro, 1979; Haigh, 2000; Haigh & Frith, 2007; Moss,
2006a).

Prior to that time, cricket was primarily an amateur game. In England, until 1962,
cricketers were categorized as either ‘amateurs’ or ‘professionals’. Amateurs had
sources of income that enabled them to play without additional pay, whereas
professionals were talented players without such means whose labour was hired. Social
change after World War II led to professional players receiving more recognition in the
forms of captaincy and honours (Sissons, 1988). Players were paid their expenses but
most administrators, ‘slavishly following Lord’s’, consistently refused to accede to
player requests for improvement in their pay and conditions (Coward, 2002; Haigh &
Frith, 2007). Efforts of professional players to improve their pay and conditions, and to
supplement their incomes by journalistic work, were strongly controlled, and often
resisted, by cricket administrators in Australia (Haigh & Frith, 2007; Knight, 2002) and
India (Majumdar, 2004).
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Although, from the 1960s, players began to show less deference to cricket authorities in
their demands until Packer provided an opportunity for them to join a rival professional
competition, the players were relatively powerless against intransigent cricket
administrators who wanted to maintain the game in its traditional form. Following the
success of the ‘Packer Revolution’ in attracting fifty of the best international players to
the substantial remuneration packages offered, other players from Australia, England,
New Zealand and West Indies joined in efforts to improve their pay and conditions.
Progressively, they formed player associations in an effort to strengthen their
negotiating position. Clearly, money was important to professional cricketers.

Packer’s WSC plan also challenged the prevailing culture of cricket by introducing
practices that marketed cricket as an entertainment product to commercial sponsors,
fans and television audiences. His critics referred to this rival competition disparagingly
as ‘Packer’s Circus’ because, among the traditions it broke, WSC players wore
colourful clothes rather than the traditional whites, used a differently coloured cricket
ball and played the shorter one-day form of the game in the evening under lights.

Australian officials facing the WSC challenge enrolled other ICC members in a range of
political and legal measures to ensure the new venture was unsuccessful, but Packer’s
company PBL succeeded in overcoming this opposition and popularised the one-day
format among the cricketing public. In 1979, a compromise deal saw Packer win the
next television broadcasting rights for Australian cricket, and the ACB was again
accorded sole administration of cricket in Australia.

This dispute heralded two major changes in the world of cricket – the growth of the
one-day international (ODI) and the commercialization of the international game with
partnerships formed between national cricket boards, media and product sponsors. This
transformation also spawned the growth of illegal betting on cricket in India.

Significantly, WSC cricket was criticized in its early days by the traditionalists as being
played for money rather than love of the game or country. Early exciting games were
‘written off’ by some critics as ‘rigged’, like professional wrestling (Stone, 2000). This
danger of fixed matches, seen by some critics during the WSC period, was forgotten
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after the ‘revolution’ as cricket boards embraced the benefits and wealth that
commercialization of cricket brought to the sport.

The growth in one-day international matches (ODIs)
The commercialization of cricket centred on the ODI. Condon (2001) identified the
rapid increase in ODIs as a major factor that encouraged match-fixing.

Figure 4.2 shows the number of ODI games played in the period 1971-2000 by the ten
full members of the ICC (Wilde, 2003), and the number of games in which the Indian
team participated. A disproportionate percentage of ODI games were played by India.
Bose (2002) provided data on the number of ODI games that involved the Indian team
in the period 1974-2002, particularly 1996-2000.

Figure 4.2
No. of ODI games of all ICC teams and the Indian team 1971-2000
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The interest of authorities in the ODI can be explained by the commercial opportunities
and popularity of televised ODI games in India. According to Majumdar
(2004:367),‘…radio and particularly television…made (cricket) the most popular game
in India’. Given the desire of television media and product sponsors to tap into the large
Indian market, new ODI tournaments were developed by the BCCI and other smaller
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cricket boards in association with American companies with interests in south Asia, like
Singer and Pepsi, and television companies like Rupert Murdoch’s Star Television, who
were keen to reach this important economic group (Bose, 2002). The ODI was more
lucrative than the traditional test matches for the cricket boards, since the revenue from
a single one-day game equalled the total revenue from 3 test matches, or 15 days of
traditional cricket. Following tradition, and without an agreement being reached in the
ICC over the shape and direction of international cricket, each board made independent
decisions about an annual calendar of matches for its national team, in which the ODI
form was dominant. In addition, commercial interests in other international locations
invited elite players to participate in world team tournaments arranged primarily to
provide the organizers and their backers with income from associated gambling
activities.

As the number of international matches increased, the motivation of players to win each
game decreased. In 1999, for example, 308 ODIs were played around the world which
led former Test bowler Frank Tyson to comment, after the scandal in 2000, that ‘since
the authorities thought so little of the ODI at that stage, why should the players think
any more of them?’ (Tyson, 2000: 9).

Commercialization of the Game
As might be expected from its active participation in conducting ODIs, the BCCI
benefitted the most among the cricketing institutions from the commercialization of
cricket during the 1990s. Although the number of ODI games increased in the 1980s,
the cricket boards failed to appreciate the potential revenue of their product until the
mid 1990s. It was India that first recognised and exploited this potential. Figure 4.3
shows this increase in profits from the annual reports of the BCCI in the period 19921998, the greatest period of growth in the ODIs (Magazine, 2000).
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Figure 4.3
BCCI annual profits 1992-1998
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While matches televised in India prior to 1991 did not result in any payment to the
BCCI from its national broadcaster, taking advantage of the entrepreneurship of its
Secretary Jagmohan Dalmiya from 1993, through a change of broadcaster, lucrative
sponsorships and gate takings, the BCCI accumulated $US200 million in the bank by
2000 (Hartman, 2004). India gradually emerged as the economic giant among the
cricketing nations, an accumulation of power which resulted in considerable antipathy
from the traditional power holders, England and Australia (Majumdar, 2004). By 2008,
India would account for 80% of all global cricket revenue with annual revenue of more
than US$1billion (Wade, 2008). With that wealth, its influence on the game increased.

After the match-fixing scandal broke in 2000, the dangers of commercialism were
raised. The BCCI was criticized by the CBI, when it investigated the match-fixing in
Indian cricket, for ignoring the health of Indian domestic cricket while pursuing the
wealth associated with commercialization of the international game (Magazine, 2000;
CBI, 2000).

Another risk was the pay and conditions of players discussed earlier. In 2001, Condon
argued that the seeds of corruption included the fact that:
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international cricketers are paid less than top soccer players, golfers, tennis
players and formula one drivers and are therefore more vulnerable to corrupt
approaches…cricketers received a low single figure percentage of the proceeds
from the event and resent the distribution of profits elsewhere. Cricketers have
little say or stake in running the sport and limited recognition of their
representative bodies, where they exist. Cricketers have relatively short and
uncertain playing careers, often without contracts and some seek to supplement
their official earnings with money from corrupt practices (2001: para 79).
During the match-fixing period, cricket administrators refused to pay attention to the
needs of their players, thereby contributing to the distance between them (Haigh &
Frith, 2007; Coward, 2004). Cricket authorities too underestimated the effect of money
on player behaviour. In 1997, the Chandrachud Inquiry accepted the testimony of Indian
captain Mohammad Azharuddin, who was later banned from the game for match-fixing,
that players would not be tempted by bookies. ‘We earn about 40 lakhs a year, officially
from the BCCI. In addition, we make quite some money in other lawful ways as in
advertisements. There is no need to look beyond it’ (Chandrachud, 1997: Pt 1). Later
inquiries, notably Condon’s in 2000-2001, came to an opposing view.

Another danger associated with putting commercial interests ahead of ethical
considerations was pointed out by cricket commentators such as former test bowler
Frank Tyson who, with the benefit of hindsight and perhaps freed by the scandal in
2000 from maintaining his silence on such matters, accused ‘the world cricket
authorities of promoting profit ahead of national pride as the primary objective of
winning’, and ‘some of its players of greed…when, in spite of earning a handsome
living out of cricket, they could not resist a few extra pennies from the bookies’ (Tyson,
2000: 9). Later, cricket writer Gideon Haigh, commenting on the practice established by
the breed of players receiving large payments for their services to play in commercial
teams, asked ‘what happens…if the highest bidder for your services should turn out to
be a bookmaker? The only thing to prevent you taking the money is conscience’ (Haigh,
2004: 167, 189). He added that ‘Perhaps, morally void as its habitués are, match-fixing
is merely a logical outcome of the concept of sport as a business and its leading
participants are businessmen, auctioning themselves in the free market of entertainment’
(2004: 179).
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The Growth of Illegal Betting on Cricket
A third environmental force contributed to the corruption. The popularity of the ODI
format in India fuelled a growth of betting on cricket in that nation. Despite that fact
that betting on cricket was illegal, there was no political will to stop or prevent it.

Within the social world of illegal betting on cricket, a small number of Indian
bookmakers and punters saw an opportunity to improve their success rate by infiltrating
the world of cricket. From 1975, these bookies and punters formed various nexus with
some international cricketers, officials and cricket media representatives to obtain
information on and, subsequently with certain players, engage in match-fixing by
manipulating various outcomes of cricket matches associated with ‘spread betting’.

A partial explanation of why that environmental threat was missed or overlooked by
cricket authorities lies in the history of betting on cricket.

Betting on Cricket: Betting and match-fixing were not new to cricket. Betting, or
gambling, had a long association with the game of cricket and, in the eyes of some,
could take some credit for its development. ‘Ironically, if it wasn’t for gambling, cricket
as we know it would not exist’ said BBC News Online reporter Thrasy Petropoulos on
12th April 2000 when reminding readers, shocked by the Cronje scandal, that betting on
cricket was not new.

From its birth, cricket had been associated with gambling, with betting on cricket,
whether legal or illegal, a part of the game (Rait-Kerr, 1950; Birley, 1999). Although
unlawful until 1845, betting in England on the outcome was ‘a feature of the early
games as both royalty and nobility became the matchmakers providing cricket with the
immunity it deserved’ (Rait-Kerr 1950:17). Subsequently, so central was betting to the
game that, prior to 1884, certain Laws of Cricket were introduced to meet the changing
requirements of the gamblers. In England, betting shops became a feature of the large
cricket grounds with markets on which teams would win games and the various
season’s tournaments (Oslear & Bannister, 1996).

Outside Britain, this association was also strong. Guha records that in 1804 in India, the
game organized by the Calcutta Cricket Club between Old Etonians and the East India
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Company was notable for two firsts – the first hundred (a century) scored on Indian soil,
and the first bets placed in India on a cricket match. However, there was no recorded
dishonesty in this period (Guha, 2002).

Today, betting on cricket is legal in many countries as it is with many modern-day
sports. The problem for sporting administrators has been preventing players from
betting on the outcome of their own games, while the legal betting industry has needed
to impose controls in order to prevent unscrupulous punters benefitting from ‘fixed’
matches (Oslear & Bannister, 1996). A well-publicised betting incident in cricket, later
interpreted by some commentators to have been a sign of the match-fixing problem in
cricket, which occurred in England in September 1981 during the Headingly Test match
between the MCC and Australia, highlights the problem for team administrators of
players betting on their own matches. Australia was in a very commanding position
when Australian players Dennis Lillee and Rodney Marsh noticed that bookmaker
Ladbrokes were offering odds of 500 to 1 for an England win. Lillee and Marsh placed
a GBP10 bet on the English team winning the test match. Australia lost the game and
Lillee and Marsh collected an estimated GBP5000 in winnings. Lillee and Marsh were
not accused of deliberately losing the match but this embarrassing story was seen in
retrospect to indicate the lack of control authorities exercised over players betting on the
result of matches in which they were participating. In other sports, such as American
baseball, authorities had taken steps to prevent players betting on the outcomes of their
matches (Oslear & Bannister, 1996; Haigh & Frith, 2007).

Illegal Betting on Cricket: While some forms of gambling are legal in India, gambling
on cricket was illegal, and remains so. However, government authorities in India ‘turned
a blind eye’ to its existence during the corruption period because it was popular with the
masses and because of the possible links between gambling and political party funding
(Oslear & Bannister, 1996). This tolerance of illegal betting would be a feature of
Indian cricket during the match-fixing period.

One-day cricket became popular in India after it won the 1983 World Cup; the growth
of the illegal betting industry on cricket in India followed. Betting on cricket in India
had only taken place on a small scale before 1983, but the success of India in the live
televised World Cup saw an increase in interest from fans of the televised short game,
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coupled with growth of illegal bookmakers across India, particularly in the cities (CBI,
2000). By the early 1990s, however, there was evidence of ‘betting on cricket having
spread across India and having obtained a level of sophistication’ (CBI, 2000: para 6).
Bombay (renamed Mumbai in 1995) became the centre of illegal betting in the
subcontinent, with ‘around 20 big bookmakers in Bombay and 200 smaller ones dealing
in ‘black money’ - the sort which is undeclared for tax purposes’ (Oslear & Bannister,
1996: 116).

The ODI tournaments in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), also became a
target for the Bombay bookmakers. Gambling was legal in Sharjah and fans at the game
could indulge in betting throughout a match. The proliferation of betting on
international cricket matches held inside and outside India was aided by the increase in
the number of ODIs shown live on cable TV involving India and other international
teams, the use of the computer for on-line betting overseas, and the introduction of
mobile phones.

Oslear & Bannister (1996:116) tell an interesting story of the relationship between
mobile phone technology and illegal betting at Sharjah:

Tony Lewis was commentating on the final of the Australia-Asia Cup between
Pakistan and India on 18 April 1986…The crowd atmosphere was electric…the
loyalties evenly divided in the crowd mostly made up from the large number of
Asian expatriates working in Sharjah. More betting takes place and more people
than not have mobile phones which they use to contact the Bombay bookmakers
sometimes two or three times an over….As in the press boxes in England, India,
Pakistan and South Africa where the equivalent of the White House ‘red
telephone’ has been established, with the hot line kept open to keep the
bookmakers ahead of the game as far as toss, weather and minute by minute
state of the game is concerned …the intelligence system sometimes deals in
seconds – I heard an Asian journalist get a bet on while the ball was in the air
and the fielder was circling underneath. A gabbled bet down the telephone was
accepted at better odds than was the case three seconds later when the catch was
taken.
Betting within India, however, was mainly carried on by word of mouth. Information
was kept in notebooks, with no exchange of money at the time of the bet which was
done telephonically. Exchange of money would take place after the matches and the
notebooks destroyed (CBI, 2000).
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With the government reluctant to take on the betting industry, certain individual
‘bookies’ and ‘punters’ from India improved their chances of winning bets placed on
the results of cricket matches by forming nexus with leading players as a result of which
they were able to obtain inside information on aspects of games associated with “spread
betting” and, in extreme cases, to arrange with those players to manipulate the game
results. They engaged in match-fixing.

4.4

Internal Weaknesses in Cricket that Enabled the Corruption

4.4.1

The Structure and Governance of Cricket

The opportunities for certain individuals in cricket to engage in match-fixing and other
sharp practices, although warned of by some commentators as early as 1977 (Moss,
2006a), did not lead to cricket authorities changing their internal governance and
administration arrangements or the culture of their organizations. To understand
cricket’s response to the change that occurred and to the threat posed by match-fixing, it
is necessary to understand cricket’s internal structure and culture, both historically and
during the match-fixing period.

The Structure of National Cricket
The structure of cricket at the national level developed in England. Whereas, in early
days, players organized the game, over time the administration of cricket passed from
players to officials, many of the latter drawn ‘from the professional classes,
predominantly lawyers, doctors, accountants, public servants and businessmen’ (Haigh,
2006: 49). Local and regional cricket boards generally comprised volunteer officials
who operated as both governance and management bodies. These officials arranged
events and venues, selected players and officials, and financed these activities. As
cricket became popular throughout the British Empire as part of the colonization
process, the structures for cricket in the colonies imitated those in Britain. The structure
of national cricket comprised a hierarchy of local or regional clubs which operated
under the umbrella of associations at state and national levels. This traditional structure
has largely remained the basic framework for national cricket although, more recently,
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some national associations and privately owned teams in ‘20:20 cricket’, playing
professional cricket at international level, have incorporated as private companies
(Buchanan, 2009).

The Governance of National Cricket
According to Williams (1999) the development of cricket, including its governance,
owes much to England’s premier club - the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). Founded
by a group of landed aristocrats in 1787, the MCC was a private cricket club whose
members were part of the political and social elite. Responsibility for running the MCC
was vested in its committee of leading members at an annual meeting where elections
were rarely contested. The MCC reigned as the ‘benevolent and benign authority’ of
cricket in England until 1968 from which time it gradually relinquished control
nationally and internationally (Engel, 2000). This authority was held by general consent
of the English cricket clubs who, from 1744 when the Laws of Cricket were formalised,
accepted the MCC as the court of appeal in the exercise of those Laws (Rait Kerr,
1950). This authority was rarely questioned by other clubs in England, due in part to
the exercise by the MCC of its powers with discretion and tact (Williams, 1999).
Acceptance of this hegemony by the MCC mirrored the monarchical rule throughout the
British Empire. ‘The policy of the Club is to advise, guide and direct – but not to
dictate. They reign, but do not rule’ (Warner, 1946: 280).

As trustee of the Laws of Cricket, the MCC was slow to resolve controversial issues.
According to Moorhouse (1983: 41):

… even now, when MCC power isn’t all it used to be, anything that matters
about the game is spoken of in there (…the Committee Room at Lord’s) by
MCC’s Committee at an early stage, discussed, weighed up, argued over,
referred back, resurrected for more discussion, and finally pronounced upon with
resonance. Great corporations with multi-national interests, and policies that
may topple governments, do not consider such matters more exhaustively than
do MCC elders applying themselves to the minutiae of cricket in their
Committee room.
From 1968, the governance of cricket at national level became the responsibility of
cricket boards elected by regional members, except in Pakistan where the national
cricket board members are appointed by the Pakistan Government. In most countries,
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the pattern of cricket governance followed the lead of the MCC, and this tradition
altered little until the late twentieth century (Haigh, 2006). With the exception of
Pakistan, national and regional cricket boards, in the main, were not accountable to any
higher or external authority in regard to the conduct of the game.

The Structure of International Cricket
During the British colonial period, cricket spread as part of the civilizing process
imposed on its colonies. International matches were initially seen as a means of
strengthening imperial loyalties (Coldham, 1983). Early international matches were
infrequent and the result of bilateral arrangements made under the patronage of the
MCC, other national clubs and benefactors. Well into the twentieth century, the MCC
governed the international game ‘by long-established custom, and with the ready
acceptance and consent of cricketers the world over’ (Warner, 1946:280). The MCC
headquarters at Lord’s became widely regarded within the institution and beyond as the
‘Cathedral of Cricket’ (Green, 2003).

A coordinated structure for international cricket governance began to evolve in 1909
with the founding of the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC). Over the next 90 years, the
representation of national bodies at its annual meeting grew. The ICC changed its name
but little else in cricket, since it largely ran as an extension of the MCC. The Conference
had neither power nor responsibility for organizing matches; its main function was to
bring the national members together at an annual conference to discuss issues in cricket.
In 1964, it was renamed the International Cricket Conference (ICC) when new rules
allowed countries outside the British Commonwealth to become members. In 1989, it
was again renamed the International Cricket Council (ICC).

Despite the existence of this coordinating body, national cricket boards continued to
take responsibility for organizing international matches for their teams. This
uncoordinated process was not without its challenges when diplomatic relations
between countries were tense. Not until the late 1990s did national cricket authorities
cooperate in arranging an international calendar of year round cricket matches and
tournaments.
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The increased membership of the Conference was not without its problems. From the
1980s, ‘west’ and ‘east’ factions began to form around the traditional founding
members (England and Australia) from the west and the leading subcontinent members
(India and Pakistan) from the east. Voting rights of the members had always dictated
who controlled the Conference, with the full members who were accorded test-playing
status because of their strength allowed two votes on Conference resolutions, and
associate members who played occasional friendly matches with other nations allowed
one vote. The most powerful decisions makers were the founding members who
retained the power of veto on Conference decisions until July 1992 when, under
pressure from other countries, they reluctantly relinquished that power (Haigh and Frith,
2007).

In 1993, the ICC ceased to be administered by the MCC and became an independent
organization. But because of member concerns about ICC rule over international
cricket, it was never resourced in a manner that would allow it much influence.
Throughout the match-fixing period, until 1999, the ICC was staffed only by a
Chairman and an Executive Officer, with its small office under one of the grandstands
at Lord’s (Halbish, 2003).

By 2000, the ICC comprised 10 full test playing member nations: England, Australia
and South Africa (the original members in 1909), India, New Zealand and West Indies
(all from 1926), Pakistan (from 1952), Sri Lanka (from 1981), Zimbabwe (from 1992)
and Bangladesh (from 2000). South Africa ceased active membership of the ICC in
1970 over the apartheid issue until it was re-elected as a full member in 1991 (Halbish,
2003). By 2005, in addition to the 10 full members, there were 27 associate members
and 55 affiliate members of the ICC (Baum, 2006).

The ICC was restructured and heavily resourced only in 2000 after the match-fixing
scandal triggered the review conducted by Sir Paul Condon and the weaknesses in
structure and governance of international cricket were recognized and addressed.

The Governance of International Cricket
During the match-fixing period, with members caught up in their personal rivalries and
conflict over the control of international cricket, the ICC operated as ‘an uneasy
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coalition of feudal barons’ (Bose, 2001: 30), unable to agree on a collaborative
approach to the governance of international cricket, or on establishing an adequately
resourced management body to run the sport (Halbish, 2003).

‘East versus west’ politics divided groups of members of the ICC during this period
(Guha, 2002; Majumdar, 2004; Bose, 2002; Halbish, 2003; Hartman, 2004; Haigh &
Frith, 2007). According to Halbish (2003), three issues that dominated the agenda of the
ICC in this period were the shift of power from the traditional members, the allocation
of the lucrative World Cup tournaments and the contest for the presidency of the ICC.

Prior to 1984 the founding members, England and Australia, dominated the ICC
because they held the power of veto over decisions. However, in 1984, India won its bid
to host the 1987 World Cup despite efforts made by England and Australia to prevent
this from occurring. The World Cup was a lucrative world tournament of one-day
cricket matches held every four years, the first three having been held in England.

After 1987, the struggle for more equal allocation of commercial opportunities for full
members of the ICC afforded by cricket’s World Cup intensified. After Australia and
New Zealand won hosting rights for 1992, the BCCI decided to seek the 1996 hosting
rights. The Indian campaign succeeded after the ICC Secretariat allowed India, rather
than Australia, to put forward the proposal that South Africa be readmitted to the ICC in
1992. The ICC had imposed a moratorium on tours of South Africa by member national
teams in 1970 over the South African Government’s apartheid policy. South Africa then
supported India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in their World Cup bid which soured its
relations with the group of western members it had traditionally supported. Shortly
afterwards, when Pakistan was unable to fulfil a commitment to tour India in late 1991
because of political tension, India invited South Africa to undertake its first major tour
since reinstatement as a full member. This gesture cemented relations between India and
South Africa and later led to South Africa providing India with the additional votes its
representative needed to win the ICC Presidency in 1996.

In 1993, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka succeeded with a joint bid for hosting the 1996
World Cup, offering competing nations more income for their participation than
England. During that event in 1996, Australia and West Indies teams refused to play
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matches in Columbo due to security fears, which led the President of the Board of
Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka (BCCSL) to suggest to the BCCI Secretary Jagmohan
Dalmiya that ‘We should have an Asian as the next President of the International
Cricket Council’ (Bose, 2002: 441). Later that year, Dalmiya campaigned for
Presidency of the ICC with the supporting votes of the majority of Associate Members,
many of whom were offered financial support to attend the ICC conference. South
Africa and Zimbabwe abstained in the final vote for the presidency between ACB
President Malcolm Gray and Dalmiya, leading to a hung result under the rule requiring
a majority of full member votes for a result (Guha, 2002; Bose, 2002). A year of
negotiation was required for agreement to be reached that Dalmiya would be President
from July 1997-June 2000, followed by Malcolm Gray, and thereafter a representative
from the factions on an alternating basis.

This political division in cricket during the 1990s between the west and east factions
within the ICC inhibited cooperation among its members in dealing with match-fixing
allegations. Members pursued their own commercial and competitive interests at the
expense of the collective interests of stakeholders.

These weaknesses in the structure and governance of international cricket enabled the
threat posed by the growth of illegal betting industry in India to be mishandled by the
national and international cricket authorities. In 2001, when reviewing the match-fixing
that had occurred in cricket, ICC Anti-Corruption Commissioner Sir Paul Condon
pointed out those weaknesses. Cricket, he contended, had retained structure and
governance arrangements established in the early twentieth century, but these were
found wanting in managing the modern game:

[T]he ICC was a loose and fragile alliance with a small central administration
based at Lord’s…with limited budgets and limited powers. Naivety and no clear
mandate to deal with corruption exacerbated the problem…The individual
cricket boards and member countries of the ICC responded to the emerging
problem of corruption with a patchwork of criminal, judicial, disciplinary and
informal measures (Condon, 2001: paras 99-105).
As the foregoing discussion shows, my analysis indicates that several characteristics of
cricket’s structure and governance contributed to the development of corruption in
cricket. The combination of the benign and benevolent authority exercised by the non93

accountable international cricket boards, their decentralised and fragmented authority,
their failure to exercise an appropriate level of governance through risk management
and control of corruption threats, and the lack of cooperation between the ICC
representatives as a consequence of their political rivalry distracted them from their duty
to exercise proper governance when the corruption became evident.

4.4.2

The Laws and Ethics of Cricket

A second set of contextual factors that enabled the corruption to develop was the
inadequacy of the Laws of Cricket and the absence of a strong ethical culture in the
institution.

The Laws of Cricket
Cricket is played under The Laws of Cricket, which were first compiled in England in
1744, and which were subsequently amended from time to time by the agreed ‘trustee’
of the Laws – the MCC – but only when those changes were deemed absolutely
necessary (three times between 1960 and 2000), and only after much deliberation
(Oslear, 2000). The pace of change in the Laws in that period seems to have been very
much in keeping with the tempo of cricket at that time, an idyllic game situation being a
leisurely day or afternoon of cricket on a county green in the English sunshine, with
time out for drinks and afternoon tea.

The Laws of Cricket, which guided national and local officials in the running of the
game across all countries, were designed to control on-field play so that, according to
Oslear and Mosey (1993), everyone could enjoy the game. However, application of the
Laws during the late 20th century became a source of disagreement and dissent at all
levels of the game. The MCC and its loyal followers promoted cricket as a contest
between bat and ball to be played according to the Laws and in a spirit which
emphasized fair play, good temperament and sportsmanship (Oslear & Mosey, 1993).
However, players deviated from these good intentions, often unintentionally but
sometimes intentionally.

Breaches of the Laws on-field, intentional or unintentional, were the responsibility of
the match umpires and, in extreme situations, the match referee, to control. In contrast,
the traditional method of control of ‘over the top’ behaviour by a player off-field was
94

often ‘the quiet word’, reflecting the paternalistic attitude and the use of benign and
benevolent authority by the management elite to bring the errant player back into line.
From the 1930s, however, the judgement of some officials about what behaviour was
deviant and required correction was found wanting in 2000 when a revision of the Laws
was carried out during the post-scandal period. This change in what was regarded as an
appropriate standard of behaviour had occurred gradually over a 70 year period and had
allowed an erosion of the game’s moral standard, more commonly known as ‘the spirit
of cricket’.

Ethics in Cricket - the ‘Spirit of Cricket’
As a creation of the English upper class, the development of cricket reflected their
collective aspirations, values and beliefs:

Between the wars, cricket was celebrated as a metaphor for England and for
Englishness… [and] the greatest of all games played in the best of settings and
in the finest spirit (Williams, 1999: 1).
Seen as more than a game by its more passionate adherents, cricket:

…was invested with a special moral worth, its discourses permeated by a spirit
of sportsmanship and fair play which expressed the English character and
extended to other areas of life (Williams, 1999:1).
Introduced into British schools as a key element in the cult of athleticism in the late
1800s, cricket was also embraced by the clergy. The game was esteemed because it
exemplified the cultural value which the wealthier classes in England placed upon
tradition, and emphasized propriety - the correct manner of behaving with probity according to the rules and norms of society.

Between 1862 and 1931 the famous British player, administrator, politician and
diplomat Lord Harris advocated the ‘spirit of cricket’, a term which came to exemplify
to British society, and to cricket players, administrators and fans in the many countries
in which it was played, the essence of what was good about the game. By 1905, the
word ‘cricket’ was synonymous with everything regarded as fair, straight forward and
right. The ‘spirit of cricket’, representing the ideals of the game, developed as a moral
imperative in cricket. So well understood was the centrality of fairness in the game that
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the term ‘not cricket’, first used in the 1930s during the infamous ‘bodyline series’
discussed below, is a concept defined in the Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and
Wordpower Guide to mean ‘not fair or honourable’ (Soanes et al, 2001: 202). The
culture which reflected the ‘spirit of cricket’ reached its peak in the ‘golden age’ of
cricket from 1895 to 1914 (Morrah, 1967; Howat, 1989). However, after the departure
of Harris from leadership of the MCC in 1931, the ultra-competitive nature of cricket
became increasingly manifest as players searching for advantage engaged intentionally
in unfair practices (Coldham, 1983).

The Erosion of the ‘Spirit of Cricket’ from 1932-2000
The ‘bodyline’ Ashes series of 1932-33 between Australia and England signalled a
significant departure of players and officials from the ‘spirit of cricket’. This infamous
series has been widely written about over the years (see, for example, major
contributions by Jardine, 1933; Fingleton, 1946; Larwood, 1982; LeQuesne, 1983;
Derriman 1984; Mason, 1984; Sissons and Stoddart, 1984; O'Reilly, 1985; Frith 2002a,
2002b; Douglas, 2002; Haigh & Frith, 2007). The ‘bodyline’ crisis represented the first
major departure from the ‘spirit of cricket’ at international level and initiated more
widespread disregard by players and officials of the norm of fair play in the years ahead.

Central to this crisis was the bowling practice known in its early stages as ‘fast leg
theory’. Known in Australia as ‘bodyline’ bowling, this strategy developed to unsettle
batsmen in the 1920s combined two permitted bowling tactics – ‘slow leg theory’ and
‘bouncers’. ‘Fast leg theory’ saw fast balls deliberately bowled regularly at the head and
body of the batsman rather than at the wicket. In the ongoing battle in cricket between
bat and ball, ‘fast leg theory’ was ‘perfectly within the Laws of Cricket but was seen at
an early stage by many to be contrary to the spirit of cricket’ (Benaud, 2005: 38).

In a context marked by Australia’s domination of the MCC team in test cricket, leading
members of the MCC allowed their captain, Douglas Jardine, to plan and execute a
strategy employing ‘fast leg theory’ in order to counter the brilliant Australian batsman,
Don Bradman. Early warnings of its danger and perceived unfairness were ignored by
the MCC captain and most MCC officials (Douglas, 2002). The crisis occurred in
January 1933 during the third test in Adelaide when the Australian captain Bill
Woodfull was injured by the tactic. A leaked rebuke by Woodfull to the MCC manager
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Plum Warner when Warner came to offer his sympathy, that only one team was playing
cricket and the other was not, together with the public disclosure of an undiplomatic
cable shortly afterwards from the Australian Board of Control (ABC) to the MCC,
referring to the strategy as ‘unsportsmanlike’, and the refusal of the MCC to end the
strategy or acknowledge its unfairness, created the crisis. Despite its rhetoric at the time,
commercial considerations were paramount in the minds of the ABC so the tour
continued (Fingleton, 1946). After the tour, negotiations between the ABC and MCC
and government diplomatic efforts continued for 11 months to address the threat this
form of bowling posed to relations between the countries and future tours. Eventually, a
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ saw the strategy banned by players and officials after the MCC
team suffered at the hands of the West Indies bowlers who employed bodyline against
them in 1933. However, the example set by the trustees of the game was not forgotten
and, following the World War 1939 – 1945, unfair on-field practices aimed at winning
matches at all cost crept into the game.

Among these practices by bowlers and fielders was ‘chucking’ or ‘throwing’ the ball
instead of bowling it, the excess use of ‘bouncers’ to intimidate batsmen, ‘ball
tampering’ in order to change the condition of the ball, ‘excessive appealing’ to
intimidate the umpire, deliberate ‘damage to the wicket’ by running on parts of it,
‘unfairly claiming catches’ that were known to have touched the ground, and verbal
abuse of a batsman in order to distract him - known as ‘sledging’. Batsmen also
engaged in similar practices such as ‘dissent from unfavourable decisions of the
umpires’ by inappropriate verbal or body language, and ‘unwillingness to walk’ when
knowingly dismissed (Oslear & Bannister, 1996; Piesse, 2000). These widespread
practices often soured relations between competing teams. Nevertheless, many of these
practices were ignored or treated leniently by umpires, who often came under pressure
from cricket administrators to take a softer approach under pain of losing their position
(Oslear & Bannister, 1996). This may have been because the practices were accepted by
an ambivalent cricketing public when perpetrated by players in their team. So, despite
being regarded by many former and current players as unfair, they came to be accepted
as part of the game by influential players, officials, administrators and media
commentators, and by the cricketing public. Perpetrated by players at all levels of the
game, these practices had a cumulative effect of the eroding the ‘spirit of cricket’.
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During this time, while unfair play on-field was being increasingly tolerated during the
last quarter of the 20th century, match-fixing crept into the game.

In August 1991, an event occurred in England which Anti-Corruption Commissioner Sir
Paul Condon later believed signified ‘the birth of underperformance in cricket’
(Condon, 2001). Two teams contrived to throw matches they were playing against each
other in two concurrent competitions. A mid-week match between Essex and Lancashire
resulted in a win for Essex which went on to win the prized English County
Championship. In the Sunday League one-day contest that same week, Lancashire won
furthering its ambitions in that tournament. The arrangement between the teams was a
secret until 1994 when Essex player Don Topley was reported in a Sunday newspaper to
have alleged that the outcome of both matches was pre-determined. An inquiry into his
allegation by the Lancashire and Essex Boards and the Test and County Cricket Board
(TCCB) resulted in no action being taken against the teams (Oslear & Bannister, 1996).
However, the allegations by Topley ended his career at Essex. He was released as a
player, close to the time he would have been awarded a traditional ‘benefit’ given to
long serving players, and never again welcomed in his county club (Hussain, 2005).
This treatment he received was typical of that received by whistleblowers (Miceli &
Near, 1992) from cricket officials enforcing the culture of silence in cricket about
matters likely to bring the game into disrepute, a matter I touch on shortly. It was not
until 2000, in the wake of the Cronje scandal, that the English and Wales Cricket Board
(ECB) passed their papers on the Topley allegations to the Greater Manchester Police,
but the Police concluded that no action by them was warranted.

Corruption, cricket writer Gideon Haigh noted, ‘is usually like erosion, or
sedimentation; a gradual process’ (Haigh, 2004: 178). Despite the cumulative effect of
unfair play and signs of match-fixing creeping into the game being noticed earlier
(Oslear & Bannister, 1996), these problems were only addressed by the MCC in
amendments to The Laws of Cricket in 2000 which expanded Law 42 - Unfair Play, and
included for the first time ‘The Preamble – The Spirit of Cricket’ (Oslear, 2000; Smith,
2000).

How did the successive regimes of officials who allowed the erosion of ‘the spirit of
cricket’ to occur also allow the corruption of match-fixing to develop? Another part of
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the answer to that question lies in certain aspects of the culture of cricket that developed
from the 1930s.

4.4.3

The Culture of Cricket in the Match-fixing Period

The concept of culture, while the subject of considerable academic debate, is commonly
regarded as a term that describes, inter alia, practices and beliefs that are shared or held
in common in groups (Schein, 1992). Culture includes explicit phenomena such as
behavioural regularities when members interact (use of common language, customs and
traditions that evolve, and rituals they employ in a variety of situations), but also group
norms that are implicit standards and values that evolve, espoused values that are
publicly announced principles and values that the group aims to achieve, broad policies
and ideological principles that guide a group’s actions, rules of the game that are
implicit guides to members of how to get along with others in the group, habits of
thinking or cognitive frameworks that are shared and are taught to new members, and
shared meanings that emerge and are created as members interact with each other
(Schein, 1992).

From a symbolic interactionist perspective, shared aspects of culture guide members’
decisions when they encounter both familiar and unfamiliar situations, but they do not
dictate their actions. Rather, individuals determine on an ongoing basis the action they
will take after reflecting on what sense they make of what they have noticed, and what
they and significant others who share their culture indicate they are proposing to do.
The culture they share influences the lines of action they consider and the decisions they
take which, in turn, reinforce or alter the existing culture (Blumer, 1969).

Three features of cricket’s culture appear to have influenced the responses of internal
stakeholders to the problem of match-fixing they encountered. The nominal categories
for these interrelated phenomena are: elitism, tolerance of deviance, and secrecy and
silence.

Elitism in Cricket
Cricket’s elites comprise the leading players, captains of the teams, and the leading
administrators. The hierarchy in cricket, based on authority, has the players at the
bottom, captains above them, and administrators at the top. At the lowest level of
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cricket’s elite in each organization’s hierarchy are the champions at their sport who
become icons and legends in their own nations and beyond. Leading players reach elite
status by virtue of their outstanding performances and perceived characteristics that
bring pride to their nation, and result in their selection in their national team. At a higher
level, team captains are generally players with high ability, favoured by administrators
and appointed to that position by them. Traditionally, captains are bestowed by the
cricket boards with autonomy in managing the on-field activities of their teams, and
possess considerable authority over the other team members, particularly the newer
members whose behaviour they influence. At the highest level, cricket administrators on
national and international cricket boards are elites as members of the oligarchy or
“small group who have control [of the sport]” (Soanes et al, 2001: 617).

According to Gorta (1998), a risk of corruption may arise when the autonomy and
authority of certain leaders is not balanced by management. During the match-fixing
period, the cricket captains of Pakistan, India and South Africa, and other leading
players involved, were largely immune from allegations of corruption by other players
because of their elite status. Historically, among cricket’s elites there has been a degree
of ambivalence about their status. While regarded as sporting heroes by the cricketing
public, their status has generally only served as a protective shield against openly
hostile actions by their fellow elites if such actions were likely to make that person
instigating such action unpopular with the fans. This phenomenon is illustrated by the
example of Australian bowler Bill O’Reilly who, when asked about his reticence in
publicly revealing his ongoing altercation in the 1930-1940s with Australian cricketing
icon Don Bradman, remarked –“you don’t piss on statues” (Carlyon, 2003).

This ambivalence about the status of cricket’s elites can be discerned in their
relationships and handling of contentious issues among them during the corruption
period. First, while the public treated leading players as the elites, administrators tended
to ignore their status when exercising authority and control over their activities and
controlling their pay and conditions while, at the same time, enjoying the social and
travel benefits gained from their own positions (Haigh & Frith, 2007). Low pay and
poor conditions for players were sources of ongoing aggravation between players and
administrators from the 1950s and were considered by Condon (2001) to be a possible
motivating factor for some players to make money from match-fixing. Second, players
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and team captains who enjoyed the status of heroes and icons needed to be diplomatic in
dealing with board members with the power to reward and punish them through the
team selection process. Consequently, most players were reluctant to speak out against,
or challenge, the exercise of authority by elite cricket board members (Smith, 1999;
Haigh, 2006; Haigh & Frith, 2007). This is addressed shortly in more detail under
‘Secrecy and Silence’. Third, board members and administrators who determined the
official response within cricket to behaviour that could be regarded as deviant or corrupt
were largely immune from criticism when they did not act to prevent it, neither being
accountable to their stakeholders who might learn of the corruption, nor to any higher
authority for their inaction in dealing with it.

This ambivalence helps explain why this institution was susceptable to corruption and
why the deviance of many of cricket’s elites was tolerated.

Tolerance of Deviance by Elites (reflecting Ambivalence)
Historically, boards, administrators, officials, captains, players and their fans regularly
displayed a tolerance of deviance by their leading players in cricket in regard to their
on-field and off-field misbehaviour. Administrators were demonstratively lenient when
addressing the bad behaviour of their players towards other teams (Rowan, 1972;
Pollard, 1966; Roberts and James, 1998, Haigh & Frith, 2007), umpires were hesitant to
take action that would damage a player’s career (Oslear & Bannister, 1996), captains
were unwilling to exercise control of their own team members (Rowan, 1972; Taylor,
2000), players were reluctant to comment adversely on fellow team members (Slater,
2004), and the cricketing public were forgiving of the misdemeanours of their heroes
(Halbish, 2003).

This tolerance of cricketers’ deviance can be attributed in part to their elite status. Fans
wanting their team to win have tended to support their best players who test the limits of
the Laws; they have not regarded this on-field misbehaviour as deviant but only ultracompetitive. When players’ tactics have been successful, their supporters have often
expressed their delight; if they have been reprimanded or penalized by cricket officials
for breaching the Laws, their supporters have often expressed understanding and, in
many cases, have targeted their criticism at the umpires unless there has been a general
consensus that the behaviour was ‘over-the-top’ (see, for example, Coward, 2002).
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Questionable behaviour by elite players has often demonstrated the presence of a
widespread ambivalence within the cricket community about such behaviour. Cricket
fans have often been shown in the sports news to regard questionable practices as
appropriate when perpetrated by their own team but inappropriate when perpetrated by
members of the opposition team (Swanton, 1994). Furthermore, cricket sponsors do not
want players whose reputations and on-field presence are central to their economic
interests highlighted as deviant and punished by suspension. Likewise, cricket
administrators wanting their elite players present on tours for economic and competitive
reasons have often been reluctant to act against them for their deviant behaviour.

Ambivalence has been understood by theorists in different ways. Merton (1976) regards
ambivalence as a psychological condition experienced by individuals who are pulled in
opposed directions, with mingled feelings, beliefs and actions, by objects at the focus of
their attention. In cricket, team members who see one of peers behaving in a manner
which they consider is deviant may experience ambivalent feelings because of their
close personal association with that member. This ambivalence may cloud their
judgement in deciding how they should react. Merton (1976) also argues that
ambivalence is a sociological phenomenon built into the structure of social statuses and
roles. In cricket, the status and roles of board members and players, of the captain and
his players, and of the coach or manager and their players might see ambivalence
surface when players engage in questionable but not clearly illegal behaviour according
to the Laws of Cricket. The duality of the roles of leaders in cricket, requiring that they
both control and support their elite players, means that they will likely experience
ambivalence when having to decide what they should do when a player behaves in a
way that is advantageous for competition and organization revenue but questionable
according to the Laws or to the ‘spirit of cricket’.

Bauman (1991), however, interprets ambivalence as a consequence of the inability of
individuals to cognitively decide on, or classify, an object. Ambivalence, he argues, is
experienced by individuals and groups when it is possible to assign an object of interest
to more than one category, but they experience psychological difficulty in doing as
Merton (1976) indicated. In cricket, fans appear to experience ambivalence of this kind
when they notice an elite player, whom they regard as a cricketing hero, engaging in
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deviant behaviour – should they criticize him as a deviant or support him as their hero.
Over the years, cricket has been replete with questionable behaviours that have defied
efforts to categorise them. For example, after 1931 when players began to move away
from ‘hard but fair play’, cricket stakeholders were ambivalent about many of the overly
competitive practices that crept into the game. This ambivalence was notable during the
‘bodyline’ crisis discussed earlier, but also more recently when the contentious practices
of ‘throwing’ and ‘sledging’ were allowed to exist in the game while debates on their
fairness were conducted in the media. While some on the receiving end of such
practices criticized them, others who were benefiting from these practices minimized
their deviant nature. Cricket authorities, the evidence suggests, were comfortable with
the ambivalence that surrounded such practices, moderating their harm and only moving
to resolve such issues after years of discussion in cricket’s social world when sufficient
numbers of critics held sway in the debates.

It is Bauman’s view of ambivalence that I believe has been under researched as an
aspect of the gradual emergence of corruption.

Secrecy and Silence: Use of ‘the quiet word’ (and ‘not airing linen in public’)
As already indicated, according to the Laws of Cricket it is the responsibility of captains
and umpires to control players during a game (Oslear, 2000). Another official is the
match referee who is responsible for noticing on-field behaviour problems that are not
adequately addressed by umpires during the game.

Historically, there has been no uniform, formal system in cricket for controlling offfield deviant behaviour since a player’s behaviour off-field has been largely regarded as
a private matter, except when members of a cricket board believe they have been
adversely affected by the players’ behaviour. The traditional way of dealing with player
behaviour regarded as deviant had been through the player’s superior; that is, through
the captain, umpire or nominated official having ‘a quiet word’ with the errant player an informal chat as a prelude to harsher controls if the advice wasn’t heeded.
Furthermore, cricket officials preferred to conduct their disciplinary affairs behind
closed doors. As former ACB CEO Graham Halbish told a Four Corners television
investigative program reporter in 2000:
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Cricket is very traditional, and very traditional in—in much preferring not to air
its linen in public. It’s always preferred to deal with matters behind closed doors,
you know, rightly or wrongly. But that is effectively how the game has been
administered over a long period of time (Jackson, 2000: 6).
This feature of cricket culture – the quiet word behind closed doors so as not to bring
the game into disrepute - bears a similarity to the concept of ‘organizational silence’
(Morrison and Milliken, 2000) outlined in Chapter 2 - a collective-level phenomenon
defined as the widespread withholding of information about potential problems and
issues by employees. According to Condon (2001), the silence of the majority of
individual players, who were effectively employees of the cricket boards, about
corruption in the latter stages of OCI development can be attributed to fear of
retribution, the belief that reporting would not be welcome, and the absence of a
reporting system in cricket about deviant behaviour, as Morrison and Milliken (2000,
2004) suggested.

Summary
Each of these internal factors, although significant, does not fully explain how and why
the corruption was not addressed. Rather, a combination of these factors that became the
antecedent conditions for corruption by influencing the behaviour of the institutional
actors and stakeholders in how they responded to the incidents of corruption that they
noticed, is suggestive in that regard. As I will show in Chapter 5, these conditions
influenced most actors to moderate their behaviour in ways that facilitated the
corruption which others perpetrated, and to nullify the efforts of a few whistleblowers
and media representatives who intervened in order to restrict the corruption (see Figure
4.1).

4.5

Proximate Risk Factors that Enabled Match-fixing in Cricket

4.5.1

Individual Risk Factors that Enabled Match-fixing

Match-fixing in cricket was initiated by a small number of individuals who identified an
opportunity that spread betting conducted by the illegal betting industry in India
provided them which enabled them to make money by winning bets on particular events
that routinely occur in cricket matches over which they had some control.
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In 2000, the CBI found evidence that a number of Indian nationals became involved in
these match-fixing efforts (CBI, 2000). The most prominent among these was the
infamous punter/bookmaker M.K. Gupta, alias ‘John’, a small business operator who
began betting as a punter. Like some others, he saw an opportunity to improve the
outcome of his betting by obtaining inside information from leading players. He paid a
former Indian test player, Manoj Prabhakar, to introduce him to leading players and
cricket captains, three of whom took up his offers of payment for inside information. At
a later stage, the captains enrolled other team players and some officials in the
conspiracy. On many occasions thereafter, Gupta and these players won bets they
placed on those predetermined outcomes.

The search for explicit reasons why some individuals in cricket and not others engaged
in these corrupt activities is beyond the scope of this study. Opinions about the reasons
for Cronje’s involvement have been offered by those who knew him well (Bacher,
2004; King, 2005), but they do not alter the current understanding in literature that most
individuals are capable of acting corruptly when the proximate circumstances in which
they find themselves enable such behaviour (Gorta, 1998). More helpful in furthering
our understanding of how these numerous individuals were able to engage in matchfixing is the identification and appreciation of situational factors that enabled the
corruption to occur.

4.5.2

Situational Risk Factors that Enabled Match-fixing

Situational factors that enabled match-fixing to occur were certain venues that lacked
controls to prevent corruption, inconsequential matches on which betting occurred,
uncontrolled access of bookies to players in arranging fixes, and the enabling
technology of mobile phones for bookie-player access before and during matches. The
conjunction of these factors enabled the perpetrators to conduct their affairs with the
low probability that their actions would be considered wrong or that they would be
caught and punished.

Neutral Venues
During the 1980s and 1990s, turbulent and often violent relations existed between
Pakistan and India. As far as cricket was concerned, ‘[t]here could be no tours of one
nation by the other. But they could meet in third countries’ (Guha, 2002: 398). It was
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therefore necessary, if play was to occur between India and Pakistan, for neutral venues
to be found. International venues for one-day cricket were developed in Sharjah,
Singapore and Toronto, where environments that encouraged betting on cricket were
created. According to Guha (2002: 398):

Through the 1980s and 1990s, India and Pakistan played each other in the tiny
Middle Eastern state of Sharjah, where an enterprising sheikh had financed a
cricket stadium. These matches were attended by flag waving expatriates in the
Gulf and telecast to a large captive audience in the sub-continent…The Sharjah
tournament became a favourite destination of the Indian super-rich:
industrialists, film stars, models, politicians and mafia dons. The matches were
marketed and were watched by more people (on television) than any other
contest apart from the World Cup. There was very heavy betting, especially
when India played Pakistan.
At these neutral venues, players who participated were free of constraints imposed by
the presence of their officials and fans which might have influenced their behaviour at
grounds in their home countries (Condon, 2001).

The CBI criticized the BCCI’s growth policy which ignored the risk that illegal betting
presented. This policy:

…directly contributed to match-fixing and related malpractices …because the
players were more exposed to betting syndicates in non-regular venues; and a
surfeit of ODIs resulted in lower levels of motivation for players who… get the
idea that there is nothing wrong in throwing an occasional match (CBI, 2000:
Section 5).
Masala Matches
The tournaments at these neutral venues were regarded as soft or ‘masala matches’ as
the Indians termed them because they were perceived as something made up and not
real (Bose, 2002). These matches were played as entertainment where the result was
unimportant for the players in a competitive sense. Unlike tests or other international
matches of historical significance, these matches did not hold lasting memories for the
players, who regarded them like confetti …too many to be recalled, and where,
according to Mark Waugh, ‘all become a bit of a blur’ (Knight, 2002:182).
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A feature of these tournaments was the substantial ‘gifts’ players were given which
were known about by cricket authorities and apparently allowed. According to Knight
(2002:185), at the time:

‘it was known that players on the subcontinent sometimes received extravagant
presents from extremely rich individuals, but there was no evidence to suggest
that such gifts were linked to corruption in the game’.

The problem of allowing this gift-giving by strangers was that the transition from
payment for attendance at the tournament to payment for information and fixing these
soft matches was missed by authorities.

Uncontrolled Access to Players
There was no control over access to players during these tournaments. According to
Condon (2001: para 43), ‘…it had been very easy for corruptors to mix freely with
players and others at cricket grounds, training grounds, hotels and other locations’.

Enabling Communication Technology
Computers enabled on-line betting to international betting agencies at the same time as
mobile phones became a tool used by bookies to communicate with punters, corrupt
players and media representatives during matches. The extent of use of the mobile
phone in the corrupt activities was shown in 2000 by the CBI when their investigators
used mobile telephonic records to emphasize the extent of player-bookie contact during
games and contrast that with contact between the same parties on non-game days
(Majumdar, 2004).

4.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, the institution of cricket has been briefly described, together with
enduring contextual and more proximate risk factors which together enabled matchfixing to occur and perpetuate over a 25 year period.
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During a time of transformational change in cricket marked by ODI growth and its
commercialization, a nexus between the sport and illegal betting on cricket in India was
created by people in the latter ‘industry’ who developed the popular concept of spread
betting on multiple outcomes of cricket matches. This nexus and a combination of
external environment factors provided certain individuals with opportunities to engage
in match-fixing. Situational factors that provided favourable circumstances for these
individuals to act corruptly included places and climates where the corruption could
occur relatively unnoticed – at neutral venues where access to players by bookmakers
was uncontrolled by cricket authorities, during ‘masala’ or friendly matches arranged by
people whose aim was to provide betting opportunities for the public, and where
communication technology was available to allow the conspirators to communicate with
one another and with bookmakers during the matches.

In addition to these outer factors, cricket’s inner environment was ill-equipped to
counter the occurrence and development of match-fixing. The structure, culture and
politics in cricket organizations played a part in facilitating the corruption. The benign
and benevolent authority of non-accountable cricket administrators and their weak
governance practice resulted in their failure to pay attention to or control the corruption.
Coupled with these structural weaknesses, their tolerance of the deviance of
organizational elites, their ambivalence about deviant on-field behaviour of these elites
when they were winning matches and their insistence on secrecy and silence about
deviant behaviour combined to create a situation that enabled the individual perpetrators
to exploit opportunities to act corruptly with little fear of being caught and punished.
Finally, political in-fighting between members of the east and west factions of the ICC
inhibited intra-organization cooperation in addressing the problem once member
organizations were aware of it. Together, these factors influenced most stakeholders in
deciding what they should do when they encountered corruption before the Cronje
scandal in 2000.

A change in context only occurred as a consequence of outsider intervention by the
media and two governments which resulted in the Cronje scandal. In the years that
followed, while the outer conditions remained largely unchanged except for growing
media and government interest in gambling-related corruption in sport (Anderson,
2011), the inner context of cricket was changed by these initial interventions. Cricket
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officials, pressured to act to restore the integrity of the game by an angry public and
concerned sponsors and media organizations, changed the structure of cricket in a way
which ensured better governance and controls were in place to tackle future corruption.
With the culture of secrecy and silence about match-fixing brought to an end and greater
cooperation forthcoming among ICC members, cricket officials created a new inner
context that disabled the growth of corruption. I explain the processes that led to the
enabling and disabling of OCI development in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5: THE CRICKET CORRUPTION CASE –
PART II: A PROCESSUAL, INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS
5.1

Introduction

Building on my explanation in Chapter 4 of the context in international cricket that
provided the antecedent conditions for match-fixing, in this chapter I present an
interpretive, processual analysis of the way corruption in international cricket was
perceived by stakeholders and handled by them between 1975 and 2002. I provide a
chronological account of ‘what’ happened, narrating a selection of corruption-related
incidents together with an interpretive explanation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ the corruption
was able to occur and perpetuate.

Figure 5.1
OCI development in cricket – an explanatory framework (interventions & moderations)

1. Contextual
Factors /
Antecedent
conditions

3. Outsider Interventions:
Actions of external stakeholders who endeavoured to prevent
OCI development
CHAPTER 5

Prior and
continuing
environmental,
organizational,
individual and
situational
factors which
enabled OCI
development

OCI dev’t over time

CHAPTER 4
2. Insider Moderations:
Actions of internal actors who, influenced by contextual
factors facilitated OCI development

CHAPTER 5

Figure 5.1 highlights the two areas on which I now focus: first, on the ‘internal
moderations’ of many stakeholders who encountered the corruption which had the
effect of enabling it; second, on the ‘external interventions’ of other stakeholders who,
when they noticed the corruption, attempted to prevent it.
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Figure 5.2
The trajectory of corruption by individuals in cricket 1975-2002
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Figure 5.2 is a second framework for presenting my analysis. It represents the dynamic
aspect of the trajectory of the match-fixing corruption over time brought about by the
effects of the moderations and interventions during the match-fixing era. I have divided
this corruption era into five periods of time - three pre-scandal periods labelled P1, P2
and P3, the scandal period P4 and one post-scandal period labelled P5. The three prescandal periods differentiate the scale of corruption that was taking place before the
‘Cronje scandal’. As indicated in section 3.3, I do not regard the key behaviours in these
periods as exclusive to one period since, as the narrative shows and as discussed section
8.3, there can be leakage of particular behaviours between them. In period P1, for
example, I explicate what Pinto et al (2008) only briefly refer to as the emergence of
corruption. However, in some organizations that were part of cricket’s multi111

organizational institution, corruption only began to emerge in period P2. In Chapter 8, I
argue that this emergence stage needs to be better understood if major scandals
concerning corruption in organizations are to be avoided. Similarly, as the corruption
surfaced in more teams in period P2, the situation was characterised by uncertainty,
ambiguity and ambivalence, which flowed on into period P3, the time when cricket
authorities and other stakeholders were more aware of the corruption that was
occurring. Influenced by contextual factors discussed in chapter 4, the authorities
enabled the growth of the corruption thwarting the efforts of some stakeholders to
prevent it. I show that, during these three pre-scandal periods, moderating behaviours
which allowed the corruption to continue dominated the intervening behaviours that
were aimed at preventing it. After highlighting the main aspects of the scandal
surrounding Hansie Cronje in period P4, I show how, in the post-scandal period P5, the
intervention of governments and media changed the moderating behaviour of cricket
authorities causing the trajectory of corruption to fall.

5.2

Period #1 (1975-1993): Emergence

The match-fixing corruption in international cricket began in the 1970s in the Pakistan
team and emerged thereafter as a ‘crescive’, or creeping, problem to those who
encountered it. As discussed in Chapter 2, the term ‘crescive’ is used by Beamish (2000,
2002) to describe problems that are barely visible and therefore easily ignored in their
early stages and therefore not regarded as a threat. A number of seemingly unrelated
interactions and on-field incidents associated with routine actions that occur in cricket
took place in the 1970s and 1980s. It is apparent that they were noticed at the time they
occurred, but were not interpreted as constituting wrongdoing, given that match-fixing
was understood to involve actions that had the intent of deliberately losing a cricket
match. They only came to be regarded as being associated with match-fixing years later
when those who had observed them became more aware that match-fixing may be
occurring and, recalling the incidents alone or in conversations with other, began to
make sense of what they had noticed years earlier (Charon, 2007; Starbuck & Milliken,
1988; Weick, 1995a, 2005).
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Toss and early declaration incidents
A strange incident in Lahore in 1975 appears to have been an early example of the
match-fixing in this period. A game of cricket starts with the toss of a coin to decide on
who will bat and who will bowl/field first. Depending on the weather and ground
conditions, the captain who wins the toss can choose the task (i.e., either batting or
bowling first) most favorable for his team.
Before the first Test at Lahore on 15th February 1975 between Pakistan and the West
Indies, the Pakistan captain Intikhab Alam allegedly forfeited the toss. West Indies
captain Clive Lloyd was completing his duties at ‘the toss’ when, having made the
wrong call, he was advised by Alam that he had won the toss (Polack & Pettet, 2000).
As discussed in Chapter 4, bets can be placed on the result of the toss. A captain who
deliberately lost the toss by claiming that the other captain had won could win money
on that toss result. While this incident was regarded as ‘strange’ by some players and
officials who heard about it after it had occurred, it otherwise went unnoticed and was
ignored or forgotten by those who had been made aware of it until recalled in the 1990s.

In January 1980, a similar strange incident, which has become part of cricket folklore,
occurred. At the start of the test match between India and Pakistan in Calcutta on 29th
January, Pakistan captain Asif Iqbal reportedly congratulated the Indian captain on
winning the toss while the tossed coin was still spinning in the air. This toss incident
was also interpreted retrospectively by other cricket administrators as an early sign of
match-fixing in cricket (Tehelka Tapes, 2000) after they observed similar occurrences in
several controversial matches in 1994-5.

What triggered the sense-making of administrators to interpret this 1980 incident as
match-fixing was a controversial declaration made by Iqbal during the same match. He
declared the first innings of his team closed early when 59 runs behind the Indian team
with six wickets in hand. Most people would have expected that the Pakistan team
would continue to bat before any such declaration since it is normal for such a
declaration to be made by the captain when his team is ahead on runs scored and time is
short to convert this advantage into a win by dismissing all the opposition players in
their next innings. While early declarations in the circumstances of the 1980 match do
occur, they are unusual and praised only if successful. In this case, Pakistan lost the
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match so criticism of Iqbal followed. As indicated in Chapter 4, declaration scores are
events in cricket on which betting takes place. A punter with advance knowledge of an
early declaration would be advantaged. In this match, many punters knew that such an
early declaration would occur as heavy betting took place the night before resumption
of the match on that improbable result. Consequently, the next day when Iqbal declared
the Pakistan innings closed at 331, less than the Indian total, the majority of
bookmakers lost heavily, so much so that all bets were cancelled by the bookmakers
affected (Bose 1995). Bookmakers affected by the result reacted at the time to correct
this suspicious situation, but cricket authorities did not. It was only in retrospect that
certain stakeholders shared their thoughts and voiced their suspicions about this
incident, and only after signs and evidence of more widespread match-fixing became
evident in the 1990s.

Early signs in India
The next recorded incident occurred in June 1983 after India won cricket’s World Cup
in England. The team ‘was feted all over the country. The rewards for the players were
many, in cash and kind…’ (Magazine, 2000: 41). But, after suffering a heavy defeat in
the next series, the captain Kapil Dev publicly criticized his players as being more
interested in money than playing for their country. Dev was pressured to retract his
statement after claims by the Indian players and cricket board that he had ‘brought the
game into disrepute’ contrary to the Laws of Cricket. The issue of Indian players being
tempted by the money was ‘swept under the carpet’ by Indian cricket officials until
1997 when new allegations of match-fixing implicated Indian players (Magazine,
2000).

The emergence of a key perpetrator
The World Cup win by India sparked great interest by the Indian public and the illegal
Indian bookmaking industry in cricket. Among the interested public was an Indian bank
clerk M K Gupta, alias ‘John’, who began betting on cricket as a punter. Gupta would
be publicly revealed in 2000 as a key figure in the corruption scandal (CBI, 2000). In
1984, Gupta met another punter, Anand Saxena, with whom he established an illegal
bookmaking partnership in late 1986. Prior to this time, illegal bookmaking was
conducted by deviant individuals known to police for their other criminal activities.
From 1988, Gupta began forming connections with leading players, beginning with
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Indian player Ajay Sharma whom he paid a token 2000 rupees (A$65) as a gift for a
good performance. In March 1990, during a tour by India of New Zealand, Gupta asked
Sharma to introduce him to fellow Indian player Manoj Prabhakar, who subsequently
agreed to provide information to Gupta for money and gifts in a partnership that became
beneficial to both in the years ahead (CBI, 2000).

Gupta’s involvement in the corruption will be addressed as this account progresses, but
it should be noted here that his associations and actions with leading players were
mostly carried out in secret, hidden from the view of most players. He left it to the
player he coopted to enrol other players in the conspiracy. Gupta enticed a few players
to provide information, or to manipulate one or more aspects of an insignificant match
from time to time (CBI, 2000). Hence, the corrupt activity he perpetrated went largely
unnoticed by actors other than those he enrolled.

An allegation in Pakistan
Not all the corrupt activity went unnoticed. During 1987, fresh rumours of the Pakistan
team underperforming for money began to emerge. Sarfraz Nawaz, a former Pakistan
player who became a ministerial advisor in government and who was later ‘dubbed an
incorrigible troublemaker by the BCCP and some captains’ (Khan, 1988: 160-161),
alleged that the team was paid Rs30 lakh (A$100000) to lose their 1987 World Cup
semi-final against Australia, with ex-captain Asif Iqbal again said to be linked. Nawaz
also accused the Pakistan captain Javed Miandad of bowling below par, and entering
into an agreement with a Sharjah bookmaker and tournament organizer, Sheikh Abdul
Rehman Bukhatir, to ensure Pakistan’s defeat (Oslear & Bannister, 1996; Polack &
Pettet, 2000). However, his allegations were ignored and no action was taken by
Pakistan cricket authorities.

Australians encounter gifting
The first encounter that Australian officials had with match-fixing occurred in May
1990 when Australian manager Colin Egar noticed the gifting of players and umpires at
a tournament in Columbo, Sri Lanka. He reported this situation to the ACB and ICC but
‘no-one wanted to do anything’ (Haigh & Frith, 2007: 277). Gifting was regarded at the
time as a normal feature of cricket on the subcontinent and at many foreign venues by
both players and authorities. Receipt by players of a car, or money, from fans was
115

simply looked on as a benefit for being an elite player, and not suspected as being a
payment for making introductions, providing information or manipulating aspects of
games played.

Gupta forms nexus with players
Unbeknown to cricket authorities at the time, in July 1990 Prabhakar was secretly paid
40000 rupees (A$1350) and given money for a motor vehicle by Gupta for information
he provided on the Indian tour of England and for his underperformance in one match.
Prabhakar also promised to introduce international players to Gupta for 50000 rupees
(A$1650) on each occasion. He contacted West Indian player Gus Logie, who refused
to cooperate but made no report of the incident. When, in December 1990, the Sri
Lankan team visited India, Prabhakar introduced Gupta to leading batsman Arvinda
D’Silva for a price. In 2000, D’Silva was alleged by Gupta to have introduced him to
New Zealand player Martin Crowe in 1991 at Crowe’s house. Gupta also claimed that
Crowe accepted US$20000 to exchange information about the pitch, but refused to fix
matches (CBI, 2000). Crowe denied any such involvement, and was cleared of this
allegation by a New Zealand board inquiry in 2000-2001, as were other international
cricketers with whom Gupta admitted to the CBI of having dealings. Each was
exonerated when Gupta refused to testify in person at the individual cricket board
inquiries (Condon, 2001).

Signs of match-fixing in Pakistan and ad hoc control efforts
In October 1991, Prabhakar introduced Pakistan player Salim Malik to Gupta, to whom
Gupta later alleged he paid Rs.8 lakh (A$26400) to fix a match in which he participated.
Malik became a major perpetrator of match fixing involving the Pakistan team from that
time (CBI, 2000).

During that same month, Pakistan captain Imran Khan learned that four of his players
may have been approached to lose an ODI match against India. To deter them he
informed them that he had committed all their match payments from that series to a bet
that Pakistan would win the match, which they subsequently did (Oslear & Bannister,
1996). During this first period, team managers dealt with rumours and allegations of
match-fixing in an ad-hoc fashion, devising measures such as Khan’s, to prevent
underperformance.
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By late 1991, cricket authorities seemed to know little, and do even less, to address
what some stakeholders in Pakistan and elsewhere were noticing and discussing –
possible corruption in the game. Ironically, the ICC promulgated a Code of Conduct for
players and officials dealing with behaviour that could bring the game into disrepute,
but match-fixing and betting on cricket were not specifically mentioned (Engel, 1999).
Instead, more concerned with loss of reputation, the Code provisions incorporated into
player contracts included bans on players making public statements that might
embarrass the cricket authorities (Haigh & Frith, 2007).

1992-1993: Initial attempts by bookies to enrol Australian players
In September 1992 at Columbo, on the verge of what would have been its first ever test
match win against Australia, Sri Lanka suffered a monumental collapse, surrendering its
last eight wickets for 38 runs to crash to a 16 run defeat. Australian players expressed
concerns to one another at the time and later about whether ‘all was above board’
casting doubt in their minds about the validity of the result. An investigation conducted
by the Board of Control of Cricket in Sri Lanka (BCCSL) concluded that three Sri
Lankan players had been approached and offered money for information and match
forecasting at the time, but its findings went no further (Polack & Pettet, 2000). With
the help of Prabhakar, Gupta continued his efforts to form nexus with influential
players, including some Australians. Prabhakar and Gupta both alleged to the CBI in
2000 that, for a payment, Prabhakar introduced Australian player Mark Waugh to Gupta
at a Hong Kong six-a-side tournament in February-March 1993. Gupta said that he paid
Waugh US$20000 to divulge information about team morale, team meeting
information, and his view of the chances of teams winning or losing (CBI, 2000). This
allegation was the subject of the Melick Inquiry held by the ACB in 2001 where, as
with similar allegations made by Gupta about his links with other international players,
Waugh was exonerated due to lack of corroborating evidence when Gupta failed to
cooperate with cricket officials (Melick, 2001).

The next approach took place the following month, at a festival tournament in Columbo.
Australian player Dean Jones was introduced to Gupta by Prabhakar and offered a cake
tin containing US$50000 and a mobile phone to provide inside information such as the
state of the pitch, team tactics and batting order. Jones rejected the offer and reported
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the incident to the new Australian team manager, ACB member Dr. Cam Battersby.
Reflecting the culture of the ACB at the time, Battersby, who was ‘fond and protective
of the players, decided not to share the information with anyone…not even the
chairman… or in his end of tour report’ (Haigh & Frith, 2007: 276-277). But Australian
coach and former captain Bob Simpson, having also been informed of the approach,
warned the team, which included Mark Waugh, Shane Warne and Mark Taylor, that
they may be approached and of the dangers involved. However, according to Australian
Team Manager Ian McDonald, players treated the approach to Jones as a source of
levity ‘…it could only happen to Deano, so everyone just laughed and kept asking
Deano if he had seen any good biscuit tins lately…no-one… took it seriously enough’
(Lockyer, 1999: 4). The significance of this early incident was mentioned at the
O’Regan Inquiry conducted late in 1998 to determine, inter alia, whether there was any
engagement by Australian players in betting, bribery and match-fixing (O’Regan,
1999). O’Regan reported that Jones was annoyed that team management had not taken
the incident more seriously. He had requested Battersby to mention the incident in his
tour report, but this was not done. O’Regan commented on this failure to report the
incident as ‘understandable but regrettable’ given the developments that later transpired
and the scandal that occurred in Australian cricket in 1998. On the Australian TV
Program Sunday in 1999, Taylor stated that ‘if more had been made at the time, we
probably wouldn’t be sitting here discussing what could’ve been done over the last
seven or eight years’ (Lockyer, 1999: 5).

The next alleged contact with an Australian player was an approach made to Allan
Border, captain of the Australian team, in August 1993 in England. Former Pakistan
captain Mushtaq Mohammad, in the Australian dressing room, made a comment to
Border which he interpreted as an offer to fix the final Test against England at the Oval.
Neither Border not his team members informed ACB tour manager Colin Egar so the
approach was not reported to the ACB. According to prominent cricket writers Gideon
Haigh and David Frith in Inside Story (Haigh & Frith, 2007), Egar was not informed
because he had ‘over reacted’ to an umpiring incident in Pakistan some weeks before
when Australia was touring that country, causing some strain in his relations with the
players, so that they were reluctant to mention sensitive matters to him. When this
incident was made public in 1998, Mohammad denied that the comment he made was
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serious, and laughed it off as ‘a party joke’ he had made while he was getting Border’s
autograph for his two sons.

Australian bowler Greg Matthews, too, advised O’Regan in 1998 that he was
approached in 1993 and invited to sell information. Matthews did not report this
approach, which he rejected, to management at the time. Rumours later circulated that,
around this time at the ‘World XI vs Indian XI’ tournament in which two Australian
players were playing in the World side, all the players received payment for a result
which bookies ‘cleaned up on’. As discussed in Chapter 4, these tournaments were
among those regarded in 2001 by the ICC Anti-Corruption Unit as ‘soft’ or ‘masala’
matches created by gambling interests for their own ends. Questioned by O’Regan in
1998, these two unnamed players denied receiving any money other than match
payments, and denied any involvement in match-fixing (O’Regan, 1999).

5.3

Period #2 (1994-1995): Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Ambivalence

During this next period (1994-1995), incidents involving the Pakistan team were
noticed more frequently by cricket stakeholders. While uncertainty and ambiguity about
what was taking place increased individual and collective sense-making among
stakeholders (Weick, 1995a), those who noticed the corruption signs were restricted in
their ability to clarify which interpretation of such incidents should be given credence
since cricket’s culture of secrecy and silence restricted information sharing and
discussion.

Furthermore, the sense-making problem was exacerbated by the ambivalence (Bauman,
1991) in cricket circles about what behaviour constituted ‘match-fixing’. Deciding such
issues was traditionally the responsibility of cricket authorities, but they exerted little
effort until specific allegations were reported in the media. When cricket authorities
from Pakistan responded to public allegations of match-fixing against their players, they
adopted a ‘legalistic approach’ (Sitkin and Bies, 1994) by appointing Justice Ebrahim to
conduct a quasi-legal inquiry into the substance of those allegations. Reported signs of
possible corruption by witnesses were ignored or dismissed by Ebrahim as constituting
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insufficient evidence of match-fixing, and the incidents known to Australian and ICC
cricket authorities were not reported to the inquiry because of the conflict occurring
between the ICC factions. Consequently, the match-fixing problem was temporarily
‘swept under the carpet’ by cricket authorities, leaving it, in the eyes of western
commentators, as a ‘Pakistan problem’ (Oslear & Bannister, 1996).
Key incidents and inquiries in Sri Lanka and Pakistan
According to statements made by Gupta to the CBI in 2000, during the Sri Lankan tour
of India in February 1994, the captain and vice-captain of the Sri Lankan team,
Ranatunga and D’Silva, agreed to underperform in the first test, claiming they could
manage it without involving other players. Gupta allegedly paid them US$15000 when
they lost the first test. He also claimed that they agreed to fix the remaining tests but the
odds were so low that a match-fixing arrangement was not worth the effort (CBI, 2000).
Following this tour, the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka (BCCSL) ordered an
inquiry into the team’s poor performance. While the inquiry report concluded that there
was evidence that ‘a bookmaker of Indian origin’ had attempted to make his presence
felt on the national cricket scene, the matter was taken no further (Condon, 2001)
indicating uncertainty by officials about the rumour or allegation that had triggered the
inquiry.

Other incidents in Pakistan’s team indicate that, in 1994, there was reluctance on the
part of uncorrupted players to break the team code of silence about match-fixing offers.
Pakistan’s Rashid Latif claimed at the Qayyum Inquiry in 1999 that he was approached
by the captain Salim Malik, with four other players present, before the 5th ODI against
New Zealand in March 1994 to play poorly for a payment of Rs10 lakh (about
A$33000). He claimed that he told Malik he would think it over. As the team’s wicketkeeper, he was expected to drop catches as his contribution. When he took a catch
during the game, Malik berated him, reiterating that they had to lose the match
(Qayyum, 1999). In another incident involving the Pakistan team in the same series,
Amir Sohail alleged that Wasim Akram asked bowler Ata-ur-Rehman to bowl opposite
to field placings for a payment of Rs3-4 lakh (about A$10000-13000). The effect of
such bowling was that batsmen were able to score runs with little fear of being
dismissed as a result of being caught by the fielding team. Ata-ur Rehman admitted to
the PCB’s Yousuf Probe Inquiry conducted in 1998 that this was true, but denied it later
that year at the Pakistan Government’s Qayyum Inquiry. Pakistan, having won the
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series against New Zealand 3-0 with the fourth game drawn, lost that final game by the
huge margin of 7 wickets with 16 of 50 overs remaining, casting suspicion on their play
and causing speculation about possible reasons for its poor quality (Polack & Pettet,
2000; Yousuf, 1998; Qayyum, 1999). Despite Sohail’s allegations and without
evidence, there was considerable uncertainty about the cause of the loss which could be
attributed to factors other than match-fixing.

The adoption of informal routines also suggests that there was uncertainty in the minds
of team management about how rumours of corruption should be handled. Sohail
alleged in the media a month later that he was offered Rs2.5 lakh (about A$8250) to
lose his wicket in a match between India and Pakistan at Sharjah. He reported the
approach to the coach Intikhab Alam rather than to the new captain Salim Malik.
Adopting a routine that he thought would work, the coach had the Pakistan players
‘swear on the Koran’ that they would each perform to the best of their abilities (Polack
and Pettet, 2000). Pakistan won. Thereafter, this routine was used frequently by the
Pakistan coach and manager to combat the temptation for the team to underperform for
money. They hoped that reminding players of a more meaningful code - the Koran would prevent their corruption. At a later tournament, concerned about talk that his
team was planning to lose the final, Alam tried another routine. He told them that he
had punted the equivalent of the team’s loser’s cheque of US$10000 on a win for his
team. They won on that occasion as well (Qayyum, 1999).

Australian players meet a bookie called ‘John’
Evidence suggests that Australian players lacked knowledge about the new forms of
match-fixing that were taking root in gambling on cricket. In September 1994 at the
Singer World Series in Columbo, Sri Lanka, Australian player Mark Waugh introduced
fellow player Shane Warne to ‘a friend named ‘John’, whom he claimed to have met the
day before at the team hotel and casino. Political violence in Columbo made venturing
outside the hotel risky, so players like Waugh and Warne, who were keen on gambling,
spent much of their recreation time in the casino. They were offered and accepted
US$4000 and US$5000 (about A$8000 and A$10000) respectively by ‘John’ in
exchange for information. The relationship between the two players and ‘John’ was kept
secret until the following February when it was discovered by ACB management. At
that time, Waugh admitted that he provided ‘John’ with pitch and weather information
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on approximately ten occasions over five months. His actions were known to his roommate on tour, Michael Slater, but Slater only revealed his knowledge in 2005 (Slater,
2005). Warne admitted receiving money from ‘John’ solely as a token of his
appreciation, but he later took three calls during which he provided ‘John’ with general
information on the Australian team composition and pitch conditions. The significance
of the large number of calls between Gupta and the Australian players was not
appreciated by cricket managers at the time, only later when managers learned that the
same players had been approached by Salim Malik to throw matches, a link only
officially acknowledged in December 1998 during the ACB Inquiry by Rob O’Regan
QC who saw the connection between players providing information for money around
game time and attempts to have those same players engage in match-fixing (O’Regan,
1999).

Other incidents in Columbo, Sri Lanka, involving Pakistan and India
At the same Columbo tournament, Pakistan player Amil Sohail told the Qayyum
Inquiry in 1998, team member Saeed Anwar advised him that a forthcoming match
against Australia in the tournament was fixed so that Pakistan had ‘to bat carefully’.
After Australia struggled to score 179 runs, Pakistan was cruising at 2 for 80 when
messages were sent to the on-field batsmen, one of whom left the field supposedly
because he was ‘ill’. The batsmen who replaced him played slowly, so that Pakistan fell
short of the chase by 28 runs, losing the game (Qayyum, 1999). Gupta told the CBI in
2000 that he contacted Malik who advised that Pakistan would lose this match against
Australia which turned out to be true and he made good money (CBI, 2000). Indian
bookmaker, Saleem Pervaz was alleged by Amir Sohail, and later admitted, to have paid
US$100000 to Malik and player Mustaq Ahmed to lose this game against Australia.
Australia’s David Boon and Steve Waugh also alleged on the ABC’s Four Corners
Program in July 2000 that, after this game, Australian players knew, from long
experience, that ‘something was not right’ (Jackson, 2000). This game appeared to
Polack and Pettet (2000) to have been one about which ‘John’ sought information from
Waugh and Warne. There appears to have been at this time competition among
‘bookies’ and ‘punters’ for control of players who would influence game outcomes on
their behalf, a view reinforced by Cronje’s testimony to the King Inquiry in 2000 that
games were ‘on or off’ depending on who was in control, and by a comment made by
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Saeed Anwar to the Yousuf Probe Inquiry about this game that both sides seemed to be
trying to lose (Yousuf, 1998; Qayyum, 1999).

By the end of this tournament, rumours abounded in the Australian camp about this
Pakistan-Australia match. Australian manager Colin Egar asked Pakistan coach Intikhab
Alam about his knowledge of Pakistan players having bet on the Australians in the
match, but he denied it. Alam would later admit having been advised by a ‘furious
caller’ who had lost money on the game that five of his players were ‘on the take’, and
that former player Asif Iqbal told him that bookies had lost Rs40 lakh (A$133000) on
the match. Egar later attended a private dinner where his unnamed host advised him that
the Pakistan team had been bought by bookmakers in Bombay and the Emirates who
had brought $US2.5 million to the tournament for that purpose. Team manager Colin
Egar, however, did not report this information to the ACB in his managers’ report
(Polack & Pettet, 2000; Haigh & Frith, 2007).

During the same 1994 tournament, Prabhakar later claimed in the Outlook expose on
match-fixing in June 1997 that he was offered Rs25 lakh (about A$83300) by a fellow
player at the team hotel to throw a game in Columbo. He claimed that he reported the
approach to Indian team manager Ajit Wadekar and the captain Mohammad
Azharuddin, who told him to forget about it and focus on his game. The player against
whom this allegation was made was the former Indian captain and then coach Kapil
Dev, who was widely regarded as a cricketing icon. However, Prabhakar did not reveal
his identity until 2000 (CBI, 2000).

Australian players offered money to throw two matches
In September-October 1994, another event involving the Australians occurred
(O’Regan, 1999; Condon, 2000; Haigh and Frith, 2007). Pakistan captain Salim Malik
first offered Australian players Shane Warne and Tim May, and later Mark Waugh,
money to throw two matches during the tour. The first offer was made to Warne before
the last day of the first test between Pakistan and Australia in Karachi, when Malik
called Warne to his hotel room and indicated that Pakistan needed to win the Test,
offering US$200000 to ensure this happened. After informing May, Warne claimed that
they turned down the request. However, Australia lost the test in controversial
circumstances by one wicket.
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Three weeks later, during the Wills Triangular Series on 22 October, an offer of
US$200000 was made by Malik to Mark Waugh at a Presidential reception before a
one-day international (ODI) in Rawalpindi for five Australian players to play badly.
Waugh reported that he told Malik that he didn’t think it was a good idea as that is not
the way Australians played and that they played to win all the time. Again, Australia
lost the match, this time by nine wickets. In 2007, Haigh and Frith reported in Inside
Story the reaction of the captain Mark Taylor to being told after the loss and the
dilemma faced and actions taken by the Australian team leaders:

…Warnie walks up to me in the dressing room and says: “By the way, Tubs, we
got offered money to bowl badly today by Malik.” My first thought as: “I didn’t
need to hear that.” But there’d been a fair bit of talk about match-fixing, and I
could tell it would almost certainly become a major issue. My worry was that if
we did or said nothing about it, maybe some people would put two and two
together and decide we threw the Test. That was the last thing we needed.
Yet, who to tell? … this was not a harmonious period in relations between
players and administrators. And at this remove, it is difficult to know who knew
what when. Simpson seems to have been the first official informed, and to have
taken the matter most seriously: it was he who would inform Richards at ICC
that there was evidence of skulduggery afoot. Yet ICC Referee Reid was given
only the vaguest instruction: “I was asked to look into betting, but I certainly did
not know about any offers to the Australians” (Haigh & Frith, 2007: 281).
Following a decision by ACB management not to raise the matter with the Pakistan AdHoc Committee then running Pakistan cricket, for fear it would likely result in the
cricket tour being called off, the Australians played out the series. The ACB waited five
months before publicly airing the allegations, and only after two journalists became
aware of the approaches. In the political climate of the time, with tensions between east
and west factions of the ICC concerning control of the game, there was apparently
difficulty in airing concerns about and adopting a collaborative approach to matchfixing.

Rumblings about match-fixing in the Indian team
During October 1994, Indian players Manoj Prabhakar and Nayan Mongia were
involved in a slow run chase (16 runs in 43 balls) in the final overs of a match in a
triangular tournament in Kanpur, India, against the West Indies where 63 runs were
required to win. Both players were dropped from the team, which Prabhakar took badly
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arguing that he scored 9 runs from 11 balls faced in the final overs, while Mongia had
only scored 7 runs from the 32 balls he faced. So obvious was the underperformance
that ICC Match Referee Raman Subba Row docked two points from the Indian team’s
final tally as a penalty, believing that the Indians had been attempting ‘to ensure that the
West Indies would qualify ahead of New Zealand and thus guarantee the financial
success of the competition’s concluding match’ (Polack & Pettet, 2000: 6). The
Chandrachud Inquiry in 1997 examined this game for evidence of match-fixing, while
the CBI in 2000 concluded that Mongia possibly initiated the slow run rate himself. It
was widely assumed in 1994 that match-fixing required a majority of team members to
participate to make it possible, since match-fixing was understood by most people in the
game, and by cricket boards in particular, as ‘throwing’ or deliberately losing matches.
The incident highlights the problems that uncertainty and ambivalence about matchfixing had on efforts to understand the corruption at this stage.

Nexus of bookie M K Gupta with Azharuddin (India) and Cronje (South Africa)
At the end of 1994, Gupta broke off his bookmaking association with Anand Saxena
and Manoj Prabhakar since it was not proving profitable (CBI, 2000). In its place, he
renewed an association with former Indian player Ajay Sharma who, in 1995 for
payment of Rs.5 lakh (about A$16500), introduced him to leading Indian player
Mohammad Azharuddin. In 2000, Gupta alleged that he paid Azharuddin an advance
sum of Rs.50 lakh (about A$165000) with this amount adjusted against future matches
he would ‘do’ for him. Azharuddin, on the other hand, told the CBI in 2000 that Gupta’s
offer did not materialize (CBI, 2000).

Around this time, South African Captain Hansie Cronje was approached by a bookie
known to him as ‘John’ who offered money for throwing a match in the Mandela series
between South Africa and Pakistan. Cronje indicated interest and approached fellow
player Pat Symcox who refused to participate because, he said, they could beat Pakistan
and that the money wasn’t a big enough figure anyway. Cronje therefore told ‘John’ he
was not interested. Consistent with cricket’s culture, Symcox did not report the offer by
Cronje to his board. Cronje later admitted that, when passing Pakistan captain Salim
Malik later on field, Malik asked him if he had spoken to ‘John’. Embarrassed that
‘John’s’ approach was known to Malik, Cronje just nodded (King, 2000a).
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UCBSA Managing Director Dr Ali Bacher notices match-fixing signs
The Managing Director of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCBSA), Dr. Ali
Bacher, admitted to the King Commission in 2000 that his first inkling of match-fixing
was sparked by two incidents during the 1995 Mandela Cup series between South
Africa and Pakistan. The first occurred when Bacher, hosting two ‘officials’ of the
United Arab Emirates Cricket Board, was informed by a Pakistan journalist whom he
knew that both his guests were Sharjah bookmakers. The second occurred when
Pakistan captain Salim Malik, on winning the toss, decided to bat last in the first game.
This decision was, to Bacher, ‘…a second, call it, signal, that just kind of alerted me,
just something’s not right here’ (Hartman, 2004:382). Bacher heard from the South
African Liaison Officer with the Pakistan team that this decision by the captain Salim
Malik so angered the vice-captain Rashid Latif and other members of the Pakistan team
that they had to be persuaded by their coach Intakhab Alam to take the field. Before the
second game started, Malik absented himself when Alam ordered players to take an oath
on The Koran that they would not accept bribes to throw the second game, or perform
poorly on the forthcoming tour of Zimbabwe (Polack and Pettet, 2000). Alam
apparently took the matter no further, still unsure of what to do given the reluctance of
his Board or their ambivalence to do anything substantial about pulling Malik into line.

Bacher also told the Inquiry of a third signal that occurred the following month, when
Pakistan lost a test match to Zimbabwe in Harare ‘in sensational style’. According to
Bacher, ‘Pakistan’s adrenalin wasn’t flowing. It appeared to me to be going through the
motions’ (Hartman, 2004: 383). Zimbabwe, quoted at odds of 40 to 1 to win, did so by
an innings and 64 runs inside 4 days. After the Zimbabwe match, Pakistan players
Rashid Latif and Basit Ali refused to play under Malik’s captaincy and left the tour.
Bacher told the King Commission that this was:

the fourth, call it, signal, alert signal…the Pakistan team from there went to
Zimbabwe, Rashid Latif and Basit Ali didn’t complete that tour…and for the
very first time it started to emerge, through the media,…a possibility, the
likelihood that three or four matches were thrown…(Hartman, 2004: 383).
Malik denied involvement in match-fixing, and threatened to take legal action over their
allegations. In response to Latif and Ali’s public allegations, ICC CEO David Richards
demonstrated the ambivalence of ICC leaders to address the alleged corruption openly.
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He wrote privately to the BCCP on 13th February urging the Pakistanis ‘to be discreet,
always bearing in mind the damage to the image of cricket if allegations were made
public in any way.’ (Jackson, 2000: 6).

Despite these signs, Bacher too waited until 1997 to raise the match-fixing issue in the
ICC, and did nothing to publicly raise his concerns until after the Cronje scandal broke
in 2000. It may well have been that the insight he described to the King Commission in
2000 occurred well after he noticed the signs in 1995, but we cannot be certain.

Match-fixing allegations are reported in the media
In February 1995, a number of media articles appeared alleging match-fixing in cricket,
an intervention that belatedly triggered a response from cricket authorities. Pakistan
player Amir Sohail alleged in London’s The Sun on 16th February that some of his
teammates had willingly taken bribes to fix the outcome of international matches.
Pakistan’s President asked Ad-Hoc Committee Chairman Javid Burki to investigate, and
an emissary was sent to South Africa. However, on returning to Pakistan, the emissary
said he had nothing to report (Qayyum, 1999).

The story of Malik’s approaches to Mark Waugh, Shane Warne and Tim May five
months earlier surfaced after a dressing room remark made in jest by Mark Waugh was
leaked to two journalists. The Sydney Morning Herald’s Phil Wilkins broke the story
(Knight, 2002), but details were only made public in 1998 when Christopher MartinJenkins reported in The Age what had been discovered:

Colin Egar and Bobby Simpson, manager and coach of the Australian team in
Pakistan in 1994, overheard a reference to bribes and began asking questions.
[This] report contradicted the recollection of the Australian Cricket Board
chairman at the time, Alan Crompton, who had stated that the players made a
voluntary approach. In an unpublished interview with a magazine, Inside Sport,
the former Test off-spinner, Tim May, had told a reporter that he had been
sharing a room with Warne in Karachi when the phone rang late on the evening
of the last day of the first Test. One of the Pakistan players asked to talk to the
two spinners. May was dozing so Warne went, returning white-faced to the
room a little later to announce: “They've just offered us US$200,000 to basically
bowl badly tomorrow. I told them to piss off”. A ‘certain Pakistani player’ later
got the same negative reaction at an official function on the eve of a one-day
international when, according to May, he offered himself, Warne and the Waugh
twins $50,000 each ‘if you put in a stinker’. In the event, Mark Waugh made a
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big century and Australia a large score but Pakistan knocked off the runs with
amazing ease. Going back into the dressing-room Mark Waugh allegedly joked,
according to May's account: “Ah, would have been better off taking the bribe,
guys.” In their official reports, these words were attributed to Malik. The
manager and the coach were there and asked what they were talking about.
According to May “there was an investigation and let's just say the players
involved in that particular thing felt very let down by the administrators at the
time”. The ACB said, “Don't say anything, don't say anything, whatever you do
don't say anything” (Martin-Jenkins, 1998).
Wilkin’s article, and three additional articles by Qamar Ahmed (The Independent – 17th
February), Peter Roebuck (Sunday Times – 17th February), and Krishna Prasad (Sunday
Observer – 24th February), informed readers about various aspects of the match-fixing
environment. Ahmed’s article, which described “bogus journalists and shady agents”
associated with cricket, made readers aware of the operations of the illegal betting
industry on cricket in India and the nexus that was evident between people in the press
box and outsiders:

Gambling has long cast its shadow over cricket on the sub-continent, where
millions of dollars ride on international matches. The main centre of
operations is the Stock Exchange in Bombay. The whole system works by
word of mouth, because, horse-racing apart, gambling is illegal in India and is
completely outlawed in the Islamic state of Pakistan. The system works
through the agents of the bookmakers. With some masquerading as journalists,
the agents are present in nearly every Test series, no matter where it is played
or who is playing. During a Test match or a one-day international, the press
box sometimes receives dozens of calls a day from people in India and
Pakistan inquiring about weather conditions, the state of play and the total
number of runs that will be scored by a team in an innings (Ahmed, 1995).
He listed key allegations concerning the outcome of one-day internationals (ODIs)
between Sri Lanka and Pakistan and incidents in New Zealand in 1994 and indicated
that, while the Federal Intelligence Agency in Pakistan had been asked by the Pakistan
Sports Board to look into the matter, nothing had come of the investigation at that stage.

Roebuck’s article reported the two approaches made by Malik to Waugh and Warne,
which a manager of the Australian team had told him about. Roebuck sought a response
both from Warne and Tim May, another player who was aware of the approaches, but
his requests were met by silence on their part because, May said, ‘It’s something too
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big’. ACB Chief Executive Officer Graham Halbish was also sought out by Roebuck.
After some time, Halbish admitted that:

…a number of players were approached…he [Halbish] had held confidential
discussions with them in recent months…The ACB was very concerned…he,
the coach and manager were absolutely confident none of our players had ever
taken a bribe.
The Roebuck article also stated that the:

…charges have also been discussed with Dave Richards, the Chief Executive of
the ICC, who has been informed by the ACB that it believes the matter should
be dealt with by the game’s governing body.
According to Guha (2002), in the third article, Prasad wrote about the shadowy world of
the Indian bookie:

He took his readers into the office of a Mr X, nine telephones linked him to
punters in towns across the sub-continent…Wagers were placed on every ball in
a one-day match…when a wicket would fall, on when sixes would be hit, on
which over would be the most expensive, on the highest and lowest scores, on
who would take wickets and who wouldn’t, and on which side would win the
match. The sums being won and lost ran into millions of rupees. The scale of the
operations had, willy-nilly, drawn active cricketers into it. Some Indian and
Pakistani cricketers were said to be directly involved. As Mr X meaningfully
remarked ‘It is not a joke the number of times India and Pakistan have lost from
a totally winning position. Australia does not lose like this. New Zealand does
not lose like this. The West Indies does not lose like this. It is so regular and
symptomatic with Indians and Pakistanis. Have you seen any other teams where
for one batsman the ball does not come up enough for strokemaking and where,
from the next, there is a rain of sixes?’ (Guha, 2002: 399).
The only official response to these articles came from the Pakistan Ad-Hoc Committee
Chairman Javad Burki, who reported to the newly-installed Pakistan Cricket Board
(PCB) in March on the knowledge he possessed about alleged gambling and conflicts
inside the Pakistan team throughout 1994, the punishments metered out to players
Sohail and Latif who broke their contracts by walking out on the team, and the
allegations made by the Australian players against Malik. The minutes of the meeting
on 27th March, a copy of which Latif later placed on his website, indicate that the PCB
was well informed and concerned about the allegations of corruption in their team
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(Pakistan Cricket Board, 1995). But, at the height of the conflict between factions in the
ICC, there was no other response from cricket authorities.

Discovery of the nexus between Australians Waugh & Warne and ‘John’ the bookie
Journalist Mark Ray contacted Australian team manager Ian McDonald while the team
was in New Zealand about rumours of the involvement of Mark Waugh with a
bookmaker. On 20th February 1995, McDonald investigated and obtained admissions
and statements by Waugh and Shane Warne. On 27th February in Sydney, ACB
Chairman Alan Crompton and CEO Graham Halbish interviewed and fined Waugh
A$10000 and Warne A$8000, equivalent to the money they admitted taking from
‘John’, but no bans were imposed.

The basis for the fines on the players was later explained by Halbish at the O’Regan
inquiry as a penalty imposed for breaching their contracts under the ACB Code of
Conduct which was generally used for on-field transgressions (Halbish, 2003). He told
O’Regan that:

…both players frankly admitted accepting money in return for providing what
appeared to them to be innocuous information. In accepting their evidence, Alan
Crompton and I concluded that the incident was isolated to contact with a
bookmaker and did not involve bribery and match-fixing (O’Regan, 1999: 19).
A clearly ambivalent Halbish went on to say that he regarded the incident as a most
important but private matter between employer and employee, unrelated to bribery and
match-fixing. ‘It was and is my belief that …it would do no good to the image of the
game by seeking to make public victims of the two players’ (O’Regan, 1999: 20).
O’Regan, however, disagreed with Halbish’s view of Waugh and Warne’s offence,
considering it more seriously than had the ACB.
Returning to the incident, the following day (the 28th February) the ACB was informed
of the fines orally at the end of its daylong meeting after some members had left.
Despite divergent views among those present, they endorsed the action, but kept the
matter a secret. The minutes, confirmed at the next Board meeting, did not record the
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divergent views but instead, in what O’Regan referred to as ‘an obscure reference’, and
recorded that:

The Chairman and CEO reported on a further matter that had come to their
attention and dealt with by them in a manner considered appropriate. The actions
of the Chairman and CEO were approved by the Directors present. It was
resolved that details should be provided to the ICC on a private and confidential
basis (O’Regan, 1999: 16).
Within the ACB, there were opposing views about the deviance of Waugh and Warne.
To CEO Graeme Halbish and ACB Chairman Alan Crompton, the incident involving
Waugh and Warne providing information for money to ‘John the bookie’ was seen as
embarrassing rather than corrupt, a stance he maintained a decade later:

To this day I have no reason to resile from the penalties imposed on Shane
Warne and Mark Waugh for taking money from ‘John the bookie’. In fact,
nothing has transpired since those decisions in 1995 to suggest the two players
were guilty of anything other than ignorance. No court or cricket official
anywhere in the world has linked them with corruption, match-fixing or bribery.
ACB Chairman Alan Crompton and I fined them the biggest amounts in
Australian history for the indiscretions to which they confessed. That simply
was that they exchanged petty information with John the bookie from Columbo
in 1994 and took considerable cash from him (Halbish, 2003:121).
A similar benign view about Waugh providing information for money to this bookie
was expressed in 2005 by teammate Michael ‘Slats” Slater, who was present when
Waugh took a call from ‘John’ in 1994. Slater wrote:

The chain of events leading up to the revelation about the Australian players is
vividly etched in my mind. I was rooming with Mark Waugh, and as well as
playing cricket I was doing some radio work with 2 Day FM in Sydney. I’d have
the pre-match chat on air, talk about the playing conditions, the likely side and
whatever else was relevant to the game…. About half an hour after I placed my
call to the radio station, Mark took a call and said almost the exact same things
that I had said in my call, adding a few other details. He said the weather would
be fine and the pitch would most likely take spin, so we’d probably play Tim
May and Shane Warne. He also said that if we won the toss, we’d most likely
bat first. After Mark hung up, I asked him what radio station he was working
for, because his discussion was similar to mine. He told me it wasn’t a radio
station; it was an Indian fellow who called him and paid him US$1000 every
time he spoke to him and passed on that kind of information. …Of course, it was
only a couple of months later that Mark learned he was speaking to the illegal
bookie, Johnny Gupta (Slater, 2005: 113-114).
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Waugh would later deny to the Melick Inquiry in 2001 that the ‘John’ he knew was
Gupta, distancing himself from corrupt bookmaker (Haigh & Frith, 2007).

The indiscretions of the Australian players and the ACB decision remained a secret for
four years. ICC Chairman Sir Clyde Walcott and Secretary David Richards, in Australia
at the time, were informed but other ICC members were not told. Media releases were
prepared by the ACB management but never issued (O’Regan, 1999; Halbish, 2003;
Haigh & Frith, 2007). Journalist Mark Ray persisted in following up on his information
with calls to Halbish at the office and at home on weekends, but was put off by
statements along the lines that ‘it was very dangerous ground for any journalist to
speculate and sully the names of cricketers who may or may not be involved in what he
was suggesting’ (Halbish, 2003: 133). Halbish (2003) claimed that he was under strict
instructions and, from 1995, a direct order from the new Chairman, Denis Rogers, to
keep the matter of Waugh and Warne from general exposure.

This episode illustrates the influence which ambiguity and ambivalence about matchfixing had on cricket authorities dealing with allegations at that time, enshrouding the
OCI development of their institution in the mists of their secrecy and silence. In 2000,
ICC President Malcolm Gray, who in 1995 was an ACB member, expressed his regret
that ACB board did not do more to address the problem at that stage.

Attempts by Pakistan to address the allegations
In light of the allegations against Malik, in March 1995 Pakistan’s Ad Hoc Committee
suspended him and Pakistan coach Intikhab Alam from any role in international and
national cricket pending an inquiry into match-fixing. However, the new Pakistan
Cricket Board (PCB) appointed by the Pakistan President removed the ban later that
month after approaches by Malik and his PCB legal advisor. The PCB then asked the
ICC to approach the ACB to have Waugh, Warne and May appear before an Inquiry,
but CEO Halbish responded with the ACB’s refusal to allow the players to go to
Pakistan to testify, indicating that the Inquiry was an internal Pakistan matter (Halbish,
2003). In April, the ACB had Waugh, Warne and May prepare sworn written statements
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for the ICC about their Malik allegations, but not about Waugh and Warne’s dealings
with ‘John’ (O’Regan, 1999; Haigh and Frith, 2007).
Indian Correspondent Mihir Bose, in a Sunday Times article on 17th March entitled ‘All
aboard the orient express as gamblers gather steam’, wrote of illegal bets on cricket
and the possibility of tempting cricketers to throw matches having long been ‘an
oriental secret’. His article summarised the rumours that had been around since 1979
concerning the Pakistan team. He estimated the comparative sizes of the betting markets
in Pakistan (small) and India (large) and the amount of money bet. He described the
betting syndicates and explained how odds changed during games and bets were placed
on small aspects of the game, all of which would be confirmed by the CBI and Condon
Reports in 2000 and 2001. Collectively, these articles provided an overview of matchfixing at the time, which should have been known to cricket boards internationally.
On 27th March, the PCB received a report on the allegations of match-fixing that players
Rashid Latif and Basit Ali had made against fellow team members Wasim Akram, Ejaz
Ahmed, Salim Malik and Ata-ur-Rehman. Concerned about these allegations, the PCB
proposed that consideration be given to addressing the matter by the selection only of
players not regarded as corrupt. The PCB, however, took stronger action against Latif
and Ali, whom they viewed as violators for having left the team thereby breaking their
contracts. The board decided they were to be punished by not being allowed to return to
the national team. However, under pressure from the public, at the direction of their
Patron, the Pakistan President, the board opened a new investigation into these bribery
allegations and Latif and Ali were again selected in the national team (Yousuf, 1998;
Qayyum, 1999; Latif, 2008).

The ICC role in 1995
During this period of political tension between west and east factions of the ICC, when
the PCB sought the assistance of the ICC in addressing the allegations by the
Australians, the ICC executive decided to leave the matter in the hands of the two
national boards involved. At this stage in its development, the ICC board met only once
each year with interim decisions left to CEO Richards and Chairman Walcott.
Politically, the ICC Executive was ‘captive’ to the traditionally dominant western
faction, and their decision reflected the interest of this faction in minimizing the
133

publicity associated with the allegations (Halbish, 2003). Richards wrote to the PCB
concerning the allegations arising in Pakistan urging it to be discreet ‘always bearing in
mind the damage to the image of cricket if allegations were made public in any way’
(Barry, 2006: 218).

Despite the ICC adding a clause to its Code of Conduct which specifically outlawed
players and officials from direct or indirect involvement in betting, gambling or any
form of unofficial speculation on the outcome of any cricket match, this ethical move
led neither to a change of behaviour by those perpetrating the corruption nor to a change
in the methods being employed by cricket authorities to control match-fixing.

Pakistan’s Ebrahim Inquiry
In September 1995, the Pakistan Board took a ‘legalistic approach’ (Sitkin and Bies,
1994) in addressing the public allegations. Justice (Retired) Fakhruddin G Ebrahim was
appointed by the PCB to conduct a quasi-legal inquiry ‘…into the allegations by three
Australian players against Salim Malik, a former Captain of the Pakistan Cricket Team’
(Ebrahim 1995: 1). This inquiry was the first initiated by the cricket boards between
1995 and 1999 to examine allegations against their leading players; others would
follow.

An organization can be regarded as taking a ‘legalistic approach’ when its managers
address organizational problems by adopting legalistic reasoning, procedures and
structures as means of sustaining or enhancing the legitimacy of the organization with
internal and external constituencies. Driven by the symbolic value of such an approach,
they ignore its limitations in resolving the problem confronting them. The legalization
process often involves, inter alia, the increased use of formal, standardized policies and
procedures and the dominance of legal criteria over managerial and professional criteria
(Sitkin and Bies, 1994).

Among the paradoxes of the ‘legalistic approach’ is its

protection of the more powerful over the less powerful whom its rhetoric espouses it
protects, and its undermining of the legitimacy of the organization and social justice for
its stakeholders when the process fails to resolve the problems being addressed (Sitkin
and Bies, 1994). The impact of this approach was that cricket boards ignored the signs
of corruption - what the King Commission in 2000 referred to as ‘alarm bells ringing’
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(King, 2000a) - and relied instead on being provided with evidence of corruption before
they would take action to prevent it.

The 1995 Ebrahim inquiry revealed shortcomings in cricket’s internal inquiry process
which would not become evident to the public until years later. First, it assumed that
match-fixing took the form of thrown matches so disregarded allegations and accounts
of behaviour that indicated betting was taking place on a broad range of phenomena
outlined in Chapter 4. Second, the judge conducting the inquiry did not have power to
take evidence on oath or affirmation, to compel witnesses to attend, or to require the
production of documents. Third, informants were not protected from libel charges.
Lastly, the testimony provided to the inquiry was not made public when its findings
were announced. Consequently, it was not only ineffective in getting to the ‘truth’ about
the allegations being made but temporarily silenced discussion about match-fixing.

In his Inquiry report, without the benefit of information in the hands of the ACB and
ICC Executive, Ebrahim questioned the motives of the Australian players and ACB in
raising the allegations only after their tour was completed. ICC Anti-Corruption
Commissioner Sir Paul Condon later commented on the lack of cooperation among the
cricket authorities throughout the match fixing period, stating that:

The individual cricket boards and member countries of the ICC responded to the
emerging problem of corruption with a patchwork of criminal, judicial,
disciplinary and informal measures…No single inquiry had the jurisdiction to
investigate beyond its own country, players and officials. Nevertheless, a
disturbing picture gradually emerged of the extent of corruption and
opportunities were missed to share information and concerns (Condon, 2001:
para 104).
Ebrahim noted that Australian coach Bob Simpson had advised ICC Secretary David
Richards of the alleged approaches by Malik in detail, but had not informed the Pakistan
cricket authorities. Further, he noted the equivocation of ACB CEO Halbish about
whether the Australians had ever been approached or taken bribes. Ebrahim saw the
non-reporting of the approaches to the Pakistan authorities in ironic terms as ‘prized
stories of great courage and integrity …conveniently kept secret!’ (1995:6). As
discussed earlier, but unbeknown to Ebrahim because of their secrecy, the Australian
players and coach had been concerned about the volatility of team manager Colin Egar
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on that tour, so they had decided not to report the matter to him. Egar, consequently,
had not reported the issue to the ACB (Haigh & Frith, 2007; Halbish, 2003). Ebrahim
interviewed Malik and his lawyer, who were provided with the documents available.
Malik argued that the accusations against him were based on a grudge held by Waugh
against him because he had replaced Waugh in the English County side, Essex. In
October, Ebrahim concluded that the ‘allegations made against Salim Malik cannot be
believed and appear to have been concocted for reasons best known to ‘the accusers’
(1995: 9). Malik was reinstated in the Pakistan team and Intakhab Alam was reappointed manager for the coming tour of Australia and the 1996 World Cup.

How was match-fixing seen after the Ebrahim Inquiry? A news report by Geoff Dean in
November before the Australia-Pakistan series began suggested that talk of matchfixing was really a problem of internal team politics regarding the captaincy of the
Pakistan team. He raised the possibility, given the reputation of the Australians for
‘sledging’ opponents, that the allegations of match-fixing were simply a slur campaign
against their rivals to prevent the Pakistan team from being successful on tour (Dean,
1995). However, according to Oslear & Bannister (1996) who examined all the
allegations against the Pakistan team to this time, there was ‘plenty of billowing smoke,
but not a spark of fire for the judge to act on’ (1996: 151). The secret of the ACB and
ICC Executive was, it seems, not known by the authors. Match-fixing, they concluded,
was perceived by players and officials on cricket circuits as ‘a Pakistan problem’. This
stereotyping of the Pakistan team encouraged other cricket boards to ignore the signs of
corruption in their own teams.

The decisions of the ACB and ICC executive in not openly addressing the deviance of
the ACB players, and in not cooperating with the Ebrahim Inquiry, highlights the
ambivalence about match-fixing that prevailed in cricket at this time - the inability of
cricket stakeholders to categorise the reported incidents as match-fixing (Bauman,
1991). Uncertainty and ambiguity in cricket about whether incidents that were noticed
constituted match-fixing was not resolved by many stakeholders until late 1998 when
the ACB secret became the subject of public knowledge and criticism. Even then, the
Commissioner of the ACB Player Conduct Inquiry, Rob O’Regan AM QC, who
conducted an internal inquiry into the incidents involving Australian players, and
Waugh and Warne in particular, regarded the decision of the ACB to hide the deviance
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of the two players as ‘unfortunate’ but, supporting the official line in cricket, did not
regard the conduct of the two players as constituting bribery or match-fixing.

While the public concern was temporarily assuaged by the conduct of these internal
inquiries, they were ineffective in addressing the corruption. The reluctance of ACB and
ICC to cooperate with the Ebrahim Inquiry, their ambivalence about match-fixing and
their silence about the ‘indiscretions’ of the ACB players, resulted in ‘evidence’ of
corruption being temporarily ‘swept under the carpet’.

5.4

Period #3 (1996-2000): Cover-up

The third pre-scandal period (1996-April 2000) was marked by the continued growth in
match-fixing behaviour which spread to the Indian and South African teams. When
fresh whistleblower allegations and media stories on match-fixing in Pakistan and India
caused public concern, rather than acknowledging their error, cricket authorities from
India, Pakistan and Australia ‘escalated their commitment’ (Staw 1981, 2005) to the
‘legalistic approach’ that Pakistan officials had adopted.

Internal inquiries were

established in India (Chandrachud, 1997), Pakistan (Yousuf, 1998; Qayyum, 1999) and
Australia (O’Regan, 1999) by the respective cricket boards to examine allegations and
media stories of match-fixing in their teams in an effort to silence the whistleblowers
and maintain their reputations as well as that of the institution. At the same time, some
took what theorists regard as an unethical stance when they enacted ‘organizational
defensive routines’ (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Argyris, 1990, 1995, 2005) in their
attempts to allay public concerns about such allegations in the media and to hide the
reports and their suspicions of corruption from the public. As a consequence of this
behaviour, the trajectory of OCI development in international cricket continued to rise.

1996: Nexus of Gupta with Azharuddin and Cronje
In April 1996, unbeknown to cricket authorities, a ‘bookie’ named Sunil made the
acquaintance of South African captain Hansie Cronje and some South African players in
Sharjah. He later casually discussed match-fixing with Cronje, but Cronje indicated that
he was not interested (King, 2000a).
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Later that year, in October, Azharuddin agreed ‘to do’ some matches for Gupta in the
Titan Cup series, but his efforts failed and Gupta lost money, which Azharuddin
promised to make up in the future. In November, Azharuddin told Gupta in advance the
results of the first two tests, on which advice he made money helping recoup 60% of his
previous losses. Gupta paid Azharuddin Rs.10 lakh (A$33000) and Indian team
physiotherapist Dr Ali Irani Rs.5 lakh (A$16500) in advance of the Indian tour of South
Africa. When the predictions of Azharuddin, who was no longer captain of the Indian
side, proved to be inaccurate, Gupta decided to cultivate South African captain Hansie
Cronje (CBI, 2000).

In December, Gupta arranged for Azharuddin to introduce Cronje to him. Gupta later
confessed to the CBI that he paid Cronje US$40000 for correct advice on a South
African loss in a test and as an advance on future information. Cronje admitted to the
King Inquiry that he accepted US$30000 for promising to talk to his team about it, but
stated that he did not follow it up. South Africa lost the match in question by 280 runs.
Cronje claimed that he did nothing more in that series to assist Gupta (King, 2000a).

Later that month, Cronje was offered US$250000 to fix a benefit match, an extra game
arranged by the BCCI and UCBSA about which the players were not very happy after a
long tour. Playing on their lack of motivation at the time, Cronje discussed it with his
South African team members, some individually on the air trip to India, then with the
team collectively in Cronje’s hotel room where they decided, on the opinions expressed
by senior players Andrew Hudson, Derek Crookes and Darryll Cullinan, to reject the
offer. After that team decision, Cronje and some of the players remained chatting during
which time Cronje ‘jokingly’ made a call to ‘his contact’ to see if they could get more.
He was offered US $100000 more, but the ‘fix’ didn’t proceed in light of the earlier
team decision. Younger players present, unaware of the nexus between Cronje and
Gupta, were uncertain if Cronje was just joking, or serious and testing them out (King,
2000a). Cronje’s autonomy and authority in the team as captain, coupled with the
normal antipathy between cricket teams and their boards, provides a possible partial
explanation for the silence of team members in reporting the approach. The other
explanation for silence lies in cricket’s culture. The UCBSA was not advised of the
approach by the coach or manager, even though the coach Bob Woolmer denounced the
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plan to the players privately after hearing about the meeting, and though team manager
Robbie Muzzell knew of the approach when he cautioned silence:

…he had said at an informal meeting in the team room (in Bombay)…’Chaps,
don’t think about it, don’t laugh about it, in this room, in the corridors’
(Hartman, 2004: 369).
Gupta confirmed to the CBI in 2000 that Cronje told him that he could not arrange the
result (CBI, 2000). India won the match. In January 1997, Cronje supplied information
about team selection and the declaration score of the South African team to Gupta for a
sum indexed to Gupta’s winnings, collecting US$50000 at this time. King found no
evidence of Cronje’s involvement in match-fixing between January 1997 and December
1999 (King, 2000a).

On returning from a tour of South Africa in February 1997, Indian team manager Sunil
Dev mentioned to the BCCI in his tour report that he suspected some players of
engaging in betting. He would not name the players he suspected for lack of evidence,
so the information was ‘swept under the carpet’ by the BCCI (Oosthuizen and Tinkler,
2001).

1997: Whistleblower and media intervention in Pakistan and India
In a Lahore newspaper, The Daily News, on 28 March 1997, Pakistan player Amil
Sohail alleged that several of his former teammates were guilty of corrupt conduct. He
claimed that Rashid Latif was told to lose his wicket in the England – Pakistan match in
1996 because there was a large amount of money riding on an England 3-0 win of the
series, and Latif was dropped from the team when he refused to comply. In an opposing
view to Sohail, cricket correspondent for the Indian paper The Hindu, R Mohan, argued
that Sohail had done the wrong thing. However, following new allegations in India
some weeks later of a nexus between some cricket journalists and bookies, Mohan was
sacked for his alleged involvement with bookmakers, the first casualty from all the
match-fixing allegations (Bose, 2002). Faced with the criticism, the Pakistan
Government requested that the PCB reconsider its decision to punish Sohail. In May,
government and PCB representatives agreed to a compromise penalty. Sohail issued an
apology to the board, and the ban imposed on him was lifted, and was replaced with a
Rs50000 (about A$1660) fine for violating the Board’s Code of Conduct by ‘bringing
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the game into disrepute’. The PCB ordered its Disciplinary Committee to conduct a full
probe on the issue and asked Sohail to expound his allegations.
Meanwhile, in India, in the 19th April edition of the Indian newspaper Pioneer journalist
Pradeep Magazine claimed he was offered Rs.40 lakh (about A$133000) and a house by
a ‘bookie’ to introduce him to members of the Indian team. He wrote the story after
investigating the nexus between bookies and cricketers and following discussions with
Indian coach Madan Lal and Indian captain Sachin Tendulkar. Lal had at first advised
him not to do the story unless he had concrete facts, and later said
“Listen Pradeep, nothing is going to come out of what you want to do. I tell you
no one is going to react. Only silence from the establishment will greet you. The
only possibility of the truth coming out is when a player gets up and says that his
teammates have taken money. Till that happens there’s no point in pursuing the
story. It could even prove dangerous” (Magazine, 2000: 25).
Tendulkar, more circumspect, had suggested he not tell the story in the media, but tell
the police instead. The BCCI’s reaction to Magazine’s article was silence. Magazine
later reported that the story:

caused a minor ripple, but no more. The Indian establishment, the …BCCI, did
not think it prudent to comment. Only when pressed by a journalist did the
Board secretary Mr. Jagmohan Dalmiya react, terming the whole thing as
‘absurd’ and condemning the news item as an attempt to malign the name of
Indian cricket for the sake of a juicy story (Magazine, 2000: 4).
Furthermore, many cricket journalists expressed their skeptism about the story, said
there was nothing new in it, and even suggested snidely that Magazine must have made
a ‘neat pile by passing on inside information to the bookie’ (2000: 34).

The exception was Aniruddha Bahal, a reporter who pursued Magazine’s allegations. In
its 11th June edition, Indian magazine Outlook India ran a story by Bahal and Krishna
Prasad alleging that match-fixing in cricket was being facilitated by a nexus of players,
bookies, punters and journalists (Bahal & Prasad, 1997). In the same edition, Indian
player Manoj Prabhakar made his allegation about the approach to him in 1994 in
Columbo to throw a match. In 2000, Prabhakar would secretly tape conversations with
other players and officials after the match-fixing scandal broke in order to obtain their
admissions of the incident but, despite some acknowledging their suspicion about
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match-fixing in the Indian team, and others accepting that it was normal, no-one
admitted to having heard anything in 1994.

In July, Outlook India published new allegations by Pakistan player Rashid Latif that a
number of Indian players regularly contacted him informally for inside information
about the team, pitch and weather conditions to pass onto others, but that he had refused
to do so.

India’s Chandrachud Inquiry
The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), under pressure from the Indian
parliament and public, responded to the June articles by appointing a one-man
Committee, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, to investigate the allegations of the previous six
months (Chandachud, 1997). The terms of reference for the Inquiry were to look into
the allegations made in Outlook India and The Pioneer, and into other statements by the
manager of the Indian team Ajit Wadekar that he had taped the telephone conversations
of Indian players for a month. The BCCI mindset at the time was defensive:

The allegations of ‘betting’ and ‘match fixing’ by Indian cricketers and/or by
management are calculated to cause grave prejudice to the future of Indian
cricket and damage its image and the image of the country…(Chandrachud,
1997: Intro, para 8).

In September, most players who appeared before Justice Chandrachud denied that there
was match-fixing in the team or that it was even possible. Azharuddin stated: “I do not
think that any match can be fixed…I cannot think of destroying [my reputation built up
over 14 years] by playing badly with a deliberate motive” (Chandrachud, 1997: Pt 1.B
testimony). During the inquiry, confident of his invulnerability, he secretly promised
Gupta that he would ‘do’ some matches in Toronto, and that the information would be
conveyed through his new wife, a former Bollywood star who was a target of constant
criticism by many of India’s players and cricket commentators. Their criticisms about
the lifestyle of the couple enabled Azharuddin to argue in the inquiry that rumours and
allegations against him were coming from critics with other motives (Chandrachud,
1997).
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Most of Azharuddin’s predictions about the outcomes of matches were incorrect, and
Gupta suspected Azharuddin of dealing with other ‘bookies’. Having paid Azharuddin
an estimated advance of Rs.90 lakh (about A$300000), following the poor results he
asked Azharuddin to return some of his money. About one third of the advance was
returned through an arrangement using a hotel locker, involving Azharuddin’s courier
Dr Irani and Gupta’s associate Anil Saxena (CBI, 2000).

In October, Justice Chandrachud advised the media that the report he was completing
would be a public document, and that if Indian players accused were found to be not
guilty, it would provide prima facie grounds for taking legal action against
whistleblower Manoj Prabhakar, whose allegations initiated the inquiry. In November,
Chandrachud handed his report to the BCCI and announced that, while accepting large
scale betting on cricket was occurring in India, he was unwilling to accept on the
evidence provided that there was proof that any Indian player, official or journalist had
ever involved themselves in such activity. Despite reporting these findings of his
inquiry to the media, the written report was not released. BCCI President Raj Singh
Dungarpur stated that the report, if made public, would do immense damage to the
image of his country. The report contained many allegations of signs of corruption.
Chandachud had accepted the denials by the Indian players and officials and stated that
the men who had appeared before him, many of whom later turned out to be involved in
match fixing, were what he termed ‘men of honour’. The exception, he said, was the
whistleblower Prabhakar who could not be believed because he was regarded by many
witnesses as a flawed character. Chandrachud concluded that:

…the data before me does not show that any Indian player, official or journalist
has ever taken part in fixing a match or that any of them lays bets on cricket for
the purpose of match fixing so as to lose a match. There is, undoubtedly, large
scale betting on cricket but that is a law and order problem. …One cannot…rule
out the possibility that some Indian players may be laying the flutter of a bet.
But, it is less than just to conclude that they lay bets for losing a match. Such a
charge lacks substance and is unjustified. (Chandrachud, 1997: Pt II, para 24)
Echoing writers of the golden era in cricket who had painted a rosy picture of the game,
Chandrachud concluded that all involved in the Inquiry had:
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…one common objective, namely to save the fair name of the game called
cricket. There were a few specks of dust here and there as they rise from a worn
wicket but there was no mudslinging by anyone at all. They told me the truth as
they honestly perceived it. ...I am sure that with all the good intentions of so
many well-informed persons, the game of cricket will survive in India and
rumours of match-fixing will die a natural death (Chandrachud, 1997: Pt II, para
27).
However, his findings did not accord with the media’s view of the situation, as a
consequence of which the BCCI was accused of a ‘cover up’.

New approaches to other players by bookies
Attempts by more bookies to involve members of other teams in match-fixing
continued. In December 1997, England captain Adam Holliaoke and fellow player
Doug Brown reported approaches by illegal bookmakers by phone while in New
Zealand. At the same time, in Australia, Australian batsman Ricky ‘Punter’ Ponting
was approached at a greyhound race meeting in Sydney. In the presence of a greyhound
trainer, a bookmaker offered to pay Ponting for information about his team before the
ODIs, with payment into a betting account with the bookmaker. Ponting told the
bookmaker he was not interested. The trainer contacted Ponting a few days later asking
that he consider the matter further, that he would be contacted after the team meeting
before every game and that he would be paid several thousand dollars for each game.
Again, Ponting advised that he was not interested. Ponting belatedly reported this
approach to the ACB twelve months later in the wake of the Waugh and Warne
admissions (O’Regan, 1999).

In May 1998, Gupta, alias ‘John’, ended his book-making career. His former associate
Ajay Sharma then introduced Azharuddin to the Gupta brothers, unrelated to M.K.
Gupta, alias ‘John’, who gave Azharuddin a mobile phone for their business dealings
(CBI, 2000).

Pakistan’s Yousuf Probe Inquiry
In July 1998 in Pakistan, a three-man Probe Committee was established by the PCB
under Justice Ejaz Yousuf to investigate the allegations by Sohail and Aaqib Javed
against their fellow players in the Pakistan team. The Probe Committee swiftly obtained
substantial testimony incriminating leading players. On 16th August, this Committee
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reported on the allegations made by nine witnesses it had interviewed, including the
earlier whistleblowers Amir Sohail, Basit Ali, and Aaqib Javed. Rashid Latif, who was
to have been interviewed later, provided an affidavit summarising his allegations. The
Probe Committee named Wasim Akram, Salim Malik, Ijaz Ahmed, Moin Khan,
Inzanam-Ul-Haq, Mushtaq Ahmed, Waqar Younis and Saqlain Mushtaq as the players
against whom allegations of match-fixing in the Pakistan team were made (Latif, 2008).
Only those making allegations appeared before the Probe Committee; those about
whom the allegations were made did not (Yousuf, 1998). Like other internal cricket
board inquiries, this Probe Committee:

did not have the powers of a judge which would compel people to speak up, and
was ‘ex-parte’, and thereby infringed the rights of the accused by giving them no
opportunity to have representation or cross-examine witnesses” (Qayyum, 1999:
para 8).
The PCB CEO, Majid Khan, in response to this unsatisfactory situation, recommended
to the Pakistan Government that the Probe Committee be replaced by a government
judicial inquiry. Consequently, in September, the work of the Probe Committee was
terminated. The PCB decided that all players under suspicion would still be eligible to
play test cricket in the coming series. The Probe Committee report was not released to
the public at the time but later found its way into the hands of Latif, who posted it on his
website at www.rashidlatif.8k.com.

Pakistan’s Qayyum Inquiry
The Pakistan government established a judicial Commission under Justice Malik
Muhammad Qayyum, who commenced his inquiry in September 1998. In contrast to
earlier cricket board inquiries, testimony was taken under oath, and witnesses within
Pakistan were required to attend, with penalties to be imposed for failing to do so. The
burden of proof required to determine the guilt of an accused player lay between that
applied to the criminal standard and the civil standard; that is, at a higher standard than
the balance of probabilities (Qayyum, 1999).

From his questioning of cricketers, sports journalists, and other witnesses, it quickly
became evident to Qayyum that Malik was the focus of many allegations. Another
player under the spotlight was leading bowler and former captain Wasim Akram.
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Akram angrily announced his retirement from international cricket during the early days
of the inquiry to fight what he claimed was a conspiracy against him, slamming CEO
Majid Khan for lack of support. Six days later, he changed his mind and was selected in
the Pakistan team in which Sohail was selected as captain. When due to give testimony,
Akram excused himself from appearing while on duty with the team. He escaped a
penalty for doing so which suggests that, because of his elite status as a cricketer,
Qayyum chose to treat him leniently at this stage. A third player, bowler Ata-elRehman, who had implicated Akram at the Yousuf Inquiry, made a conflicting
statement to the Qayyum Inquiry, at first denying the affidavit to the Yousuf Probe
Committee was his, but later advising Qayyum privately of his involvement in the New
Zealand incident in 1994 with Malik and Akram. Former captain Imran Khan told
Qayyum that some of his former team mates accepted bribes to throw matches, naming
games and dates. Bookmakers were also called to testify. Bookie Raja Aftab told
Qayyum that Akram, Malik and Ejaz all accepted bribes to throw matches. Another
bookie Raja Zafar Iqbal named three other bookies with links to Akram (Qayyum,
1999).

Qayyum sought to have the Australian players Mark Waugh and Shane Warne testify
before the Inquiry about their allegations against Malik in 1995. At first, the ACB
refused but their new CEO Malcolm Speed negotiated with Qayyum to enable this to
happen. Speed, together with Waugh and Mark Taylor on behalf of Warne, attended an
in-camera hearing with Justice Qayyum in Pakistan in October, during which they made
formal statements regarding approaches by Salim Malik in 1994. When he was first
appointed CEO, Speed had been briefed on the 1995 cover-up. While he and the
Australians did not reveal the long held secret of the 1994 involvement of Waugh and
Warne with ‘John’, determining that they would do so only if asked, Speed believed
that it would only be a matter of time before the media discovered it. His concern and
actions again reflected the ambivalence in the Australian camp about match-fixing since
the ACB decision in 1995. The Australians felt uneasy about their secret and the barrier
it presented to resolving the Pakistan problem but, nevertheless, they maintained their
silence in this encounter with Qayyum (Haigh and Frith, 2007).

The Australian secret (and ambivalence about match-fixing) revealed
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In December, around the time that the Qayyum Commission was initially due to
complete its work, the ACB secret was made public after former test cricketer and 3AW
radio commentator David Hookes and The Australian journalist Malcolm Conn asked
questions about rumours that Mark Waugh had been fined in 1995 for dealing with
bookmakers, and CEO Speed admitted that he had (Haigh & Frith, 2007). At a press
conference arranged by the ACB, Waugh and Warne both admitted being ‘naive and
stupid’ for accepting the money (O’Regan, 1999; Knight, 2002; Warne, 2001). CEO
Speed defended the ACB in a media release stating that a fine was appropriate given
there was no suggestion that Waugh and Warne had been involved in anything other
than providing information, and not in any match-fixing. The former ACB Chairman
Alan Crompton, when questioned, said that the issue was not announced at the time
because it was regarded as an internal disciplinary matter.

The cricketing public, unconvinced by the ACB spin, vented its hostility at Waugh
when he came onto the field to bat at his next match (Knight, 2002; Barry, 2006).
Benefitting from the ambivalence many sporting fans felt regarding the misbehaviour of
their heroes, Waugh quickly re-established himself in their eyes with a good batting
performance. His teammates were also ambivalent. In an interview around that time,
Mark Taylor, Australian cricket captain in 1994, expressed guilt about his own silence
on the matter and worry about the disclosure:

…speaking to my mother and father …about the possibility and worried because
I had been a part of it…and I knew I had information I hadn’t disclosed…sitting
at the back of my mind and worrying me… To be totally honest, I hoped for the
sake of Mark and Shane that the bookmaker story would never become public
(Taylor, 1999: 150).
In January 1999, former Australian Test Cricketer Geoff Lawson wrote an article in The
Cricketer International that indicated ambivalence about the definition of match-fixing:

Shane Warne and Mark Waugh admitted having accepted payment for giving
information that could be obtained from a hundred other sources for free, and
were punished by the Australian Cricket Board...four years ago. Was their act a
capital crime, a minor misdemeanour or just good management? The debate
rages inside and out of Australia as to whether they have committed a horrible,
unforgiveable, heinous crime or were simply “naive and foolish”… Giving
weather and pitch opinions is in a whole different paddock to fixing matches for
bribe money, yet there is an attempt to tar Waugh and Warne with the same
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brush…The ACB and the ICC did not see fit to inform the cricket public or their
fellow cricket nations that attempts were being made to influence international
cricketers. They lost a prime opportunity to forewarn and therefore forearm the
cricket community (Lawson, 1999).
Given the opportunity to speak up that the media revelation provided, in December
several players broke their silence about past approaches by bookies. Greg Matthews
(Australia) and Danny Morrison (New Zealand) advised that they were approached by
bookmakers in 1992 and 1994 respectively, and Australian batsman Ricky Ponting
revealed the approach to him in 1997 which he had told his manager about, but which
he had kept secret from the ACB. He had not told CEO Malcolm Speed the week earlier
when Australian players were asked whether they had been approached. He admitted
error in not doing so (O’Regan, 1999). In the Australian team, the silence broke, but not
completely. Other players and officials revealed more of what they knew in biographies
written years after they retired from international cricket (for example, Taylor, 1999;
Slater, 2005; Halbish, 2003; Hartman, 2004).

The ICC defends its approach but promises change
In the first of two media releases from the ICC about the ACB secret, CEO David
Richards explained his Council’s inaction. He argued that the briefing given to the ICC
Executive by the ACB in 1995 was ‘on a strictly confidential basis’. A founding
principle in the ICC was respect for ‘the sovereignty of the Member countries’ where
‘each country has the sole power and responsibility to deal with its own players on
matters of discipline’ (ICC Media Release, 1998). In the second media release, ICC
President, Jagmohan Dalmiya, announced that:

the very fabric and charm of the great game is being damaged due to charges of
match fixing and/or betting brought by the players…allegations and charges
which has put the game of cricket into disrepute….ICC cannot merely be a
passive spectator and…shall play a positive role to ensure the game retains its
glory and not be prejudiced by either unexamined outbursts and vilification or
by misguided individuals…it would be most unfortunate if cricket loving
people, players, right thinking members of society…are compelled to believe
that some players may not play cricket for the game’s sake but for unacceptable
personal gain…ICC will be decisive in the matter and will not allow the issue to
be swept under the carpet (ICC Media Release, 1998).
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As the editor of the Wisden Almanack of 1998 pointed out, doubts about gambling
taking place for large sums, and cricketers being involved, had been dispelled by this
stage. ‘Anyone with experience in gambling will feel that the amount of smoke
billowing out of this story is a pretty reliable indicator of fire’ (Engel, 1998).

After an ICC conference convened in Christchurch, New Zealand in January 1999,
Richards told a news conference that the nine Test-playing countries had unanimously
agreed to arm the ICC with wide-ranging powers to deal with match-fixing and bribery.
In allowing the ICC to tackle the scandals, each of the member nations agreed to
relinquish some of its sovereign powers over national cricket. Individual countries
which had been allowed to determine their own rules on player indiscipline agreed to be
bound by the uniform penalties established and enforced by the ICC (ICC Media
Release, 1999). What history later showed was that talk and decisions of the ICC at this
time were not matched by its action, indicating ‘organizational hypocrisy’ (Brunsson,
2002) on their part.

Australia’s O’Regan Inquiry
The ACB, faced with widespread criticism over its handling in 1995 of the Waugh and
Warne affair, appointed Rob O’Regan A.M., Q.C. to investigate whether:

any contracted players had engaged in certain conduct relating to betting,
bribery, match-fixing, the unauthorized receipt of moneys or other benefits and
related matters, and to investigate also disciplinary processes available for
consideration of such conduct…to cover the period from 1 January 1992 to 31
December 1998 (O’Regan, 1999:1-2).
Like other internal inquiries, the O’Regan inquiry had no power to compel witnesses to
give evidence, nor protect them against libel claims. But the public release of
O’Regan’s report in February 1999 signalled a fresh transparency by the ACB. O’Regan
criticized the ACB and, less directly, the ICC for their secrecy which had prevented
cooperation with Pakistan authorities in addressing the Australian allegations against
Pakistan captain Malik. O’Regan noted that a Code of Conduct and player contracts had
been available to the ACB as tools for control. The Code had prohibited betting,
gambling, financial speculation on the outcome of any cricket match, the acceptance of
inducements likely to adversely affect performance, and conduct detrimental to the
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game. The standard contract of 1991 had required that each player compete to the best
of his ability and not directly or indirectly bet on any match or series of matches in
which he took part. O’Regan pointed out that the ACB had the option in 1995 of dealing
with the case under the Code, with its heavier penalties and public announcements, or
under the private contract with its lighter penalty. ACB officials chose the latter which
did not require any public announcement of the decision, ensuring secrecy and the
silence of the players, officials, the board and the ICC executive who were aware. He
recommended that the ACB review the way it conducted serious disciplinary
proceedings, publicity about such proceedings, penalties, and player counselling and
education about contact with people who have gambling interests. While he did not
recommend any changes to the penalties on Waugh and Warne, he regarded them as
having been inadequate (O’Regan, 1999). Waugh and Warne continued with their
careers.

Wanting to reconsider the evidence of the Australians Waugh and Warne against Malik,
since the revelation that they had themselves been involved with bookmakers cast doubt
on their credibility, Qayyum requested the ACB send them to Pakistan. The ACB
refused but, as it had done in 1995 with Ebrahim, invited Qayyum to Australia to
interview the players. The inquiry officials travelled to Melbourne in January 1999 and
interviewed Waugh and Warne. Finalizing his report took Qayyum another eight
months (Qayyum, 1999).

The ICC reviews two earlier inquiry reports
Despite its announcements in December 1998 and January 1999 that it would act
decisively on match-fixing, it was only in May 1999 that the ICC took a tentative step
of appointing an ICC Code of Conduct Commission Inquiry Panel (CoCC) under Lord
Griffiths to review the earlier reports on match-fixing from India and Australia.
Committed to their ‘legalistic approach’ to handling the match-fixing allegations, in
October 1999 the Panel expressed its satisfaction with the Chandrachud Inquiry and its
findings, concluding that:

We are satisfied that the Chief Justice saw and heard every witness that he could
reasonably expect to contribute to his inquiry. He was on the spot and steeped in
the matter and it was for him to decide which evidence to accept and which to
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reject. We can see no grounds upon which his conclusion could be challenged.
(ICC CoCC, 1999: 3)
The CoCC recommended that the ICC Code of Conduct for Players & Team Officials
be enforced by the cricket boards. The Code prohibited betting by players, umpires,
referees, team officials or administrators, directly or indirectly, on matches in which
their team was involved, and in dealing with betting or attempting to contrive the result
of a match. However, the Code had little effect. Control measures were not put in place
at this stage by any national authority to address the risk of corruption. Three years
later, the CoCC criticised ICC members’ failure to heed their recommendations and to
enforce the obligation in the ICC Code of Conduct:

We repeat the advice given in an earlier report that there should be an obligation
on a player to report any corrupt approach to another player of which he
becomes aware. We cannot find any such obligation in November 2000 Code of
Conduct (ICC CoCC, 2001).
Collectively, international cricket authorities ‘escalated their commitment’ (Staw, 1981,
2005) to their established methods of handling the corruption and to maintaining
secrecy and silence about it.

1999: Corruption continues in the Pakistan team
Despite being under the spotlight in Pakistan and Australia at this time, the corruption
continued. In May 1999, England lost to India in suspicious circumstances in the World
Cup in England and Bangladesh defeated Pakistan by 62 runs in a game which became
the subject of many allegations after the Cronje scandal broke in April 2000. When
Pakistan collapsed against Australia in a lopsided final of the 1999 World Cup, the
Pakistan President called on his government’s accountability unit, the Ehtesab Bureau,
to investigate the actions and conduct of the team. Qayyum was still completing his
report at this time. News reports at the time indicate that Akram, Malik and Mustaq
Ahmed, suspected of involvement, were banned from playing for Pakistan until their
names could be cleared.

In October 1999, Qayyum’s report was delivered to the Pakistan government but not
released publicly, provoking accusations of a ‘cover up’. Even Qayyum publicly
criticized the secrecy surrounding his report, but to no avail. It was only released seven
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months later after the Cronje scandal broke. In the interim the PCB, aware of the
allegations and the findings of the earlier Yousuf report, demonstrated the ambivalence
in Pakistan cricket concerning match-fixing and their tolerance of the suspected
deviance of their players when the three who had been stood down - Akram, Malik and
Ahmed - against whom adverse findings would be made in 2000, were again made
available for national selection (Qayyum, 1999).

The English team was not immune from attempts to involve their players in corruption.
In July, two Indian nationals, one later identified as prominent Indian Sports Promoter
Ashim Khetrapal, allegedly approached England player Chris Lewis with a view to him
arranging players to influence matches in the series against New Zealand (Rediff
Interview, 1999; Condon, 2001). He rejected an offer of GBP300000 and reported it to
the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) and the London Metropolitan Police, who
initiated a criminal investigation. Within days, New Zealand captain Stephen Fleming
reported a similar approach in his hotel in Leicester by the same two Indian nationals to
fix the test at Old Trafford in August. He too rejected the approach and reported it to his
team manager (Boock, 2004). There was little action regarding these allegations until
after April 2000 when the London Metropolitan Police liaised with New Delhi Police,
the Indian CBI and the King Commission to again examine the approaches to Lewis
(Condon, 2001).

In September, on the eve of the Coca-Cola Cup final in Singapore, South African
umpire Rudi Koertzen was telephoned by a bookie who discussed the possibility of
becoming involved in corrupt umpiring decisions. Koertzen reported the incident to the
UCBSA Managing Director Ali Bacher who confirmed it to media the following week
when questioned by reporters (Hartman, 2004). In November, Indian cricket
administrator Sunil Dev revealed in a television program that a bookie informed him of
the course that the forthcoming India-New Zealand ODI series would take, predicting a
2-2 score line before the final match. The scenario he painted unfolded as he predicted
but no action was taken in India or New Zealand to follow up on this claim (Alltree,
1999).

It appears that claims and allegations of corruption had become so frequent by this stage
that cricket authorities regarded them as ‘normal’ and did not treat them with any sense
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of urgency or concern. This ‘normalization’ of alleged corruption is a similar
phenomenon to the ‘normalization of deviance’ which Beamish (2000, 2002) and
Vaughan (1996) have conceptualized as occurring in situations that lead to ‘normal
accidents’, as discussed in Chapter 2. It appears that national cricket authorities came to
accept reports of deviance as normal, and failed to act on them. Condon would nominate
‘apathy’ about the corruption as one of the institutional climate conditions he
encountered during his anti-corruption work for the ICC in 2000 (Condon, 2001).
2000: Match-fixing incidents and events involving Cronje and the South African
team
In the 5th test match of the series between England and South Africa at Centurion Park
South Africa in January 2000, rain affected play in a game that was moving inexorably
towards a drawn result, with teams unable to complete two innings each in the time left.
In an unusual move, captains Hansie Cronje and Nasser Hussain agreed to forfeit an
innings each so to provide a result in the time available. Hussain, after refusing an offer
by Cronje to chase a score of 270 in 73 overs, agreed to a reduced target of 249 in 73
overs which favoured England. South African players were privately angry at Cronje for
making such a concession, but said nothing (Mallett, 2000). Hussain was unaware that
Cronje had been offered money and a leather jacket by a punter, Marcus Aronstan, to
produce a result. The odds for a result were high since, in the normal course of events,
the betting market expected a drawn result. Cronje’s decision was hailed in the media as
a great sporting gesture at the time, never before seen in the 122 year history of test
cricket. The reason for Cronje’s ‘bold’ initiative only emerged during the King Inquiry
months later. England won the match and Cronje collected his reward from Aronstan
(King, 2000a; Gouws, 2000; Oosthuizen & Tinkler, 2001).

Around this time, Hamid ‘Banjo” Cassim, a Johannesburg businessman who had
befriended South African players and other cricket internationals, approached Cronje
about winning money from cricket and received a friendly reception. He introduced
Cronje to Sanjay Chawla, a London based businessman / bookmaker who travelled
extensively. The three stayed in daily mobile phone contact during January and
February regarding the possibility of Cronje fixing a match for Chawla (Oosthuizen &
Tinkler, 2001). In February 2000, Cronje was under pressure from Cassim to produce a
result for Chawla. Cronje offered several players money, again ‘in a joking manner’, but
they refused his proposals. Cronje endeavoured to enrol a relatively new player, Pete
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Strydom, ‘in a light hearted fashion’ in an offer for payment to players of SAR.70000
(about A$17500) if they scored 250 or less. Strydon indicated to Cronje that his interest
in such an offer would only come after he had played in 50-60 tests, that is, towards the
end of his career. Cronje later that day nudged Strydom and suggested double the
amount, but Strydom again declined (Gouws, 2000; Oosthuizen & Tinkler, 2001). A
few days later, Cronje approached players Lance Klusener, Mark Boucher and Jacques
Kallis before the second Test and casually informed the players of an offer to throw the
test but they rejected the enticement. During March Cassim, on behalf of Chawla, rang
Cronje on numerous occasions during the ODIs in India because they were losing
money as he had not delivered on his promises. Cronje told Cassim that South Africa
would lose the first ODI in Cochin, but South Africa won, upsetting Cassim and
Chawla, who had promised Cronje US$100000 for a loss, on which they had paid him a
US$10000 deposit to secure his compliance (King Commission Inquiry, 2000). India
won the next three games and the series which Cronje could not influence as he was
unable to enlist other players in fixing matches at that stage. Before the fifth ODI,
having promised a low score by his team, Cronje approached Gibbs and Williams with
the proposal that the former score less than 20 runs, and the latter as a bowler concede at
least 50 runs. Both failed to deliver the result, and South Africa won the match (King,
2000a).

It was these arrangements between Cronje and Chawla that, unknown to the culprits, the
Delhi Police taped. The world found out on Friday 7th April, 2000, regarded by some
commentators as the darkest day in cricket history.

5.5

Period #4 (April 2000): Hansie Cronje’s Fall

A media scandal erupted when Delhi Police convened a conference with international
media that day and revealed that they had uncovered evidence of South African cricket
Captain Hansie Cronje on tape with ‘bookies’ making arrangements for fixing a cricket
match. As Tiffen (1999) argues, a scandal occurs where a transgression that subverts
social expectations, or throws into question the adequacy of public institutions, is
revealed and brings about a strong negative moral judgement from the public. In this
case, unlike the scandals that had occurred between 1995 and 2000 over allegations of
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match-fixing, this scandal intensified and persisted throughout 2000 and 2001 because
the allegations were backed by strong evidence and by the admissions made by Cronje.

The Delhi police charged Cronje, his team mates Nicky Boje, Herschelle Gibbs and
Pieter Strydom, as well as bookies Sanjay Chawla and Rajesh Kalra, with cheating,
fraud and criminal conspiracy in fixing ODIs played against India in March (Gouws,
2000; Oosthuizen & Tinkler, 2001). Cronje initially denied the charges, and both the
UCBSA Managing Director Ali Bacher and the South African Sports Minister Ngconde
Balfour defended their captain against the allegations. UCBSA Media Officer Bronwyn
Wilkinson, new to the organization, endeavoured to counsel Bacher against defending
Cronje but, out of loyalty to Cronje, he would not listen I suggested to him that it might be a good idea to have an investigation or
inquiry. This could even be a good way for the players to clear their names. He
exploded. ‘Bronwyn, you back your captain!’ When I pursued the issues, he
repeated over and over again, ‘You back your captain!’ (Hartman, 2004: 356).
Like Bacher, many cricket commentators could not believe that Cronje was involved in
match-fixing. The cricket world too went into shock (Magazine, 2000).

By evening that day, the South African public had closed ranks behind their cricket
captain. “I am more inclined to believe that the Pope is guilty of bigamy than to believe
that Hansie is guilty of being involved in bribery and corruption” said one disbelieving
caller on talk-back radio (Ooosthuizen & Tinkler, 2001). Outrage of South Africans was
directed at the Indian Police and authorities for tapping Cronje’s phone. But unbeknown
to the public, the mobile phone tapped by police was one that Cronje had been given by
bookie Chawla for their dealings.

Over that weekend, with the support of Bacher and Sports Minister Balfour, Cronje
denied any involvement while making hurried arrangements to cover his tracks (King,
2005). On Monday 11th April, however, an anguished Cronje confessed to Bacher in the
early hours of the morning of having accepted US$10-15000 and gratuities from a
bookmaker in return for information and forecasts, but he denied match-fixing. The
UCBSA sacked Cronje and called for a government inquiry, as well as announcing that
new contracts would be prepared for its players with requirements for strict controls
over aspects of players’ off-field conduct. Questioned by Bacher on 12th April, each
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player in the South African team denied having been a party to the match fixing or
having been approached to participate. Their loyalty to Cronje saw most players
maintain a ‘wall of silence’ about past approaches and their own involvement at this
stage, with one exception, Jonty Rhodes, who ‘alluded to [the] game in 1996, the tour
of India, where the team had been offered money to throw a match’ (Hartman,
2004:366). This was the unpopular benefit match that Gupta had tried to convince
Cronje to persuade his team to throw for money. This offer was already known to
Bacher, having been mentioned by Cronje months earlier in a brief aside during a
conversation, but was never followed up on. At the King Inquiry weeks later, Bacher
recalled that:

a few weeks before these revelations emerged in South Africa, in discussion…
for about 5, 10 seconds, out of nowhere, Hansie just said to me ‘there was a
match, an offer; we turned it down immediately’. There was no mention made
to me of the year, the country, the amount of money. It was dismissive, it was
almost reflex, and I don’t think it lasted more than five seconds…I thought
nothing of it because that was the response I would have expected from the
national captain, and at that point in time it would have been unthinkable to me
for our national captain to even remotely consider that type of offer (Hartman,
2004: 367).
Player and public reaction to Cronje’s confession and to the action of the UCBSA was
‘shock beyond words’. The public was in a state of disbelief:

The news that their highly respected captain had been ousted from the team
stunned South Africa. Newspaper and radio-station switchboards were inundated
with calls from disbelieving members of the public. In pubs, shops and offices,
groups of shell-shocked people gathered around radios and television sets, where
the story was enjoying Kennedy assassination-type prominence (Ooosthuizen
and Tinkler, 2001: 85).
These five days were only the beginning of an international scandal that would run for
over a year. The scandal broke the ‘nexus of silence’ in cricket circles that had
accompanied the corruption over the years. It provided the opportunity for cricketers,
along with the public, to openly discuss match-fixing:

The air was suddenly thick with tales and rumours that flew around like clods of
dirt in a mud-bath. Everyone in cricket, it seems, had at some stage been
approached to throw a match, or knew someone else who had been asked to do
so. Everyone had an opinion as to when and why the cancer had started, who
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was to blame and what was to be done to fix things (Ooosthuizen and Tinkler,
2001: 109).
Unlike the previous reactions to allegations of match-fixing in international cricket
which had been headlined in the media, on this occasion match-fixing became a ‘social
problem’ (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) in the eyes of the public. Fed by a constant flow
of information that arose from government and cricket board inquiries and the reports of
previous inquiries released by cricket authorities, the match-fixing scandal in cricket
became a sustained ‘social drama’ that stimulated public sense-making about the nature
and extent of the corruption throughout 2000-2001 (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Tiffen,
1999; Weick, 1995a).

During April, some cricket board officials, former players and umpires made statements
to the media about the problem, while others sought to ward off criticism about their
past inactions. On the other hand, incoming ICC President Malcolm Gray admitted on
Four Corners in 2000 that “We should have acted sooner…with greater
alacrity…better…we didn’t” (Jackson, 2000). When Bacher divulged that he had been
aware of match-fixing since 1997, he was criticized for breaking ranks by some other
ICC members, notably outgoing ICC President Jagmohan Dalmiya from India
(Hartman, 2004).

But the storm then broke in India when Manoj Prabhakar named Kapil Dev as the
person who had approached him to throw the match in 1994 (CBI, 2000). Dev, the
Indian coach, was an iconic figure in Indian cricket. With South Africa and India now
embroiled in the scandal, government diplomatic exchanges increased. This
intergovernmental aspect of the scandal led to the establishment of the King
Commission in South Africa, while the Indian government commissioned its Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation. The Indian government
pressured the BCCI to release its 1997 Chandrachud Inquiry report. The Pakistan
government released its 1999 Qayyum Report.

The extraordinary outpouring of public information about match-fixing that followed
resulted in the scandal remaining alive throughout 2000 – 2001.
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5.6

Period #5 (2000-2002): Cleaning the Augean Stables of Cricket

During the post-scandal period (May 2000-2002), pressured by government inquiries in
South Africa and India that broke the secrecy and silence that had enshrouded matchfixing thereby reducing the uncertainty and ambiguity that had clouded understanding
of match-fixing, ICC members reversed the strategy they had adopted in handling it.
While national cricket authorities conducted new inquiries to consider the evidence
governments had uncovered and dispense justice to the perpetrators of corruption, the
ICC established an Anti-corruption Unit that acknowledged the international corruption
problem and redefined match-fixing, thereby resolving much of the ambivalence that
had inhibited resolute action in the past. Its recommendations for tackling the problem
were adopted and effectively actioned, completing the task of ‘cleaning the Augean
stables’ of cricket of its corruption at least to that time.

New ICC resolve
Three weeks after the Cronje revelations, the ICC convened an extraordinary meeting in
London in early May at which its previously factional members agreed to establish an
Anti-corruption Unit under Sir Paul Condon to tackle the problem. It began by imposing
a requirement on all players and officials to declare in writing whether they had or had
not been approached to become involved in match-fixing, thereby clearing the way for
the release of information it held on match-fixing. The June 2000 edition of The
Cricketer International magazine ‘Bouncer’ column, in discussing the scandal,
suggested that ‘it looks like a real attempt is being made to clean the Augean stables’
(2000: 12). ‘Bouncer’ was using the analogy of cricket’s house resembling the mythical
cattle stables that Augeas, the king of Elis, required Hercules to clean as his sixth task
(Leadbetter, 1999).

A new definition of match-fixing began to emerge in an article in that magazine by
former test player Ashley Mallett, who stated that:

It is the insidious spread and line betting that can somehow water down the guilt
in a player’s mind if he so chooses to sell his soul. Apparently those who
become involved can rationalise their behaviour. Lose the odd wicket, drop a
sitter or bowl a wide. It happens in any session every day, from backyard
contests to the Test arena. We are all human and make mistakes. But in the
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context of this form of betting, as simple a thing as a wide could mean dollars
for you and many more dollars for them. A dropped catch, a run-out, perhaps
crucial to the result, no one can tell for sure at the start of a Test. But you can
cash in and that is where a bet becomes betrayal. You may lose a session, but it
is only one frame in the big picture. As long as you win, your conscience is clear
and your bank balance swells (Mallett 2000: 10-11).
New Evidence against Malik
On 21st May 2000, News of the World published a transcript of evidence obtained by an
undercover team of reporters in late April of Salim Malik discussing with them how he
could fix a match. The transcript provided further evidence of Malik’s involvement in
match-fixing (News of the World, 2000; Oosthuizen and Tinkler, 2001).

Pakistan release the Qayyum Report
The Pakistan Government released the 1999 Qayyum report which outlined the
allegations and earlier evidence against leading Pakistan players Salim Malik, Ata-urRehman, Wasim Akram, Mushtaq Ahmed, Waqar Younis, Inzamam-ul-Haq, Akram
Raza, Basit Ali and Saeed Anwar. Qayyum had recommended that life bans should be
imposed on Malik and Ata-ur-Rehman, that the others should be fined amounts ranging
from A$16000 down to A$1600, warned, censured, further investigated and be kept
under observation for various offences ranging from associating with gamblers to
withholding evidence, and that Akram should be banned from captaincy in the future.
Notable was Qayyum’s view that associating with gamblers should be an offence
(Qayyum, 1999). His suggestions on preventing match-fixing in the future were
consistent with Condon’s recommendations (Condon, 2001) which were adopted by the
ICC.

South Africa’s King Inquiry
The South African Government established “an independent Inquiry Commission
backed by the law” under Justice Edwin King to inquire into match-fixing by the South
Africans. With greater power than had been available to national cricket boards in
earlier inquiries, the King Inquiry extracted information and admissions from South
African players and officials about their corrupt activities by offering them amnesty
against criminal prosecution in South Africa and India. The ‘code of silence’ among the
South African players was broken when several revealed the approaches made to them
between 1995 and 2000 by Cronje. Cronje’s televised appearance before the King
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Commission revealed that three national cricket captains – Azharuddin, Malik and
himself – had been involved in the corruption (King 2000a; Piesse, 2000; Gouws, 2000;
Ooosthuizen and Tinkler, 2001; Condon, 2001).

Bacher’s testimony to the King Inquiry revealed the understanding that he and other
ICC members had about match-fixing. He admitted that he had been aware of
allegations and rumours of corruption in international cricket before Cronje’s
confession. A reliable source had told him about previously unreported match-fixing
incidents, including a test between South Africa and England in 1998 in which a bribed
umpire had made multiple leg-before-wicket decisions, Pakistan’s loss to Bangladesh in
the 1999 World Cup allegedly for a prearranged fee of US$1million, and three other
pre-arranged World Cup match results. Bacher admitted that he had naively believed
that the corruption in world cricket would not touch South Africa.

Despite his reputation for being well informed about everything in cricket, Bacher
denied having seen an article by South African journalist Colin Bryden in the
Johannesburg Sunday Times in December 1998 that revealed the approach in 1996 to
the South African team to fix the ODI Benefit Match for Indian player Mohinder
Armanath in Bombay (King, 2000a; Gouws, 2000; Hartman, 2004). This article had not
featured prominently in the paper because the reported action of the captain and players
in turning down the offer was, in the opinion of the sports editor, nothing less than he
expected of them, supporting Bacher’s trust in Cronje’s honesty (Hartman, 2004).
Bacher had also believed that, since South African cricketers were well paid at around
US$200000 per year, they would not be tempted by such offers.

Bacher admitted experiencing strong personal ambivalence throughout April in his
feelings towards Cronje. UCB legal counsel Gauntlett described Bacher:

as a deeply conflicted man who spoke of Hansie Cronje with warmth and a deep
sense of loss… yet he could not forgive Cronje for targeting ‘development
players’…Gibbs and Williams, as his naïve and failed accomplices (2004: 358359).
While his loyalty to Cronje had coloured his judgement about action he should take on
April 7th, after Cronje’s confession on April 11th he was more resolute. He sacked
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Cronje as captain and appointed fellow player Shaun Pollock in his place for an
upcoming series against Australia. But he steadfastly refused to acknowledge that he
had been betrayed by Cronje; the harshest thing he could ever bring himself to say about
the disgraced captain was that ‘he had erred grievously’ (2004: 359). Even after the
King Inquiry, when Cronje tried to appeal his life ban from cricket, Bacher took a softer
line than other UCB members. He was less ambivalent in 2001 when Cronje attempted
to get accredited in cricket journalism for the 2003 World Cup. In his 2004
autobiography, he admitted:

I took the pragmatic view … and reasoned that his presence in the media box
during the most important cricket event ever staged in South Africa would only
succeed in taking the focus away from the World Cup. Sachin Tendulkar might
be scoring a century, but all the visiting international journalists would be trying
to get an interview with Cronje (2004: 395).
Bacher came under fire from some ICC members at an ICC Executive meeting for
‘internationalizing’ the match-fixing problem by mentioning the allegations about other
teams. He defended himself against these criticisms by reminding the ICC that he had
raised the problem in June 1997 and June 1999 at the ICC meetings, where his
comments were neither discussed nor minuted (Hartman, 2004).

Bacher’s testimony provided evidence that ICC members had adopted ‘organizational
defensive routines’ (Argyris & Schon, 1974; Argyris, 1990, 1994, 2005) from June
1997 that reinforced the ‘nexus of silence’ in cricket about the corruption. Condon
(2001) later alluded to some of the following routines in acknowledging the
opportunities that cricket boards had missed to prevent the corruption - the formation of
quasi-judicial inquiries and punishment of whistleblowers that had the effect of
silencing allegations, denial of the presence of corruption in the late 1990s, board
decisions not to release their inquiry reports, failure to establish reporting mechanisms
for those making allegations, and failure to obtain information offered by police about
known corruption.

The King Inquiry First Interim Report released in August 2000 (King, 2000a) led to
Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams being suspended from international cricket for
six months until January 2001, but allowed to continue in domestic cricket. Gibbs later
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returned to the South African national team. The King Inquiry was due to recommence
in October, but did not. In December, King released a Second Interim Report of
recommendations to combat match-fixing (King, 2000b), but shortly afterwards, the
Inquiry was quietly closed after months of legal challenges that appear to have been
aimed at terminating it (Condon, 2001; King, 2001, King, 2005), possibly to limit the
damage to Cronje’s image but also that of South African cricket and South Africa
generally.

India’s CBI investigation
The Indian Government’s Ministry of Sport requested that the Indian Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) investigate the allegations of illegal betting and match-fixing. In
contrast to the Chandrachud Inquiry conducted by the BCCI in 1997, the CBI was
empowered to collect overt and covert information about players, bookies and
middlemen, including details of property and business dealings, and information from
the public, and to analyse telephone accounts and records of players, their relatives,
bookies and associates to establish a player-bookie nexus, and videotapes shot
clandestinely by media and whistleblowers. In addition to the roles played by Indian
players, officials and bookies, the CBI examined the role and functions of the BCCI to
evaluate whether it could have prevented the alleged malpractices.

The CBI report, released in November 2000, redefined the term ‘match-fixing’ to
include many actions previously regarded by players and other stakeholders as unrelated
to corruption. The ‘smoke’ that many had seen in earlier periods that had been ignored
by authorities was now shown to be caused by the ‘fire’ of corruption. The CBI
definition of match-fixing removed for most people the ambivalence they had
experienced concerning what behaviour of cricketers constituted match-fixing. This
new definition was adopted by the ICC in 2001 when it released the Report on
Corruption in International Cricket (Condon, 2001).

The CBI identified the Indian players, officials, bookmakers and punters involved in
match-fixing and obtained statements from bookies about their involvement with
foreign players. Gupta’s confessions to the CBI opened ‘the Pandora’s box’ on matchfixing. Foreign players named by Gupta as having been associated with him included
Mark Waugh and Dean Jones (Australia), Brian Lara (West Indies), Martin Crowe
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(New Zealand), Alec Stewart (England) and Aravinda de Silva and Arjuna Ranatunga
(Sri Lanka). They denied any involvement in match-fixing, although de Silva admitted
being approached but declining offers.

A ‘wall of silence’ and lying encountered by the CBI during its interviews was broken
down when those people were confronted with evidence. Their admissions indicated to
the CBI that there was a relationship between gifting, information provision and matchfixing. The early stage in the nexus between the bookie and the player involved
‘grooming’ by the former with wishes for friendship, declarations of admiration and
gifting of cash, cars and other goods. This ‘grooming’ had led to a casual request for
information generally available to the public. Following early disclosures of
information, the bookie offered the compromised or willing player opportunities to
make money. As the stakes grew, and the nexus moved to a more mature phase,
communication increased. The utility of the mobile phone in match-fixing was shown in
the case of Indian player Jadeya and bookie Uttam Chand in 1999, with contact that
involved 46 calls, 62 calls, 48 calls and 55 calls on particular days during crucial
matches (CBI, 2000: Sect IV).

Apart from identifying the individuals involved and the manner in which the corruption
evolved, the CBI criticized the BCCI for its failure to prevent the malpractice. Its
criticism showed the role that organizational context played in the occurrence and
perpetration of the corruption. The CBI argued that lack of accountability and the
undemocratic and unprofessional structure of the BCCI allowed it to indulge in
patronage and nepotism to control board membership, and ignore rumours and reports
of malpractice for a decade, without being held to account by a higher authority. The
BCCI had focused on obtaining the benefits of commercialization of the game, with
frequent tours to controversial venues like Sharjah, Singapore and Toronto and their
thoughtless participation in ODIs at the expense of test and domestic cricket (2000: Sect
5). The policies of the BCCI contributed to malpractices in two ways – players were
more exposed to betting syndicates in the independent venues, and a surfeit of ODIs
lowered the motivation of players who could form the view that there was nothing
wrong with throwing the occasional match. (CBI, 2000: PartV). The revenue of the
BCCI had increased from the 1987 World Cup, through sponsorship and television
rights, with increased profits from Rs.5.06 lakhs (A$16500) in 1987-1988 to Rs.8.37
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crore (A$2.76million) in 1998-1999. The structure of the BCCI made it very difficult
for any person outside the current members of the Board and State affiliates to become a
member or office-bearer. Parochialism was evident to the CBI in the running of the
affairs of the BCCI. The systems of the BCCI lacked transparency which made it
difficult for outsiders to judge its performance. To the CBI, the overwhelming priority
of the BCCI seemed to be running the affairs of the Board rather than administering
cricket. As a consequence, corruption was not addressed.

The CBI concluded, from the statements of past BCCI officials, that:

in response to definite rumours/reports about match-fixing and related practices
from time to time…it was clear that the BCCI never seriously addressed the
problem till the lid was blown after the Hansie Cronje affair. It is obvious that,
in spite of their public posturing now, all the office-bearers of the BCCI over the
past decade or so have been negligent in looking at this problem in spite of clear
indications of this malaise making inroads into Indian cricket. The primary
reason behind this is the lack of accountability of the BCCI to anyone (CBI,
2000: Part V: p1).
National cricket board inquiries arising from the CBI report
Indian and Pakistan cricket authorities responded to their government reports by
conducting their own inquiries using the government reports as part of the evidence.

In India, the BCCI established an Inquiry under Justice K Madhaven to review the
evidence and recommend action against the Indian players and officials named in the
CBI report. On receiving Madhaven’s report in December, the BCCI fined and banned
for life Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma, and banned for five years Manoj
Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and Dr Ali Irani. Nayan Mongia was exonerated over the
allegation that he deliberately played slowly in the 1994 run chase with Manoj
Prabhakar (Madhaven, 2000). Despite being commissioned by the BCCI, Madhaven
also reported that the BCCI failed to respond to his requests to its President to supply
him with the information he required to comment on the criticisms of the BCCI by the
CBI (Madhaven, 2000). The silence and non-accountability of the BCCI in relation to
its own part in the corruption persisted.
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In Pakistan, the PCB commissioned Justice Bhandari to investigate the allegations of
Bacher to the King Commission that two 1999 World Cup matches Pakistan lost were
fixed and that the Pakistan umpire Javed Akhtar had been involved in fixing the
controversial match between South Africa and England. In June 2002, the PCB released
Bhandari’s report of the inquiry he conducted between August 2001 and January 2002
indicating that, with the exception of Sarfraz Nawaz and Majid Khan, few people in
cricket registered themselves to be questioned. Consequently, Bhandari had obtained
“no credible evidence” to support the allegations (Bhandari, 2002), once again
demonstrating that the internal board inquiry in cricket was not an effective corruption
control mechanism since people could not be forced to attend or provide information.

Cricket authorities of the countries of foreign players named in the CBI report, who had
dealings with Gupta, also established national internal inquiries. The most prominent of
these was conducted in Australia in February 2001 by the ACB under AG Melick, SC
on the allegations made by Gupta that he had engaged Waugh’s services earlier than
1994. Waugh denied meeting Gupta in 1993 in Hong Kong, insisting he had only met
someone he knew as ‘John’ in 1994, who he claimed was not Gupta. Confusion over
whether Gupta was the ‘John’ whom Warne and Waugh met was left unresolved,
although later commentary suggested that he was (Slater, 2005; Haigh & Frith, 2007).
In August 2001, Melick reported to the ACB that, unable to find evidence to
corroborate Gupta’s allegations that were consistently denied by Waugh, there was no
basis to recommend any charges (Melick, 2001). Each inquiry, in the absence of an
appearance by the accuser Gupta, similarly found no evidence to support any actions
against their players.

The ICC Condon Report and COCC Report
In May 2001, The Report on Corruption in International Cricket – April 2001 (Condon,
2001) and the supplementary ICC Code of Conduct Commission Report – May 2001
(ICC CoCC, 2001) supporting Condon’s recommendations were released. Condon
related the story of match-fixing and drew a picture of ‘twenty years of corruption
linked to betting on international cricket matches’ (2001: para 4). He described the
environment in cricket he found during his Inquiry as one marked by ’a climate of
silence, apathy, ignorance and sometimes fear’ (2001: para 10).
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Condon concluded that contextual factors played a part in the corruption, many of
which I have elaborated on in Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this chapter. Corruption, he
found, had developed because the large number of meaningless ODIs being played,
players were paid less than other top sportsmen so vulnerable to corrupt approaches,
paid a low percentage of revenue earned by many national bodies, and had little say or
stake in the game, even though player associations. Contrary to the views heard from
some perpetrators and accepted by Chandrachud in 1997, Condon argued that some
players sought to supplement their short-term contract earnings with money from
corrupt practices. As BCCI Vice-President Latit Modi opined in 2008 ‘At the end of the
day, a player’s motivation is to earn more money’ (Wade, 2008).

Condon believed that some administrators had turned a blind eye to the corruption or
participated in it. He believed that the ICC and national boards could and should have
done a great deal more to deal with the problem at an early stage, but the problems the
ICC faced were limited by naïve staff, lack of jurisdiction and procrastination.

Whistleblowers were ignored or penalized, and there were no structures to receive
allegations. Some players were reportedly coerced into match-fixing because of threats
to them and their families (2001: para 79). In addition, the environment in which
matches were played was important. Match-fixing took place behind a screen of
benevolence and playfulness. Without knowledge or education on how the corrupt
‘bookies’ established their connections and activities behind this screen, team
management enabled illegal bookies to infiltrate teams and befriend leading players
who either provided information or manipulated the results of matches. Condon
regarded the seductive approach of ‘bookies’ as subtle, ambiguous and patient. Neutral
venues where players were under less scrutiny by their fans provided ‘relaxed regimes’
that allowed easy access to players. Lack of controls and security allowed unrestricted
mixing and failed to prevent access to players by ‘bookies’ at hotels, training grounds,
stadia, and dressing rooms (2001: para 84-88). These venues also had vague
arrangements for payment of players including cash in envelopes, gifts and payments
from fans to players and umpires (2001: para 89). The carnival atmosphere lent itself to
greater conviviality and less serious play, where players were tempted to join in the
corruption. Condon found that many people involved in cricket were not aware of the
seduction techniques employed, nor the corruption involved.
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He criticized the lack of resolve of national cricket boards to address their problem:

Firm action has been taken in some cases. However, the resolute action by some
has been diluted by others who have procrastinated and missed opportunities to
deal with the problem. National pride and embarrassment have certainly
hindered a more collaborative and coordinated approach to dealing with the
problem. In some cases the perception has been given that allegedly corrupt
players have been tolerated because of their importance to national sides. This
ambivalence to facing up to the challenge of corruption remains a real threat to
the integrity of efforts to clean up the game (Condon, 2001: para 105).
Condon found that, in the period between 1980 and 2000, over fifty matches had been
allegedly fixed, a number that corresponded with the earlier findings of Polack & Pettet
(2000). He believed that, even after the scandal broke in April 2000, match-fixing had
continued. He recommended that a focus on prevention, rather than ‘naming and
shaming’ players over past behaviour, was the way forward. He urged the ICC to move
from a loose and fragile alliance to a more highly structured world sporting body, able
to address corruption and other issues in the game. His recommendations were similar
to those that had been made in the reports of O’Regan (1999), Qayyum (1999), King
(2000b), Madhaven (2000) and the CBI (2000). They were adopted and attempts made
to implement them from mid-2001. The ICC CoCC, formed in 1999 but, without
resources and never effective in addressing the corruption, endorsed Condon’s
recommendations under the categories of education and awareness, security and control,
and prevention and investigation (ICC CoCC, 2001).

Despite the efforts of the CBI and Condon to redefine match-fixing, many in cricket
persisted in their belief that only ‘thrown’ matches constituted real corruption. Former
England captain Nasser Hussain, in his 2005 autobiography, expressed the view that
information selling was not match-fixing: ‘…the ‘crime’ Shane Warne and Mark
Waugh admitted…is not match-fixing at all in my book’ (Hussain, 2005: 274).
Furthermore, he argued that:

[The naming of an England player Alex Stewart by M K Gupta in the CBI report
in 2000] …came as a huge shock to us at the time…I knew then it would
become a massive, massive story. I think the first thing to say is that Stewie was
accused of things that to my mind did not constitute match-fixing or even an
action that was in any way bad for the game. You have to remember that in 1993
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the idea of match fixing never even entered our minds, and I can’t imagine that
any players in those days who passed on what was pretty innocent information
actually thought they were doing anything wrong (Hussain, 2005: 332).
He highlighted one of the problems that the ICC would have faced in implementing the
Condon recommendations, namely the unwillingness of the players to conform to the
controls imposed on their association with others:

The ICC says they are fighting corruption, they set up their units and came to
see me as captain and tried to ban mobile phones from the dressing rooms.
That’s not getting to the crux of the issue. When I was asked to ban phones,
Karen was pregnant and I wanted my phone to be with me at all times. We were
expected to take some stance because the ICC didn’t have the guts… to ban the
people they knew were guilty. They were not doing anything about the real
culprits while they were trying to stop us ringing our families …so I refused. I
told the ICC that, until they hold a few people up as match-fixers and ban them
from the game, then I wasn’t going to help them with their silly mobile phone
gestures. So I didn’t. (Hussain, 2005: 275).

5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the process whereby many leading organizations within
the institution of international cricket developed into ‘organizations of corrupt
individuals (OCI)’ between 1975 and 2000 and whereby the leaders of those
organizations endeavoured to reverse that situation, following powerful outsider
interventions by the media and two national governments, in an effort to restore the trust
of fans, sponsors and the public in the integrity of international cricket.

Drawing together the findings of this chapter and the last, I now expound a substantive
theory about OCI development and decline in cricket utilising Pettigrew’s processual
analysis model (1997) as the framework. The theory explains how context, moderation
and intervention (see Figure 5.1) combined to generate a rise and then a fall in the
intensity of corruption in that sport over time (see Figure 5.2).

As I showed in chapter 4, match-fixing in cricket occurred in a context shaped by
historic and contemporary conditions in what Pettigrew (1997) would have termed the
outer and inner environments of the sporting institution. Opportunities for individuals to
engage in corruption arose from changes which have now occurred in many sports
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(Anderson, 2011). In cricket, growth in a short version of the game - the one-day
international - followed its commodification as a commercially sponsored product for
television. This change in the sport captured the attention of the sport’s management to
such an extent that they failed to seriously consider or address the risks posed by that
change. One risk, as Anderson (2011) has pointed out is present in many sports, was
that it attracted both large audiences and gamblers. In cricket, it was television
audiences and the illegal betting industry in India; in other sports, the latter party has
been the legal betting industry. Some participants in the gambling industry seek to
increase their chances of winning bets by forming a nexus with players who are naïve or
willing to conspire with these punters or bookmakers in various forms of match-fixing.
Cricket players involved were those motivated by greed – the desire to make more
money than they could earn through legitimate use of their cricketing skills by
manipulating their performance - or those seeking what they felt were more equitable
earnings than the sport’s officials awarded them by failing to adjust their pay and
conditions in keeping with the increased demands they placed on the use of their skills
and the wealth they generated in the new environment. This opportunity to act corruptly
was more attractive if they believed that a lack of controls meant there was little chance
of them being caught and punished. The absence of any external regulatory authority in
cricket enhanced this opportunity in the absence of internal standards and any
accountability by management to stakeholders.

Weaknesses in the inner environment of the sport – in its structure, culture and politics
– increased the risk of OCI development. A lack of governance quality and other
structural weaknesses in cricket created by benign and benevolent management resulted
in the corruption risk being overlooked or ignored and no precautions being taken to
prevent it. An organizational culture in which deviance of elite members was tolerated
and where members expressed their ambivalence about possible corruption in the sport
encouraged a collective perception that little would be done about such behaviour.
Strong adherence to and enforcement of the norm of secrecy and silence among
organizational members about any deviance within the organization or the institution
served to reinforce this perception. At an intra-organizational level, political in-fighting
among institution members minimised the possibility of any cooperation or
collaboration in fighting known corruption. Situational factors such as foreign location
for games and confining the corrupt acts to less important matches where the climate
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was playful and otherwise discerning fans were less attentive to performance of the
players enhanced the likelihood of corruption.

Context, however, only partly explains how and why cricket authorities and a large
number of stakeholders facilitated OCI development; additional reasons can be found in
the process of OCI development. Two types of process - insider moderations and
outsider interventions – each shaped by context, influenced the trajectory of corruption
over five stages of development and decline. I have named these stages as an emergence
stage, an uncertainty stage, a cover-up stage, a major intervention-scandal stage and a
restoration stage. Three pre-scandal stages enabled cricket’s OCI development; two
later stages resulted in its decline. The behaviour of insiders and outsiders during each
stage, while not discrete since the boundaries between the adjoining stages seemed to be
porous with certain behaviours taking place at more than one stage, were sufficiently
distinct. What differentiated each stage was the type and degree of moderations and
interventions that took place, and their consequences. These insider and outsider
behaviours related to three themes shown in Table 5.1 – sensemaking, ambivalence and
secrecy and silence – which I derived from the literature reviewed in chapter 2.

When the corruption began, insider moderations had the effect of enabling the OCI
development. These enabling behaviours were unintentional at first since there are few
cases to notice. Since the form of corruption was novel, it was not understood as deviant
and therefore not labelled as such by those who encountered it. The OCI phenomenon
developed as a crescive or creeping problem (Beamish, 2000, 2002) since the activity
was concealed among the routine practices of cricketers during the affected matches.
The deviant player’s unusual behaviour or poor performance, associated with an aspect
of a match on which bets were placed, did not come to the notice (Starbuck and
Milliken 1988) or trigger the sense-making (Weick, 1995a, 2005) of the actors not
involved in the conspiracy. Incidents that were noticed because they were unusual were
only made sense of as part of the corruption in retrospect. The norm of secrecy and
silence in cricket militated against open discussion of the possibility of corruption so
that, with no external regulator, there was no outsider intervention at this stage.

During the next stage of ‘uncertainty’, with more corrupt incidents occurring, some
were noticed. Since the institution’s definition of match-fixing did not accord with the
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observed incidents, they were not labelled as ‘match-fixing’. This ambivalence about
behaviour which constituted ‘match-fixing’ increased the uncertainty and ambiguity
members experienced about the action that should be taken. This state of affairs was
exacerbated by a legalistic approach taken by cricket officials during early inquiries
they conducted into allegations of corrupt conduct. The culture of secrecy and silence
meant that leading members understood that their organization’s ‘dirty linen should not
be washed / aired in public’ and that attempts to raise the issue of corruption would not
welcomed. Internal whistleblowers who had the courage to speak out suffered harsh
treatment for ‘bringing the game into disrepute’ by publicizing the possibility of
corruption in the sport since the effect of the publicity could tarnish the image of the
administrators and concern the sponsors about having their product associated with a
questionable game. Without an external regulator of the sport, these whistleblowers
were unable to persuade other stakeholders of the seriousness of the problem. Without
evidence of match-fixing, the media did not engage for long in publishing the
allegations

and

rumours.

Insider

moderations

therefore

dominated

outsider

interventions at this stage. Together, these moderating behaviours ensured that
information about the corruption was temporarily ‘swept under the carpet’ and therefore
failed to capture the interest or attention of outside stakeholders and the public.
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Table 5.1
Variations in themes across periods of OCI development in cricket
Themes

Period P1

Period P2

Period P3

Period P4

Period P5

Theme:
Sense-making
(Weick, 1995a, 2005)

A crescive problem
begins;

The crescive problem
develops;

The corruption allegations
increase;

Corruption is revealed by
evidence and a
confession;

Corruption is better
understood following
gov’t and media
intervention;

little sense-making occurs
since incidents are neither
noticed or understood
being hidden in routine
activities

limited sense-making
occurs because of
uncertainty, ambiguity and
ambivalence and secrecy &
silence about match-fixing

increased sense-making
occurs when allegations
made public provide the
public with some
information

considerable sense-making
occurs when secrecy and
silence norms are broken
following the scandal

extensive sense-making
occurs when information
from past and present
inquiries is made public

Theme: Ambivalence
(Bauman, 1991)

Ambivalence exists with
the formal definition of
match-fixing not aligned
with the new forms being
perpetrated

Ambivalence develops
when the limited definition
of match-fixing is used by
cricket boards in ‘legalistic
approaches’ to contest
corruption allegations

Ambivalence intensifies
when managers ‘escalate
their commitment’ to
earlier ‘legalistic
approaches’ taken

Ambivalence is suspended
by news that match-fixing
not fitting the limited
definition has been found
by external authorities

Ambivalence ends when
external authorities
formulate a new definition
of the match-fixing which
is adopted by
management

Theme:
Secrecy and silence
(De Maria, 2006;
Morrison and Milliken,
2000, 2004)

Secrecy & silence norm
creates an atmosphere
where any deviance of
elite members cannot be
openly discussed

Secrecy & silence norm
creates an atmosphere
where the perceived
corruption by elite members
is not openly discussed

Corruption starts but is
largely unnoticed

Corruption grows when
signs are ‘swept under the
carpet’

Secrecy & silence norm
begins to break;
match-fixing becomes a
‘social problem’ for the
community and
management changes its
attitude to discussing
match-fixing
Corruption declines when
its extent is revealed
during the scandal

Secrecy & silence norm is
broken when stakeholders
release to the public
information they have
about the corruption

Consequences on OCI
development

Secrecy & silence norm is
reinforced by
managements’ adoption of
‘organizational defensive
routines’ (ODRs) which
restrict discussion and
learning about the
corruption
Corruption spreads when
its signs are dismissed and
information is ‘covered
up’

OCI dev’t begins

OCI dev’t increases

OCI dev’t expands

OCI dev’t plateaus

OCI dev’t declines

Noticing
(Starbuck and
Milliken, 1988)
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Corruption is reduced by
interventions and new risk
management strategies

In the final pre-scandal period, a cover-up occurred. With OCI development now more
apparent within several national teams, whistleblower allegations and media reports of
signs and cues of match-fixing triggered the sense-making of a greater number of the
sport’s stakeholders and the public. Authorities may have responded to these fresh
allegations in two ways – by coming clean about the corruption and addressing the
problem, or by escalating their commitment to their legalistic approach in determining if
corruption was present.

They chose the latter course by requiring those making

allegations to provide evidence of match-fixing at the internal inquiries they conducted
to address public concerns about the allegations. They dismissed allegations of reported
signs and cues of corrupt conduct despite many having personally concluding that
something was amiss. They attempted to maintain ‘secrecy and silence’ about the
corruption by punishing internal whistleblowers and by withholding their inquiry
reports from the public. This ‘cover up’, aimed at minimizing damage to the image and
reputation of the game, was moderately successful in keeping outsiders at bay for
several years but allowed OCI development to continue. However, this cover-up proved
to be unsustainable.

A powerful external intervention by Delhi police which found evidence of corruption,
followed by an admission by a high profile perpetrator of acting corruptly, created a
media scandal that broke the ‘secrecy and silence’ norm about match-fixing. Ongoing
media reports increased sense-making about the corruption to such a degree that the
public came to regard it as a ‘social problem’ (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Early reports
of the scale and nature of the match-fixing occurring broke the silence of numerous
stakeholders surrounding the issue and led to further outsider intervention by
governments.

In the post-scandal period, these outsider interventions by governments, media and
knowledgeable insiders will enhance stakeholder and public sense-making (Weick,
1995a, 2005). Ambivalence about ‘match-fixing’ ended when a new definition was
adopted, the norm of ‘secrecy and silence’ became unenforceable and the sport’s
authorities acknowledged the problem and adopted strategies to ‘clean their Augean
stables’ of the corruption. With increased knowledge of and transparency about this
form of match-fixing in cricket, OCI development ceased and went into remission as a
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result of decisive action taken by the governance body. Strong action by officials to
signal the end to the past moderations gradually restored the image and reputation of the
sport. The history of international cricket since 2000 suggests that these efforts have
largely been successful.

These findings supplement the contribution that Pinto et al (2008) have made to
understanding the OCI phenomenon. I discuss them in more detail in Chapter 8
following my analysis of the second corruption case – the sexual abuse of minors by
clergy in the U.S. Catholic Church in Boston - in Chapters 6 and 7. In Chapter 8, I will
highlight any moderations to this substantive theory of OCI development and decline
based on this second case.
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CHAPTER 6: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASE – PART I: THE CONTEXT THAT
ENABLED THE CORRUPTION
6.1

Introduction

This second case of organizational corruption concerning the sexual abuse of children
by clergy in the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston in the United States (U.S.) is part of an
international problem for the Catholic Church that one church leader in Australia has
recently termed ‘the most serious challenge the Church has faced since the Reformation
in the 16th century’ (Power, 2010). Boston proved to be just the ‘tip of the iceberg’,
according to The New York Times in 2010, because in the U.S. and other countries over
three decades, the Catholic Church has continued to grapple with a series of clergy
sexual abuse scandals and lawsuits that has cost an estimated $2 billion in settlements
and shaken the faith of many Church members.

The current crisis began the U.S. in 2002. The Boston Globe revealed that Catholic
Church leaders in the Archdiocese of Boston (AOB) had enabled a Catholic priest, Fr
John Geoghan, to sexually abuse 130 minors between 1960 and 1995 (Terry, 2008a).
An intervention by Massachusetts law officials during 2002-2003 then uncovered
evidence in AOB files that at least 789 victims had allegedly been molested by 250
clergy of the AOB between 1950 and 2002 (Reilly, 2003). The Boston crisis grew to
new proportions and took on new meaning in 2004 when the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) revealed that research it had commissioned to determine the
extent of child sexual abuse (CSA) allegations against clergy in U.S. catholic dioceses
in the period 1950-2002 found that 4392 clergy had allegedly abused 10667 children
(Burke, 2004; John Jay College, 2004, 2006; Terry, 2008b). Similar patterns of abuse
by clergy and corruption-enabling behaviour by Church officials have since been
revealed as having occurred in Ireland, Germany and Malta, confirming that CSA by
clergy remains a problem of institutional proportions (The New York Times, 2010).
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In this chapter and the next, I focus on the Boston case in answering my research
question concerning how and why OCIs developed in the U.S. Catholic Church to the
extent that they did. My analytic framework for this chapter and the next is similar to
that which I utilised in my other case of OCI development in international cricket – see
Figure 6.1 below.

Figure 6.1
OCI development in the Catholic Church, Archdiocese of Boston – an explanatory
framework (context)
1. Contextual
Factors /
Antecedent
conditions

3. Outsider Interventions:
Actions of various stakeholders who endeavoured to prevent
OCI development in the CatholicChurch
CHAPTER 7

Prior and
continuing
environmental,
organizational,
individual and
situational
factors which
enabled OCI
development in
the
CatholicChurch

CHAPTER 6

OCI dev’t over time

2. Insider Moderations:
Actions of internal actors who, influenced by contextual
factors, facilitated OCI development in the Catholic Church
CHAPTER 7

In this chapter, I discuss contextual factors within the Church and broader society that
facilitated the corruption. In the next chapter, I provide an analytical narrative of the
corruption in the AOB, explaining the behaviour of Church stakeholders that enabled
the corruption to flourish, before the intervention of the Boston Globe and the
Massachusetts Attorney-General sparked the scandal that proved to be a watershed
event in altering the trajectory of corruption. While the external inquiries by law
officials were largely successful in identifying and punishing many deviant clergy, no
criminal action was taken against Church officials. Rather the church has largely
resisted the efforts of victims and their lawyers to obtain compensation, but has made
efforts nationally to strengthen controls over clergy (situational factors), including more
careful screening of those who are admitted to the clergy (individual factors).
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Suggestions for structural changes in the church have been ignored. I will say more on
the failure of the Church to solve its problem of being perceived as an ‘organization of
corrupt individuals’ (OCI) in Section 7.7.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: In Section 6.2, I briefly describe the Catholic
Church and follow this with a preliminary explanation of child sexual abuse (CSA). In
Section 6.3, I address the institutional structure and governance of the Catholic Church
at international, national and regional levels, highlighting factors that arguably
influenced the way in which sexual and other deviance by clergy was handled. Aspects
of the Church’s culture, similar to those found in the cricket case, which influenced the
way stakeholders reacted to clergy deviance, are also addressed. In Section 6.4, I
discuss three social trends in the external environment of the Church which affected the
behaviour of the clergy and laity and which challenged the influence of Church leaders
in dictating what they believe is acceptable human sexual behaviour. The response of
Church leaders to these social trends resulted in many of the laity turning away from
their engagement with the Church and many priests, and other religious, leaving their
vocations. I explain how, desperate to enrol new candidates for the priesthood, Church
leaders failed to control the recruitment, selection and formation of new candidates, a
consequence of which was that non-celibate individuals were ordained and placed in
ministry, many of whom subsequently engaged in CSA. Finally, in Section 6.5, I outline
some conclusions which researchers on CSA have reached about its more proximate
causes, namely - characteristics of individual perpetrators and victims and the
situational factors that enable incidents of abuse to occur without most individuals being
caught – and compare these findings with the evidence in this case.

In Chapter 7, I will discuss the dynamic aspects of this corruption and its cover-up,
focusing on the behaviour of Catholic Church stakeholders in responding to their
encounters with incidents of CSA. As Figure 6.1 indicates, the upward arrows represent
the relative strength of those moderating factors which facilitated the corruption while
the downward arrows represent the relative strength of interventions by media
representatives and governments, and earlier by whistleblowers, who attempted to
prevent the corruption. As occurred in the cricket case, the behaviour that facilitated the
corruption (internal moderations) was dominant in its early stages whereas, after the
Boston scandal in 2002, the corruption was suppressed in Boston by the stronger
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interventions of the media and government which caused an adverse reaction against the
AOB by the Catholic Church laity. However, recent evidence of similar corruption in
Ireland, Germany and Malta (The New York Times, 2010) indicates that Church leaders
only partially ‘cleaned their Augean stables’.

6.2

The Catholic Church and Child Sexual Abuse

6.2.1

A Brief Description of the Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Church is the largest branch in the tree of Christianity,
representing over half of all Christians and about one sixth of the world's population.
Christianity is one of the world’s great religions, or systems of belief and practice,
which is founded on the teaching and life of Jesus Christ at the start of the first
millennium. The central theme of his teaching was the pre-eminent duty of all people to
love both God and their neighbours (Livingstone, 1977).

Over the centuries, the Roman Catholic Church shaped the moral behaviour of the
societies where it had influence and exercised secular power over members
(McManners, 1990; Green, 1996). Church leaders came to see themselves as the arbiters
of moral authority, the teachers of God’s laws, the shepherds in charge of the Church
flock. But their influence has varied over time, and has been in decline in the late 20th
century during the period that coincides with the CSA issue in the Church. I write more
about relevant aspects of the Catholic Church in Section 6.3.

6.2.2

An Explanation of Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)

Sexual abuse of minors, more commonly known as child sexual abuse (CSA), refers to
the sexual exploitation in some form (verbal or physical, consensual or non-consensual)
by an adult person of a child or young person. The World Health Organization (WHO)
has recently defined CSA as:

…the involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or she does not fully
comprehend, is unable to give informed consent to, or for which the child is not
developmentally prepared, or else that violate the laws or social taboos of
society. Children can be sexually abused by adults or by other children who are
– by virtue of their age or stage of development – in a position of responsibility,
trust or power over the victim (WHO 2006:10, cited in Smallbone et al, 2008).
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According to Terry (2008a: 548), CSA includes:

contacts or interactions between a child younger than the age of 18 and an adult
when the child is being used as an object of sexual gratification for the adult. A
child is abused whether or not this activity involves explicit force, whether or
not it involves genital or physical contact, whether or not it is initiated by the
child, and whether or not there is discernible harmful outcome.
In different countries and states within many countries, the legal age of consent for
sexual activity varies. The age of consent in most countries ranges from 14 to 17, but in
the Vatican State and Spain, the ages are 12 and 13 respectively, but 18 in countries
such as Malta and Turkey (ageofconsent.com, 2010). Variations in the age of consent
and in the laws and their administration point to the existence of considerable
ambivalence (Bauman, 1991) in society and in the Church about CSA, both currently
and historically.

Societal Sense-making and CSA
In the U.S., people did not really begin to make sense of the extent of sexual abuse that
children suffered at the hands of adults until the 1970s. Little was known about CSA,
even by professionals, until a sharp learning curve took place in the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s (Filteau, 2004). In the 1930s and 1940s, possibly triggered by some events at that
time, CSA came to be recognized by a small number of U.S. state governments as a
problem that required legislative intervention. However, it was not until the 1980s that
the U.S. community became aware that the incidence of child sexual abuse was far
greater than had previously been assumed (Doyle et al, 2006; White and Terry, 2008).
This increased awareness followed the enactment of legislation in the mid-70s in some
states requiring mandatory reporting by professionals of cases of child abuse. A trickle
of reported cases became a torrent, with 12000 cases a year in the 1970s rising to
150000 a year by 1985, with over 90% of those allegations being regarded by the police
as credible (Bruni and Burkett, 2002). These cases revealed that, while family members
or close relatives were often the perpetrators, abuse was often perpetrated in
professional settings by medical practitioners, counsellors, therapists or religious clergy
(Blaszezynski, 1996; France, 2004). The ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1973 cited in Marshall
& Dewe, 1997; Ben-Yehuda, 1990; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994) that ensued did not
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result in U.S. state governments introducing mandatory reporting requirements for
professionals in the Church. Nor did it lead to government agencies interfering in cases
of sexual abuse by clergy which they perceived as an internal Church problem
(Bartenuk, 2006; Terry & Ackerman, 2008).

Despite the legislation, there was considerable debate between 1973 and 1993 about the
defining characteristics of child maltreatment, including CSA, with many of these issues
still unresolved in 2008 (Smallbone et al, 2008). This ambivalence about what
behaviours constituted CSA related to the ambiguity about practices ranging from
bathing or sleeping with children to kissing and massaging them, which were less clear
than behaviours such as genital stimulation or sexual intercourse which more clearly
involved sexual abuse. Terry (2008b) found that the most common types of sexually
abusive acts perpetrated by the U.S. Catholic priests were touching under and over the
victim’s clothes (in 57.25% and 56.80% of the cases respectively). Other common types
of abuse (around 15-27% of cases) involved the priest or the victims disrobing and
performing masturbation, oral sex, and penile penetration.

The age of the victim contributed to this ambivalence because it became debatable
whether informed consent was given by older children. CSA is often perpetrated by
individuals who exhibit paraphilic behaviours (Terry, 2008b). Paraphilias are disorders
indicated by recurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies about nonliving objects, nonconsenting persons, or violence (Terry, 2008b, citing the American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). Two types of paraphilia are pedophilia and ephebophilia.
‘Pedophilia’ describes a sexual orientation towards pre-pubescent children, while
‘ephebophilia’ describes a compulsive attraction to adolescents or post- pubescent
children (Terry, 2008b; Reilly, 2003; France, 2004). While pedophilia is almost
universally condemned, there is less agreement about ephebophilia. This definitional
problem is only one of the difficulties that explain why CSA was poorly understood and
ineffectively dealt with both in society and the Church in the last century. Other
difficulties are discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 7.
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6.2.3

Catholic Church Interpretations of CSA

Despite a 1600 year history of dealing with many forms of sexual behaviour that
Church leaders labelled as deviant, U.S. Catholic Church leaders did not treat CSA as
such until after the Boston scandal in 2002. Prior to that time, little regard was shown to
the victims by the Church; the focus of pastoral attention was the wellbeing of the
perpetrator priest (Doyle et al, 2006).

When clergy sexual abuse became manifest in the 1940s (Smith et al, 2008; Terry,
2008), it was regarded by the Church hierarchy as a psychological condition to be
treated, and from a spiritual perspective as ‘a sin to be forgiven’ (Doyle et al, 2006). In
1924, the first catholic treatment centre for priests with alcohol and similar problems
opened. In 1947, a religious order known as the Servants of the Paraclete began a
ministry operating ‘retreat centers’ for troubled priests in the U.S. including a handful of
priests who had abused minors. Sexual disorders by clergy were initially treated as
problems generated by excessive drinking, but over time they were differentiated not
only from alcoholism, but from depression, mental illness, character disorders and sin
(Doyle et al, 2006). From the 1950s, additional centres were opened which used
psychiatric and psychological treatments informed by medical knowledge of the time.
These methods proved to be ineffective in curbing the abuse of recidivist priests who
were repeatedly and quietly returned to ministry after treatment (Berry, 1992, 2000;
Doyle et al, 2006; Podles, 2008). In 1952, the founder of the Servants of the Paraclete
warned the U.S. bishops that sexually abusive priests who were recidivists could not be
rehabilitated and advocated laicization as the solution to their problem, but his warnings
went unheeded (Goodstein, 2009). Insulated from government intervention, the bishops
alone decided how to deal with priests against whom allegations of CSA were made.
The lack of knowledge in society about CSA generally and CSA perpetrated
specifically by priests protected both the priests and bishops from scandal.

By interpreting CSA as a ‘sin to be forgiven’, each priest could approach his trusted
confessor who, bound by the Church’s ‘seal of the confessional’, could listen to the
perpetrator’s admissions and ameliorate his spiritual guilt without any obligation to
report the abuse or to take practical steps to prevent further offences.
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In Chapter 7, I will discuss the strategies adopted in the Church by the bishops to handle
the allegations that they received from 1950-2002. But here I will discuss some features
of the internal environment of the Church which are unique in many ways, but bear a
strong resemblance in others to the structure, governance and culture of international
cricket discussed in Chapter 4. These features of the internal environment of the Church
influenced the decisions of various actors on how they would behave when they
encountered the corruption.

6.3

The Catholic Church – Structure, Governance and Culture

Factors

6.3.1

The Structure and Governance of the Catholic Church

The structure and governance of the global Catholic Church is complex; ‘a product of
history, not management theory’ (Reese, 1998: 109). While it was not always
hierarchical (see, for example, Kung, 1994; Collins, 1986, 1997, 2001; Lennan, 1997),
Vatican officials in the 20th century regarded it as such since they believed that its
nature stemmed from the structure established by the founder, a belief that can be found
in the 1964 encyclical Lumen Gentium (Flannery, 1988).

Leadership in a hierarchical Church
There is a view among many theorists who have studied the sexual abuse crisis in the
Church (for example, Sipe, 1995; Shupe, 1995, 1998, 2008; Bruni and Burkett, 2002;
Bartenuk et al, 2006; Robinson, 2007; Podles, 2008) that it is largely the result of a
structural problem - an abuse of power in ‘trusting hierarchies’ within the Church by
elites (the clergy) over non-elites (the laity) - rather than a problem that can be
explained by psychological and sociological theories. While structural factors cannot
provide a complete explanation, they played a part in the crisis that has enveloped the
Church.
Leadership within the Church begins with the person elected as ‘the Vicar of Christ’ –
the Pope. The first Pope, Peter the Apostle, was reputedly appointed by Christ with his
authority to teach the nations. A line of succession can be traced from Peter to the
current Pope Benedict XVI. Regarding themselves as the authentic Church in relation to
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Christ’s teaching, Church leaders have consistently adopted a unitary approach in
deciding on Church dogmas and moral issues. This unitary approach is reflected in its
structure, governance and clerical culture. The key members of the Church relevant to
this case are the Pope, the bishops, the priests and the laity.

The Pope: The Pope is both head of the Church and head of the secular state of the
Vatican. While the spiritual authority of the Pope has been widely acknowledged over
the centuries, as histories of Christianity and the Catholic Church attest (see, for
example, Green, 1996; McManners, 1990), the secular authority and power of the Pope
fluctuated. In contrast to earlier centuries, the Vatican in the 20th century has had little
secular power over its members. The Pope is assisted by the officials of the Roman
Curia, or Vatican bureaucracy, and by the bishops of the Church (Reese, 1998). Since
the Vatican is a small secular state as well as the headquarters of the universal Church,
the Pope is represented in many countries by a Papal Nuncio, or Vatican Ambassador,
as his representative (Berry & Renner, 2004).

Within the Church, the teaching authority of the Pope has also been challenged. Debates
around the primacy of the Pope in exercising his teaching authority or magisterium
within the Church have been waged over the centuries, where:

the understanding of the right relationship between authority, power, and
charism… [has been]… subject to the cultural, sociological and even ideological
fashions of the time (Lucas et al, 2008: 51).
At the first Vatican Council (Vatican I) in 1871, the Vatican proclaimed that the Pope
had sacred primacy in his infallible teaching. Following that pronouncement, the topics
on which the Pope regarded his teaching as infallible, and therefore binding on all
Catholics, expanded from a small number of dogmas of a spiritual nature to a wider
range of encyclical teachings issued by the Roman Curia that affect the lives of the
faithful (Collins, 1997, 2001). During the 20th century, the unitary pronouncements of
the Vatican on matters that were unpopular, such as birth control and human sexuality,
were challenged by theologians who subscribed to the pluralist view that knowledge of
what is true has many sources. However, more direct calls from within the Church for a
more democratic structure (see, for example, Collins, 1986, 1997, 2001; Lennan, 1997;
Bartenuk et al, 2006) have consistently been ignored or dismissed by the Vatican.
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The Bishops: At the next level of the Church hierarchy are the bishops each of whom is
appointed by the Pope to govern a diocese – a geographical area of the Church in each
country. Bishops are responsible for teaching and pastoral governance, which they
undertake in conjunction with priests and other religious in service to the community
where, in an official interpretation of their role, they ‘preside in the place of God over
the flock, whose shepherds they are, as teachers of doctrine, priests of sacred worship
and ministers of government’ (Lucas et al, 2008: 39). Each bishop is responsible for
determining the policies and procedures that are adopted in his diocese, ensuring that
they are aligned to the teaching of the Magisterium (that is, the teaching authority of the
Pope). Policies include how each bishop handles aberrant priests, with the Vatican
claiming in 2010 that it defers to local bishops the initial decision on how an aberrant
priest is to be treated (Goodstein, 2010) after having required, since 2001, that the
Vatican also be notified of credible allegations against priests (Allen Jr., 2004), prior to
which there was no such requirement.

The Priests: Under the bishops is the order of presbyters, or priests, which came into
being during the early centuries of the Church. The role of the priests or clergy was to
assist the Church leaders, or bishops, in teaching and preaching what the Church
hierarchy believes is good for the spiritual and temporal wellbeing of people. The
authority given to the bishops and priests was normally expected to be exercised in a
benign and benevolent manner for the good of the flock, although history shows that
this benevolence was not always extended to members of the Church who deviated by
consistently preaching or writing or publicly acting contrary to the teaching of the
Magisterium (Collins, 2001).

The Laity: The laity comprises the great majority of Church members, but their role as
contributing members has only been formally recognized in recent times. In 1906, Pope
Pius X saw the Church as an unequal society comprising priests with the power and
authority to govern the docile laity. In 1967, as an outcome of the Vatican Council
(Vatican II) held from 1962-1965, the laity was given a greater role in the mission of the
Church (see Lumen Gentium in Flannery, 1988). However, the nature and extent of that
role has been contested since that time around issues of governance and Church
teaching (Collins, 1986, 1991, 2001).
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Church Laws
As a visible and organized society, the universal Church developed its own rules and
norms over the centuries. Those rules, contained in many collections and often difficult
to find, reflected the cultures in which the Church existed and the issues of concern at
the time. In 1917, a Code of Canon Law containing the Church’s hierarchical and
organic structure was established to ensure its principal activities were ordered, and to
safeguard the rights of its members (Lucas et al, 2008). The Code was revised in 1983
and was the last of the documents that flowed from the Second Vatican Council (19621965) – known as Vatican II. The 1983 Canon Law outlined, inter alia, the various
norms of the Church relating to grave offences against the communion of the Church,
the nature of these offences and the methods by which communion was to be
reestablished. It also dealt with tribunals of the Church – their competence, rules of
evidence, systems of appeal, and so on (Doyle et al, 2008). These measures within the
Code of Canon Law proved to be inadequate for dealing with corrupt clergy in the CSA
crisis in the U.S.

The Catholic Church in the United States
The Church in the United States developed as a consequence of high levels of
immigration from Europe (McManners, 1990; Weisner-Hanks, 2000; O’Toole, 2006).
In contrast to the monarchical-style rule of the Church in Europe, Catholics in American
colonies enjoyed more freedom in their religious practices where, from 1800, freedom
of religion was guaranteed to citizens under the U.S. Constitution (Morison, 1965).
While, by 1884, U.S. bishops had secured uniformity of structure and religious practice,
tension developed between the Vatican and the ‘American Church’ over this pluralist
movement, called Americanism (Livingstone, 1977). This movement, which was aimed
at adapting the Catholic Church in America to modern cultural ideals by minimising
points of difference between catholics and other Christians, provoked the wrath of Pope
Leo XIII in 1899 when he condemned the movement for a lack of docility of mind.
Despite this criticism, members of the ‘American Church’ continued to develop a more
pluralist culture than their counterparts in the ‘European Church’ although, from the
early 1900s following the upheaval in 1899, the U.S. Church members became more
passive in exercising their religion through routine practice, gaining the gratitude of the
Pope by making substantial financial contributions to Rome (Morison, 1965). From
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1890, when the U.S. Catholic Church had 12 million members, it continued to grow so
that, by 2002, it comprised some 64 million members located in 20000 parishes across
194 dioceses (Symonds, 2002).

The Archdiocese of Boston
In 2002, the Archdiocese of Boston (AOB) comprised a membership of over 2 million
Catholics and administered 362 local parishes, with 901 priests located in 5 regions,
each under an auxiliary bishop (Reilly, 2003). The AOB was led during the abuse
period by Cardinal Richard Cushing (1940-1969), Cardinal Humberto Medeiros (19701983) and Cardinal Bernard Law (1984-2002) (France, 2004). Like all Catholic bishops,
they were accountable only to the Pope to whom they reported in person every 5 years
during their ad limina visit to Rome. During these visits, they were able to interact with
the Curia and discuss with its members and the Pope the report they prepared on key
aspects of Church life and governance in their dioceses (Reese, 1998). One might
expect that this mechanism for reviewing Church governance at diocesan level would
have revealed the corruption problem in Boston to the Vatican but, until 2010 in the
case of abuse allegations made against German priest Father Peter Hullermann in 1980
(Kulish and Bennhold, 2010), there was no evidence obtained by governments that this
was the practice. Whether or not the CSA problem involving clergy in Boston was
reported, it did not result in any effective action being instigated by the Vatican.
Furthermore, in regard to breaches of criminal or civil law by priests of the U.S.
Church, the Vatican had no power to intervene other than diplomatically since it only
had the status of a foreign state.

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
The national collective body of bishops - the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) – was formed in 2001 as an amalgamation of two previous bodies that had
existed since 1966 - the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and the
United States Catholic Conference (USCC). A National Catholic Welfare Conference
had been formed in 1922 to address common concerns of the Church hierarchy such as
education, immigration and social action. However, the USCCB, like the bodies before
it, had no authority over a bishop in how he conducted the affairs of his diocese
(Symonds, 2002; Burke, 2004).
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From 1966, the NCCB attended to the affairs of the Church in the U.S., fulfilling the
Vatican Council's mandate that bishops jointly exercise their pastoral office (Christus
Dominus - Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church, 1965). It operated
through committees made up exclusively of bishops, many of the committees having
full-time staff organized in secretariats to provide them with advice and
recommendations. In the USCC, the bishops collaborated with other Catholics,
including lay people, to address issues that concerned the Church as part of the larger
society (USCCB, 2010). Despite having these resources, Church leaders failed to
adequately address the corruption. Its best opportunity came in 1985 when the NCCB
was briefed in detail on the sexual abuse problem by Fr Thomas Doyle and colleagues
(Doyle et al, 2006), but its members, including Boston’s Cardinal Bernard Law, failed
to heed the advice that they ought address the corruption in their dioceses by changing
their strategies for addressing it. It was not until 2002, after the Boston scandal broke,
that the newly formed USCCB played a belated role in addressing the problem by
conducting research on the corruption across the U.S. Church and developing policies to
help Church dioceses address the problem.

The lack of accountability of the U.S. Church hierarchy
According to Pope (2004: 74), ‘accountability involves answering to others for one’s
behaviour’. The Catholic Church, like other religious institutions in the United States
during the 20th century, enjoyed freedom from government interference in relation to the
practice of religious beliefs that were not contrary to U.S. law. Legislation and judicial
practice often exempted or gave preferential treatment to the Church, a situation that
only changed towards the end of the millennium when the lack of accountability by the
Church became an issue in some court hearings and changed as an outcome of common
law decisions about some institutional malpractices (Dane, 2004; Lupu and Tuttle,
2004). When priests came to the notice of law officials because of their deviant
behaviour, the complaints received were often referred to the bishop out of deference to
the Church and its elite members by government authorities. Neither was the Church
held to account by the media until mid-2001. The power of the Church hierarchy
intimidated many private media owners, particularly in the largely catholic populated
area of Boston, inhibiting them from publishing negative news about the Church. The
owners feared that stalwart catholics might be persuaded to withdraw their financial
support from their newspapers if they believed the criticisms of the Archdiocese that the
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negative publicity they were receiving about clergy abuse was untrue and motivated by
anti-catholic feelings of the media rather than efforts to reveal clergy deviance harming
young people (France, 2004).

Furthermore, in accordance with the Code of Canon Law and in keeping with tradition,
the bishops did not regard themselves as being accountable to the laity for their
decisions and actions. They were able to exercise the authority of their position in their
dioceses without many constraints being imposed on them either by the Vatican or by
other bishops. Similarly, parish priests were able to exercise considerable autonomy in
their role as pastors and parish administrators without being held to account for
decisions they made and actions they took at parish level (Post, 2003).

6.3.2

The Culture within the U.S. Catholic Church

According to Post (2006), the culture of the Church affected the organizational and
ethical safeguards that might otherwise have deterred the widespread abuse of children.
A combination of cultural factors that influenced the action taken by Church officials
against priests who were alleged of sexually abusing children comprised clericalism/elitism that favoured priests (Appleby, 2002; Burke, 2004), tolerance of
deviance by elites that put clergy welfare ahead of the safety and well-being of children
(Reilly, 2003, Burke, 2004), and the arrogation of authority by Church officials that,
coupled with their lack of transparency and accountability, enabled them to hide the
abuse taking place by their secrecy and silence (Appleby, 2002; Burke, 2004).

Clericalism / Elitism
In its report on the corruption in the U.S. Church, the National Review Board (NRB)
established by the USCCB in 2002 to investigate the CSA problem in the Church
identified ‘clericalism’ - an attitude that priests and bishops are apart from and superior
to the laity - as a cultural belief that led bishops to tolerate the corrupt behaviour of
fellow clergy. According to Post (2006:180), ‘protecting abusive priests and
systematically ignoring the claims of victims [could] be traced to core elements of
clericalism’.

In 2003, Thomas Doyle, a priest who warned U.S. bishops in 1985 about the problem of
sexual abuse, wrote to abuse survivors indicating that:
187

Clericalism is a deadly disease. It’s the virus that causes a priest’s mind to
…believe that he is above others and has super powers, deserves special
consideration and can get away with things others must answer for. Clericalism
causes moral blindness…addiction to power and control…is why sex abuse
victims were ignored and abusers covered up…and why so many are still in
denial. Some of the major carriers of this disease are laypeople who want to
remain spiritual infants and have father tell them what to do… (Doyle, 2003;
cited in France, 2004: 563).
This attitude affected many of the laity who deferred to priests and bishops on issues of
concern to them. In 2005, Doyle wrote that clericalism is ‘a social atmosphere that
regards clerics with exaggerated respect and authority’ (Doyle et al. 2006: 334).

‘Clericalism’ had previously been referred to as ‘elitism’ by Shupe (1998) when
referring to cardinals, bishops and priests. Prior to the Boston scandal in 2002, when the
problem of CSA in the Church had already been exposed by earlier scandals in
Louisiana and Boston, Shupe (1998) argued that five structural features of ‘elitism’ in
the Church had facilitated those incidents of abuse: i) the unequal power structures
between clergy elites and the laity, ii) the moral persuasion of elites over the laity
because of their position in the Church, iii) the unquestionable trust of parents in the
elites that enabled them to obtain unsupervised access to their children, iv) societal
belief in churches as ‘trusted hierarchies’ or ‘protected places’ where no corruption
would occur, and v) the absence of control over these ‘trusted hierarchies’ that provided
opportunities for clergy malfeasance.

Guided by Vatican norms and rules that influenced a priest’s behaviour in relationships
with his clergy peers, many non-abusive priests were also affected by ‘clericalism’. The
NRB (Burke, 2004: 104) concluded that:

Clerical culture and a misplaced sense of loyalty made some priests look the
other way in the face of evidence of …abuse…and contributed to the
unwillingness of members of the clergy to condemn the conduct of a brother
priest. Some believed that priests and bishops who rocked the boat were less
likely to advance, and some bishops did not want to be associated with any
problem because of fear of criticism because the problems arose on their watch.
As a result, problems were left to fester.
‘Clericalism’, it argued, contributed to a culture of secrecy and silence:
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The secrecy and silence of the Church leaders and officials regarding the clergy
sexual abuse was indicative of a culture that valued confidentiality and the
priest’s right to privacy above the prevention of harm to victims (2004:104).
‘Clericalism’ could be blamed ‘…for the bishops and other Church leaders engaging in
massive denial, and [failure] to acknowledge that a priest could be engaged in the
horrific acts....’ (Burke, 2004:105).

‘Clericalism’ was partly responsible for the failure of NCCB members to correct the
behaviour of their peers who, by 1985, were known to be covering up the abuse by their
clergy. Bishops who ignored the collective efforts of their peers to make changes from
1985 until 2002 were not subject to any intervention by fellow bishops, nor was their
recalcitrance reported by the NCCB to the Vatican (Burke, 2004).

Tolerance of Clergy Deviance
Many bishops, confronted with allegations of abuse by their clergy, gave preferential
treatment to the abusing clergy rather than to the abused children.

Bishops had traditionally tolerated deviance by their clergy provided their actions were
conducted in private and were not perceived by Vatican officials to be the cause of
scandal. This benevolent treatment of clergy by bishops was not due to the individual
disposition of particular bishops but has its origins in their instruction by the Vatican. In
Sacerdotalis caelibatus (Flannery, 1988), Pope Paul VI exhorted bishops to exercise
benevolent authority over their priests. Bishops were to be:

their masters, fathers, friends, their good and kind brothers, always ready to
understand, to sympathize and to help…before being superiors and judges…so
that priests would open their souls and confide their difficulties in the certainty
that they could rely on…kindness to be protected from eventual defeat, without
a servile fear of punishment, but in the filial expectation of correction, pardon
and help, which would inspire them to resume their difficult journey… (1988:
311).
Where there were:
lamentable defections … during moments of diffidence, doubt, passion or folly,
every persuasive means available were to be used … to lead them from a
wavering state to one of calm, trust, penance and recovery (1988: 309).
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Furthermore, fellow priests were:

… to feel a lively responsibility for fellow priests troubled by difficulties which
gravely endanger the divine gift they have. They should have a burning charity
for those in need… (1988: 307).
These exhortations became the norms that bishops and priests used in their handling of
deviant behaviour by fellow priests.

Bishops exercised their benign and benevolent authority over priests who engaged in
sexual abuse of children in the period when they regarded the abuse as ‘a human
condition which is to be expected; a sin which can be forgiven’ (Deposition of Cardinal
Bernard Law, 2002). Bishops had established treatment centers in the U.S. from 1924
for various forms of clergy deviance, such as alcoholism and other ‘medical’ problems
(Doyle et al, 2006). From the late 1950s and early 1960s, to address the ‘human
condition’, sexual problems were subsumed under the umbrella of psychiatric and
psychological problems by the medical profession as part of a ‘celibate / sexual system’
that concealed the sexual activities of supposedly celibate clergy from the public (Sipe,
2004, cited in Doyle et al, 2006). According to Doyle et al (2006: 67), ‘psychiatry and
psychology were used to treat offending clerics, contain scandal and placate the civil
legal system if a cleric ran afoul of the law of the land’. Bishops adopted this
therapeutic model in dealing with sexual abuse and became reliant on it. Although these
treatment centers used cutting-edge psychological and psychiatric treatment on priests
who had abused minors, some bishops ‘were too willing to turn over the problem of
sexual abuse of minors to psychiatrists and psychologists’ (Burke, 2004: 38). They were
motivated to do so because, within Church law, clergy who were diagnosed as suffering
from psychiatric or psychological illness could not be ‘laicized’, that is, permanently
removed from the priesthood by the Pope.

From a spiritual perspective, sexual abuse was regarded by the Church hierarchy as a
sin, alongside other forms of clergy malfeasance and sexual deviance. Sexual deviance
by clergy took many forms since mandatory celibacy was required by the Church
hierarchy of priests and others in religious life. There was considerable advantage in
treating sexual deviance as a sin since the bishop and priest could discuss any omission
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under the seal of the confessional. As a consequence, in the case of sexual abuse
allegations:
where evidence of misconduct was incontrovertible, many bishops felt
compelled to forgive the offending priest so long as the priest appeared contrite.
Clearly, where brother priests were concerned, bishops often felt more
comfortable forgiving than condemning, even where condemning was demanded
by the nature of the offence (Burke, 2004: 36).
There is evidence that this tolerance of sexual deviance by clergy began in the
seminaries from the 1940s. The NRB (Burke, 2004) revealed that large numbers of men
were enrolled in seminaries at that time when no one questioned a candidate’s ‘calling
from God’ and sexual abuse was not regarded as a risk or serious problem either in the
Church or society. Throughout the abuse period, without screening tests on candidates
and because bishops paid insufficient attention to checking on the suitability of
candidates during formation, recruitment and formation practices in seminaries enabled
men with homosexual predispositions who were unwilling to practice celibacy to create
a ‘gay culture’ in those seminaries (Burke, 2004). The continuation of their non-celibate
practices in priesthood was tolerated and covered up within the ‘celibate / sexual
system’ (Doyle et al, 2006). When a decline in numbers of men entering seminaries
occurred from the 1960s, at the same time as many priests left the priesthood, the
policies and practices of the Church leaders continued to reflect this tolerance of sexual
deviance by the clergy.

Secrecy and Silence
A culture of secrecy and silence has been a feature of Church culture for centuries, ‘the
Roman way’ of avoiding scandal about the dark side activities of the clergy and
hierarchy for centuries (Goodstein, 2009; Collins, 1986, 2001; Burke, 2004).

While the Oxford Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide (Soanes et al, 2001)
defines scandal as ‘outrage and gossip arising from an action seen as wrong and
unacceptable’, the Church sees scandal as actions that become a ‘cause of moral
stumbling’ (Thompson, 1997: 37), and a ‘cause of ruin and loss of faith’ (Soukop, 1997:
223). Over the centuries, Church authorities showed concern about two forms of
scandal – first, scandal arising from heresy - theological teaching or liturgical practice
regarded as contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium (Collins, 2001; McGillion,
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2003), and second, scandal arising from sexual behaviour and other deviance by clergy
not in accordance with Church teaching or canons (Doyle et al, 2006; Weisner-Hanks,
2000).
In the 16th century, the Roman Inquisition was developed by the Vatican to prosecute
individuals accused of heresy. Collins (2001) showed that, since that time, many leading
catholic theologians whose writings and teaching were seen to vary from Church
doctrine were subjected to examination by the Vatican. Catholics came to understand
that speaking out against Church teaching or acting in a manner that was seen by the
Church hierarchy to cause scandal carried a penalty.

This culture seems to have influenced the behaviour of Vatican and U.S. Church
officials around the times that two prominent sexual abuse scandals occurred in the U.S.
In 1984, in the wake of the scandal surrounding a serial abuser, Fr Gilbert Gauthe of
Louisiana, the Vatican Nuncio in the U.S. was made aware of the extent of the clergy
sexual abuse in a briefing provided by an author of the ‘Doyle-Mouton- Peterson
Manual – May 15, 1985’, a proposal to the U.S. bishops on the serious problem of
clergy sexual abuse of minors and ways of addressing it, but took no action to see that
its recommendations were reported and acted on by the U.S. bishops (Doyle et al,
2006). Again, in 1990, the Vatican was appraised of the growing problem as a result of
another scandal in Boston in 1990 concerning the serial abuser, Fr James Porter, but
again took no effective action to end the corruption (Cornwell, 2004). Subsequently,
despite increasing public knowledge that hundreds of priests had been accused of sexual
abuse and a number had been convicted in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland in
the 1990s, as well as others in Italy, Spain, Mexico, Australia, Canada and Africa in that
decade, Church authorities did their best to minimize the problem. By the late 1990s,
academics such as Shupe (1995, 1998), Sipe (1995), Gula (1996), and Wills (2000) had
written extensively on the problem, but Church authorities failed to act in a practical
manner to address the corruption with the help of external authorities, in part at least
because of reservations expressed by a Vatican official in 1997, and only made public in
2011, over a proposed policy of mandatory reporting abuse to the police being
considered by Irish bishops about which the Vatican had ‘moral and canonical
concerns’ (Goodstein, 2011).
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Inside the Church, secret processes were legitimately established by the Vatican to
address the concerns of U.S. bishops about the sexual deviance of the clergy and the
difficulty they were experiencing of removing abusive priests from ministry. A Papal
decree issued in May 2001, entitled Sacramentorum Sanctitatis Tutela, required every
bishop to report credible allegations to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
(CDF) in Rome, which had exclusive canonical jurisdiction over cases of sexual abuse
of a minor, aimed at providing accused priests with a full canonical trial rather than
allowing bishops the power to dismiss priests through administrative authority. The
rules imposed strict secrecy on officials involved in this process (Allen Jr., 2004).
Finally, secrecy as the ‘Roman way’ continued to be demonstrated after the Boston
scandal broke when the Secretary of the CDF at the Vatican expressed criticism of the
emerging U.S. jurisdictional requirement that U.S. bishops would be required to divulge
records of their discussions with accused priests in court proceedings arguing that that
‘the professional secrecy of priests’ needed to be respected even outside the
confessional. Despite being aware of the sexual abuse problem in the U.S. and other
countries, other Vatican officials blamed U.S. society and certain media for the attack
on the Church over the Boston scandal (France, 2004).

Secrecy and silence were used by clergy to support one another over their transgressions
regarding celibacy or homosexuality (Wills, 2000; Berry and Renner, 2004). As Doyle
et al (2006) indicated, the closed ‘celibate / sexual system’ kept the sexual activities of
supposed celibate priests and religious from the public. According to Cozzens (2002),
this ‘sacred silence’ used to protect the Church from scandal has been a traditional
attribute of the culture among the Church hierarchy and elite. Silence in the form of
denial and minimization of the offences kept many alert and intelligent people of the
faith from addressing with candour the issues and challenges that weighed on the
Church. Silence produced a dysfunctional form of loyalty, responsibility and tranquility
that avoided conflict among members of the Church, but failed to resolve the problems
they faced.

The extent to which secrecy and silence by the Church hierarchy covered up the sexual
abuse problem in Boston was fully revealed when a government investigation after the
scandal subpoenaed and examined the personnel files of the AOB that contained a
history of complaints against each priest alleged to have engaged in sexual abuse and a
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record of the efforts of Church officials to hide the complaints. In 2003, Massachusetts
Attorney General Reilly reported that:

top Archdiocese officials, in response to reports of sexual abuse of children and
aware of the magnitude of the sexual abuse problem, decided that they should
conceal – from the parishes, the laity, law enforcement and the public – their
knowledge of individual complaints of abuse and of the long history of such
complaints within the Archdiocese (Reilly, 2003: 30).
Structures and systems established within the Archdiocese of Boston by Cardinal Law
and his predecessors were primarily aimed at:

protect[ing] the image and reputation of their institution rather than the safety
and well-being of children entrusted to their care. They acted with a misguided
devotion to secrecy. And they failed to break their code of silence even when the
magnitude of what had occurred would have alerted any reasonable, responsible
manager that help was needed (Reilly, 2003:73).
The AOB, Reilly discovered, had maintained confidential files on its clergy and dealt
with allegations of abuse in private, preventing access by its staff and committees who
were to provide advice and make recommendations on the disposition of errant clergy.
These files, which outlined past offences of serial offenders, prevented staff and lay
committee members from seeing patterns of abuse by particular individuals and enabled
favourable recommendations to be made about reassigning them after treatment.

The NRB drew a similar conclusion in 2004 about the U.S. Church more generally,
indicating that:

some bishops and other church leaders often put what they erroneously believed
to be institutional concerns of the local church above the concerns of the
universal church. The fear of scandal caused them to practice secrecy and
concealment (Burke, 2004: 9).

This culture of secrecy and silence in the Church about known or suspected sexual
abuse also enveloped the catholic laity and government officials as a result of their
deference to the Church hierarchy and elites. This will become more apparent in
Chapter 7.
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6.3.3

Social Changes and the U.S. Catholic Church 1940-2002

Historians (Green, 1996; Mitchell, 1990; Wilson, 1990) have identified three social
trends during the late 19th and early 20th centuries that reduced the influence of the
Church in secular affairs – secularization, modernism and plurality. Church leaders had
difficulty in coming to terms with the social changes resulting from these trends. When
many followers, including practicing clergy, ignored their teachings on celibacy and
homosexuality, Church leaders engaged in organizational hypocrisy (Brunsson, 2002)
by tolerating private deviant sexual behaviour by clergy while continuing to preach the
merits of and rule about celibacy and condemning homosexual behaviour.

Secularization
Secularization – the transformation of society away from close identification with its
religious institutions – began in the late 19th century in Europe with moves to separate
church and state. Starting in France, and spreading to Germany and Italy, secularization
denied the Church its previous role as rulers of the state. The secularization of society
was marked by the establishment of new and autonomous social systems as responses to
economic, social, technological, legal, health and recreation challenges:

Organized religion lost its erstwhile functions of legitimating authority and
polity; of informing and superintending justice and the law; of providing the
basis for education; and of reinforcing social control (Wilson 1990: 587).
Following the action of French politicians to separate Church and state in the 1870s,
Pope Pius X condemned the law of separation insisting that the state give the Church a
recognized place in the social order of ‘a divine society’, and pay deference to the
claims of God. He disapproved of secularization because, to him, this movement
threatened the integrity of the faith as well as the loss of property and many financial
resources of the Church (Green, 1996). His concerns were borne out by increasing
secularization of society during the 20th century. Secularization spread from Europe to
other continents. In the constitutionally secular society of the U.S., it was seen as less of
a problem by the Church hierarchy where tolerance of diversity of opinion on religious
matters was more accepted by Catholics than in Europe. However, over the 20th century,
the Church environment was increasingly ‘marked by religious indifference, lower
church attendance, anticlericalism, and declining numbers of priests and religious’
195

(Reese, 1998: 12). Consequently, the teaching of the Catholic Church on sexual
behaviour lost its persuasive power among a large proportion of catholic clergy and
laity.

Modernism
Modernism is an umbrella label coined by the Popes in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries when referring to Christian scholars whom they saw were associated with a
movement which called into question the bible interpretations of the Church
Magisterium. Christian theologians pioneered efforts to bring the traditions of catholic
belief into closer relation with the modern outlook in philosophy, the historical and
other sciences, and secular ideas manifesting themselves in society. In doing so, they
questioned the assumptions behind certain Christian beliefs that were not be supported
by empirical scientific knowledge (Livingstone, 1997). However, these scholars were
seen by the Popes to be falling into agnosticism – the belief that we cannot know if God
exists - and therefore posed a challenge for the Church since it suggested that the
ultimate ‘truth’, that which the Vatican pronounced as dogma, was relative rather than
absolute (Wilson, 1990).

Initially tolerated by Pope Leo XIII, modernism was condemned by his successor Pius
X as the ‘synthesis of all heresies’ (Cozzens, 2002: 37) in his 1907 encyclical Pascendi
dominici gregis. He listed and condemned modernist ‘errors’ and directed that any
teacher or person in the Church or government found to be tainted with modernism
should be removed from their post. From 1910, he required seminarians and priests to
take an oath against modernism. Seminarians weakened their academic learning by
being refused the opportunity to study the works of the theologians who were labelled
as modernists (Cozzens, 2002). However, Pius’s death and the advent of the World War
I in 1914 demobilized the Church in dealing with modernism. Modernism was
strengthened when Christian churches were unable to stem the tide of secularism. Many
protestant churches began to accommodate the findings of science to their theology, but
more conservative fundamentalist Protestants and the catholic hierarchy in Europe
withdrew to their traditional strongholds.

The mood of the Catholic Church changed following the election of Pope John XXIII in
1958. Believing that Church authorities had to come to terms with the challenge of
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science which was enhancing understanding of the natural world while not offering a
moral view in its findings, he convened the second Vatican Council (Vatican II) from
1962 to 1965 to engage with modernism.

In the meantime, a third trend developed in many societies that challenged traditional
morality – pluralism.

Pluralism
The Oxford Thesaurus, Dictionary and Wordpower Guide (Soanes et al, 2001) defines
‘pluralism’ as the existence or toleration in society of a number of groups that have
different beliefs, or from a religious perspective, a person holding a number of different
ecclesiastical positions. Swiss theologian Karl Rahner used the term ‘pluralism’ to
describe the 20th century phenomenon of multiple and irreducible sources of knowledge
that made simple moral decisions in an environment characterized by so much
complexity difficult (Lennan, 1997).

Cultural pluralism saw individuals drawing on many sources of knowledge to arrive at
moral decisions. Whereas the Church had claimed authority as the sole source of
wisdom in regard to morality in Europe, pluralism saw moral relativism take hold in
western society in the 20th century. People began to think of multitude ‘moralities’, each
reflecting the needs of particular individuals and groups (Wilson, 1990). In the U.S.,
where religion took more diverse forms than in Europe, pluralist moral views saw the
community ‘relativise their religious claims’ (Wilson, 1990):

Whereas in European societies, religious diversity (dissent) was regarded as a
threat to social cohesion, in America, tolerance of such diversity was a
prerequisite for it (1990: 592).
So while Christians looked to their particular church for guidance on moral issues
(many deferring to the ‘church view’), individual conscience increasingly became the
guide to what an individual would do when faced with a moral issue (Mitchell, 1990).
Nevertheless, despite this tolerance of diversity in the U.S., in the early 20th century
theologians who publicly supported pluralist moral views found that their discourse was
not welcomed by the Church hierarchy. Prominent catholic theologians who voiced
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opinions that were contrary to the Church position continued to be punished as they had
in the centuries before (Collins, 2001; McGillion, 2003).

6.3.4

The Response of the Catholic Church to Social Change

A strategic response of the Catholic Church to secularization, modernism and pluralism
began in 1962 with an historic gathering of its leaders at the second Vatican Council
(Vatican II) convened by newly elected Pope John XXIII. His aim was to redefine the
Church in the modern world. In Gaudium et Spes – the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World (1965) - the hierarchy outlined the environmental forces
emerging from and shaping the world, among which was the uncertainty people were
experiencing despite having access to abundant wealth and personal freedom amid
changing social order.

One of the main issues addressed at Vatican II was the Church teaching concerning
human sexuality. From the viewpoint of the hierarchy there had been an apparent shift
in societal standards in many countries where increased affluence was accompanied by
moral relativism and associated hedonism. The ‘sexual revolution of the 1960s’ saw the
traditional limitations on what was acceptable sexual behaviour challenged by many
young people (Weisner-Hanks, 2000). Christian standards of proper sexual behaviour
came to be widely labelled as hypocrisy by young people who believed that there
should be no restraints to genuine self-expression of ‘love’ and that any constraints on
sexual activity should be decided by the parties, with the only important principle to be
followed being the avoidance of exploitation and deception. As these ideas took hold,
there was a progressive liberalization of the law concerning sexual behaviour in
advanced Western countries and a tacit abandonment of traditional sexual ethics
(Mitchell, 1990).

Prior to Vatican II, the majority of catholic laity relied on the clergy to define the
standards expected of a good catholic. Deference to the clergy about what was right or
wrong took the place of an informed individual conscience. As moral relativism
replaced stricter moral standards advocated by catholic and other Christian churches
regarding pre-marital sexual relations, birth control and abortion, fidelity to marriage,
celibacy of the clergy and homosexuality, there was considerable ambivalence within
the Church communities about these liberal trends and their consequences.
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Conservatives remained unquestioning in their acceptance of Church authority but
progressives argued for increased democracy and lay participation in decisions on issues
affecting them, particularly around human sexuality (Collins, 2001, 2005; Cozzens,
2002; Reese, 1998; France, 2004). Many catholic clergy, religious and laity hoped that
the disjunction they were experiencing between Church teaching and their sexual
practices would be remedied by new pronouncements arising from Vatican II. They
were disappointed when a series of encyclicals issued by the Vatican rejected pluralistic
views and reaffirmed traditional teaching on those issues. Subsequently, the number of
Catholics who continued to practice their faith in the traditional ways, and the number
of men and women who took up or remained in a religious vocation, declined. Two
issues related to the sexuality of priests – celibacy and homosexuality – were regarded
in some quarters of the Church as associated with the sexual abuse of children by clergy
(Podles, 2008).

Celibacy and the Church
In 1963, during Vatican II, the progressive Pope John XXIII died and was replaced by
the more conservative Pope Paul VI who continued the Council. In 1967, the new Pope
issued his Encyclical Letter on Priestly Celibacy - Sacerdotalis caelebalis – in which he
reaffirmed mandatory celibacy for priests (Flannery, 1988). Celibacy of priests, he
claimed, was regarded as ‘a brilliant jewel in the Church’ by successive Popes, which
had been in place voluntarily since the 4th century. Celibacy became a norm in the 12th
century after centuries of such practice in local churches. This norm was made
mandatory from the 16th century and, in 1917, was enshrined in the Code of Canon Law
(Cozzens, 2002). Stirrings of opinion in the Church in the mid 20th century that celibacy
should again be made optional were dashed by the 1967 encyclical. As a consequence,
many clergy and religious left their vocation, and fewer young people opted to join the
ministry or religious life. But others, who broke the celibacy vow, remained.

The celibacy ideal, understood by the Popes to be both a gift and an obligation freely
taken on as a lifelong vow by ordained priests after appropriate formation in the
seminaries, was eroded by the recruitment and formation practices in many seminaries.
In its Report on the Crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States (2004), the NRB
found that, from the 1940s, seminarians and priests were not adequately prepared,
educated, supported or supervised in regard to the celibate life they were to lead.
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Celibacy was a special and challenging form of asceticism that required an aspirant to
the priesthood to acquire:

… a balanced personality, strong and mature, a combination of inherited and
acquired qualities, harmony of all of his powers in the light of the faith and in
intimate union with Christ… (Flannery, 1988: 305).
In the seminaries, the fitness of young men was to be determined by successive proofs
of attained maturity, including the practice of voluntary celibacy during training before
it became definitive and permanent through ordination as a personal accepted
obligation. Unsuitable candidates for the priesthood were to be removed from the path
of priesthood before ordination, but this did not happen in many seminaries. Church
authorities responsible for selecting and training candidates failed to adequately screen
them, resulting in many persons who would abuse children being admitted to the
priesthood (Burke, 2004).

Difficulties and risks associated with practiced celibacy were well understood by the
Pope and acknowledged in the encyclical. It was intended that these difficulties were to
be addressed by the priest’s own efforts in embracing the spiritual life, by priestly
fellowship and by the support of his diocesan bishop (Flannery, 1988). Notably, in
exercising benevolent authority over their priests, bishops were to be:

their masters, fathers, friends, their good and kind brothers, always ready to
understand, to sympathize and to help…before being superiors and judges…so
that priests would open their souls and confide their difficulties in the certainty
that they could rely on…kindness to be protected from eventual defeat, without
a servile fear of punishment, but in the filial expectation of correction, pardon
and help, which would inspire them to resume their difficult
journey…(Flannery, 1988: 311).
However, in practice, an emerging trend developed of tolerance of breaches of celibacy
within the clerical culture coupled with the use of benign and benevolent authority by
the bishops in dealing with the deviant clergy. This same soft approach to the control of
sexual deviance among the clergy was adopted in cases of homosexual behaviour and,
as the Boston scandal revealed, when clergy sexually abused minors.
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The Church and Homosexuality
In 1975, in Personae humanae – the Declaration on Certain Problems of Sexual Ethics,
Vatican authorities proclaimed homosexuality as an intrinsic disorder contrary to nature
(Flannery, 1988). Homosexual acts were therefore regarded as gravely immoral (Burke,
2004). Homosexuality had been, and still remains in many cultures, an unacceptable
sexual preference, but this view was and continues to be increasingly challenged in
pluralist secular societies.

Despite the Church’s official disapproval, the modern view of homosexuality was
absorbed by many clergy and members of the hierarchy. Firstly, large numbers of
candidates of homosexual orientation entered the priesthood from the 1960s (Burke,
2004). Secondly, as a consequence of pluralist views on celibacy and homosexuality:

…there developed at certain seminaries a ‘gay subculture’…where homosexual
liaisons occurred among students or between students and teachers…and in
certain dioceses and orders (Burke, 2004: 28).
As the NRB concluded, bishops failed to exercise control over these practices at a time
when there was an increasing acceptance of people of homosexual orientation in
contemporary culture.

In 2002, the USCCB commissioned a study by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice
at the City University of New York to determine the nature and scope of sexual abuse of
minors by catholic priests and deacons between 1950 and 2002. It found that 81% of
the abuse victims of clergy were male, suggesting to the bishops that men with
homosexual tendencies and inability to be celibate presented a high risk of being sexual
offenders (Burke, 2004). While researchers later determined that sex offenders generally
constitute a heterogeneous population (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006; Smallbone et al,
2008; Terry, 2008a; Terry & Ackerman, 2008), the Vatican issued an instruction in
2005 directing that bishops not admit candidates to seminary formation who practiced
homosexuality, who presented such tendencies, or who supported the ‘gay’ culture
(Cozzens, 2002). It also made efforts to strengthen formation practices to equip all
candidates with greater understanding of the obligations and challenges of celibacy.
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The relationship between homosexuality and child sexual abuse remains contentious. In
the next section, I provide a description of child sexual abuse (CSA) and discuss the
more proximate risk factors that enabled this corrupt activity to occur in the AOB and
other Catholic dioceses.

6.4

Proximate Risk Factors that Enabled Sexual Abuse of Minors

by Clergy

6.4.1

Individual Factors that Enabled Child Sexual Abuse

Incidents of CSA involve an offender and a victim. I will address the characteristics of
each in turn using CSA research findings by Wortley and Smallbone (2006) and
Smallbone et al (2008) and comparing them with the research findings of the John Jay
College concerning the clergy offenders and young victims in the U.S. Catholic Church
(John Jay College, 2004, 2006; Terry, 2008b).

Offender Characteristics
The sexual abuse of minors in Boston, and in other U.S. Catholic dioceses, was
perpetrated by around 4% of Catholic clergy (John Jay College, 2006; Terry 2008b).
This is an equivalent percentage to the percentage of people in society who abuse
minors sexually.
There are two categories of CSA offenders - familial (a person within a family who
abuses family members) and non-familial (a person outside the family who abuses
children) (Smallbone et al, 2008). In this case, the offenders were non-familial, so I will
only address the findings relating to that category of offender.

Males comprise around 90-95% of all sex offenders in society (Smallbone et al, 2008).
In this case, 100% of offenders were male since they were deacons and priests in an all
male institution (Terry, 2008b). The onset age for CSA offenders varies from 15 -75
years (Smallbone et al, 2008). Terry (2008b) found that the age range of clergy
offenders was between 28 (the average age of ordination) and 68, those starting younger
often being the recidivists with 20 or more victims, those starting much older having
fewer victims.
202

In society, a small number of perpetrators are disproportionately responsible for a large
number of victims. This was also the case in the clergy abuse. Table 6.1, which shows
the number and percentage of formal allegations made against U.S. priests, indicates
that around 17% of offenders were responsible for recidivist abuse against four or more
victims.

Table 6.1
Number of formal allegations against U.S. priests 1950 – 2002
Number of allegations

Number of priests subject Percentage
of
priests
to allegations
subject to allegations

1

2411

55.7

2-3

1160

26.9

4-9

600

13.9

10+
149
Source: Adapted from Terry, 2008b: p560

3.5

The risk of CSA recidivism declines substantially with age, with studies indicating that
non-familial offenders are more likely to persist with CSA than familial offenders, with
males their main victims (Smallbone et al, 2008). The priests with four or more victims
offended over periods of up to forty years (Terry, 2008b). The arrest of offenders has a
major impact on the trajectory of persistent CSA offences (Smallbone et al, 2008). In
this case, low intervention by victims and their families, by peers of the clergy who
noticed signs of their corrupt behaviour, and by government authorities reluctant to act
against the clergy resulted in few arrests. Consequently, the trajectory of persistent CSA
offences rose. Any intervention that did occur was restricted by the moderating efforts
of bishops and other officials who protected the priests and the Church from scandal, as
a result of which recidivist offenders were able to commit multiple offences.

Empirical evidence shows that adult CSA offenders often commit nonsexual offences as
well. Over 80% of recidivist CSA offenders (those with at least one conviction) are first
convicted of a nonsexual offence before their first self reported contact with a child.
However, there is no evidence in this case that clergy offenders engaged in other illegal
activities, but some were engaged in other deviant activities for priests – alcoholism,
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non-celibacy and possibly homosexuality (Burke, 2004). With low reporting of clergy
offences to civil authorities, and the tolerance of clergy deviance indicated earlier, it is
probable that many of the CSA offenders in the Church were otherwise deviant but
protected from exposure.

The modus operandi of CSA clergy offenders was similar to that of child sexual abusers
in the wider community. Offending priests established non-sexual relationships with
children, often through the parent or guardian of the child, before their first CSA
offence. As pastoral carers, they established quasi-parent relationships with victims
through routine activities which allowed them to establish close emotional and physical
proximity to children and escape suspicion in doing so. While research suggests that
many non-familial offenders who form relationships with parents before offending do
not admit to doing so to gain access to the child, this case indicates that recidivist
offenders do target children and families from the outset. Emotional attachment is first
established, a grooming process that may take more than a month in most cases, some
taking as long as one year to develop. This grooming process involves graduation from
attention giving and nonsexual touching through low-level sexual talk and / or touching,
to more explicit sexual behaviour. Grooming behaviour is difficult to distinguish from
normal care-giving behaviour, and therefore difficult to detect and prevent before it
occurs (Smallbone et al, 2008). Grooming by priests involved gifts (to 7.8% of victims)
and enticements such as alcohol and drugs, sport and recreational benefits, money, or
permission to stay overnight at the priests’ residence (to 17% of the victims) (Terry,
2008b).

Victim Characteristics
Research studies of CSA victims indicate that, while both male and female victims
experience CSA in society, girls are approximately twice as likely as boys to suffer
CSA. However, studies of CSA offenders indicate that offences against boys may be
underreported and boys are more likely to be the victims of repeat offenders (Smallbone
et al, 2008). The John Jay College study found that, of the 10667 children abused by
catholic clergy in the U.S. between 1950 and 2002, 81% of the victims were male (John
Jay College, 2004). Males were the largest percentage of victims of clergy who
admitted to having only one victim (66.7% males compared with 33.3% females) but an
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even greater percentage of clergy offenders who had multiple victims (84% males
compared with 16% females).

CSA research indicates that, while some have been much younger, victims’ ages on
average range from 7 to 15 years with the average age around 11.6 years (Smallbone et
al, 2008). In this study, around 80% of victims of clergy were aged 11-17. Most of the
offences fit the ‘ephebophilia’ rather than the ‘pedophilia’ classification. The
ambivalence problem associated with ephebophilia – the difficulty many observers
experience in deciding whether an offence has been committed or if the victim has
contributed in some way to the situation – may have inhibited action on the part of
many adults in preventing ongoing offences.

Most crime victims 12 years and older do not report the offences against them
(Smallbone et al, 2008). The John Jay College study data showed that there was, on
average, a twenty year delay between the time the abuse occurred and the time it was
reported (See Table 6.2). Hence, most of the reported abuse in the 1990s was
perpetrated in the 1960s-1970s.
Table 6.2
Reports of incidents of CSA by priests in U.S. dioceses 1950-2002
Decade in which the abuse was
reported
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000-2002

Number of reports
53
190
266
1146
4022
4533
N= 10210

% of total
victims over
the 52 year
period
0.5%
1.9%
2.6%
11.2%
39.4%
44.4%
100%

Source: Terry & Smith (2006), p8.

Why was there such a low level of reporting of CSA? According to Smallbone et al
(2008), research indicates that offences against children are less likely to be reported
than comparable offences against adults. Furthermore, victims usually suffer negative
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outcomes ranging from increased anxiety and depression, self harm, somatic
complaints, social withdrawal, anger, aggression and sexual behaviour problems.

Children do not report offences for several reasons. First, they do not have access to
police unless their parents are made aware of the abuse and decide to act. Many parents
(90%) do not want to involve the police. Second, older children may fear stigmatization
and ostracization by peers or blame from adults who fear losing a valued relationship
they have with the perpetrator or retribution from him if they proceed to complain.
Third, the perpetrator has often coerced the young victims into silence, having chosen a
child they believe will be compliant with their wishes (Smallbone et al, 2008).

Many parents do not become aware of sexual abuse their children suffer. Few parents
who become aware of such abuse against their children report it. Some do not define the
alleged incident as a criminal offence; some do not believe their children. Others choose
to protect their children from further trauma by keeping silent when they perceive the
justice system is harmful because of police insensitivity or the stress of the court
process (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006). Others fear being stigmatized and ostracized
by their friends or family members if they become aware of the allegations they make.

There was a strong pattern of non-reporting by victims and their families at the time
offences were committed evidenced by the number of victims who came forward years
after they were abused to claim compensation (France, 2004; Podles,2008). As I will
show in Chapter 7, those parents and victims who made allegations of clergy abuse
were neglected and ill-treated by the Church authorities who gave priority to the clergy
offenders over the victims and their families.

In addition to the 10263 reported victims, John Jay College researchers in 2004 also
estimated that another 3000 victims did not make formal allegations and that, given
there were more victims to come forward in the future, the extent of the abuse was still
to be revealed in the years ahead, which reinforced the point Attorney-General Reilly
made in his report on the Boston abuse in 2003 (Reilly, 2003; Burke, 2004; Terry,
2008b). This forecast of more abuse revelations would subsequently be shown to be
correct both in the U.S. (for example, in New York and Philadelphia), in Ireland, as
revealed in the Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse in Ireland in
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2009), in Germany (Goodstein, 2010; Kulish and Bennhold, 2010), and other countries
(Yallop, 2010).

When victims did muster the courage to report the abuse incidents and take civil action
as groups to obtain compensation for the negative outcomes of their abuse, on average
20 years after the offences occurred, the evidence provided to courts led to massive civil
payouts having to be made by the dioceses (Podles, 2008; Yallop, 2010). Reilly (2003)
concluded that while the Church leaders had not committed criminal offences, they had
been responsible for an institutional acceptance of the sexual abuse and a failure to
prevent it. They had not heeded the plight of the victims:

For decades, cardinals, bishops and others in positions of authority within the
Archdiocese chose to protect the image and reputation of their institution rather
than the safety and well-being of children. They acted with a misguided
devotion to secrecy and a mistaken belief that they were responsible only to
themselves (Reilly, 2003: 2-3).
However, while individual factors are partly to blame for the occurrence, spread and
frequent invisibility of CSA, more proximate situational factors also enabled CSA
incidents to be perpetrated without them being noticed.

6.4.2

Situational Factors that Enabled Child Sexual Abuse

Situational factors enabled priests to offend with a low probability that their abuse
would be noticed.

CSA Offence Settings
Studies indicate that CSA is most likely to occur in places where adults and adolescents
often spend time together. Three main types of locations which provide the opportunity
for CSA to occur are: i) domestic settings, usually the victim’s or offender’s home; ii)
institutional settings, such as residential homes, schools, and recreational clubs and
locations; and iii) public settings, such as parks, play areas, and public swimming pools
(Smallbone et al, 2008).
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Terry and Ackerman’s (2008) comparison of the situational opportunities reported by
Wortley and Smallbone (2006) and found by John Jay College (2004) in the Church
case show a commonality in location (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3
Comparison of situational opportunities where CSA offences occurred
Situations of Opportunity

John Jay College

Wortley and Smallbone

Offender’s residence

41.0%

68.9%

Victim’s residence

12.4%

19.5%

During travel
17.8%
Source: Adapted from Terry and Ackerman (2008), p652.

20.0%

Terry and Ackerman (2008) found that incidents of abuse by clergy also commonly
took place in a church (16.3%), a vacation house (12.4%) or a school (10.3%). The
motor car of the priest was also a frequent location for abuse when the priest took the
victim on an outing without the parent (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002).

Offences often occurred when parents became reliant on or trusted a priest to care for
their children without other adult supervision. The research indicates that the children
are more vulnerable when parental supervision is compromised by absence, illness or
alienation, or when the children have poor relationships with their parents (Wortley and
Smallbone, 2006). Children were particularly vulnerable in single parent families which
perpetrators targeted, and in situations where parents became reliant on and trusted the
priest following the grooming process.

6.5

Conclusion

In this chapter I have briefly described the institution of the Catholic Church and
identified contextual factors that enabled CSA corruption to develop in the AOB. In this
context, the same form of corruption developed in other dioceses and religious
institutions of the Catholic Church in the U.S. and other countries. I explained how
these factors also influenced the behaviour of various stakeholders of the Church who
encountered the corruption. The patterns of behaviour in the dioceses and religious
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institutions were very similar bearing out the view that organizational contexts have a
marked influence in shaping member behaviour.

I highlighted some key features of the Church’s structure and governance at
international, national and regional (diocesan) levels which seemed to influence
behaviour. I showed that the Church throughout the 20th century was characterized by
the unitary authority of the Pope and Vatican, which was exercised at diocesan level in a
benign and benevolent manner by the bishops. Neither the Pope nor the bishops were
accountable to any external human authority. Individually and collectively, the bishops
tolerated the private deviance of their elite priests in their non-celibate and homosexual
practices. The Vatican allowed this situation to exist, only acting decisively to correct
any deviant teaching and public behaviour by clergy or leading catholic theologians that
risked scandal. Throughout the Church, a strong culture of secrecy and silence created
by church leaders in the past to protect the Church from persecution was maintained
during the twentieth century to prevent potentially scandalous matters from public
discovery.
Three social trends which affected the Church during the 20th century - secularism,
modernism and pluralism – had negative impacts on the teaching and moral influence of
the Catholic Church, particularly in relation to human sexuality. Modernism and
pluralism led to an increasing reluctance by members of the Church to follow its
teaching on issues such as pre-nuptial chastity, birth control, celibacy and
homosexuality. Sexual mores and practices acceptable in the secular world replaced in
the lives of many Catholics the more restrictive norms espoused in traditional Church
teaching. Following the second Vatican Council (Vatican II) to address these trends, the
policies of Pope Paul VI, which reaffirmed much of the traditional teaching on sexuality
issues, dashed the hopes of many Catholics who either exited the Church or ceased to
practice their religion according to the teachings of the Church. Many disappointed
clergy and religious also left their religious vocation. As the Church lost its authority, its
leaders became increasingly ambivalent about the sexuality of their clergy. With fewer
men seeking admission to the priesthood, seminary officials became less discriminating
in their recruitment of candidates, allowed a hedonistic culture of homosexuality and
non-celibacy to develop in some of their training institutions and tolerated the behaviour
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of an estimated 4% of priests who engaged in child sexual abuse (CSA), all the time
promulgating their teachings about sexuality to the laity.

More proximate individual and situational factors confirmed by recent research (John
Jay College 2004, 2006; Wortley and Smallbone, 2006; Smallbone et al, 2008) were
also influential in enabling the abuse to occur. Individual clergy exploited the autonomy
they were accorded by the bishops in undertaking their priestly role, the deference and
trust they were shown by the laity, and the Church facilities they had available for their
own illicit purposes. CSA grew as a hidden social problem in both society and in the
U.S. Catholic Church, often unwittingly aided by officials of other civil institutions,
until the Boston Globe exposed the problem in 2002.

In Chapter 7, I show the dynamic effect that these antecedent conditions had on the
behaviour of the actors who perpetrated the corruption and who encountered many of
these CSA incidents between 1950 and 2002.
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CHAPTER 7: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASE – PART II: A PROCESSUAL,
INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS
7.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I provide a processual interpretive analysis of the handling of child
sexual abuse (CSA) by the Archdiocese of Boston (AOB), and by other dioceses in the
U.S. Catholic Church, between 1950 and 2004. I discuss a selection of typical incidents
by the perpetrator Fr. John Geoghan, a serial pedophile who victimized 130 children
between 1960 and 1997 (Terry, 2008a). My aim in taking this approach is not to
highlight the behaviour of the CSA perpetrators, since such descriptions have been
provided by writers including Podles (2008), France (2004), Mudaly and Goddard
(2006) and Parkinson (1997). Instead, I focus on the key stakeholders of the
Archdiocese of Boston (AOB) in order to show how their responses to their encounters
with this corruption resulted in the AOB developing into ‘an organization of corrupt
individuals’ (OCI).

Building on my explanation in Chapter 6 of the antecedent conditions for CSA by
clergy in the Catholic Church, in this chapter I present an interpretive, processual
analysis of the way this corruption was perceived by Church stakeholders and handled
by Church officials between 1940 and 2004. I provide a chronological account of ‘what’
happened, narrating a small selection of corruption-related incidents together with an
account of their handling by the AOB and my interpretive explanation of ‘how’ and
‘why’ the corruption was able to occur and perpetuate as a result.

This corruption-enabling behaviour in the AOB was typical of such behaviour in other
U.S. and overseas dioceses of the Catholic Church so my analysis is relevant to other
dioceses as well.
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Figure 7.1
OCI development in the Catholic Church, Archdiocese of Boston –
an explanatory framework (interventions and moderations)

Contextual
Factors /
Antecedent
conditions

External Interventions:
Actions of external stakeholders which endeavoured to reduce
OCI development in the Catholic Church
CHAPTER 7

Prior and
continuing
environmental,
organizational,
individual and
situational
factors which
enabled OCI
development in
the Catholic
Church

CHAPTER 6

OCI dev’t over time

Internal Moderations:
Actions of internal stakeholders which, influenced by
contextual factors facilitated OCI development in the Catholic
Church
CHAPTER 7

Figure 7.1 highlights the two areas on which I focus: first, on the ‘internal moderations’
of many stakeholders who encountered the corruption which had the effect of enabling
it; second, on the ‘external interventions’ of other stakeholders who, when they noticed
the corruption, attempted to prevent it.

My explanation of the trajectory of corruption in this case again covers five nominal
periods - three labelled P1, P2 and P3 in the pre-scandal years, the scandal period P4,
and the post-scandal period P5 - as depicted in Figure 7.2. As discussed previously in
sections 3.3 and 5.1, and elaborated on in section 8.3, the behaviours that occurred in
these stages were not necessarily confined to that particular stage.
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Figure 7.2
The trajectory of corruption by individuals in the Catholic Church,
Archdiocese of Boston 1940-2004

The scandal
period 4 in
January 2002

The
corruption
trajectory
1940 -2004
Scale of
corruption

Pre –scandal
period 1

Pre-scandal
period 2

Pre-scandal
period 3

Post-scandal
period 5

emergence

uncertainty

cover-up

restoration

1940-1959

1960-1983

1984-2002

2002-2004

Time

In each of the three pre-scandal periods, the trajectory of corruption rose when Church
leaders and other stakeholders failed to deal adequately with signs and allegations of
child abuse. In period P1, I show how CSA developed as a ‘crescive’ problem
(Beamish, 2000, 2002) in the Church. Few incidents were noticed except by the victims,
some parents and clergy, and the bishops and cardinals who received their complaints.
Many who encountered incidents of CSA helped protect the perpetrator priests from
discovery and punishment, allowing the corruption to spread. In period P2, Church
authorities unintentionally established a flawed process, in responding to new signs and
allegations of the growing abuse, which became a routine for dealing with such matters.
Using the Geoghan case to illustrate the effect of this routine, I demonstrate how
uncertainty and ambiguity about CSA inhibited sense-making (Weick, 1995a) among
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stakeholders who encountered the corruption. The ambivalence (Bauman, 1991) of
leaders in the Catholic Church and their advisors from legal and medical institutions
about CSA shaped their responses to allegations made about clergy offenders which
minimized its seriousness and effects. Where deference was lacking among parents
making complaints, the bishops successfully adopted a ‘legalistic’ approach (Sitkin and
Bies, 1994) to dealing with their claims. This approach enabled the problem of CSA to
be ‘swept under the carpet’ and abusive clergy to return to ministry, thereby continuing
the spread of the corruption. In period P3, the scope of the abuse became apparent to the
bishops as did the risk of scandal. Ignoring advice provided to the USCCB in 1985
(Doyle et al, 2005), Boston’s Cardinal Law escalated his commitment (Staw, 1981,
2005) to the strategy that his predecessors had used for handling the abuse allegations
against Geoghan and other errant clergy. Despite stronger interventions by past victims
and their supporters which resulted in criminal proceedings against two pedophile
priests, one in Louisiana in 1984 and a second in Boston in 1990, a range of
organizational defensive routines (Argyris, 1990, 1995, 2005) adopted by most U.S.
bishops covered-up the scale of the problem and protected the Church from major
scandal until 2002. Government and media organizations continued to defer to the
Church in matters relating to the deviance of clergy, including CSA.

Period P4 commenced with the Boston Globe revelations in 2002 about how the AOB
had handled the corrupt behaviour of Geoghan and other abusive clergy, by ‘treating’
perpetrators and returning them to ministry. This scandal period was marked by
increased public knowledge of the abuse and its cover-up. This corruption was viewed
by the U.S. public as a serious ‘social problem’ (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) requiring
remedial action. The trajectory of corruption fell in period P5, following strong
intervention by the Massachusetts government that broke the culture of secrecy and
silence that the U.S. bishops had maintained, forcing them to produce personnel records
on the offending priests which contained evidence of their abuse and its cover-up. The
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) initiated a research project that revealed
the extent of CSA problem in U.S. dioceses (John Jay College, 2004, 2006; Burke,
2004). While some bishops attempted to ‘clean the Augean stables’ of the AOB and
other U.S. dioceses, removing the priests who had been involved, others continued with
the strategies and practices of the past. In those latter cases and to a lesser degree in the
former, the Church’s internal structure, governance and culture remained largely
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unchanged, suggesting to critics that the Catholic Church was engaging in
‘organizational hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 2002). This perception was subsequently
reinforced by CSA scandals in Ireland in 2009 and in both Germany and Malta in 2010,
indicating that Church leaders were not being pro-active in removing errant clergy. The
problem has continued to the present time.

I conclude the chapter with a summary that draws together my findings in Chapters 6
and 7 and provides a substantive theory of how the AOB and other Catholic Church
dioceses became ‘organizations of corrupt individuals’ (OCIs).

7.2

Period #1 (1940-1959): A Crescive Problem

During this first period (1940-1959), the CSA corruption in the AOB and in other
dioceses of the U.S. Catholic Church seems to have developed as, what Beamish (2000,
2002) termed, a ‘crescive’ or creeping problem. While acts of CSA by clergy were
taking place, there were fewer allegations at this stage than at later stages since
incidents were rarely reported at the time they occurred (Terry, 2008a). These
allegations were managed in accordance with policies and practices determined by each
bishop. At the same time, in U.S. society CSA was neither seen a social problem nor
was it openly discussed. Hence, with the few reported incidents handled in a culture of
secrecy and silence within the Church, few people knew or understood what was
occurring.

The number of CSA incidents was not known at the time
It is not known how many acts of sexual abuse occurred during the time that Cardinal
Cushing was Archbishop of Boston (AOB) from 1940 until 1969 (Krebs, 1998). While
Church records indicated that there were 24 allegations made in Boston in the period
1940-1959, they were possibly only a small percentage of the abuse that took place
during that period (Reilly, 2003). The report of Attorney-General for Massachusetts
Thomas Reilly in 2003 indicated that his inquiry into the abuse in the AOB focused
mainly on the abuse in the time of Cardinal Law between 1984 and 2002 because, given
the ‘statute of limitations’ barrier that applied to older allegations, it had been
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unproductive for those incidents to be pursued by his Office. Similarly, in its study of
allegations made against all 114 dioceses and religious institutes of the Church between
1940 and 2002, John Jay College researchers found that the percentage of priests
against whom allegations were made was only 1% in the 1950s. While the trajectory of
allegations rose steadily to a rate of 3.5% of clergy by 1969, and to a peak of 8% in
1980, it then declined annually to a rate of less than 1% by 2002 (John Jay College,
2004, 2006).

Reasons for low numbers of CSA allegations
There are five reasons for the low reporting rate in the early years. First, most victims of
pedophilia and ephebophilia struggled to deal with their abuse well after the event
(Reilly, 2003; France, 2004). Reilly (2003) believed that many children who were
abused may have been too young to report the abuse at the time it occurred, since they
could not recognize or effectively assert their victimization until they reached
adulthood. Perpetrators were able to influence or coerce children into silence,
convincing them that they would not be believed, or that something terrible would
happen to their parents, or that they would be blamed if their secrets were revealed
(France, 2004).

Second, believing that they were the only ones affected, many young children were
silent about the abuse and did not report it, even to their parents or other siblings, but
attempted to deal with the situation by themselves in different ways. Some children who
did report the abuse to their parents were not supported by them, and some were even
punished for accusing a priest of such deeds (France, 2004).

Third, until the 1970s CSA was regarded in U.S. society as an aberration that rarely
occurred. In this period, sexual activity outside marriage was still regarded by some as
deviant and, despite growing secularization, within U.S. society Christian teaching on
human sexuality remained largely moralistic (Sipe, 1995; Weisner-Hanks, 2000). Most
people were not educated about CSA and its prevalence in society. There would have
been little public sense-making about CSA since, in the dominantly Christian society, it
would not have been a topic that was openly discussed. Few Catholic parents would
have understood the risk of their children being sexually abused by a trusted Catholic
priest. Situational factors enabled perpetrators to build trust and confidence of the
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parents in them as friends and benefactors, and begin their grooming activity (Wortley
and Smallbone, 2006; Terry and Ackerman, 2008). Socializing with the family
developed a trusting relationship, which later translated into offers of assistance in
caring for the children, putting them to bed or taking them on outings. These grooming
tactics were employed by the perpetrators to get access to children on their own in
locations where they were unlikely to be disturbed or suspected if the children confided
in their parents (Terry and Ackerman, 2008; Tallon and Terry, 2008; Gehring, 2007).

Fourth, perpetrators targeted vulnerable children in need of love and friendship in
troubled families who did not suspect the offenders’ motives. Interest by a priest in their
family was often welcomed by socially isolated parents in troubled families grateful for
such attention (France, 2004). The relative standing in the community of the priest and
the family / victim limited the possibility that the child or the parents would be believed
by other adults if they alleged abuse.

Fifth, many parents whose suspicions were aroused would have felt powerless to take
any action to address their concerns. As France (2004) has shown, it was too difficult
for them to confront the priests or a bishop about alleged abuse. The clergy possess
power:

to deny the laity privileges of membership…that the laity do not possess. They
can threaten hellfire and the loss of salvation as well as other forms of spiritual
retaliation if a clerical-lay transgression or disagreement arises. Laity cannot
reciprocate... [so] such moral power is therefore asymmetrical (Shupe, 1995:
26).
Many parents would have been understandably afraid of the social and economic
consequences of supporting their children by making such allegations (France, 2004)
since the Church had influence in the predominantly Catholic community of Boston at
all levels. Charismatic priests with autonomy to run their own parishes and the support
of most parishioners who deferred to them on ethical matters had sufficient power to
deal with individual families. In addition, many parishioners who supported the clergy
threatened people who made allegations against them, including lawyers for the victims
when the allegations became more prevalent just prior to the 2002 scandal (France,
2004).
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As a consequence of the low reporting rate, apart from the perpetrators and their
victims, incidents of abuse would have gone largely unnoticed except by parents
involved, the bishops and those few diocesan officials involved in addressing them.

The early handling of CSA allegations
How did Church officials handle these earlier allegations? Bishops regarded CSA
allegations with any substance as sporadic and isolated ‘sins’ of a priest who was ill
(Burke, 2004). While these first cases were possibly met with shock and disbelief by
some bishops, it appears that they reacted by drawing on routines and cultural practices
that were aimed at avoiding scandal. According to Shupe (2008: 147), they addressed
the problem of sexual abuse:

…with a short term out-of-sight/out-of-commission strategy, but with the long
term plan of placing them in functional assignments after protocols …that often
involved prayer, meditation and penance.
At the retreat centers, troubled priests were provided with psychiatric and psychological
treatment and spiritual counselling to help them address their problems (John Jay
College, 2006). But despite forceful warnings to U.S. bishops in 1952 by the founder of
the Servants of the Paraclete order who ran these centers that a different strategy should
be adopted for sexual predators among the clergy, they were not removed permanently
from ministry (Goodstein, 2009). Bishops understood that a major role they had as
leaders was to protect the Church from scandal. According to Reilly (2003), in Boston
both Cardinal Cushing and his predecessor Cardinal Medeiros dealt with allegations in
an informal, ad-hoc way, without policies, verbally but sometimes in writing, using
vague language in communications. They exercised benign and benevolent authority
over their errant clergy, tolerated their deviance and concealed it from other members
through secrecy and silence.

7.3

Period #2 (1960-1984): Doubt

During this next period, while the Church hierarchy and laity were focused on and
reacting to the outcomes of the Second Vatican Council, reported incidents of CSA
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increased in the AOB and other U.S. dioceses. In Boston, 445 allegations were made to
the Archdiocese about their priests between 1960 and 1984 (Reilly, 2003).

A major theme in this period is ‘doubt’ – which is also the title of a 2008 movie about
suspected CSA in the Church. The movie well illustrates the difficulties and
uncertainties which stakeholders faced during this period when they encountered
possible CSA. To aid my presentation of this theme, I begin the discussion of my
analysis of this period with a brief description of this movie.

Doubt
Set in a Catholic School in 1964 in the Bronx, New York, Doubt (2008) is the story of
the confrontation between an autocratic principal Sister Aloysius (played by Meryl
Streep) and a popular priest Father Flynn (played by Philip Seymour Hoffman) whom
she suspects of behaving improperly with a socially isolated 12-year-old black student
at her school. Without proof, but with a deep seated conviction of his guilt based on her
past experience with clergy sexual abuse, her observations of Fr. Flynn with students,
and the report of a young teacher at the school, Sister James (played by Amy Adams),
of noticing alcohol on the student’s breath after meeting with the priest and Fr Flynn
putting a singlet of that student’s school locker, Sister Aloysius confronts the priest.
Flynn deflects the initial accusations with plausible explanations of his suspicious
conduct. He attempts to silence her with a sermon to his supportive congregation on the
consequences of gossip, but this tactic fails. Continuing her efforts to expose him, Sister
Aloysius obtains information from the boy’s mother that her son is in danger of physical
abuse from his father because of his homosexual orientation. Still without evidence but
convinced by these signs she has noticed, Sister Aloysius threatens Flynn with
exposure, deceiving him into believing that she has contacted a nun from his last parish
whose information on his history she will reveal. Flynn is transferred by the Bishop to
another parish where he will continue to have access to young people. Despite her
single-minded determination to that point, Sister Aloysius is left torn by doubt about
whether the priest was guilty of abuse.

This movie mirrors to a considerable degree the documented case of serial abuse during
this time frame, that of Fr John Geoghan. In analyzing this case, I will illustrate a
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common pattern of perpetrator and stakeholder behaviour which allowed CSA to be
perpetrated by many priests and the AOB to develop as an OCI.

The Geoghan Saga
Father John Geoghan, an active pedophile for 36 years, graduated from St John’s
Seminary in 1962 (France, 2004; Podles, 2008). As Reilly observed in 2003, a large
proportion of offenders around this period graduated from St. John’s between 1953 and
1973, during which time a non-celibate culture developed in U.S. seminaries and
recruitment and formation practices enabled unsuitable applicants to become ordained
priests.

Geoghan began molesting boys in his first parish assignment at Blessed Sacrament
Church, Saugus, Massachusetts, between 1962 and 1966. The children he targeted were
often those who were without fathers, whose mothers appreciated his support in helping
them raise their families by taking the children on outings, or by bathing and babysitting them. At an early stage, his habit of taking boys to his bedroom at the presbytery
was noticed by a fellow priest who raised his concerns with the bishop, only to be
threatened with reassignment to South America if he pursued his allegations (Podles,
2008). Why this would have been the response can be gleaned from many of the
antecedent factors discussed in Chapter 6.

Between 1967 and 1974, Geoghan pursued his ministry and pedophilic activities in
Hingham, Massachusetts. Reflecting on his activities years later, other priests at that
parish reported that they saw Geoghan as being different from them, doting on altar
boys and first communicants and frequently absenting himself from collegial activities
with other priests. However, at the time, they had insufficient information to judge what
was occurring. One priest recalled:

I found him different…I just didn’t know how to react to him. He was
different… Something is wrong…Something is not right here, but you can’t put
your finger on it. (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002: 19).
In 1967, Geoghan befriended a woman and began abusing her two sons. The single
mother was unaware of the abuse until an uncle discovered it and removed Geoghan
from the house. Geoghan later returned and persisted with his abuse until the uncle
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again forcibly removed him. The uncle complained to a priest with whom he was
acquainted demanding that Geoghan be expelled from the parish, but he took the
complaint no further. His request was not met by the diocese, although it was recorded
on Geoghan’s personnel file. However, after a further complaint about his behaviour in
1968, Geoghan was sent by Cardinal Cushing to the Seton Institute for psychiatric
treatment (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; Podles, 2008).

In the early 1970s, after leaving the Institute, Geoghan befriended the Mueller family
and began abusing three of the four boys. It was only years later, in 1973, that the
mother found out about the abuse after one of her children became upset following her
announcement that Geoghan would be visiting their home. Shocked and overwhelmed
by her childrens’ hysterical revelations, she left the house with the children before his
arrival to complain to another priest, Fr Paul Miceli, who knew both Geoghan and the
Mueller family (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; Podles, 2008). Fr Miceli
counselled her and her young sons ‘…to try not to think about this; to forget about it. It
will never happen again…he will never be a priest again…it will never happen again’
(Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002: 20). While there was no official response to
her complaint, Geoghan was eventually moved from that parish within the year.

In 1974, he was again reassigned, recommencing his pedophilic activities at Jamaica
Plain, Massachusetts, where he was scout chaplain and put in charge of altar boys
(Podles, 2008). It is possible that he was assigned these tasks at his own request and in
the absence of any knowledge by most officials of the AOB of CSA or Geoghan’s
recidivist tendencies. However, some did. A 13 year old victim from this period later
recalled a rare occasion when another priest at the rectory, who became aware that
Geoghan invited him and other children to his bedroom, broke in during an abuse
incident and berated Geoghan. “Jack, we told you not to do this up here! What the hell
are you doing? Are you nuts?” (Podles, 2008: 146).

In 1979, a Miss Coveny complained to the Boston Police chaplain, Rev William
Francis, about something Geoghan had done (Podles, 2008). On hearing the complaint
from the police, Vicar-General Bishop Thomas Daily, an assistant to the cardinal,
recorded in typical fashion without details that a complaint ‘of a moral nature’ was
made against Geoghan. Daily quickly decided that the accusation was false based on
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Geoghan’s denial when questioned during a phone call (Podles, 2008; Reilly, 2003),
and subsequently consoled Geoghan and assured him that his good record and name,
and priestly reputation, were intact (Podles, 2008).

In 1977, Geoghan next befriended the Dussourd family. The family comprised the
husband Ralph, a practicing Baptist who worked long hours, his wife Maryetta, a
devoted Catholic who welcomed the attention of Geoghan in caring for their eight
children aged between 11 and 4 years - three sons and one daughter of their own and
four nephews. Over the years, Geoghan sometimes stayed overnight at the Dussourd
residence. In 1980, the Dussourds became suspicious of Geoghan’s night time visits to
the children’s room, which he explained was to ‘bless them’, while all the time abusing
them. Weeks later, Maryetta was advised by a nurse at a clinic she was attending that
Geoghan was to blame for the condition of two children of another family who were
attending the clinic after setting fire to their bedroom. The nurse asked Maryetta if she
had any problems with Father Geoghan, to which Maryetta replied that he was loved by
her family and that she and her husband were helping him with fundraising for the
baseball league he was conducting, at which point the conversation ended. While she
initially dismissed the comments by the nurse as incomprehensible, in the weeks that
followed she began to worry:

During that time, memories took on different meanings. She remembered a
remark Geoghan made about the other family he had loved: one night, he had
said cryptically, the father had accosted him as he was blessing the children,
chased him down the stairs and out of the house, and said “If I ever see you
again I swear I will kill you.” This was a story she had heard him tell for years,
plain as a confession. But rather than provoking suspicion, the sad tale refused to
yield to her understanding. She felt pity for the priest. (France, 2004: 136-7)
She contacted her pastor, Fr John Thomas, and informed him of the conversation with
the nurse as well as her knowledge of Geoghan’s work with families, including her
neighbours - the Muzzis and the Covenys. Enlightened by the nurse, she had come to
believe that fifteen children she knew could have been affected by Geoghan, and that
immediate and decisive action by the Archdiocese was necessary (France, 2004). Fr.
Thomas raised the allegations with Geoghan who admitted that he was perpetrating
abuse in two families, but indicated that he did not think that it was a problem for his
continuing work as a priest (France, 2004). Fr. Thomas advised Vicar-General Bishop
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Daily of the situation. Daily removed Geoghan from the parish three days later and
placed him on sick leave, during which time he was evaluated and treated by a
psychiatrist. However:

…because he wanted to keep the abuse matter private, which he thought was the
priest’s right, he did not report Geoghan’s behavior to the church personnel
committee. He did not tell the police a crime had been committed, believing,
wrongly, that priests enjoyed immunity under the law. He never reopened [past]
investigations (France, 2004:140).
The Dussourds were advised by Fr. Thomas of the action Bishop Daily had taken. More
firmly, however, Daily advised Maryetta to keep the matter to herself to avoid
stigmatizing the boys. He warned her against involving the police, indicating concern
for Geoghan’s mother and the legal costs to her of action that might follow. He
appealed to her understanding as a Catholic that they were all sinners who should be
forgiven. As a consequence of the warning, she did not discuss the matter again in their
family - until an incident in mid 1982.

Unbeknown to the Dussourds, after 11 months treatment and a report from one of the
psychiatrists who treated him, Geoghan was placed by Cardinal Medeiros at another
parish as an assistant pastor, where he was given responsibility for altar boys and
children’s catechism classes. The laity in his former parish was not told about the
appointment and the laity in his new parish was not warned of his previous behaviour.
In July 1982, however, one of the Dussourd children saw Geoghan in the company of
boys at an ice cream store and informed his mother (Reilly, 2003; France, 2004).
Together with two relatives, the Dussourds confronted Bishop Daily who responded by
reminding her of the wisdom of the Church hierarchy who did not regard Geoghan now
as a danger to anyone. Dissatisfied with that response, Maryetta Doussourd’s sister,
Margaret Gallant, wrote to Cardinal Medeiros who responded by encouraging the
family to have compassion for Geoghan, to forgive him his sin, and be patient while he
determined how the problem would be dealt with so as to avoid scandal (France, 2004).
Within a month, Medeiros sent Geoghan to Rome for studies. However, following those
studies, Geoghan returned to Boston where, in 1984 and against advice given to the new
Cardinal Bernard Law, he was assigned by the cardinal to the same parish (Reilly,
2003).
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The Problem of Uncertainty
According to Parkinson (1997), it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that child sexual
abuse became an issue widely discussed in the media. Until that time, little was known
of the nature and extent of child sexual abuse (CSA) in society whether inside or outside
the family setting. Consequently, when some parents of children being abused noticed
that their children had developed disturbing behaviour patterns, despite signs that
‘something was not right’, they struggled to understand what was occurring.

For them to do so, they would have to have been aware of the individual and situational
factors that enable the occurrence of CSA outlined in Chapter 6, and have had an
understanding of offence settings and environments and the methods that abusers use to
gain access to victims. As Parkinson (1997) explains, a would-be perpetrator who lives
outside the family must find ways of gaining access to the children without arousing
suspicion so he can create an environment in which the abuse can occur. Some
perpetrators become teachers, scout leaders, sports coaches and youth workers in order
to gain legitimate and accepted contact with children. As the Geoghan story shows,
pedophile priests often undertook pastoral work with targeted families in their homes in
order to have access to vulnerable children. Pastoral care provided a plausible reason for
a priest’s contact with the family and the children both to the family and to outsiders.
They played on the trust they built and the image they developed with naïve parents in
order to gain access to their children and so that, if a child disclosed sexual abuse, those
parents and other adults found it hard to believe the accusation against them. Having
gained access, grooming a child involved forming a special relationship with him or her.
Once trusted and having rapport with the child, perpetrators had access to them without
their parents on excursions, at youth group activities, in the presbyteries, the churches or
in their cars, and, in Geoghan’s case, in the bedrooms of children in households where
he was a guest. The sexual contact often began only after the child felt comfortable with
non-sexual contact, after which the young victims experienced mixed feelings that
sexual contact created. Feeling trapped in that confusion and lacking clear
understanding of what is happening in their relationship, and by threats in many cases,
most remained silent.
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Unaware of this pattern of trust-building and grooming, the behaviour of priests that
was observed failed to provide warning signs of potential CSA since the behaviour was,
in many cases, similar to the behaviour of priests who were not abusers. In Geoghan’s
case, without knowledge of grooming and intent, even when parents were aware of the
priest visiting their children at night, their affection for him created uncertainty about
any misgivings they had about such visits. Even more direct warnings provided by the
behaviour or statements of the abused children were not understood or not believed by
parents and adults. Parkinson (1997:70) revealed that it was very difficult for children to
tell of their abuse:

Frequently, they will try to tell an adult just once, and if they are not believed or
the adult does nothing to stop the abuse, they will not tell again. Their disclosure
may be very cautious as they test the waters to see how the adult will react. The
voice of the perpetrator may be ringing in their ears threatening the
consequences of disclosure.
In Geoghan’s case, one victim’s mother reprimanded her children when they sought to
avoid a priest taking them on outings and dropping them off one by one (France, 2004).
Lack of knowledge about the schemes and ploys of pedophiles and ephebophiles and
the silence of the child victims served to increase this uncertainty.

The Problem of Ambiguity
Whereas a person experiences uncertainty as a result of having insufficient information
to correctly interpret something that is noticed, ambiguity is a result of a person
obtaining an ongoing stream of information that supports different, sometimes
contradictory, interpretations of what is noticed. According to Weick (1995a: 91):

the shock in each case that triggers sense-making is somewhat different. In the
case of ambiguity, people engage in sense-making because they are confused by
too many interpretations, whereas in the case of uncertainty, they do so because
they are ignorant of any interpretations.
In the Geoghan example, Maryetta Dussourd was faced with an ambiguous situation
when she became aware that she and the nurse had different perceptions of the priest.
Her perception of Geoghan, based on her own experience, was favourable – he was
loved by her family and they assisted him with his junior baseball team. The clinic
nurse had a different view - other families were having trouble with Geoghan. Her
225

sense-making triggered, she remembered that Geoghan had told her of the problem he
had with another family where ‘a relative broke the loving relationship’. She
remembered Geoghan’s night time wanderings to ‘bless their children’, and his initial
denial of having done so (France, 2004). What was she to believe now? And to whom
was she to turn to resolve her ambiguity? She began by discussing the issue with her
family. In the absence of a system for reporting concerns about priests, she discussed
the situation with another priest, Fr Thomas. He provided multiple and conflicting
interpretations of the situation and desirable actions she should take - Geoghan was ill
and had been placed on sick leave; she should keep the matter private and not report it
to the police; all people were sinners so she should be forgiving; she should be
charitable by taking into consideration Geoghan’s mother; she should be prudent given
the cost of legal action; she should trust the Bishop that the problem had now been
addressed. What sense was she able to make of the situation with these multiple
interpretations, given at that stage there was no evidence that the children have been
abused or detrimentally affected? She decided to leave the matter in the bishop’s hands.

It was only after discovering that Geoghan had been reassigned, and had access to other
children, that the Dussourd family, more certain now that Geoghan was a danger and
that the diocesan officials had not taken their concerns seriously, became more resolute
and confronted the bishop. Casting off any previous deference they had for the bishop,
and certain that their interpretation of the situation was correct, they rejected his new
interpretation of the situation that Geoghan was no danger to anyone. Maryetta’s sister
Margaret Gallant complained directly to Cardinal Medeiros who, perceiving a scandal
risk, removed Geoghan from his post. At a later time, however, the new Boston
Cardinal Bernard Law would reinstate Geoghan against the advice of some of his
officials thereby allowing him to abuse new families.

As indicated in Chapter 6, ambiguity was further enhanced in this period during which
issues pertaining to human sexuality - adolescent sexuality, recovered memory
syndrome, homosexuality and clergy celibacy – were being debated. Differences of
opinion on these issues would have affected many adults, both in society and in the
Church, on how they should respond to signs, rumours and allegations of sexual abuse.
In relation to adolescent sexuality, some people argued that consensual relations
between adults and physically mature young teenagers should not be criminalized and
226

that prohibiting adolescents from engaging in sexual intercourse in the name of child
protection was a violation of their human rights. Furthermore, argument about the
permissible legal age for sex – the appropriate age of consent - blurred the boundary
between acceptable and unacceptable sexual relations between adolescents and adults.
At the same time, controversy about recovered memory arose in the field of psychology
(Williams, 1994). When allegations of past abuse surfaced, there were differing
interpretations about the ability of young adults to accurately recollect what had
happened years before. Ambiguity was also generated by changes in societal attitudes
about homosexuality and celibacy. The John Jay College research showed why the
former was a problem. Tallon & Terry (2008) found that only 2.2% of priests were
pedophiles who had allegedly abused pre-pubescent children, whereas 10.8% of priests
were ephebophiles who targeted post-pubescent children. The majority of priests were
versatile in their choice of target, and while there was widespread condemnation of
pedophilia, few of these cases surfaced. The majority of cases involved post-pubescent
children about whom there was growing ambiguity in society about the age when it
might be acceptable for them to engage in sexual relations. Furthermore, growing
acceptance in society of homosexuality and skepticism about the value of celibacy for
unmarried people and the clergy combined to create an environment where it was
unclear to whom an abused youth might turn to obtain support about abuse by a priest.

Ambiguity was not only confined to parents but, as discussed in Chapter 6, seems to
have affected the Church hierarchy, members of whom permitted a homosexual and
non-celibate culture to develop in the seminaries during the controversy about the
celibacy of the clergy. In retrospect, the problem the U.S. Church faced was highlighted
by the John Jay College research into the abuse (Burke, 2004). While the official
teaching reinforced mandatory celibacy for the clergy and the unacceptability of
homosexuality, neither was practiced in the seminaries or by some members of the
clergy. In the seminaries, non-celibate aspirants were ordained to the priesthood, and
practicing priests, found to be abusing children, or otherwise being non-celibate, were
not defrocked at a time when many men were leaving the priesthood (Goodstein and
Luo, 2010). The primary goal of the hierarchy was the avoidance of the scandal that
would arise if the public became aware of the contradiction between their teaching and
clergy practice. Their handling of the non-celibacy issue and, more critically, the CSA
issue was exemplified by their handling of the deviance of Fr. Paul Shanley - an open
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advocate of homosexual love among the flock and a serial ephebophile between 1966
and 1979. They addressed the Shanley problems, and all such problems of sexual
deviance, in secrecy and silence (France, 2004). There was another factor that
contributed to ambiguity among members of the church about CSA and shaped their
response to the problem - the ambivalence of the church hierarchy about CSA.

Ambivalence shapes the Church response to allegations of abuse
Throughout the abuse period, the Boston cardinals and many other Church leaders
categorized the sexual abuse as a ‘sin to be forgiven’ and a ‘medical problem’
(Depositions of Cardinal Law, 2002). As the NRB concluded in 2004:

in the 1950s and early 1960s, many church leaders viewed sexual abuse as a
moral lapse only and did not understand the psychological causes and
consequences of such conduct. More recently, some church leaders viewed the
sexual abuse as a psychological problem only and placed undue reliance on
therapy as a solution. The failure of Church leaders to recognize …abuse as a
crime…and deal with it accordingly…contributed enormously to the …crisis
(Burke, 2004: 93-94).
This categorization problem about CSA represents what Bauman (1991) termed
‘ambivalence’.

As Cardinal Law was later to admit, the interpretation of CSA as a sin and a medical
condition rather than as a crime became the basis of diocesan policies and procedures
for dealing with allegations (Deposition of Cardinal Law, 2002). As a consequence, the
offence was minimized and the perpetrators were treated more leniently by the Bishop
without being referred to the police. As previously indicated, the ‘seal of confession’ is
a Church law which prevents a priest from disclosing admissions by the penitent, and
was used to keep perpetrators’ admissions of CSA secret. As a medical problem,
perpetrators were referred for evaluation and treatment from the late 1940s to one of the
Church-run psychiatric institutions.

This approach served a number of objectives of the Church hierarchy. Reilly (2003)
claimed that the cardinals compelled the accused priests to undergo psychiatric
evaluations for the following reasons: i) concern for the priest’s well-being, ii) to
determine the veracity of the complaint, iii) to assess the nature of the priest’s problem
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and prognosis of re-offending, iv) to be able return the priest to ministry, and v) to limit
the exposure of the Archdiocese to legal liability if a returning priest re-offended, since
blame could be placed on his medical assessment. Within the Church, a diagnosis
indicating a mental health or psychiatric problem as the cause of the abuse also
prevented the Vatican from laicizing the priest under Canon Law.

It is possible that the cardinals and their bishops, as well as other Church officials and
medical professionals who implemented the policy, experienced psychological and
sociological ambivalence (Merton, 1976) during the period they were handling sexual
abuse allegations against their clergy. Psychological ambivalence, the symptom of acute
discomfort one experiences when having two strong opposed feelings about an object,
or conflicting wishes of which only one can be satisfied, or conflicting ideas which
cannot be easily resolved, can emanate from particular or multiple roles people have in
life, which Merton (1976) has referred to as sociological ambivalence. Hence, when
cardinals and bishops discovered that some of their priests were engaged in pedophilia,
they may have had mixed feelings about supporting them or, as a consequence of the
dual roles they were expected to play, the victims. Despite any such ambivalence,
consistent with the role they were expected to play as bishops, they gave preferential
treatment to the clergy perpetrators under their control in caring for them while handling
the allegations of parents by minimizing the effects of the abuse and harm that had been
inflicted on the victims, exhorting them to be loyal and silent.

Expecting that their child’s needs would be foremost in the minds of the bishops and
cardinals, parents deferred to these authorities (France, 2004). It is probable that some
of these families, peers of the offending clergy and others aware of the abuse may have
experienced psychological ambivalence over their relationship with the perpetrators.
Similarly, some medical and legal professionals advising the Church leaders would
possibly have experienced ambivalence when assisting them in protecting the
perpetrators. Yet their collective ambivalence enabled the perpetrators to return time
and again to ministry and to their abusive ways.

The Legalistic Approach to addressing allegations
As more families became aware of abuse, the deference that had been shown to the
church hierarchy dissipated with some victims and their families turning to civil suits
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and occasional criminal proceedings against the Archdiocese. At this stage, cases filed
against the church were passed over to diocesan legal teams.

In Boston and other dioceses, this ‘legalistic approach’ (Sitkin & Bies, 1994) saw the
cardinals and bishops adopt strategies aimed at minimizing the Church’s economic loss,
protecting the priests from prosecution for offences committed years previously, and
maintaining the secrecy and silence about the abuse and the manner in which cases were
handled in an attempt to avoid scandal. Church lawyers adopted a range of strategies to
achieve these objectives. They delayed responding to the allegations in order to take
advantage of a 10 year statute of limitations provision in state law restricting the time
available for victims to take criminal and civil action against perpetrators (Vitello,
2009). They kept information of past abuse by some priests in diocesan personnel files
that were not provided to the defence teams or the courts, since these files would have
boosted the understanding of all parties of the extent of the perpetrators abuse and the
fact that there were more victims. They negotiated low out-of-court settlement payouts
to individual victims and tied these settlements to confidentiality clauses that avoided
media publicity and silenced the victims (Podles, 2008). Because government
institutions did not intervene, this approach was initially successful in achieving their
aims (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002). As a consequence of this behaviour,
despite having greater knowledge and being aware of increasing signs of widespread
abuse, Church authorities were successful in sweeping the problem of clergy sexual
abuse under the carpet to this point. That changed in 1983.

A Landmark Case against the Church – Fr Gilbert Gauthe
In 1983, a case in Lafayette, Louisiana, involving the sexual abuse of children by a
priest, Fr. Gilbert Gauthe, led to a media scandal. Until this time, thanks to an overlyrespectful relationship between the Catholic Church, the state courts and the media, civil
legal cases against priests for sexual abuse had not made more than brief appearances in
the press (France, 2004). It was no different when a group of families, who found that
their children had been abused by Gauthe, filed lawsuits against the Diocese of
Lafayette, claiming that it failed to protect their children from him. Gauthe’s lawyer and
the church’s insurance company, preferring to maintain secrecy about the case, achieved
a settlement with the plaintiffs for a payout of $4.2 million (Berry, 1992, 2000).
However, despite documents of the Gauthe case being impounded by the court, news of
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the settlement eventually reached the media, but initially most newspapers declined to
publish the story out of deference to, or concern about the repercussions of criticizing
the Church (Berry, 2000). But other families pursued criminal action against Gauthe,
causing the scandal. He was indicted by a grand jury on 34 counts of sexual abuse
involving 9 boys, including one charge of rape which carried the death sentence in that
state (Cornwell, 2004). During his criminal prosecution, his career as a serial pedophile
during his priesthood was detailed, the first time that details of a priest’s sexual abuse
had been made public (Berry, 2000; Doyle et al, 2005) . He was sentenced to
imprisonment for 20 years. Further civil cases that followed his imprisonment resulted
in additional settlements by the Church with victims of Gauthe amounting to US$22
million (Berry, 2000).

While the Gauthe case awakened some members of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops (NCCB), as the USCCB was then called, to the growing problem, many of its
members, including Boston’s Cardinal Law, did not alter the way they handled CSA
allegations against their clergy.

7.4

Period #3 (1984-2002): Denial

After being installed as Archbishop of Boston in early 1984, Cardinal Bernard Law
continued the unwritten policies of his predecessors in dealing with allegations of
sexual abuse against Boston clergy. Despite multiple warnings about the problem,
including a written briefing provided in 1985 to the U.S. bishops (Doyle et al, 2006),
Law decided to protect the offending clergy while taking administrative steps to avoid
scandal. He developed formal structures and standard procedures within his
administration for handling allegations of abuse that had the effect of normalizing the
deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Vaughan, 1996). The approach adopted by his
predecessor was strengthened to manage a spate of civil legal claims against the
Archdiocese that threatened to cause scandal. Together with his administration, legal
and medical professionals, Law adopted a range of measures aimed at maintaining
secrecy and silence about the abuse and its handling that enabled the AOB to avoid
adverse publicity until January 2002.
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Clear warnings about clergy sexual abuse are ignored
Soon after his appointment in early 1984, Cardinal Law reassigned Geoghan to parish
duties despite the many warnings he received. Geoghan had been sent to Rome by the
former cardinal and, having returned, was waiting on a decision as to his future. Bishop
John D’Arcy, one of his auxiliary bishops in Boston, expressed alarm at Law’s decision
given Geoghan’s ‘history of homosexual involvement with young boys’ (Burke, 2004:
41; Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 16 October 2002: 4). After ignoring this
advice, Law arranged for D’Arcy to be transferred to another diocese in Indiana,
signalling that ‘D’Arcy did not fit the clerical culture of Boston. He did not understand,
the way the other bishops did’ (Podles, 2008: 150). In 2002, reflecting back on this
period, Law admitted to understanding the seriousness and gravity of sexual abuse
following the Gauthe scandal in 1984. Despite this understanding, however, in February
1985 Law failed to heed what he termed the ‘observations’ of the experienced Director
of the St Luke’s Institute that recidivist pedophiles among the priests who were treated
at the Institute should not be returned to ministry (Deposition of Cardinal Law, 2005).

In September 1984, Geoghan was again spotted by the Dussourd family ‘in the
company of many boys, to the extent of dropping them off at their homes as late as 9:30
p.m.’ (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002: 31). Margaret Gallant wrote to Law
outlining her concern that he was still active, her efforts to keep a lid on the anger of the
family, her own sense of responsibility for his sexual predations and her concern about
the disgrace the breaking of the family silence would bring to other priests and members
of the church who were currently in the dark about Geoghan’s sexual proclivities. In
response to this threat, Law reassigned Geoghan to a different parish in the
Archdiocese, thereby continuing the routine response of the Archdiocese to allegations
that had the potential to cause a scandal (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002). In
making his reassignment decisions during his reign as cardinal, Law ignored both
medical and other internal advice not to reassign certain clergy, despite contending that
he relied on medical advice (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law, 8 May 2002). In fact,
there were occasions when he pressured doctors treating the perpetrators in the Catholic
medical institutions for a favourable report that accorded with his wishes to reinstate
priests like Geoghan (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002).
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A clearer warning of the CSA problem and its potential consequences was sounded to
all bishops in a discussion paper prepared for delivery at the 1985 U.S. Bishops’
Conference. The outcome of the Gauthe scandal had spurred Rev. Michael Peterson,
president of St Luke’s Institute, Father Thomas Doyle, a canon law professor and
Vatican Embassy official in Washington from 1981 to 1986, and Ray Mouton, Gauthe’s
defence lawyer, to address the clergy abuse problem. Entitled ‘The Problem of Sexual
Molestation by Roman Catholic Clergy: Meeting the Problem in a Comprehensive and
Responsible Manner’, the report provided a comprehensive overview of the CSA
problem in the Church and a way forward for the bishops (Doyle et al, 2006). Despite
initial encouragement from Cardinal Law and others prior to the conference, the report
was not placed on the agenda. According to Doyle et al (2006), the Conference
Secretariat informed the authors that there was nothing in the paper that was not already
known to the bishops. The approach suggested in the paper for a national coordinated
effort to address the abuse was, it seems, at variance with the wishes of many bishops
who preferred to maintain their autonomy and respond individually through their own
expert diocesan personnel (USCCB, 2001). After some bishops sought a copy, Doyle
sent a copy of The Manual to each bishop, providing them with a clear view of the
problem and the risk that its current handling posed for the Church at that time (Doyle
et al, 2006). The Manual, however, was not released to the public until 2006. Many of
its recommendations were only taken up in 2002 after Church leaders were publicly
criticized over their handling of the allegations of abuse (Elsbach, 2006). The
difficulties in implementing the Manual lay to a considerable degree in the structure and
politics of church governance.

The structure of and politics within the Church inhibit progress
The NCCB failed to influence the autonomous bishops and the Vatican authorities to
take effective action to address the growing corruption since they had insufficient power
to resolve the problem independently. A collaborative response to the growing
corruption did not eventuate after influential NCCB members heeded the advice of their
legal counsel and insurers about the approach they should take to minimize their
financial losses arising from claims of Gauthe’s victims around 1985. As outlined in
Chapter 6, the legal structure of the Church nominates the individual dioceses as the
responsible bodies for addressing the claims of victims and the NCCB concluded that
the bishops of those dioceses should continue to be responsible for formulating policy
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on dealing with victims’ claims and their errant clergy (Berry, 2000). The NCCB
remained an advisory body to the bishops and an advocacy body to the Vatican.

In late 1989, the NCCB asked the Vatican to institute an expedited administrative
process for laicization – the removal of priests who sexually abused minors (USCCB,
2001). There were several barriers preventing laicization being used as a deterrent and
solution to the serial abuse. The laicization process was lengthy, required the
participation of the victim, and evidence that the priest had not acted under some type of
mental illness or psychological disturbance. Dismissal from the priestly state was not an
option the Church could use under Canon Law where priests had been sent to treatment
centers for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Furthermore, some church lawyers were
advising their bishops not to invoke the full penal process when civil litigation was
pending, fearing the consequences (Burke, 2004). The Vatican initially refused the
NCCB request because a speedier process would disadvantage the priests:

The Vatican …refrained from assuming a significant role with respect to the
response of the bishops in the United States…[and] did not recognize the scope
of gravity of the problem…despite warning signs; and it rebuffed earlier
attempts to reform procedures for removing predator priests (Burke, 2004: 43).
It was only after a second major scandal occurred in 1992, over the Fr. James Porter
case in Boston, that cooperation between Vatican and NCCB officials gained some
traction. Before that happened, in response to the adverse publicity about the Porter
case, Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Wells contended that the sexual abuse
problem was a North American phenomenon where a permissive society, hyper-inflated
with sexuality, induced otherwise well morally-formed individuals to commit grave
moral acts. He also suggested, mistakenly as the John Jay College study in 2002-2004
would show, that the number of priests involved was a smaller percentage than society
generally (Krebs, 1998). This Vatican response came at the time the NCCB established
an Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse to audit the diocesan enactment by bishops of
‘five principles’ issued for dealing with accusations of sexual abuse (Reilly, 2003).
These five principles required bishops to i) respond promptly to all allegations of abuse,
ii) relieve the alleged offender promptly of his ministerial duties and refer him for
appropriate medical evaluation and intervention, iii) comply with the obligations of civil
law as regards reporting of the incident, iv) reach out to the victims and their families,
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and v) deal as openly as possible with the members of the community. However, the
principles were not binding on the bishops. Like its parent body, the Ad Hoc Committee
of the NCCB had no teeth and was not supported by some bishops (France 2004). As
had happened in 1985 when the Manual was released:

some bishops went home and put the recommendations into effect and other
bishops went home and decided that their colleagues were wrong…that they
could proceed with business-as-usual. As a result, the inexcusable footdragging… had disastrous consequences (Burke, 2004: 35).
Despite the initial friction, following work by the Vatican and NCCB officials in 1993,
the Pope approved some derogation from Canon Law which could be applied by U.S.
bishops as an experiment, and later that year, the establishment of a joint committee of
Vatican and Conference to the Vatican experts to see how canonical norms could best
be applied. In 1993-4, an Ad-Hoc Committee survey of the 191 U.S. dioceses on their
policies on sexual abuse discovered great variations. Most diocesan policies were
pastoral in tone, some especially so, and there were clearly problems and difficulties in
gaining acceptance for the idea that abusive priests should never again return to any
ministry that included minors, reflecting the ambivalence still being experienced in the
church about CSA being perpetrated by clergy (USCCB, 1994). The Ad-Hoc
Committee continued to work on education about sexual abuse over the next nine years,
but to no avail given these structural, cultural and political barriers it faced.

As a consequence, when the scandal broke in 2002, the bishops were collectively
criticized. According to Cornwell (2004: 231):

the bishops … did their best to keep the problem out of the media, they covered
up, moving erring priests from place to place [where they invariably offended
again]; they failed to address the impact on the victims; they failed to reform the
clerical caste, the regimes in their seminaries, their methods of recruiting priests.
They did not act decisively, by laicizing erring priests and turning them over to
civil authorities, because they did not believe they had the authority to do
so…because of generations of increasing enfeeblement of their office by
Rome…treating bishops like branch managers.
‘Escalation of Commitment’ in the Archdiocese of Boston
Despite the warnings and the advice he received in 1984-1985, Cardinal Law escalated
his commitment to the policy approach his predecessors had taken in dealing with
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allegations of abuse. He formalized a system of practice that comprised receipt and
assessment of allegations to determine their credibility, evaluation of priest by medical
experts and treatment they determined was necessary, and reassignment based on their
recommendation as to the fitness of priest to resume priestly duties and a similar
diocesan review board recommendation (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law, 11
October 2002).

In response to the Gauthe scandal, Law established a cabinet system to assist him in
administering the Archdiocese. He appointed a Secretary of Ministerial Personnel to
handle matters related to priests, including sexual abuse allegations, but did not create
written policies and procedures at that time. He admitted during his deposition in 2002
to errors of judgment during this period:

I …and those who assisted me, attempted to do our level best in handling these
kind of cases in a way that would avoid risk to potential victims, and …I see that
some of the things we did were not adequate to that task. Should I have known
better? Well, you know, the fact of the matter is I didn’t know better, and I acted
as best I knew how with advice …on which I was relying…and in which I had
reason to have confidence. I have an accumulated insight in this problem now
which I didn’t have in 1984. The number of cases that I had dealt with myself
personally before that date was rather limited, and the general understanding of
this problem at the time was quite distinct than where it is today (Deposition of
Cardinal Bernard Law, 5 June 2002: 70).
Asked by Massachusetts lawyer Eric MacLeish during deposition whether protecting
children was ‘the primary focus’ in 1985, Law responded:

It was certainly a primary focus. But I think the difference between 1985 and
2002 was that…looking back and trying to explain things…there was a tendency
to focus on a particular aspect at a specific time. So you would deal with…what
was or was not appropriate for the safety of children…treatment of the
priest…and the possibility of the priest being reassigned…The switch came in
saying that everything that is done has to be done in view of the safety of the
children…We didn’t have that in 1985…the tendency was to focus on individual
elements of the problem and not seeing them together in terms of safety of the
children…as our policy is now (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law, 14
August, 2002: 4-5).
By prioritizing the protection of his clergy and the avoidance of scandal in the Church
rather than the protection the children, Law’s policy and processes established a routine
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for dealing with the allegations in a way that achieved his goals. Those goals were
accepted implicitly by his diocesan officials and the health / legal professionals who
assisted him.

To a large degree, Law was assisted in this task by the members of two other
institutions – the media and the law.

Legal and media institutions facilitate the cover-up of CSA by the Church
Cardinal Law and other bishops in the U.S. Church were able to keep the extent of CSA
by clergy from the public because of the rules and decisions of legislators, police, and
the courts. Massachusetts law contained short statute of limitations times on child abuse
claims. This rule presented a barrier to the successful prosecution of sexual offenders
(Reilly, 2003; France, 2004). The law also exempted the clergy from mandatory
reporting of child abuse, so that allegations received by the Church did not need to be
reported to the police or child welfare authorities. As indicated earlier in the Geoghan
story, some police preferred accusations of CSA by clergy to be handled internally, so
they referred those accusations to the Church. Judges too, many of them catholics, were
complicit in the secrecy that kept the extent of the abuse hidden from public view
between 1992 and 1996 when they chose to impound all records in lawsuits involving
priests molesting children (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002: 125). Church
lawyers often successfully motioned the court to have the entire proceedings of cases
impounded, providing a shield of secrecy for the church that extended to barring
lawyers from speaking publicly about the case (France, 2004). Out-of-court settlements
avoided media coverage. Hence, when pursuing a potential story, these barriers
prevented reporters from obtaining information about CSA cases involving the church.

The U.S. mainstream press too was reluctant to cover stories about priests who sexually
abused children (Healey, 2004). Many media owners were either supportive of the
church or were pressured by the cardinals to desist from publishing stories that were
critical of it. Following a blow-up over its coverage of the Porter scandal in 1993, for
example, the Boston Globe came to an arrangement with the Catholic Church that saw
editorial control exercised to protect the church from bad news (France, 2004). A Globe
reporter who took an interest in the issue of clergy sexual abuse when pursuing the
Geoghan story in 1999 was instructed by its editor, who had been alerted by the
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Archdiocese and the newspaper’s owner, to desist from further investigation. This
arrangement lasted until 2001 when ownership of the Globe changed and a new editor
was employed who was prepared to follow up on leads that suggested a cover-up
(France, 2004; Shupe, 2008).

‘Organizational defensive routines’ used to avoid scandal
In order to reinforce the effect of these arrangements, Cardinal Law went to
considerable lengths internally to avoid scandal during the period. He delegated the
handling of the abuse problem to selected officials who employed ‘organizational
defensive routines’ (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1994, 2005) outlined below to
neutralize the efforts of victims, parents, supporters and their lawyers to have the
Archdiocese address their allegations and to conceal the problem from the public. The
purpose of these neutralizing tactics was to protect the reputation of the clergy and the
church by avoiding scandals (Reilly, 2003; Shupe, 2008). The routines involved:

Ignoring certain allegations: Where allegations were made by third parties or
anonymous sources, church officials ignored them regardless of the level of detail these
sources provided (Reilly, 2003). These allegations carried little weight with or threat to
church officials since the persons making them lacked evidence that the media could
use to create a scandal and were not in a position of representing victims who could take
civil or criminal action.

Fragmenting the incidents and cases: Each incident and case was dealt with in
isolation from others, with records of the past allegations and offences of serial abusers
not made available for reference, to ensure that the pattern of abuse was not evident to
most officials. The Deposition of Cardinal Law in 2002 revealed that different officials
interviewed the accused clergy and the victims. They each submitted individual reports
to the Secretary of Ministerial Personnel who alone put the facts together. New
personnel files on cases involving each cleric were developed and the old files were not
made available for staff to obtain a picture of the pattern of abuse by an individual.
Filing was left disorganized so that putting related files together was difficult, as was
found in 2002-2003 when the courts required the files be opened to plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Staff in these diocesan roles was changed every few years resulting in their collective
knowledge being dissipated.
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Non-reporting of allegations and avoiding external help: Law and other bishops
failed to report the abuse allegations to law enforcement authorities, as they were
‘sensitive to preserving the church’s independence from secular authorities’ (Reilly,
2003: 46). As indicated earlier, Law was aided by some police who preferred such
accusations to be handled internally by the church. In addition, notifications were not
made to child protection agencies given the mandatory reporting exemptions in the law
(Deposition of Bishop Thomas Daily 21 August 2002). Law ignored internal and
external advice to be open and transparent about the problem, insisting on handling such
cases as internal matters even though he knew external resources could help him
(Reilly, 2003).

Appeals to loyalty: Loyalty and confidentiality were expected of diocesan staff and
others assisting the Cardinal in order to avoid scandal by maintaining the culture of
silence, a practice that investigations of deviance in sporting teams, police, medical
professions and boarding schools have shown is a common phenomenon in tight-knit
organizations, as discussed in Chapter 3. Church officials went as far as to appeal to
victims families for secrecy and silence out of loyalty to the Church (Boston Globe
Investigative Staff, 2002; Doyle et al, 2006).

Distancing: Cardinal Law distanced himself from the problem by having bishops and
priests run interference between perpetrator priests and their accusers, referring direct
approaches made to him to other officials (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 5 June
2002). He largely avoided direct contact with the perpetrators in order to personally call
them to account, and avoided direct contact with victims by sidestepping face-to-face or
telephonic conversations with them, but instead delegated the detail to loyal others. In
doing so, he was able to plead difficulty in memory recall and denial of detailed
knowledge when called to account, enjoying what Mellema (2003) has termed ‘ethical
distance’ between himself and the state of affairs.

Not informing parishes: Diocesan officials failed to notify priests in other parishes of
the history of priests being transferred (Reilly 2003). Furthermore, they did not advise
the parishioners of the abuse that had occurred, even if that might have brought forward
others who had been abused (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 16 October 2002), or
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alert them to the risk the diocese was taking with their children by placing previous
offenders in their parish. In that way, knowledge of the extent of the corruption was
contained and scandal avoided. Law did not act on internal advice from his Delegate in
1993 that he should invite other victims in the parishes of the Archdiocese to come
forward so she could help them. He argued during his deposition that he thought silence
was better so that victims would not be put off from coming forward by the fear of their
abuse becoming public, despite the fact that there were 85 priests (70 still alive) with
allegations against them, and each had served in three parishes on average at that stage
(Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 5 June 2002).

Denial of risk: Cardinal Law’s Secretary of Ministerial Personnel, Bishop Banks, on
receiving complaints about a serial offender, chose to believe the priest’s denials and
not take action, telling the complainant there was ‘nothing he could do’. He did not
carry out a thorough investigation or ask for a psychiatric assessment despite his
knowledge of earlier offences (Deposition of Bishop Robert Banks 14 August 2002).
Neither did Law use the record system he created in updating his knowledge when
making decisions on reassigning clergy (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 11
October 2002). Despite having been warned that the psychiatric assessments and
evaluations of treatment did not guarantee that perpetrators were cured, Law argued that
he had reassigned priests in the belief that there was a very reasonable probability that
they would not reoffend (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 5 June 2002).

Secreting records: The personnel records of priests containing accusations against
them were intentionally stored by the Cardinal in confidential files that lower ranked
officials were unable to access. It was therefore difficult for these officials to understand
the scale of abuse that had been perpetrated by serial offenders. Furthermore, from
1994, when Law’s Delegate began producing a secret annual report on the number of
victims and the cost associated with helping both them and the priests involved (Reilly,
2003), this collation of data did not trigger any review of procedures because the
Delegate only gave these annual reports to the Cardinal:

The material for this report was collected with the utmost attention to
confidentiality. Individual sections of the report were produced by those staff of
the Delegate’s office who had the material but the composite report was put
together by the Delegate. Typing was mainly done by the person putting the
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material together, not by typing staff. The total report was not stored in any
word processor, and there were only three paper copies of the report, all under
the Delegate’s control (Reilly, 2003: 45).
Legalistic tactics: As indicated earlier, when allegations became legal claims for
compensation, Law and his team adopted a legalistic approach (Sitkin and Bies, 1994)
in which a litigation mentality was used against perceived threats (Stutman and Putman,
1994; Randall and Baker, 1994). Church lawyers defended the Diocese from scandal
and its economic consequences by devising legalistic tactics that, while legal, were later
judged by some critics as immoral. Lawyers were paid:

to limit fiscal liability but create[d] greater anger by compounding clerical abuse
with institutional abuse and the priority to secrecy, and authorities disregard[ed]
their pastoral role and adopt[ed] an adversarial stance to victims in the face of
threat (Burke, 2004: 8-10).
A common legal tactic involved creating delays to take advantage of statute of
limitations provisions in law. Delays in processing allegations were aimed at reducing
the number of claims that required payment of compensation. Another legal tactic
involved tying out-of-court settlements negotiated with victim’s lawyers to
confidentiality agreements. Out-of-court settlements avoided media coverage by the
U.S. mainstream press who, as indicated earlier, ‘were reluctant to cover stories about
priests who sexually abused children’ in the 1990s (Quote from Healey, 2004). Cynics
later saw this normal legal practice as use of ‘hush money’ attached to confidentiality
clauses (Robinson, 2003) to secure silence in an ‘unholy alliance’ (Boston Globe
Investigative Staff, 2002: 47).

Minimizing the problem: The Cardinal and other Church spokesmen used coded and
euphemistic language when being interviewed by the media to ‘minimize’ the problem.
They referred to the early scandals as ‘an aberration’ or singular event while knowing
otherwise. Pastoral support provided to victims with counselling ‘[urged] them to keep
silent’ (Boston Globe - 24 January 2002: 3). Silence had the effect of keeping the many
incidents and cases known only to a few people involved. Aggrieved families were also
silenced by promises of effective action, by ignoring their emotional public allegations
against individual clergy or the Archdiocese itself, sometimes suggesting that the
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outspoken family members were dysfunctional (Boston Globe Investigative Staff,
2002).

Condemning the media: During the Porter scandal in 1992, which I describe below,
Cardinal Law blamed the media for besmirching the reputation of his priests. He did
this despite knowing by this stage that there were allegations against 10% of his 1000
priests (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 22 January 2003). His claims were
supported by some Vatican spokesmen. From 1993 until 2001, a private arrangement
between the owner of the Boston Globe and the Cardinal saw editorial control exercised
to protect the church from reports of bad news involving clergy (France, 2004).

Punishing whistleblowers: Cardinal Law and his officials set out to silence
stakeholders who knew or suspected that the abuse was occurring and who urged that
action should be taken to prevent it. While many Church officials working for the
Cardinals and bishops were complicit in their silence, there were some notable
exceptions such as Bishop D’Arcy, who was transferred from the Archdiocese in 1984
over his criticism of Law’s handling of Geoghan, and Fr Thomas Doyle, who was
demoted for promoting the Doyle-Mouton-Peterson Manual’ that he co-authored in
1985 (Berry and Renner, 2004; France; 2004; Shupe, 2008). In Boston, Sister
Mulkerrin, Law’s Delegate who handled allegations from victims from 1992 and who
chronicled over 100 credible allegations against 20 Boston priests (Deposition of
Cardinal Bernard Law 16 October 2002), suggested that the Archdiocese should be
proactive in addressing the abuse more openly. Law refused on the grounds that the
publicity might deter people from coming forward and scandalize people about the
sexual abuse committed by the clergy (France, 2004). Before resigning in 1994,
Mulkerrin secretly began referring callers making allegations to the victims’ group
lawyer Roderick MacLeish.

Obfuscation during deposition: When the scandal broke in 2002, Cardinal Law and
Bishop Daily failed to detail the abuse and their knowledge of it during deposition.
When questioned, Law frequently ‘could not recall’ potentially incriminating
conversation details. Lawyers for the Archdiocese and Law argued unsuccessfully that
communication between bishops and their priests was privileged, and that personnel
files should not be made public (Burke, 2004).
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The interventions of victims and their lawyers
While these tactics were effective in helping Cardinal Law avoid a major scandal until
2002, signs of past CSA in the church emerged from 1992 as victims began to assert
themselves through litigation. Two major cases became public with the victims of
James Porter, a former priest, and Fr John Geoghan taking action to sue the Church
prior to the 2002 scandal initiated by the Boston Globe.

The James Porter case: In May 1992, six victims of serial abuser James Porter, a
former priest in Boston, contacted lawyer Roderick MacLeish after learning of his
success in a major civil abuse case to obtain his professional assistance in suing the
Church. One of these victims then contacted Porter by telephone and secretly taped their
conversation in which Porter admitted that he had abused children. With this tape, the
victim contacted a television station. An investigative team from the station then taped
Porter admitting to having molested 50-100 children and claiming that a bishop and
several priests were aware of his abuse. After the media report was aired, more victims
called the television station. Realizing for the first time that they were not his only
victims, they spoke out. The reporters and lawyer MacLeish realized the problem was
much bigger than Porter. Victim numbers increased from six to forty-eight with their
complaints of incidents dating back to 1963 (France, 2004). Cardinal Law responded to
the televised report by blaming the media for suggesting the problem was wider than
one aberrant priest. He asked for ‘the power of God’ to come down on the media,
particularly the Boston Globe, for their negative coverage of the Church over the Porter
case (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 5 June 2002). Law, however, was not being
honest since he failed to admit that ten other Boston priests were offenders known to
him at that stage (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 16 October 2002). By
minimizing the problem to Porter alone, Law averted a greater scandal.

After the District-Attorney determined which of Porter’s actions could be prosecuted,
and which could not because of the statute of limitations, the AOB immediately settled
the civil case with MacLeish in which Porter’s known victims, 101 at that stage (it was
later estimated that Porter assaulted 125 male and female victims), each received
US$100000, far above the US$12000-15000 that earlier victims had negotiated in
relation to abuse by other clergy (France, 2004). A few months later, Porter was
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convicted of 46 counts of sexual assault and sentenced to 18-20 years imprisonment
(Iadicola, 1998).

The Geoghan case (continued): In late 1994, a single mother who had befriended
Geoghan some years earlier, but had discovered that he was abusing her three children,
sought help from the Archdiocese. Church officials offered her a minimal payment for
child therapy but Law again decided not to curtail Geoghan’s ministry.

In late 1995, having received little attention from the Archdiocese, she approached
lawyer Mitchell Garabedian who, after hearing her story, met with other tenants in her
building whom Geoghan was ‘assisting’. Within weeks, dozens of victims of Geoghan
related similar stories of abuse to the lawyer. In 1996, possibly warned of the problems
that were mounting and seeing the risk of scandal increasing, Law finally placed
Geoghan on permanent sick leave. In early 1997, Garabedian filed 38 individual cases
of abuse against Geoghan with the court. A legal struggle ensued between lawyers for
the Archdiocese and the victims over their attempt to gain access to church documents.
After Garabedian decided to sue church officials, including Law, as persons who had
supervised Geoghan, the church lawyers successfully motioned the court to have the
entire proceedings impounded, providing a shield of secrecy for the church that
extended to barring lawyers from speaking publicly about the case (France, 2004).
Later, rulings of the court allowed Garabedian access to the AOB’s personnel files on
Geoghan. As these documents were slowly released to Garabedian, without admitting
guilt or responsibility, Archdiocesan lawyers began to settle the cases in extreme
secrecy. Settlements in 1997 eventually topped $10 million for the 50 victims (France,
2004), but this was not the end of the matter.

By January 2001, Garabedian had 86 new Geoghan accusers. He did not publicize the
new cases because he used the silence of victims as a bargaining chip to extract a higher
payment for his clients from the Archdiocese. In response, however, church lawyers
hardened the church’s legalistic approach by deciding not to settle any new cases but,
instead, to take their time in dealing with the individual claims. After the scandal broke
in January 2002, by mid 2002 there were another 150 victims of Geoghan known to the
Archdiocese being aided by Garabedian (Deposition of Cardinal Bernard Law 8 May
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2002). The Archdiocese paid $85 million compensation to victims of Geoghan around
that time.

Geoghan did not escape the consequences of his actions. In December 1997, he was
charged with crimes against 28 children. He was laicized by the Vatican in 1998 (Burke,
2004). In February 2002, Geoghan was sentenced to 9-10 years in state prison for
molesting one ten-year-old boy (Reilly, 2003). In 2004, he was murdered in prison by
an inmate who had been a victim of sexual abuse (Podles, 2008).

Intervention of the media
Throughout 1999, a Boston Globe reporter pursuing the Geoghan lead was instructed by
the Globe editor to desist from further investigation. In January 2001, when a judge
decided to overrule the Church lawyers’ efforts to keep Law’s name off the lawsuits, the
ruling was published but was ignored by the Boston Globe. However, a reporter from a
rival newspaper, the Boston Phoenix, then accessed the available court documents and,
in March 2001, wrote an article highlighting Law’s cover up of Geoghan’s abuse.
However, this article, headlined ‘Cardinal Sin’, went largely unnoticed by the public.
The reporter had missed an admission by Law in the available documents that he had
been notified of the abuse by Geoghan of seven boys in 1984. Law decided not to
respond publicly to the article (France, 2004).

In July 2001, a new editor appointed to the Boston Globe decided to pursue the
Geoghan story. Less deferential to the church than his predecessor, he decided to
challenge a confidentiality order on the Geoghan case, and assigned an investigative
team to the story while the Globe’s lawyers pursued the legal barriers. Through the
lawyer Garabedian, the investigative team accessed several victims, while a
whistleblower from the Archdiocese provided the names of the priests who had been
accused of abuse (France, 2004).

The Boston Globe’s legal challenge between August and November 2001 for access to
all the Geoghan files was assigned to a judge who was aware of the Geoghan civil cases
and was not deferential to the church, despite her catholic upbringing (France, 2004).
She sided with the Boston Globe, just as the authors of the ‘Manual’ had predicted
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would occur in 1985 (Doyle et al, 2006). The Church documents were now available for
perusal by the media and public.

7.5

Period #4 (January 2002): The Boston Scandal

The media scandal that brought the corruption to the public’s attention erupted in
January 2002 when the Boston Globe published the first story of its ‘Spotlight Series’how the Boston Archdiocese coddled John Geoghan and other pedophile priests who
abused children. This ‘Series’ published throughout January triggered a crisis for the
AOB and for the U.S. Catholic Church. Over a four month period, the Boston Globe ran
nearly three hundred stories about clergy sexual abuse using the church’s documents
made public by the Supreme Court in 2001. The stories disclosed that high-ranking
church officials had repeatedly put the welfare of priests ahead of that of the children
(Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002). Overall, the Boston Globe’s investigation
produced over 900 negative news stories throughout 2002 (Robinson, 2003).

Despite earlier accounts and analysis of the abuse problem throughout the 1990s (for
example, by Shupe, 1995, 1998; Sipe, 1995; Parkinson, 1997; Krebs, 1998) and the
earlier scandals involving Gauthe, Porter and Geoghan, it was not until the Boston
Globe Spotlight Series was published that catholics and other members of the public
came to regard the sexual abuse of children by clergy as a serious ‘social problem’
(Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). The detailed accounts of the abuse that had occurred
captured public attention and contributed to increased sense-making about CSA and a
greater understanding of this type of corruption and its mishandling by the Church in
Boston and elsewhere (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002; Cozzens, 2002; Berry
and Renner, 2004; France, 2004).

The Boston Globe stories broke the nexus of secrecy and silence among Church
stakeholders that had existed about the corruption since the 1940s. The impact of the
information flow on the church was immediate. In a reversal of the strategy that he had
pursued in the past, Cardinal Law apologized, admitting that his ‘judgments made in
good faith were tragically wrong’ (Boston Globe 26 January, 2002). He agreed to turn
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over the names of past and present priests accused of sexually abusing minors just days
before a Massachusetts law was enacted requiring mandatory reporting to civil
authorities by the clergy and church professionals of abuse. Law also announced a zerotolerance policy against priests in Boston who were found to have offended, and
promised to reach out to victims (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002).

But this turnaround came too late. U.S. Catholics were furious and felt betrayed. Many
of them called for Law’s resignation and began withholding financial contributions
from the Church (Boston Globe Investigative Staff, 2002). The news stories encouraged
additional victims to tell their stories and seek civil justice through the courts. Church
documents released by the Court were used by victim’s lawyers in depositions of the
Cardinal and his officials which preceded successful civil claims against the church.

The scandal and its consequences continued for the next three years during which time
government and church investigations revealed the nature and extent of the corruption,
and victims’ lawyers successfully claimed damages against the Boston Archdiocese and
other dioceses for having allowed the abuse to occur (Podles, 2008).

7.6

Period #5 (2002-2010): Cleaning the U.S. Catholic Church

In this post-scandal period, the investigation conducted by the Massachusetts AttorneyGeneral Thomas Reilly (2003) revealed to the public the scope of the corruption in the
Boston Archdiocese. Church leaders decided to obtain a national picture of the scale of
the abuse. The USCCB commenced an internal inquiry in 2002 under the National
Review Board (NRB) of lay members it established. In 2004, the NRB reported to the
USCCB on the scale of CSA by clergy across the U.S. church it had found and
criticized the response which church leaders had made to the abuse which they judged
had been characterized by moral laxity, excessive leniency to errant clergy, insensitivity
about victims, secrecy and neglect (Burke, 2004).

It was left to the U.S. Church to ‘clean its Augean stables’, but it failed to do a thorough
job. As a consequence, the reputation of the Church continued to be damaged by
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ongoing scandals in the U.S. and Europe (see Podles, 2008; Robertson, 2010; Yallop,
2010; The New York Times 2010).

Government intervention: the Inquiry in Boston
In the wake of the Boston scandal, the Attorney-General of Massachusetts, Thomas
Reilly, himself a catholic, decided to investigate the continuing risk to children and the
conduct of the Archdiocese and its managers where there was potential criminal
responsibility of both the Archdiocese and its senior managers, as well as systemic
issues that permitted the abuse of children over many years (Reilly, 2003).

On 23 January 2002, the Massachusetts Senate passed a law to include employees of the
church as mandatory reporters of sexual crimes, prior to which church officials had been
under no legal obligation to report allegations or admissions by priests of abuse. Many
states had enacted mandatory reporting laws between 1962 and 1967 requiring certain
professionals, but typically not clergy, to report child sexual abuse. Cardinal Law
promised future compliance, but the Attorney-General required the Church to apply the
law retrospectively, and to report all past offenders (Burke, 2004).

The Attorney-General’s Criminal Bureau initiated a grand jury investigation in June
2002 because of the slow pace at which the Archdiocese was producing the documents
after a court instruction in 2001 to do so. These documents comprised notes,
memoranda of interviews, psychiatrists’ reports on the clergy they treated, and
correspondence from families and victims dating as back to 1940. They showed, for
example, the history of allegations made against Geoghan as early as 1979. In July
2003, Reilly concluded that:

There is overwhelming evidence that…Cardinal Law and his senior managers
had direct actual knowledge that substantial numbers of children in the
Archdiocese had been abused by substantial numbers of priests (2003: 25).
Reilly reported that, over six decades under the administrations of three successive
cardinals, 789 victims complained of sexual abuse by 250 members of the clergy, and
that the church authorities decided to protect the reputation of their priests and
institution rather than the safety and well-being of children (Reilly, 2003). He focused
on the faults of the Archdiocese, its officials and systems that had allowed the sustained
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abuse to occur. These officials escaped being charged with crimes because of statute of
limitations factors and lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they had aided the
felons (Reilly, 2003). While they had not been guilty of crimes, Reilly found that there
had been an institutional acceptance of abuse and a failure of leadership in preventing it.
That leadership responsibility rested with the Cardinal and his assistant bishops who
managed the handling of abuse allegations and the clergy. He recorded that:

It is essential to create an official record of what occurred because although this
Office is unable to charge crimes, the conduct of the Archdiocese and its senior
managers was undeniably wrong. For decades, cardinals, bishops and others in
positions of authority within the Archdiocese chose to protect the image and
reputation of their institution rather than the safety and well-being of children.
They acted with a misguided devotion to secrecy and a mistaken belief that they
were responsible only to themselves. (2003: 2-3).
In Reilly’s view, the apathy of Church authorities had allowed the problem to grow over
the 50 year period. This apathy resulted in their failure to act energetically, responsibly
and effectively. The reluctance of Church leaders to embrace pluralism was indirectly
criticized by Attorney-General Reilly when he noted a lack of commitment by the
bishops to reform in the Boston Archdiocese commensurate with the scope of the
tragedy and to prevent future abuse. In his view, they were reluctant to address the
systemic causes of clergy sexual abuse that would result in removing offenders and
holding them accountable, and in cooperating with and sharing information with state
law enforcement authorities concerning suspicions or allegations. Reilly believed that
structural changes in the governance of the Church were necessary to create greater
accountability. But having no power to bring about such change, Reilly left that
challenge to members to take up.

Response to the intervention: Church Inquiry into CSA in U.S. Dioceses
After the Boston scandal broke, U.S. cardinals and other leaders of the USCCB were
summoned to Rome for a meeting with the Pope. Following that meeting, an apology
was issued by the Pope on Holy Thursday, 2002 (Collins, 2005; France 2004) together
with a clear statement that ‘there was no place in the priesthood or the religious life for
those who would harm the young’ (Burke, 2004: 43). The apology and statement paved
the way for the U.S. cardinals and bishops to remove known offenders amongst the
clergy and to initiate some reforms to prevent further abuse.
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A Charter and Essential Norms that required all dioceses to implement safe
environment measures and participate in annual audits to help ensure compliance was
adopted in 2002 (Gehring, 2007). Furthermore, the USCCB also decided to impose a
“zero tolerance” policy on abusers, including clergy, retrospectively. However, they
excluded bishops from this policy and, not regarding themselves as being accountable,
offered no reasons for having done so. Nevertheless Cardinal Law, under pressure from
the clergy and laity of Boston over his handling of the abuse, resigned in December
2002, and several other bishops were later forced to resign in 2004 over allegations
made against them (Collins, 2005).

At the annual USCCB conference, the bishops were admonished by invited academic R.
Scott-Appleby for putting the Church at risk, signalling a revolt among the laity. The
root of the crisis, he argued, was a lack of accountability by the bishops, which allowed
a severe moral failure by some priests and bishops, fostered by a closed clerical culture
that infected the priesthood. The actions of the few had tarnished the reputations of the
many. Future Church structures, he argued, had to involve the laity more than in the
past, and these structures had to be marked by transparency and accountability, with
clericalism rooted out in the seminaries and priesthood (Scott-Appleby, 2002). But the
President of the USCCB, following Vatican policy, took a firm stand against advocate
groups who were suggesting such measures (Shupe, 2008).

The quest to ‘clean the Augean stables’ of the Church
The USCCB established the NRB which, in turn, commissioned the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice of the City University of New York to survey U.S. dioceses to
determine the scope of the abuse problem. The task confronting the Church was
described by former Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, Chairman of the NRB from
June to December 2002, as akin to the Herculean task of ‘cleaning the Augean stables’
(Keating, 2003). Prior to his appointment, Keating had advocated that the laity should
vote with their purses. When he resigned from the NRB, based on his experience during
those months, he announced that ‘the church hierarchy was like the mafia’ (CBS News,
17 June 2003; Yallop, 2010). He discovered that the bishops who had been responsible
for secrecy about the abuse, and who had decided to resist grand jury subpoenas, to
suppress the names of offending clerics, to deny, to obfuscate, to explain away the
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abuse to civil authorities and the community, were to be in charge of the processes of
discovery and discipline of abusive priests. Keating’s resignation announcement may
have referred to the response of the bishops to the Boston crisis in their own dioceses
because, despite the USCCB’s announced intentions in June 2002 to undertake reform
that would end the sexual abuse, not all Church leaders acted in accord with that
espoused position.

Throughout 2002-2003, Cardinal Law continued to obfuscate during his deposition to
lawyers representing victims (France, 2004). Other bishops too continued to make
‘neutralization’ statements that blamed the victim advocate groups for the continuing
‘social drama’ (Shupe 2008). Keating’s resignation ended the hope of many Church
reformists that the USCCB would adopt ‘a posture of accountability, atonement, and
internal reform’ (Shupe, 2008: 128).

In Boston, following the resignation of Cardinal Law in December 2002, the
Archdiocese under the leadership of Archbishop O’Malley set about the task of
rebuilding the trust that had been lost as a result of the corruption and the scandal within
the authority available to him. Symbolically, he replaced the long standing Archdiocese
lawyers and settled numerous cases that had been pending for years, and closed schools
and churches in the process of selling the property assets of the Church in Boston to pay
the massive compensation that was settled (Burke, 2004).

In 2004, the NRB reported on the results of the survey conducted by the John Jay
College researchers, revealing that between 1950 and 2002, credible allegations had
been made against 4392 priests, comprising four percent of priests in ministry, who had
committed acts of sexual abuse against 10667 minors (Burke, 2004).

Efforts to address the problem in the U.S. continued, but they were not particularly
successful, evidenced by continuing scandals in U.S. cities as past victims of clergy
abuse found their voices and commenced civil actions. The ‘long tail’ of victims’
claims, as a result of child victims mainly coming forward to report on their abuse when
they reached adulthood, have continued since 2002 both in the U.S. and other countries.
Another reason for the failure of U.S. bishops to clean the church’s ‘Augean stables’
has been their reluctance and inability to change the church’s structure and culture that
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is dictated by the Vatican, as discussed in Chapter 6. A third reason has been the
unwillingness of the Vatican to take an international, proactive approach to encouraging
victims to come forward and to identifying errant clergy.

The Vatican and church dioceses have mostly adopted a reactive approach to revealing
the extent of the corruption in the institution, waiting on victims to make public
allegations and failing to disclose the known extent of abuse by clergy until each
scandal broke. Subsequently, new scandals similar to that which occurred in Boston
broke in 2009 in Ireland and 2010 in Germany and Malta triggering a new crisis for the
Catholic Church embroiling the Pope and the Vatican (O’Gorman, 2009; The New York
Times, 2010; Robertson, 2010; Yallop, 2010).

7.7

Conclusion

This chapter has shed light on how and why the Archdiocese of Boston (AOB)
developed as an organization of corrupt individuals (OCI). Other dioceses within the
institution of the Catholic Church suffered the same fate, and continue to do so (The
New York Times, 2010). In the context described in Chapter 6, which provided the
antecedent conditions for this form of organizational corruption to occur and perpetuate,
around 4% of clergy in U.S. dioceses engaged in child sexual abuse (CSA) between
1940 and 2004. In this section, I draw together the findings of this chapter and the last
in providing a second substantive theory of OCI development and decline again
theorising on the key context factors that shaped the behaviour of perpetrators and the
responses of Church stakeholders to signs and evidence of clergy sexual abuse of
minors in the AOB, again using Pettigrew’s processual analysis model (1997).

Social change in society in the forms of secularism, modernism and pluralism, which
concerned Church leaders from the mid 19th century, saw church members become
increasingly reluctant to follow church teaching on issues of sexuality, including prenuptial chastity, celibacy of the clergy and homosexuality. Widespread disappointment
of the laity after Vatican II in the decisions of the Pope in the 1960s and 1970s to
uphold traditional teaching on these issues led to an exodus of clergy, religious and laity
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from the Church. A decline in church membership and, most notably, in the recruitment
of men into seminaries for training for the priesthood, led to a softer and less
discriminating approach by leaders to sexual deviance by trainees and clergy who
otherwise followed church teaching and practice resulting in the development of a
hedonistic culture in regard to their sexual practices. Among these deviant individuals,
around 4% of clergy across the United States engaged in the sexual abuse of minors
from 1950-2002 (John Jay College, 2004, 2006).

The inner environment of the Catholic Church – its structure, culture and politics –
increased the risk of OCI development in its dioceses. The structure was, and continues
to be, marked by the strong unitary authority of the Pope and Vatican on matters of faith
and teaching, but a more benevolent and benign authority exercised by diocesan bishops
over clergy and laity in regard to their religious practice. Historically, the separation of
church and state had resulted in a tacit understanding in many countries that regulatory
interference by government in church affairs would not occur. This absence of
accountability of the Church to society over CSA began to change in the U.S. in the
1980s. This case shows two aspects of Church culture that led to OCI development –
the tolerance of deviance by clergy and the strong norm of secrecy and silence about
such deviance aimed at protecting the Church and its elite from scandal. This
understanding of the need to protect the Church and its elites from scandal shaped the
behaviour of stakeholders in the way they dealt with allegations and rumours of CSA –
failing to hold them accountable for deviant behaviour. Why certain individuals engage
in CSA is beyond the scope of this thesis, but proximate situational factors in this case
confirm research findings (John Jay College, 2004, 2006; Wortley and Smallbone,
2006; Smallbone et al, 2008) that settings without adult supervision are the locations
perpetrators use for CSA.

With the antecedent conditions for the OCI development in the Catholic Church
understood, many of which seem to apply to other religious organizations which have
experienced the same problem, I turn now to summarising the process whereby an OCI
developed and declined in the AOB, having described in this chapter the ‘modus
operandi’ of perpetrators in accessing and exploiting victims, both the insider
moderations of Church authorities and members and, in general, the lack of outsider
interventions until 2002 which enabled this corruption in Boston and more broadly in
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the Catholic Church. I also theorise on the changes in these moderations and
interventions after 2002 which, in the Archdiocese of Boston (AOB) at least, saw a
constriction of the OCI phenomenon. As with the cricket case, I posit that there were up
to three pre-scandal stages during which the insider moderations were stronger than
outsider interventions, but again these stages have porous boundaries so that some
defined actions occurred in more than one stage. It is the level of understanding which
the collective stakeholders, both insiders and outsiders, have about the extent of the
deviant behaviour that is occurring – about the scale of corruption - that differentiates
the stages. During the final two stages – scandal and post-scandal – efforts to address
the OCI phenomenon are led by powerful outsiders from the media and government.

When CSA begins, as it did in Boston in the 1950s when the Church was still strong in
clergy numbers and attendances, three groups of stakeholders enable it to happen - some
unintentionally, others intentionally. The first group are the child victims who, while
young, are often unable to understand and mostly unable to prevent it. The second
group are peers of the offending clergy and some parents who, aware of the abuse,
either fail to report it or leave their concerns in the hands of their church leaders. The
third group are the bishops and other Church officials, and some representatives of
government and media institutions who become aware of the abuse through the
allegations they receive but choose to handle these complaints in secrecy and silence to
avoid scandal for the church. The responses of these three groups, which I term internal
moderations, enable the OCI development. A fourth group, comprising some
whistleblowers, past victims and their lawyers, and representatives of media and
government organizations, who seek to disable the corruption through their external
interventions, do not act at this stage because of contextual factors outlined and a lack of
knowledge or concern for the state of OCI development. This level of understanding of
the state of OCI development in each period is summarised in Table 7.1, where I again
draw on the themes of sense-making, ambivalence, and secrecy and silence as the basis
of these levels of understanding.
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Table 7.1
Variations in themes across periods of OCI development in Boston
Themes

Period P1

Period P2

Period P3

Scandal P4

Period P5

Theme:
Sense-making
(Weick, 1995a, 2005)

A crescive problem of
CSA by clergy begins;

The crescive problem
develops;

The corruption allegations
increase;

Corruption is revealed by
evidence obtained by the
Boston Globe;

Corruption is better
understood following gov’t
and media intervention;

little sense-making occurs
since incidents are not
understood as corruption
being hidden in routine
activities by clergy

limited sense-making
occurs because of
uncertainty, ambiguity and
ambivalence and secrecy
& silence about CSA

increased sense-making
occurs when past victims
initiate civil and criminal
actions against the church
and 2 perpetrators

considerable sense-making
occurs when secrecy and
silence norms are broken
following the AOB
scandal

extensive sense-making
occurs when information
obtained by government
and the church is made
public

Theme: Ambivalence
(Bauman, 1991)

Ambivalence exists with
the understanding of CSA
by the church and
professionals as a sin and
illness, not a crime

Ambivalence develops
when CSA allegations are
treated by the church in a
‘legalistic manner’ with
offenders returned to
ministry

Ambivalence intensifies
when, despite warnings,
church leaders continue
with earlier ‘legalistic
approaches’ that protect
offenders

Ambivalence is suspended
by media news of the
Geoghan case and the
protection of corrupt
clergy by the cardinals and
bishops

Ambivalence ends when
governments enable
criminal and civil action to
be taken against
perpetrators and the church

Theme:
Secrecy and silence
(De Maria, 2006;
Morrison and
Milliken, 2000, 2004)

Secrecy & silence norm in
the church creates an
atmosphere where any
deviance of elite members
is not made public

Secrecy & silence norm
creates an atmosphere
where the CSA by clergy
is not revealed publicly so
not openly discussed

Secrecy & silence norm is
reinforced by the church
and its lawyers in adopting
‘organizational defensive
routines’ (ODRs) to
protect the church from
scandal

Secrecy & silence norm
begins to break;

Secrecy & silence norm is
broken when government
requires the church to
release information they
have about the corruption
and it is published by the
media

Consequences on
OCI development

Corruption starts but is
largely unnoticed

Corruption grows when
initial allegations are
treated as sin and illness

Corruption spreads when
its allegations and legal
proceedings are ‘covered
up’

Corruption declines when
its extent is revealed
during the scandal

Corruption is partly
reduced by government
intervention and church
prevention strategies

OCI dev’t begins

OCI dev’t increases

OCI dev’t expands

OCI dev’t plateaus

OCI dev’t partly declines

Noticing
(Starbuck and
Milliken, 1988)
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CSA by clergy becomes a
‘social problem’ for the
community when the
media reveal the church
cover up

In the next stage of uncertainty and doubt, the OCI phenomenon develops as a crescive
problem (Beamish, 2000; 2002) in the Church. World-wide, it appears that CSA has
been perpetrated by offending clergy during their routine pastoral activities where their
contact with children was neither unusual nor unwelcome. In this period, the second and
third groups of stakeholders enabled the corruption. Often in doubt, parents of the child
victims or peers of the clergy initially fail to notice the abuse taking place or, because of
uncertainty or ambiguity, struggle to make sense of the signs they notice and fail to act.
When they did, they sometimes reported their concerns to key members of the third
group - diocesan leaders who in Boston, with society in accord with their interpretation
of CSA at the time, regarded it as a sin and an illness rather than a crime. Throughout
the Church, in many countries, all parties dealt with cases of abuse about which
allegations were made in secrecy and silence - by families to avoid embarrassment and
protect their children from further trauma in testifying about what had happened to
them, by the dioceses and their professional support to avoid scandal. Cardinals and
bishops, ambivalent about the seriousness of CSA and deciding to treat it as a sin and an
illness, adopted routines consistent with this belief for dealing with abusers and
reassigning them to ministry elsewhere within the diocese after a brief respite from
parish duties without attempting to control their corrupt activities.

In the last pre-scandal period, bishops are more aware of the scale of the abuse problem
but, if they ‘escalate their commitment’ (Staw, 1981) to the routine they have
successfully adopted to address the CSA problem from a scandal avoidance viewpoint,
they again enable the OCI development. In the U.S., three whistleblowers alerted their
bishops to the nature of the problem the Church was facing, and recommended a way
forward, but these recommendations were ignored by a majority of USCCB members.
When past victims and their lawyers triggered the sense-making of church officials,
media and government stakeholders and the public with their allegations, notably in the
mid 1980s and early 1990s in Louisiana and Boston when government law authorities
prosecuted two serial clergy pedophiles, church authorities maintained the legalistic
approach (Sitkin & Bies, 1994) they were taking. They adopted numerous
‘organizational defensive routines’ (Argyris, 1994, 2005) aimed at covering up the
extent of the CSA by clergy. This ‘cover up’, which continued to facilitate OCI
development within the institution, proved unsustainable as an increasing number of
past victims, now old enough to make sense of what had happened to them and assert
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themselves, sought compensation through the courts. In Boston, the intervention of a
media owner and a judge of the state court led to the release of evidence in records of
the AOB of the CSA by pedophile priests.

It takes a major scandal led by the media to bring the OCI development in religious
institutions to a halt. The Boston Globe Spotlight Reports on the AOB created such a
scandal in Boston which triggered widespread stakeholder and public sense-making
(Weick, 1995a) about the CSA. Unlike the earlier scandals in Louisiana and Boston,
sense-making was assisted by the media which resulted in knowledge of CSA by clergy
becoming widely known and regarded by the public as a significant ‘social problem’
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). In the post-scandal period, the intervention of the
Massachusetts Attorney-General pressured Church authorities in Boston and the U.S. to
suspend their ambivalence and to end their secrecy and silence about the extent of CSA
by clergy since 1950 and their methods of handling it. The Boston case and many other
similar scandals across the U.S. and the globe have followed a similar pattern of
disclosure involving whistleblowers, victims and their lawyers, the media and
government authorities. One can therefore conclude that where OCI development by
elites is taking place in well-established non-accountable institutions, it takes a powerful
outsider intervention to end this state of affairs. While the Boston Archdiocese and U.S.
Church made efforts to ‘clean their Augean stables’ in 2002-2004, it later transpired that
this exercise was only undertaken in some U.S. dioceses. Consequently, fresh scandals
have continued both in the U.S. and in other countries since, severely damaging the
reputation and image of the Catholic Church and its elite members.

In Chapter 8, I take these substantive findings and combine them with those in the
cricket case to establish a more general theory for OCI development and decline.
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
8.1

Introduction

This thesis advances theory in the field of organizational corruption by providing an
empirically informed theoretical explanation of the context and dynamic process by
which the phenomenon of ‘an organization of corrupt individuals’ (OCI) (Pinto et al,
2008) develops and declines.

I chose two internationally prominent cases of widespread individual corruption in
organizations for textual study with the aim of progressing theoretical knowledge about
this phenomenon. After reviewing relevant literature on organizational corruption,
deviance, man-made disasters and secrecy and silence in Chapter 2, I analysed available
primary and secondary documents on the two cases using grounded theory methods and
a processual interpretive approach in the manner explained in Chapter 3. Following
Pettigrew (1997), the processual method I adopted took account of the context and
process of the corruption which, together with the interpretive perspective, saw me
focus on the actions and interactions of the people engaging in and encountering the
corruption in order to interpret their understanding of it and what, if anything, they
would do about it.

I developed two frameworks which I employed in Chapters 4 to 7 to explain the OCI
development in the two cases. One framework (Figures 4.1 and 6.1) reflects Pettigrew’s
(1997) view of the relationship between content, context and process. Content refers to
the issue under study – OCI development over time - which resulted from the behaviour
of the corrupt individuals and other organizational stakeholders who encountered it.
One group of stakeholders, mainly insiders, acted in ways that attempted to moderate
the impact of corruption on the organization; other groups of stakeholders, mainly
outsiders, intervened at different times in efforts to have the increasingly apparent
corruption problem addressed. As these figures indicate, OCI development occurred as
a consequence of the interventions, shown by the thin downward arrows, being
insufficient to overcome insider moderations, shown by thicker upward arrows. The
second framework (Figures 4.2 and 6.2) reflects the processual nature of OCI
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development and decline over five stages - three pre-scandal stages which I term
emergence, uncertainty and cover-up, a major intervention-scandal stage and a postscandal stage which I term restoration. At the conclusion of each case, I posited a
substantive theoretical explanation for the OCI development (and decline) that occurred.
In this final chapter, in section 8.3, I discuss a theoretical model which combines the
main elements of those two formative frameworks in positing an explanation of how
and why certain organizations and institutions develop and decline as OCIs over time.
Since this theory is based on only two cases, I do not argue that it represents a grand
theory but rather a preliminary integrated theory of the development of the OCI
phenomenon.

Before doing so, in section 8.2 I discuss the similarities and differences between the two
cases using Pettigrew’s framework (1997) of content, context and process and justify
my view that the cases represent the OCI rather than CO phenomenon by comparing my
findings concerning their features with the work of Pinto et al (2008). After explicating
my theory in section 8.3, in section 8.4 I outline the contribution of the study to
organizational corruption theory. Next, in section 8.5, I discuss its limitations and make
some suggestions for extending this work. Finally, in the section 8.6, I articulate the
implications of my findings for management practice.

8.2

Comparisons

8.2.1 Similarities and Differences between the Two Cases
The similarities and differences between the two cases become apparent using
Pettigrew’s framework (1997) of content, context and process.

Beginning with content, there is a difference in the types of corruption that took place in
each case. Match-fixing can be regarded as indirectly financial, different from more
common and direct forms of financial corruption in many organizations such as fraud or
embezzlement, whereas child sexual abuse (CSA) is a form of non-financial corruption.
Although both types had a history in their relevant institutions, their relative novelty in
the institutions during the corruption period explains to some extent why there was a
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low level of noticing and sensemaking by members when they began to occur, and why
a high level of uncertainty and ambivalence affected people who encountered them.
Since both types of corruption shared the characteristic of slowness in development,
their growth presented a crescive problem to organizational stakeholders.

Turning to context, the type of environmental change which affected each institution
was substantial but different. Rapid growth taking place in cricket contrasted with slow
decline occurring in the church; economic change in cricket differed from social change
in the church; technological change impacted on cricket but not the church insofar as the
corruption was concerned. Given these differences, I argue that it is the extent of change
that is significant for OCI development rather than the type of change occurring, since
change will engage manager’s time and attention on its impacts on their core business
rather than on addressing less apparent signs of corruption, particularly in the absence of
any external regulator. I discuss this further in section 8.3.

Similarities in the structure, culture and internal politics of the two institutions suggest
that these features of an organization or institution play a prominent role in OCI
development or decline. Each institution possessed a hierarchical structure with
relatively autonomous national (in cricket) and regional (in the church) bodies at an
operational level, ruled over by boards (in cricket) and bishops (in the church) who had
autonomy in exercising benign and benevolent authority over their elite members. The
cultures in each institution were similar in the deference paid by members at all levels to
their organizational elites, in the tolerance shown by managers to various forms of
deviance by those elites which facilitated an erosion of the institutions traditional values
during the period of the corruption, and in the exercise of secrecy and silence about such
deviance borne out of the desire of leaders to protect the image and reputation of their
institutions from scandal. Furthermore, the internal politics of each institution featured
long standing inter-organizational and intra-organizational conflict which militated
against collaboration in addressing the corruption problem.

Two situational factors which enabled the corrupt conduct in each case were locations
and climates for the conduct of corrupt activities which avoided critical observance of
the perpetrators’ behaviour and enabled the corrupt conduct to take place ‘under the
radar’ of institutional stakeholders. While this study has not attempted to discern the
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motives of the perpetrators of corruption in these cases, given the differences in the
types of corruption that occurred in each case, they are considered as having been
different - individuals in cricket seeking money, clergy desiring sexual gratification.

In the process of corruption, I was able to identify three pre-scandal stages of OCI
development in each case – emergence, doubt or uncertainty, and cover up by managers
– a major intervention-scandal stage, and a post-scandal restoration stage. I address this
similarity in more detail in section 8.3.

8.2.2

Justification for considering the cases as OCI Development

Pinto et al (2008) use fifteen attributes to distinguish between OCI and CO phenomena.
I do not intend to address them all but to highlight a number of the attributes they share
which justifies my position that both cases are examples of the OCI rather than the CO
phenomenon.

The first distinguishing attribute is the beneficiary of the corruption – in the case of an
OCI it is the individual perpetrator whereas, in the case of the CO phenomenon, it is the
organization. In both cases in this study, individual perpetrators of the primary acts of
corruption were the intended beneficiaries of those acts, not their organizations. The
moderating behaviour of organization leaders which enabled the corruption in both
cases was intended to benefit their organizations, but this response to corruption should
not be considered to be the same as situations where the managers are the prime
initiators of the corruption as in CO cases. Some regulators have decided that the
enabling of individual corruption by managers is corrupt, even when unintentional
(East, 2009; Independent Commission against Corruption, 2008). However, in these
cases where the enabling was found to be intentional, the regulators did not regard it so
(CBI, 2000; King, 2000a, 2000b; Reilly, 2003). As the deviance and processual
literature argues, labelling of behaviour as ‘corrupt’ is a context shaped choice which
regulators make in the same way managers or other organizational stakeholders or
members of the public do, but with greater authority. I say more on this issue of the
labelling of corruption facilitation as ‘corruption’ when addressing some ambiguous
attributes shortly.
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A second attribute is the nature of the phenomenon – continuous in cases of OCI but
discrete in cases of CO. I have shown that the two cases were examples of continuous
corruption by individuals rather than a discrete cluster of related incidents by a group. A
third and related attribute is the time to manifest – gradual and slow in the OCI, but
relatively fast in the CO. As indicated above, these two cases reflect the OCI
phenomenon on that score given the crescive nature of the corruption that occurred. A
fourth attribute is socialization effects - covert in OCI development but more overt in
CO development. In the cricket case, the evidence presented shows that collusion
among individuals was mostly covert, and this can be assumed to have been the case
among any pedophiles in the church case who were members of pedophile rings.

In this study, however, several attributes exhibited ambiguous characteristics. First is
the key metric which Pinto and colleagues argue is the ‘number of employees’ involved
in the OCI but ‘corporate illegality’ in the CO. In both cases, a large number of
employees were involved in individual corruption, the largest number by far in the
church case. This seems clear but it has been suggested that in the church case, since
dioceses were sued, there may have been corporate illegality. I address this issue below
under ‘organizational intentionality’ and the ‘organizations’ criminogenic role’. A
second ambiguous attribute is interaction or collusion among the perpetrators – deemed
as not necessary in an OCI but essential in a CO. Individuals did not require other
perpetrators to collude with them in the church case but, in the incidents examined,
collaborators were required in many incidents in the cricket case. A third attribute that
exhibits ambiguous features is the location in the organization where the phenomenon
is manifested – at the periphery in the OCI but at the core in the CO. In both cases
examined, I argue that the perpetrators were at the periphery of their organizations
whereas it was key enablers who were at the core. As indicated earlier, I differentiate
between the perpetration and the enabling of corruption even though some regulators
and members of the public do not. A fourth attribute is organizational intentionality.
OCI is usually organizational unintentional whereas the organization (through its
leaders) intends corruption in the case of the CO. In the two cases, the corruption was
not intended by the leaders of the organizations involved, although this view might be
disputed by some at stage 3 in each case. Again, I have differentiated between the
intentions of the perpetrators and the enablers in reaching my conclusion. A fifth
attribute, the organizations’ criminogenic role, shows that managers were corruption
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facilitative in the cover-up stage of its development, not for the purpose of ensuring the
corruption continued for the benefit of the organization as would be the case in a CO,
but for the purpose of keeping knowledge of the OCI development from the public so as
to avoid damage to the image and reputation of the organization. In summary, despite
the ambiguities mentioned, the cases examined represent the OCI phenomenon. My
attribute analysis refines and adds to the texture of theory on OCI development
suggesting that some attributes may be less rigid than previously thought. The
distinction between OCI and CO attributes is important because it refines our
understanding of how and why corruption in organizations develops, and argues that
causes of and measures to prevent OCI development differ from those affecting CO
development.

8.3

A Model for Understanding OCI Development (and Decline)

The theoretical model (Figure 8.1) on page 264 is a generic representation of the context
and process which creates, sustains and brings about the demise of the OCI
phenomenon in an organization or institution. The OCI phenomenon develops over time
in an organization when an increasing number of its members seize the opportunity to
benefit from behaviour that will be later judged as corrupt, having perceived that
favourable antecedent conditions exist in their organization’s inner and outer context. It
declines when these conditions change and become unfavourable. Based on the two
cases in this study, I argue that the process of OCI development and decline occurs
during up to five periods – development during three pre-scandal periods (P1-P3 which
I have termed emergence, uncertainty and cover-up), a plateauing in the period in which
a major intervention and scandal occurs (P4 which I have termed major interventionscandal), and decline during a post-scandal period (P5 which I have termed
restoration). It is possible for there to be fewer pre-scandal periods if a strong
intervention occurs during period 2 rather than period 3, but this may not save the
organization from a major scandal. The level of corruption in each period is dependent
on the balance between the moderation and intervention efforts of organizational
stakeholders. These moderations and interventions are shown by the vertical arrows in
the model, the thickness of the arrows indicating their relative power in each period.
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OCI development occurs in periods P1-P3 when the interventions are weak and the
moderations are strong. OCI development is halted (in period P4) when a powerful
outsider intervention sparks a major media scandal that creates the widespread public
perception that a social problem exists and brings about a successful demand for action
by an external regulator to address it. It ends or is substantially reduced in period P5 by
the domination of intervention efforts.

Figure 8.1
A theoretical model of OCI development and decline in organizations and institutions

Context - the
antecedent
conditions for
corruption

Historic and
continuing
environmental,
organizational,
individual and
situational
factors which
create corruption
opportunities
and influence
stakeholder
interventions and
moderations
which enable or
disable OCI
development in
organizations
and institutions

Outsider Interventions:
Behaviours of various stakeholders who endeavour to lower the trajectory of
corruption and reduce OCI development in organizations and institutions in
the pre-scandal periods (P1-3) and who succeed in the major interventionscandal and post-scandal periods (P4-5)

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

OCI Dev’t over time

Insider Moderations:
Behaviours of internal actors who, unintentionally or intentionally, raise the
trajectory of corruption and facilitate OCI development in organizations
and institutions in the pre-scandal periods (P1-3) but who may help stem its
growth in the major intervention- scandal and post-scandal period s(P4-5).

Legend:
P1 – The emergence stage
P2 – The uncertainty stage
P3 – The cover up stage
P4 – The major intervention- scandal stage
P5 – The restoration stage
The dotted line boundaries between stages P1-P3 and stages P4-P5 are porous with singular types of
moderations and interventions present across several stages. The solid boundary which separates P3 &
P4 indicates little leakage of moderations and interventions between those periods.
Arrow thickness indicates the relative strength of moderations and interventions at the different stages.
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The process of OCI development and decline flows from stage to stage rather than stops
and starts. The model depicts this flow with dotted boundaries between stages P1-P3
and between stages P4 and P5 reflecting their porosity. The solid boundary between
periods P3 and P4 indicates less porosity. The porosity relates to what I pointed out in
section 3.3, namely that the behaviours which enable or disable the growth of the
corruption, while dominant in one particular period, occur in other periods to some
extent. There are several reasons for this porosity. First, corruption is a ‘hidden practice’
involving legal or semi-legal exchanges or interactions which may breach laws, rules,
decrees, codes or norms (Anders & Nuijten, 2007). It is a complex phenomenon which
manifests itself in forms which elude the observation of people in whose midst it occurs,
so many organizational stakeholders may see but not notice acts of corruption at the
time they occur. They may only notice and try to make sense of what they have seen, or
heard about from others, in retrospect when the issue surfaces in some way at a later
time. That time may be in the same period in which they have seen it or during a later
period, since these periods are nominal and have fuzzy boundaries. Second, in different
organizations that form an institution, with different cultures in which there are different
perspectives on corruption, certain acts may be regarded as corrupt in one but not in
another at the same time. Hence, organizations within an institution may come to the
realization that corruption is occurring in their institution at different stages of its
development. Third, when a corrupt act occurs, signs of its presence may be noticed by
stakeholders of that organization but may be ambiguous – able to be interpreted in
different ways by, and have different meanings for, those who notice them. Fourth,
eluding observation, corrupt acts perpetrated by one or more individuals are unlikely to
be noticed by many people if they take place in different locations, at different times
and between different parties. Hence, interaction among those who encounter such
corruption is likely to be limited. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any non-participating
actor will encounter the corruption more than a few times, and those encounters may be
years apart and involve different perpetrators and situations. Consequently, making
sense of such signs and being able to convince others that corruption is occurring will
present difficulties for such actors, particularly in a context which expects silence of its
members about such matters, or there is widespread self-deception by members about
the presence of corruption or members rationalize their behaviour in failing to act
(Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 2009) at any stage of its development. What this porosity
means in practice is that, while I propose that noticing and sense-making is difficult for
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stakeholders who encounter corruption in period P1, it will continue to challenge
stakeholders who encounter it for the first time in periods P2 and P3, and possibly in
periods P4 and P5. Similarly, while I argue that collective uncertainty, ambiguity and
ambivalence presents barriers to those who encounter corruption in period P2 and
causes organizational leaders to unintentionally enable that corruption often by their use
of euphemistic language about what is alleged to be occurring, this same situation will
exist for stakeholders in period P3 even if leaders are intentionally covering up the
corruption at that stage. A cover-up may continue in periods P4 and P5 even though the
major scandal has occurred and efforts are underway to bring justice to perpetrators and
restore the organization’s reputation. As a further example of the flow between periods,
scandals may occur at an earlier stage than period P4. Minor scandals may occur in
period P3 as a result of allegations and rumours being made public, but these earlier
interventions involving media and judicial officials may only be sufficient to address
part of the corruption problem associated with one perpetrator or one organization, or
may result in a case against corruption failing for lack of evidence. As already indicated,
a powerful outsider intervention in period P2 or P3 backed by evidence of corrupt
behaviour is necessary to terminate or substantially reduce OCI development.

8.3.1

Contexts that facilitate OCI Development

This study suggests that a confluence of environmental, organizational, situational and
individual factors underpins OCI development rather than any single condition. As
Pettigrew (1997) reminds us, the behaviour of individuals is influenced by the outer and
inner context of their organization or institution which provides the terrain around
which multiple streams of activities and events take place. These multiple streams
converge and diverge to such an extent that actors rarely have the luxury of dealing with
a single issue at any one time; instead they have only limited time to focus on their
prioritised issue. Social processes they participate in are deeply embedded in their
organization’s outer and inner contexts, the former comprising economic, social,
political, legal forces affecting the organization and institution, the latter comprising the
structural, cultural and political features of the organization which members have helped
produce and sustain. This terrain influences their perspectives, perceptions, decisions
and actions as organization stakeholders.
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OCI development occurs when certain individuals who normally pursue the legitimate
aims of their organization decide to further their own ends by engaging in corrupt
activity at the expense of their organization. They do so successfully when they navigate
a context that is favourable for corruption. The context for OCI development comprises
the following elements:-

Environmental change may provide an opportunity for individual members to engage in
corrupt behaviour. The change impacting on the organization or institution may be
economic, as occurred in cricket where the commercialization of sport as a media
product for entertainment associated with the growth of the one-day international (ODI)
popularised the sport in eastern countries. This change led to the development of the
illegal betting industry in India and its nexus with cricket. Technological change may
enhance the opportunity for certain forms of corrupt behaviour as it did in cricket where
the availability of television and mobile phones combined to popularise the sport and
provided some players and cricket stakeholders with the means of colluding during a
game. As Anderson (2011) has observed, these changes have since become a feature of
many sports so that they too face a similar corruption risk. Alternatively, the
environmental change which provides a corruption opportunity may be social, as
occurred in the Catholic Church when, during the 20th century, secularism, modernism
and pluralism impacted negatively on the influence which Church leaders had in
guiding the sexual behaviour of their members, even the sexual proclivities of some
clergy. Both changes in these institutions, one positive the other negative, shared the
common feature of requiring managers to focus most of their attention and energy on
the core business of their organizations. In doing so, they failed to envisage the
corruption opportunities which the change provided. As these institutions were not
overseen by an external regulatory authority, they were not obliged to have appropriate
structural arrangements in place to combat such corruption.

An organization’s internal structure and culture seems to play a more significant role in
influencing the decisions of perpetrators to engage in corruption, and those of managers
and stakeholders who encounter it. Hierarchical organizations which are governed by a
unitary authority will tend to rely on that individual’s or group’s judgement on what is
acceptable member behaviour, often regardless of whether their organization’s internal
laws and rules label particular forms of behaviour as deviant. Where leaders enjoy
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considerable autonomy in dealing internal deviance and exercise their authority in a
benign and benevolent manner, they may treat many transgressors leniently. Where they
are neither transparent in doing so nor amenable to changing their approach if their
efforts prove ineffective, they will run the risk of enabling corruption. Where they do
not label a particular behaviour as deviant, they are unlikely to put education and
training measures in place to counter it. In a similar vein an organization’s culture,
shaped by the traditions and beliefs of past members about what is important, gives
meaning and order to actions of members and managers in the present. As Feldman
(1996) argues, an individual’s actions are influenced by their past experience. An
organizational culture, characterised by elitism, tolerance of deviance and secrecy and
silence aimed at avoiding reputational damage to the institution and its leaders, will
influence the behaviour of both perpetrators and organizational stakeholders. Potential
perpetrators who are such elites may assess such a culture as favourable to them if they
believe, and find in practice, that managers show a preference for addressing many
forms of deviance in a tolerant manner and behind closed doors. At an intraorganizational level, political infighting may result in a lack of cooperation among
leaders in dealing with such deviance in their respective organizations.

Situational factors which enable corrupt activity to take place include locations and
climates where perpetrators are able to conduct their deviant activities without being
noticed or prevented from doing so. The behaviour they propose to engage in may not
be regarded as deviant in some locations. In cricket, for example, favourable situations
for match-fixing were found at foreign venues where bookmakers had uncontrolled
access to players and a social climate of insignificant ‘masala’ matches provided
unregulated betting opportunities for the public and gifting opportunities to visiting
players, and where enabling technology was available to assist information exchange
and betting during matches. In the church case, on the other hand, situations which
enabled child sexual abuse to occur took place in church facilities, accessible to and
often controlled by the perpetrator where, in a climate of trust of and deference to the
perpetrator, he was to have unsupervised access to a young person (confirmed by the
recent research of John Jay College 2004, 2006; Wortley and Smallbone, 2006;
Smallbone et al, 2008).
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Finally, OCI development does not occur unless some individuals seize on these
conditions and decide to act corruptly. Who are these individuals and are they able to be
identified in advance of their corrupt behaviour? There is considerable controversy
about whether crime or corruption is perpetrated by individuals with character defects.
According to Stachowicz-Stanusch (2010a), research indicates that certain predispositions may influence individuals or small groups to act corruptly. Those predispositions to act immorally are a lack of integrity, moral identity, self-control and
empathy, a low level of moral development or a diagnosable psychopathology. Other
cognitive pre-dispositions, such as the limits of human cognitive capability and
information processing capability, not only influence those who perpetrate corruption
but others who enable it because they are unable to fathom the linkages between
individuals and the networks, systems and environments that bring about widespread
corruption. But others disagree. Andreoli & Lefkowicz (2009) argue that personal
characteristics have not been shown to be significant antecedents of organizational
misconduct but, instead, organizational compliance practices and ethical climate are the
independent predictors of misconduct, while Heath (2008) suggests that character
defects, intense passion (for money) and rejection of community values are largely folk
stories in explaining why individuals engage in crime, arguing instead that
psychologically normal individuals may engage in such activities taking advantage of
opportunities to do so.

8.3.2

The Process of OCI Development (and Decline)

There are many ways in which an individual who acts corruptly notices and begins to
assess an opportunity to do so; some make that assessment and decision alone while
others are introduced to the idea by other actors and interact with them in making that
decision. The decision may be swift or the end result of a gradual process.

There are up to five stages of OCI development. At each stage, organizational
stakeholders who encounter the corruption fall into two categories – moderators and
interventionists. Moderators are organizational stakeholders who notice the corrupt
behaviour but, for reasons I will explain, act in ways that enable it. Interventionists are
organizational stakeholders who act in ways that question its appropriateness or
legitimacy. The related concepts discussed in earlier chapters – noticing and sense269

making, ambivalence, and secrecy and silence - combine in different ways at each stage
of the corruption process to enable or disable OCI development. Noticing and sensemaking are actions that stakeholders engage in when trying to understand and decide
what to do about the corruption being perpetrated in their organization; ambivalence and
secrecy and silence are perceptual barriers which stakeholders experience when noticing
and sense-making. These actions and barriers, which both Pettigrew (1997) and Weick
(1995a) argue are influenced by context, affect the response and behaviour of
organizational stakeholders who encounter corrupt behaviour. These related concepts
combine in ways that either enable OCI development (during periods P1-P3), or halt it
(during period P4), or disable it (during period P5).

In the emergence period P1, in an organization where there is a high level of secrecy
and silence and a high degree of ambivalence about deviant behaviour in general, there
are low levels of noticing and sense-making occur because there are few corruption
incidents to notice and those that are noticed are either ignored or dealt with quietly.
Moderators deal with complaints / allegations in an ad-hoc fashion in line with an
established routine for addressing the perceived problem in line with their ambivalent
view of it. In the absence of an external regulator, the only intervention that occurs
during this stage is from people who make an allegation or complaint. Inadvertently,
both moderators and interventionists enable the corruption to develop as what Beamish
(2000, 2004) terms a crescive problem.

In the uncertainty period P2, in the same organizational context, more incidents of
corruption take place through the actions of a larger number of individuals. While the
levels of noticing and sensemaking increase, with individuals engaged in a process of
enlarging small cues and searching for contexts within which the small details fit
together and make sense, the influence of management’s ambivalence to the deviance
and a shared understanding of the need for secrecy and silence about deviance to avoid
bringing the organization into disrepute limits discussion among members about what
those signs, cues and suspect behaviour represent. Managers’ initial perceptions of the
problem often shape the actions they take which both change the nature of the problem
and possibly shape the actions which they and others subsequently take (Weick, 1988).
Some of Turner’s reasons for perception failure in the case of disasters (Turner, 1978;
Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) may be the cause of the perception failure about individual
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corruption; for example, the possibility that corrupt behaviour could take place may be
underestimated, the risk that such corrupt behaviour poses to the organization may be
minimized, differing views about the deviance of perceived behaviour may not be
explored, and organization leaders may fail to seek, or to take notice of, outsider views
about the perceived behaviour. Interventionists in the person of some complainants,
whistleblowers and journalists are more prominent at this stage. If there is a powerful
external regulator who receives and acts on these allegations or complaints at this stage,
it is likely that the third stage of OCI development may not occur, as in the Wollongong
City Council corruption case (ICAC, 2008, East 2010). However, in the absence of such
a vigilant and active regulator or other powerful interventionist like a media
organization who obtains evidence of corruption, moderators are likely to deal with the
allegations and complaints more formally at this stage using legalistic routines to stamp
their authority on the way in which the issue is to be regarded – labelling the alleged
behaviour as ‘unproven’ or as ‘other than corrupt’. Unable to clarify their uncertainty
(lack of information) or ambiguity (conflicting information or perspectives) about
alleged corruption, concerned stakeholders are likely to see their concerns ‘swept under
the carpet’ by ambivalent moderators, as a result of which the corruption will be able to
continue.

In the cover-up period P3, in a context that is largely unchanged but with growing
corruption becoming more evident, organizational leaders who become more aware of
its presence from continuing reports or allegations may ‘escalate their commitment’
(Staw, 1981, 2005) to their routines for addressing such concerns and to maintaining
secrecy and silence in their organizations in order to protect their own and their
organization’s reputation. They will likely enact a range of ‘organizational defensive
routines’ (Argyris, 1990, 1994, 2005) which will have the effect of criticizing or
punishing vulnerable interventionists while continuing with their internal inquiries into
public allegations but maintaining secrecy about any evidence they have of wrongdoing.
In doing so, these moderators will cover-up the growing corruption and thereby
continue to enable the OCI development to continue despite the increased activity of
interventionists highlighting the corruption. In this period, the media may learn of the
corruption allegations and report on them or evidence against one or more corrupt
individuals may cause regulators to institute legal proceedings. In both these situations,
without evidence of the full extent of the corruption or with evidence of only a
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component of the corruption, a scandal may result but it will be insufficient to cause the
public to judge that there is a ‘social problem’ (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) requiring an
intervention and remedial action by their government showing that not all interventions
and scandals by media and the government bring an end to OCI development.

A cessation of the corruption development is only likely when a major interventionscandal occurs in period P4. Such an intervention and scandal will be distinguishable
from those that may have occurred in periods 2 or 3 as indicated by a solid vertical line
in the model between P3 and P4. This scandal will begin with the disclosure of a
powerful external intervention by the media or a government regulator which has
obtained evidence of the widespread corruption in the organization or institution should
cause a major scandal. Extensive media coverage which follows the initial disclosure of
the alleged corruption will substantially increase noticing and sensemaking by
stakeholders and an interested public. This media coverage will, as a consequence,
temporarily halt the OCI development, but whether or not this is permanent depends on
the outcome of the process that follows. A continuation of front page news of the
corruption coupled with details of the evidence and the ongoing intervention by the
media or government may create a moral panic where the public regard the corruption
as a social problem (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988) needing remedial action. The continuing
media and regulator interest is likely to reduce both the ambivalence and the secrecy
and silence of stakeholders about the corruption. Moderators will be pressured by these
interventions to adjust their attitude to and position on how they should deal with the
corrupt behaviour. In doing so, they may have to accept change in the inner context of
their organization - initially the culture of tolerance of deviance perpetrated by
organizational elites and the culture of secrecy and silence stakeholders have shared - as
government interventionists subpoena documents and witnesses from the organization.
If, however, the news ceases and the government fails to intervene or to limit its
intervention, it is probable that the context will remain unchanged and that OCI
development will continue either in the organization or elsewhere in the institution.

In the restoration period P5, change in the organizational context continues if the
powerful intervention persists. With the interventionists on centre stage, noticing and
sensemaking increases among stakeholders and the public as people discuss the problem
more openly. As a consequence, past ambivalence and secrecy and silence about the
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corruption largely cease. The OCI development declines provided that organizational
leaders terminate their moderating behaviour and, in doing so, change the context which
has influenced it. In some organizations, the structure of the organization may change
with leaders replaced. Making changes in a way that convinces the public that the
corruption will be controlled in the future is necessary to restore the reputation and
image of the organization or institution provided future incidents are managed
appropriately.

8.4

Theoretical Contributions of the Thesis

This thesis makes four theoretical contributions to knowledge in the field of
organizational corruption.

First, it demonstrates the value of an interpretive processual approach in exploring and
analysing the dynamics of corruption development in obtaining a deep view of
corruption (Ashforth et al, 2008). Research on corruption within the various disciplines
has been fragmented since many contributions have tended to focus on one or more
factors that have been hypothesized to cause it. Consequently, as Ashforth et al (2003)
observed, progress on understanding the dynamics of organizational corruption has been
slow. Largely as a result of the methodology pursued, this study has made a significant
further contribution to the recent efforts of Ashforth et al, (2008), Pinto et al, (2008),
Lange (2008), den Nieuwenbour and Kaptein (2008), Martin et al (2009) and De Maria
(2010) in improving an understanding of the dynamics of corruption development.

A second contribution, related to the first, is that this study integrates some important
extant theories in the diverse fields of organizational corruption, man-made disasters,
and organizational secrecy and silence, and more broadly in organizational behaviour,
in explaining the dynamics of OCI development. By establishing new connections
among concepts in these different fields, this study demonstrates their practical value in
helping managers and researchers understand the complex and dynamic situations in
which OCI development occurs and in delineating it from CO development.

273

The third contribution of the study is its demonstration of the important role that
organizational stakeholders play in enabling or disabling individual corruption in
organizations. It explains the difficulties they encounter in noticing certain acts of
individual corruption and in making sense of such acts as they face uncertainty,
ambiguity and/or ambivalence about their meaning. Furthermore, it explains the
challenges they face in preventing such corruption when managers of organizations
affected become aware of the corruption but fortify communication barriers within their
organization in order to limit knowledge of the behaviour that is occurring.

Finally, the study highlights the shortcomings of ethical management as the primary
response of organizations to managing the spread of individual corruption during its
early stages. Much of the extant and predominant literature in the field of corruption,
including literature on ethical management and governance, has taken corruption as
‘given’ possibly because financial corruption perpetrated by the leaders of organizations
has been the subject of such studies. As a result, many researchers who have focused on
CO development have failed to appreciate that certain forms of corrupt behaviour
perpetrated by individuals other than managers are not easily detected or understood
during their early stages for reasons I have outlined. This study shows that reliance on
ethical awareness and decision making in the early stages of OCI development is
unlikely to prevent it from occurring. Consequently, the ethical approach to prevention
of individual corruption is more likely to be of value in the late pre-scandal stage of
OCI development – what I have referred to as the ‘cover up’ period P3 – when
managers who are aware of the corruption have the opportunity to intervene in a timely
manner to prevent or ameliorate a major scandal. The ethical approach will also be
valuable in the post-scandal stage as managers set about ‘cleaning the Augean stables’
of their affected organizations, aided by the fact that much of the uncertainty, ambiguity
or ambivalence about the presence of corruption will have been removed.

8.5

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

While these two significant cases provide considerable weight to the argument that
context plays an important role in influencing behaviour which contributes to OCI
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development, further empirical studies are desirable to confirm the findings presented
here. As Turner argued in relation to his initial examination of three man-made disasters
(Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997), it is possible that the pattern of events
associated with a small number of cases may be so unusual or idiosyncratic that they are
of little use when applied to other situations. Therefore other researchers might examine
different cases of OCI development using both the methodology employed here and
other methodologies which take account of context and behaviour as contributors to this
organizational problem.

Given this limitation, there are many research questions which are still to be pursued
regarding OCI development of which the following are a selection. For example, are the
findings of this study on context factors which enable OCI development universal and
what is the relative importance of each of these factors in enabling different forms of
individual corruption? How important is the existence of a vigilant external regulator in
disabling corruption? In that regard, I have made reference to another OCI case in this
thesis – the corruption at Wollongong City Council from 2002-2008 – in which a
preliminary analysis indicates that an external regulator who acts on early signs of
corruption may disrupt OCI development at an earlier stage than at cover up period 3,
though not necessarily early enough to prevent a major scandal (see East, 2010; ICAC,
2008c).

This study also raises the question – ‘are some institutions more prone to OCI
development than others?’ Sport is likely to be a fruitful field for further empirical
research on OCI development given the new scandals in cricket and in football codes
where betting or drug use is taking place to manipulate or enhance performance
(Masters, 2010). So too are organizations and institutions in which child sexual abuse
by organization members has occurred, as the continuing crisis in the Catholic Church
(Robertson, 2010; O’Gorman, 2009; Foster, 2010) and past scandals in the Anglican
Church (O’Callaghan and Briggs, 2003; Olsson and Chung, 2004) indicate. Are public
and community sector not-for-profit institutions more prone to OCI development than
for-profit institutions as the cases presented here indicate? Are the latter more prone to
CO development as many studies indicate?
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A further area to be explored is the implications which the findings of this study have
for managers. A pivotal question is that which Turner and Pidgeon (1997) asked of
Turner’s theory of man-made disasters caused by crescive problems – ‘can this theory
be translated into one of prevention or disablement?’ There are challenges in doing so.
Risk management has been recommended as a means of tackling potential corruption
(Standards Australia, 2009) on the basis that it is a key element of good governance in
organizations. But other literature has shown that the risk management approach may
not be effective in the long run if management of affected organizations engage in
‘organizational hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 2002) by ignoring discrepancies between their
talk, decisions and actions, or if they fail to avoid ‘practical drift’ (Snook, 2000) where
discrepancies arise over time between rules, practical situations and actions in the
organization or institution. As this study shows, neither institution entirely succeeded in
‘cleaning their Augean stables’. In 2010, match-fixing in cricket occurred again in the
Pakistan team (Wilkinson, 2010) with indications that the prevention measures put in
place by the PCB and ICC following the scandal in 2000 were not sustained thereby
allowing the return to systemic corruption to cricket in Pakistan. In a similar manner,
the Catholic Church has had to continually defend itself against allegations that sexual
abuse perpetrated by clergy in Ireland, Germany, Belgium and other countries, and in
some dioceses in the U.S. such as Philadelphia, has been covered up by church leaders
since the 1980s, indicating ‘organizational hypocrisy’ continues among many Church
leaders (O’Gorman, 2009; The New York Times, 2010; Robertson, 2010; Yallop,
2010).

While this study provides a deep view of organizational corruption (Ashforth et al,
2008) that is integrative (draws on and synthesizes research from a number of academic
fields), interactionist (focuses on the effect of interactions both in perpetrating and
understanding individual corruption) and processual (focuses on the emergence of
corruption and how perceptions of it, and actions towards it, evolve over time), it is only
a forerunner to future research which may provide deeper insights into the OCI
phenomenon.
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